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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mediation in armed conflicts have become a popular way of conflict resolution and a valuable tool for states to promote their interests.The paper argues that mediation has been instrumentalised by Russia and has been used as atool in expanding Russian foreign policy in the Russian Near and Far Abroad. Coercion through military support is a cornerstone in Russian mediation strategy as it is used to maximise the leverage over the adversaries in the conflict and secure the best outcome for both Russia and the party that it supports. The paper will use the realism theory to examine four different cases where Russia was a third-party mediator, and it will try to shed light on the interests that Russia pursued through its participation in the mediation as well as the role of coercion in the Russian mediation strategy.

This document presents the design of two experiments embedded in an omnibus survey on a national sample of Estonian adults. The first experiment studies the effects of Russian- and Estonian-sponsored news articles on voters' preferences in Estonia. The design is based on our earlier pilot study that took place in August 2019. The second experiment studies how citizens' expectations shape their evaluations of reassurance signals sent by major security allies of Estonia. The rest of this pre-analysis plan is divided into three parts, each of the first two lays out the theory, hypotheses, experimental design, and data analysis plan for each of the two experiments. The final part of this document presents our sampling strategy and demographic questionnaire, which are shared by both experimental modules.

This article contributes to the study of Russian great powerness, focusing on the potential of the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations to influence the construction of Russias great power status in a multipolar world. Based upon Russian and English literature dedicated to the study of great power concept and Russian great powerness, authors adopt analytic eclecticism for the theoretical framework of the study. In this regard, for a comprehensive understanding of Russian great powerness, both constructivism with its focus on identity, and neorealism stressing national interests, security, and power, are applied. The authors actively employ the official documents, international agreements, statements of government officials, and official declarations. As a result, the study examines to what extent bilateral relations with Turkey and Israel, the Wests traditional non-Western allies, can contribute to the construction of Russian great power identity. For this purpose, first of all, the factors of Russian great power construction and its role in Russian foreign policy are examined. After addressing the efficiency of great power status as a foreign policy tool, the development of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations are discussed. It is concluded that Russia has developed strategically significant relations with Turkey and Israel despite the deteriorated relations with the West, and the development of these relations has supported the consolidation of Russias great power status at the international and regional levels. Furthermore, the study suggests that Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli bilateral relations can enable Russia to strengthen its great power status vis--vis the West via cooperation and competition and contribute to the construction of a multipolar world.

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a significant actor in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. This text is dedicated to its role in Russiaʼs foreign policy, specifically to the topic of the Russian interest in problems and protection of Christians, which is one of the most essential parts of the cooperation between the state and the Church. Analyzing primary sources (state and Church documents), the author shows when and under what circumstances this topic became relevant to both actors, what role the Russian Orthodox Church played in this regard and how the topic of protecting Christians is used by the Russian regime today. The study shows that the interest in protection of Christians did not arise simultaneously on both sides and that it is connected mainly with situations where a threat for Christians is posed by unfriendly actors.

Russia, a Eurasian power with an anti-Western foreign policy agenda and a counter-hegemonic discourse, made an important attempt to develop a reliable vaccine, a key to fixing the deadly effects of the pandemic, and a matter of honor and prestige for a great power. While fighting the pandemic could not turn into a global effort because of its nationally organized and politically motivated character, the Kremlin challenged the West, not only in the scientific but also in the ideational arena by promoting a success story that ultimately aimed to undermine the rhetoric of Western normative superiority. Contemporary Russian foreign policy is based on a strategic narrative that questions the strength and permanence of the Western-dominated international system and envisions a greater role for Russia and China.The article falls into four sections. The first part focuses on “the rise of Russia” narrative that questions the superiority of the democratic liberal model. By so doing, the Kremlin not only provides a counter-argument against the oft-raised criticisms of its illiberal authoritarian regime but also takes an offensive stance against the Western democracies arguing that they are outmoded to fight against global problems. The second part discusses the employment of the Kremlin’s strategic narrative during the time of the pandemic. The third part scrutinizes Moscow’s bid to develop the first working vaccine. It is argued that the race for the discovery of a vaccine became a part of the discursive rivalry among great powers for prestige and honor in global politics rather than just a scientific and public health issue. The article concludes with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kremlin’s storyline, which aims to convince domestic and foreign audiences at the time of the pandemic., Batı karşıtı bir dış politika gündemine ve hegemonya karşıtı söyleme sahip bir Avrasya gücü olarak Rusya, COVID-19 pandemisinin ölümcül etkilerini yok etmek için bir aşı geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Bu girişim, büyük bir güç olduğu iddiasındaki Rusya için aynı zamanda onur ve prestij meselesi olarak görülmüştür. Salgınla mücadele, ulusal düzeyde örgütlendiği ve siyasi bir karaktere sahip olduğu için küresel bir çabaya dönüşemezken Kremlin, Batı’nın normatif üstünlük retoriğini zayıflatmayı amaçlayan bir başarı anlatısı ile sadece bilimsel değil, düşünsel anlamda da Batı’ya meydan okumuştur. Günümüz Rus dış politikası, Batı hakimiyetindeki uluslararası sistemin gücünü ve kalıcılığını sorgulayan ve Rusya ile Çin için daha büyük bir rol öngören bir anlatıya dayanmaktadır.Makale dört bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, demokratik liberal modelin üstünlüğünü sorgulayan “yükselen Rusya” anlatısını ele almaktadır. Bu anlatı ile Kremlin, otoriter rejimine yöneltilen eleştirilere bir karşı argüman geliştirmekle kalmıyor, aynı zamanda küresel sorunlara karşı savaşmak için modası geçmiş olduğunu iddia ettiği Batılı demokrasilere karşı agresif bir duruş da sergilemektedir. İkinci bölüm, pandemi döneminde Rusya’nın stratejik anlatısını nasıl kullandığını tartışmaktadır. Üçüncü bölüm Moskova’nın dünyada işe yarayan ilk aşıyı geliştirme gayretini incelemektedir. Aşı yarışı sadece bilimsel veya halk sağlığı ile ilgili bir mesele olmaktan çok, küresel siyasette prestij kazanmak için girişilen söylemsel rekabetin bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Makalenin son bölümü, Kremlin’in pandemi döneminde yerli ve yabancı izleyicileri ikna etmeyi amaçlayan anlatısının güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini değerlendirmektedir.

Nowadays science diplomacy tends to be one of most relevant and important fields of applied research in International Relations. In general, it can be regarded as a functional expression of both foreign and science policy conducted by states and non-state actors on the world arena. The emergence of the modern concept of science diplomacy has been taking place since the second half of the 2000s and is basically linked to a close intertwining of research and diplomatic practices. Still, most of the existing research works in the above area both in Russia and abroad can be described as somewhat fragmentary and focusing on specific case studies without providing a holistic picture of national science diplomacy models, including the Russian one. Considering this, the author of the article casts light upon the key features of the Russian science diplomacy complex based on a systematic approach and looks into its three main elements, i.e. "science in diplomacy", "diplomacy for science" and "science for diplomacy". In this context, he analyses the activity of the Russian science diplomacy main stakeholders in positive (how it is) and normative (how it should or could be) terms. The synthesis of the respective results reveals structural drawbacks of the system in question, which in 2020 have become even more acute than they used to be before. However, the outlined trends and tendencies infer that the ongoing pandemic did hardly bring on new problems, but can rather be seen as a catalyst for processes, which have already been witnessed in this field. Working from these premises, the author formulates a number of concrete and applicable policy recommendations aimed at optimizing the current practices, which might potentially be of use for decision-makers in Russian science and foreign affairs.

The world faces a strategic challenge of reforming the governance basis of international politics, which is displaying the symptoms of significant destabilization, searching for new ways of crafting nuanced equilibria of interests and capacity at the global, regional, and domestic levels. Developing intricate and adaptable formulas to manage individual facets of international engagement is becoming increasingly complex and volatile. The effects of instability vary in different countries, but the global operational and political space is increasingly determined by problems within countries, where external stress becomes a result of domestic discrepancies, aggravating them and producing a set of contradictions. In the context of profound global transformations, what explains Russia’s status and positioning in the world? This article argues that as states are struggling to adapt to new realities and acquire capabilities in an effort to survive or gain more influence, Russia’s standing will depend on how adequately it can respond to the challenges and how effectively it will be able to use its advantages. Russia should not simply take in the results of global turbulence, but rather employ and actively develop areas of leadership and collaboration, by tying foreign policy firmly to the priorities of domestic development. While Russia conducts an active foreign policy consistently defending its interests and combining efforts to find optimal solutions to many contemporary problems, it has not yet arrived at a coherent security strategy or produced a vision of a future world order. The success may depend on understanding of the current trends, recognizing opportunities and demonstrating leadership, willingness to share in responsibility for results, as well as conducting essential domestic reforms.

This article touches upon the main dynamics in Russian foreign policy since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Following a Constructivist approach to the analysis of foreign policy, the article positions this study at the intersection of domestic processes and external relations, as well as understanding foreign policy as a combination of material and ideational aspects. The discursive practices that drive foreign policy shaping and making are the result of social interaction, and thus, of the combination of these elements, in different formats and weights. Three main dimensions in Russias foreign policy course are identified, namely a normative one, defining the guiding principles for foreign policy shaping, the status dimension as the power-alignment underlining foreign policy making, and an identity-driven dimension, ontologically characterizing foreign policy. These three dimensions of analysis are co-constitutive and reinforce each other at different moments and in distinct configurations. The article concludes that Russian foreign policy in the last twenty years has kept its main end-goal quite stable - great power status, - what has changed have been the means - and ways of doing - to achieve this, both regarding a more assertive foreign policy, and increased pressure for revising the international order, attributing Russia the label of a revisionist power in the international system.

The article gives an analysis of Russia’s foreign policy in relation to the Baltic States from 1990 to 2019. The author identifies four main stages of its evolution. It is concluded that the main problems of the Russian-Baltic dialogue are discrimination of the Russian-speaking minority, issues of historical memory, a decrease of the Russian transit and security. The relations between Russia and the Baltic states has become conflict almost after dissolution of the USSR. However, in 1990-2000-ies, Russia still tried to formulate a positive agenda for the relations with the Baltics. The main motive of its strategy was to build trust and political relations on the basis of economic cooperation and civil society. Since 1990-s Russia has been developing cross-border cooperation programs. Since late 2000-s Russia has been also developing cross-border programs with the EU. However, Russia’s hopes were not justified. Its relations with Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have worsened since 2014 after the Ukrainian conflict. Prospects for their improvement are still unclear. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia is “tired” from the Baltic States. Despite the fact that Russia has been systematically transforming its foreign policy after the dissolution of the USSR, it has not fully achieved its goals. There is still discrimination of the Russian minority. Russia and the Baltics have not come to a single interpretation of the Second World War history. Political contradictions prevail over economic ties. Despite the growing estrangement between Russia and the Baltic States, Russia keeps developing them concentrating on trans-border and civil society cooperation. Such relations are non-political and they are focused on solving specific problems.

The interaction between Russia and Gulf countries represents the story of ups and downs, severe conflicts and sharp warmings that can largely be explained by the permanently changing role and place of each of these players at the global and Middle Eastern political arenas. After Russia's “return” to the Middle East in 2012–2015, Moscow's foreign policy towards the Gulf can be explained in terms of a bargaining strategy. On the one hand, Russia is trying to underline its importance and relevance to the GCC by putting forward diplomatic and political initiatives. The Kremlin uses its direct or indirect presence in the key regional conflicts such as the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni civil wars as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear issue. On the other hand, Russia is interested in building up stronger economic cooperation with the GCC, drawing bigger volumes of investments from the Gulf to Russia’s broken economy, as well as coordinating efforts with Saudi Arabia in the global oil market. While, in the near future, the qualitative evolution of Russia’s relations with the GCC is hardly possible, there are still options for their deepening within the current level of interaction between Moscow and the Gulf.Other Information Published in: International Politics License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0See article on publisher's website: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00286-4

The article analyzes the research of modern Russian historians on the problems associated with the emergence, activity and significance of the Holy Union as an interstate Association of the first half of the XIX century. The study, analysis and evaluation of the Holy Union were engaged in scientists and pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. But their conclusions were largely determined by the political and ideological features of the two periods of the Russian state. The modern Russian historiography of the Holy Union is characterized by the rejection of both the assessments of historians of tsarist Russia praising Imperial decisions and those explaining the activities of the Holy Union from the reactionary positions of historians of the Soviet period. At the present stage of Russian historical science, due to the absence of ideological restrictions and the involvement of a wide range of archival sources, scientists continue to study the Holy Alliance as an integral part of the Vienna system of international relations of the first half of the XIX century, and as an independent Association of European States. At the same time, in the works of Russian scientists, the Holy Union is considered and evaluated the personal and religious factors of this organization.

The background of the second Russian-Iranian war of 1825-1826 is considered. It is shown that for almost three decades from the beginning of the 19th century, Kajar Iran stubbornly and persistently fought with Russia for supremacy in the South Caucasus, while the first Russan-Iranian war of 1804-1813 ended with the defeat of Iran and the conclusion of the Gulistan Treaty. It is noted that, despite the peace treaty, tensions between the two countries persisted, since both states were dissatisfied with its conditions. The purpose of this article is to consider the prerequisites and reasons for the start of the second Russan-Iranian war and to answer a number of questions, in particular, whether the unratified Tiflis Treaty (1825) on border delimitation can be considered final; whether Great Britain was the culprit or instigator of the second Russan-Iranian war, as claimed in almost all Soviet and Russian historiography; why Britain did not provide the promised assistance to Qacar Iran under the Tehran Treaty of 1814. The author comes to the conclusion that in the second Russian-Iranian war, the policy of Kajar Iran was defensive in relation to Russia and was due to the expansionist actions of Russia in the region.

In 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EAEC), one of the key supranational bodies of the Union, received the mandate to conduct all negotiations on trade liberalization, including negotiations on FTAs with other countries, became the main operator of the conjunction of EAEU and One belt One road Initiative (OBOR), – and, thus, an important agent of promoting the interests of member states in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in the future we can expect the expansion of the Commission’s mandate to other areas of international cooperation affecting the economic interests of Russia. In the context of the policy of the Turning to the East that Russia has pursued in recent years, such a redistribution of roles between the national and supranational levels requires further study. However, due to the young age of the association, both in the Russian and foreign literature, we can find relatively few studies on the international role of the EAEU and, in particular, of the EAEC. This article analyzes the Commission’s international tracks with Asian countries that are currently open and attempts to study other formats of international interaction that might involve the Commission in the future according to its current mandate. The results of the study indicate that bilateral tracks remain the dominant ones for the Commission, and the transition to multilateral negotiations within the EAEU-ASEAN or EAEU-RSEP formats can only occur in the medium term. This conclusion has been confirmed by the analysis of open information about the negotiations of the Commission, and a series of expert interviews conducted during the research.

In this article, we aim to analyse the research discourse in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as regards Russian soft power, which is considered as hard power, and to compare the theses that dominate this discourse with the actual interactions between Russia and the three states in media, education, and culture. Each Baltic country has built a system of political and legal restrictions to diminish the effect of Russian soft power, which is considered in terms of hard power, i.e. as a threat to national security. The current forms of Russian soft power are becoming less productive in the region and their use in the negative political context of bilateral relations has the opposite effect for Russia – the country loses in reputation and image. The main factor at play is the information content of the Russian-language media space. At odds with the historical and political views of a significant part of the Baltic States’ ruling class, it is becoming the target of counteraction. At the same time, Russian high and mass culture and, partly, educational services are in demand from both Baltic Russian speakers and ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Our analysis shows that the views of Baltic researchers that Russian soft power is politics-driven and foreign to the region are exaggerated and biased. In its turn, Russian soft power in the Baltics retains the potential to aid the country’s foreign policy, being a complement to the latter rather than its direct tool.

Status of Africa in Russian foreign policy is characterized by combination of high interests in multidirectional development of cooperation with some restrictions defined by geodistance, political instability, economic specifications of potential partners as well as unpreparedness of Russian business to manage projects within African realities. However development of cooperation between Russia and African states is in trend of Russian international strategy and shall be supported not only by practice of international relations but also by business and humanitarian cooperation and expansion of objective knowledge about African realities. After the period of reduction of Russian presence in Africa in the early 90-th, in recent 10-15 years we witness the inverse trend, that is controversially assessed by Russian and foreign experts. However the author of the article believes that the situation in 2018-2020 is positive, stable and predictable in general. That may be proved by system analysis of the system moments: role of Africa in current world order, cooperation of Russia with African states, promotion of Russian interests in the African region. That is worth mentioning that Russian policy at African direction increases its economic efficiency and material data of Russian-African economic cooperation is gradually growing.

Introduction. The complexity of foreign policy actions’ international legitimization is determined by the use of unilateral approach in the new environment of world political processes. Due to Russian foreign policy’s intensification, the issue of international legitimization of its foreign policy actions has expanded and deepened in the post-Soviet space and beyond: it is obvious in practice, but not conceptualized at the theoretical level. Methods. It seems to be of utmost importance to consider the problem in the context of the recent most pressing events – the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, using the case-study method as well as through the perceptualhermeneutic analysis of foreign policy actions. Analysis. The need to do research in legitimization as a process of justification and achievement of a foreign policy position’s recognition is obvious. It is necessary to highlight the reasons for the ineffectiveness of Russian foreign policy actions’ justification instruments and legitimization policy. Results. The assessment and conceptualization of existing legal and political concepts is particularly important to build an international legitimization foreign policy strategy. The implementation of foreign policy action should be accompanied by the transfer of basic foreign policy values and interests, combining legal, political, and moral grounds. The improvement of the international legitimization mechanism, its tools’ rapid revitalization and operating flexibility can give Russia an indisputable advantage over other actors and allow it to ensure the necessary result for the foreign policy strategy and strengthen its positioning in the international environment.

Despite the panic in the American media surrounding Russian interference in American affairs, today Russia does not have its own full-fledged lobby in the United States. Russian experts are excluded from the American foreign policy debate, even in those matters that affect Moscow directly. Speakers invited to the Congress spoke, as a rule, with criticism of the Russian government. Meanwhile, in the United States exists a request for an alternative opinion of experts from Russia. Americans ignore weak arguments and propaganda, but are ready to accept useful criticism and discussion. The key to the success of Russia’s lobbying aspirations may be the creation in Washington of a respectable analytical center expressing the interests of Moscow and actively participating in American foreign policy discussion.

Introduction. In this paper the public diplomacy of the Russian Federation is considered as one of the important tools of implementing modern Russian ideas and principles of soft power. We observe increased importance of implementing different activity directions within the public diplomacy in the conditions of the difficult international situation. Many of them are at the stage of formation. At the same time, a complex work in this direction can allow to strengthen public diplomacy positions as the effective tool implementation of Russian soft power. Methods. Comparative method allows matching the main specifics of public diplomacy activity and soft power implementation that let us concluding that public diplomacy is the soft power tool. Using this method was possible to establish that realization resources of public diplomacy and soft power are substantially identical. Analysis. The analysis of Russian public diplomacy activity and its clear relation with the main principles of the soft power which are implemented by the modern Russian government is based on search principle of such phenomena extinguishing features as the public diplomacy and soft power. It should be mentioned that many public diplomacy functions are coinciding with main tasks of soft power. The possibility for further public diplomacy institutionalization has been emphasized, and the specifics of unified direction of soft power and Russian diplomacy actions have been characterized. Results. In the result of the research it was revealed that public diplomacy is a direct tool of the soft power implementation. An attempt has been made to delimit the definitions of ‘society diplomacy’, ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘soft power’. Russian researchers’ approaches to public diplomacy understanding and its activity directions have been determined, the most realized directions have also been revealed. E. F. Parubochaya has revealed key differences in the definitions of ‘society diplomacy’ and ‘public diplomacy’, and determined main interlinks of Russian public diplomacy and soft power. N. V. Piskunov has marked basic displays of the modern Russian soft power.

The article was submitted on 02.12.2019. Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course. Представлено эссе сэра Родрика Брейтвейта, выпускника Колледжа Христа Кембриджского университета. После завершения учебы он поступил на службу в Министерство иностранных дел Великобритании и занимал дипломатические посты в таких городах, как Джакарта, Москва, Вашингтон, Варшава, Рим и Брюссель; в последнем он работал в качестве члена британской делегации в Европейском сообществе. В 1988–1992 гг. сэр Родрик был послом Великобритании в СССР в ходе решающих лет перестройки и впоследствии стал первым британским послом в Российской Федерации, позднее был назначен советником премьер-министра по внешней политике во втором кабинете Джона Мейджора, в 1992–1993 гг. возглавлял Объединенный разведывательный комитет Великобритании. В 1994 г. был титулован рыцарем Большого Креста ордена Святых Михаила и Георгия. Будучи ветераном дипломатической службы, сэр Родрик в течение многих десятилетий был близко знаком с основными вопросами непростых отношений между Россией и Западом, в том числе принимал участие в многочисленных переговорах по контролю над вооружениями. Его контакты в политическом истеблишменте как России, так и Великобритании, а также владение русским языком позволяют ему точно анализировать причины взлетов и падений в отношениях Москвы с западными соседями, привлекая работы англо- и русскоязычных аналитиков. В числе его недавних работ – Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). В настоящем эссе сэр Родрик проводит обзор своей дипломатической практики и рассуждает о пользе и применимости исторических примеров во внешней политике.

This article offers a new approach to Russian foreign policy under Putin’s presidency as shifting from its ‘soft power’ model to what might be characterized through the prism of biopower. The author discusses the various meanings attached to the concept of attraction, and scrutinises the biopolitical turn in Russia as a domestic phenomenon and as a key element of Russia’s power projection abroad. It is argued that biopolitics as a power instrument can play different roles – it can be a tool to construct Russian national (and simultaneously imperial) identity and to distinguish Russia from the West, and channel for communication with conservative forces across the globe.

Despite the fact that Metropolitan Neilos of Pentapolis (1809–1887) was an important Church fi gure known as one of the most educated clergymen of his epoch, his life and work have not been studied yet. This paper reconstructs Neilos’ biography drawing on previously unknown sources from Russian archives as well as on fragments of information from printed letters and other documents. It analyses main periods of Neilos’ biography as a church and public fi gure and evaluates them in the context of Greek-Russian relations. In the 1840–1860s, Neilos was in charge of Athos property in Moldavia. In his resistance to multiple attempts of local authorities to expropriate church properties in Moldavia and Walachia, Neilos collaborated closely with Russian diplomats and public fi gures. In the late 1860s, he took part in the struggle for the Patriarchal Throne in Alexandria. He was elected Locum Tenens of Alexandrian Throne, became Metropolitan of Pentapolis and then Patriarch of Alexandria. However, despite Russian diplomatic support, he failed to stop political struggle in Alexandrian Church and had to leave the Throne. Afterwards, he resided on Mount Athos being an active participant in church life and a proponent of Russian monastic community. Neilos’ longstanding collaboration with Russians was motivated by his conviction that Russia was the only genuine and effi cient defender of the Oecumenic Orthodoxy.

While the scope of the paper is to assess the actions undertaken by the European Union towards the FSU-CIS (the former Soviet Union, Commonwealth of Independent States) which was manifested through the Eastern Partnership Initiative in the years 2008–2014, the focus will be centred on theoretical concepts and their ‘explanatory power’ rather than actions undertaken by European or Russian decision makers. Taking that into the account, this essay will critically assess the explanatory power of the neorealist school of thought which although overtly criticized, still remains a viable tool in explaining the processes occurring in international relations.

Kontraspionage, kultur og kontinuitet i Kreml: Et efterretningsteoretisk perspektiv på Ruslands interventioner i Ukraine By applying the specialized terminology and theoretical approaches of the field of intelligence analysis, this article investigates Russian hybrid warfare in the case of Ukraine in order to offer a fuller understanding of this disputed phenomenon. Most scholars have addressed the concept of Russian hybrid warfare through a rather classical war-theoretical approach. This article, however, argues that any analysis of Russian warfare should take as its point of departure the extensive and historically consistent influence of the country’s security services. The liberal analysis presented here reveals the prevailing continuity that characterizes Russian foreign policy, including the country’s current actions in Ukraine. Most importantly, the liberal approach sheds light on the sources of this continuity, finding them embedded primarily within the security apparatus and its peculiar, strategic culture and mindset. This means that Russia’s military actions are based on the assumption that the threat from the West is imminent, and on a fundamental focus on regime security. Russian warfare today is not the result of a new, coherent military doctrine or a belief in newfound superiority as proponents of the non-liberal approach often argue – instead, it is rather born out of fear.

The article is focused on the real meaning of the Eurasian Integration Project for East–West relations. The author departs from Sakwa’s treatment of Russian strategy as neo-revisionist. It does not aspire to change the current world order while trying to make the West observe its national interests within the existing framework. This perspective is treated in the article from the standpoint of world-systems analysis. The Eurasian Project is understood as a reaction of the Russian state to the failure of the neoliberal attempt to integrate into the world economy and the international security system. The two great trade mega-unions—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Partnership—are seen as geoeconomic bolt clamps, which put Russia under enormous pressure. The Russian strategy in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises is designed to find the way out of strategic isolation. The Eurasian Union is expected by the Russian ruling elite to be an important tool to forestall the isolation of the country and secure her economic, military and international security.

The relationship between Russia and Hungary in the first years of the Great Northern war and the War of the Spanish Succession are analysed. The background of events of 1707-1708 is described. A brief overview of the contacts between the two states since the 15 th century is given. The development of the history of Hungarian lands in 16 th -17 th centuries is traced in general. The situation in Hungary and the Russian state on the eve of the recovery of the active relations of the two states is analysed. Special attention is paid to the negotiations, which were held in 1707 and led to the conclusion of the Union between Peter and II. Rakoczi Ferenc. For a better understanding of the causes of events of 1703-1711, special attention is paid to the biography of F. Rakoczi, changing in his worldview under the influence of external factors. There has been some transformation of the foreign policy of the Russian state, which was caused by the signing of the agreement between the tsar and Hungarian Prince. According to the author, negotiations between the Russian monarch and leader of the Hungarian rebels as well as an alliance between them could lead to significant changes in the development of Russian-Swedish and Austro-Hungarian conflict. The opposition of different forces has led to the fact that a promising union did not take place.

In this paper, we borrow the dramaturgical analysis from sociologists and use it to analyze how contemporary Russian elites communicate with the public. It is my goal to analyze the performance of the Russian political elite when presenting the changes caused by the worsening Russo-Western relations over the Ukrainian crisis to the domestic audiences, with focus on the impact of sanctions introduced by the Western countries last year. Which strategies, narratives and symbols remain the same and which are adjusted, erased or newly introduced by the political elite when communicating with the public in order to justify the contemporary situation? We will focus especially on two basic components of the narrative: the symbolic level, particularly the use of history, geopolitics and other symbolic topics to frame the current situation; the pragmatic level, especially adjustment of current strategies and introduction of new plans and partners who will help to manage the new situation. As we will clarify later, our analysis will focus on symbolic arguments used by Vladimir Putin as “the national leader” and pragmatic politics introduced by him as “the president”.

This article assesses the normative resistance to Responsibility to Protect adopted by Brazil and Russia against the backdrop of their international identities and self-assigned roles in a changing global order. Drawing upon the framework of Bloomsfield's norm dynamics role spectrum, it argues that while the ambiguous Russian role regarding this principle represents an example of 'norm antipreneurship', particularities of Brazil's resistance are better grasped by a new category left unaccounted for by this model, which this study portrays as 'contesting entrepreneur'., (undefined)

Leaders choose to mislead their domestic peers when the political risk and cost associated with a particular foreign policy decision is too great and when the structure of the political system in question is too leader-centric to afford these costs being incurred by the leader. This article argues that risk uncertainty and imperfect information are not necessarily external unwanted or unforeseen factors in foreign policy decisions. In certain cases they too are instrumentalized and adopted consciously into decision-making systems in order to diffuse the political costs of high-risk choices with expected low utility by insulating the leader from audience costs. This dynamic can be best observed in leader-centric and strong personality cult systems where the leader's consent or at least tacit approval is required for all policies to be realized. This article uses two important case studies that effectively illustrate the use of deliberate uncertainty in decision-making in leader-centric systems: post-2014 Russia (War in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea) and Turkey (ending of the Kurdish peace process and the change in policy towards Syria).

There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

Hoy en día la Educación no puede ser estudiada solamente en el marco de la política interior de un país, porque, cruzando las fronteras nacionales, la Educación, igual que todas las esferas de la actividad humana, tiende a ser global. Y así se va convirtiendo en uno de los recursos de la política exterior de los estados, recursos potentes y perspectivos a largo plazo. Últimamente, muchos estados apuestan por el desarrollo de la política del poder blando, y la Educación, desde luego, forma parte de esta estrategia como uno de los instrumentos principales de la creación de la imagen positiva del país en el extranjero. Debido a esto, la colaboración internacional en la esfera de la Educación forma parte de la esfera de los intereses geopolíticos del estado. Consideramos muy actual no solamente hacer el estudio de la importancia de la colaboración internacional educativa en el marco de la política social del país, sino analizarla desde el punto de vista de las perspectivas de relaciones internacionales. En el artículo se investiga y se hace el análisis comparativo de la política cultural exterior de Rusia y España; se estudia la experiencia de la creación de los primeros programas de Doble Titulación entre Rusia y España en el contexto de las estrategias del desarrollo de la Educación de los dos países. Se analizan los primeros resultados del funcionamiento de dichos programas, que supusieron un avance muy importante en la colaboración internacional de los dos países. Nowadays education can not only be studied within the framework of a country's internal politics, because, across national boundaries, education, like all spheres of human activity, tends to be global. And so it becomes one of the resources of the foreign policy of the states: a powerful and long-term perspective tool. Lately, many states support the development of soft power politics, and Education is a part of this strategy as one of the main instruments to create a positive image of the country abroad. Because of this, international collaboration in the field of Education is part of the geopolitical interests of the state. We consider that it is a current issue, not only to study the importance of international educational collaboration within the framework of the social policy of the country, as well as to analyze it from the point of view of international relations. In the article we research the comparative analysis of the foreign cultural policy of Russia and Spain. We describe the experience of the creation of the first Double Degree programs between Russia and Spain in the context of the educational development strategies of the two countries. We analyze the first results of the operation of these programs which represented a very important progress in the international collaboration of the two countries.

Information and communication technologies (ICT) play an essential role in the improvement of the quality of life, economic and socio-political of individual countries and humanity in general. However, ICT development is fraught with new challenges and threats to international and national security. Interstate rivalry in the information sphere generates conflicts, an extreme form of which is an information war. Since 1998, the Russian initiative supports the international cooperation on information security at the global and regional level as well as within the framework of the bilateral relations. The article analyzes the characteristics of the global information society, which has a decisive influence on the international security in the information age, as well as international cooperation in this field. The analysis of Russian foreign policy initiatives in the field of international information security is also presented. Today more than 130 countries develop cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive, that pose serious threats to the international stability. It's difficult to trace the source of information attacks and its consequences can be devastating and cause retaliation, including the use of conventional weapons. In this situation Russian approach, advocating for the development of the rules of conduct of States and demilitarization of information space in order to ensure its safety, seems urgent and relevant with the international situation.

Correction of the assessments of Russian national interests in international low intensity conflicts is particularly relevant with regard to Russian policy in the the South Caucasus. Replacement of the ruling elites in Georgia expands the space for dialogue with Tbilisi, but the main trend in the foreign policy orientation of Georgia's - Euro- Atlantic integration - seems to remain unchanged. Due to the fact that "political legacy" of Saakashvili's government continues to influence Georgia's policy it is reasonable to refer to the possible strategy of indirect actions of Russia to win sympathies of the Georgian society and inhibit the "Atlantic" tendency “from below”.

The article clarifies author’s typology of conflict behavior in contemporary international conflicts proposed in previous papers. Based on the methodology of analysis of the motives for conflict behavior the paper contains a classification of the most significant international conflicts 1990-2000's with the participation of Russia. In conclusion are given the results of an in-depth analysis of the Georgian- South Ossetian conflict in 2008, with an emphasis on analyzing the behavior of Georgia, Russia and the United States.

The article analyses the potential of Russian tertiary education as a tool of long term influence in world politics. It makes a coherent review of a changing nature of leadership in world politics, shows advantages and disadvantages of Russian education as a soft power tool, evaluates the current government initiatives to improve the quality and attractiveness of Russian universities and colleges.

With its growing geopolitical inclination, Russian foreign policy has beenconsidered as a resurgence of Eurasianism (Neo-Eurasianism).Notwithstanding its strong geopolitical sense, Eurasianism is multifacetedconcept. It is often associated with philosophical thinking, cultural andpolitical doctrines which changed over time and yet full of contradictions. Thisarticle seeks to find out the influence of Neo-Eurasianism in Russian foreignpolicy. Tracing back the idea of Eurasianism from historical perspective andemploying Graham Smith classification on school of Eurasianism, this articleargues that the rise of Neo-Eurasianism in Russia is driven by the needs todefine and strengthen the spheres of influences. It is mainly motivated byethnocentric sentiments to expand the sphere of influences across the border as a safeguard and protection. Neo-Eurasianism compromises building aforeign policy consensus based on political culture and national awareness.

Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin hâkim konumda bulunan pozitivist/rasyonalist çizgideki teorilerinin Rusya'nın Batı dünyası ile ilişkilerini analiz etme bakımından sınırlı bir açıklama kapasitesine sahip oldukları söylenebilir. Maddi unsurları bütünüyle dışlamayan; ancak kimlik, kültür, söylem gibi uluslararası ilişkilerin normatif yönlerini ön plana çıkaran bir yaklaşım olarak konstrüktivizm, uzun ve karmaşık bir geçmişi olan Rusya-Batı ilişkilerinin analizi bakımından uygun bir kuramsal çerçeve sunmaktadır. Rusya'nın modern dönemde Batı dünyası ile kurmuş olduğu ilişkilerin ele alındığı bu çalışmada görülmüştür ki, Rus dış politikasının en ayırt edici yanı sahip olduğu emperyal vizyon ve özel misyon duygusudur. Çarlık Rusya'nın Mesihçi ve pan-Slavist politikaları, Sovyet Rusya'nın enternasyonalist ve anti-kapitalist söylemi, Rusya Federasyonu'nun BDT ve `yakın çevre' politikaları özünde hep bu vizyon ve misyon duygusunun bir parçasıdır. Dolayısıyla bu dış politik anlayış, tarihsel süreç içerisinde Rusya'nın sürekli bir biçimde Batı ile karşı karşıya gelmesini yol açmıştır. Ancak kabul etmek gerekir ki, Rusya-Batı karşıtlığını salt bu gerekçeler ile açıklamak doğru değildir. Rusya'nın Batı dünyası ile olan ilişkilerinde, bu ülkenin kendi kimlik tanımlamasından kaynaklanan sorunlar daha belirleyici olmaktadır. Modernleşme süreci ve bu sürece verilen gelenekçi tepkiler ise Rus kimliğinin oluşum sürecinin en önemli yönünü oluşturmaktadır. Bu çekişmeden doğan ve özü itibarıyla ülkenin kimliği, kültürü ve Batı karşısındaki konumu gibi meselelere odaklanmış olan çeşitli politik söylemlerin tarihsel süreç içerisinde Rus dış politikasını da etkilediği bilinmektedir. Çağdaş Rus düşüncesinin gelişiminde de önemli bir yeri bulunan bu söylemlerin varlıklarını günümüze değin sürdürdükleri görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, günümüz Rusya'sının hem dış politikasını hem de Batı dünyası ile ilişkilerini anlama bakımından ilgili söylemlerin özellikle kimlik ve kültür meselesine nasıl yaklaştıklarının doğru anlaşılması gerekmektedir. It would be quite appropriate to contend that the mainstream positivist/rationalist based theories of International Relations discipline have a limited explaining power when it comes to analyze the Russia?s relationship with the Western world. On the other hand constructivism, emphasizing the normative facets of international relations such as identity, culture and discourse without ruling out the material aspects completely, has a unique ability to provide us with a particularly suitable theoretical framework for analyzing the long and complex Russian-Western relations. In this study which dwells on the relations between Russia and the Western world in modern times, it is argued that the distinguishing feature of the Russian foreign policy is the imperial vision and the special sense of mission it incorporated. The Messianic and Pan-Slavic policies of the Tsarist Russia, the internationalist and anti-capitalist discourse of Soviet Russia and finally the CIS and `near abroad? policies of Russian Federation are all reflections of those vision and mission sense in essence. Therefore, this political mentality paved the way for Russian-Western encounters. Nevertheless it should also be admitted that Russian-Western confrontation can not solely be understood on the basis of those justifications. It seems in Russia?s relation with the West problems originated from Russia?s own identity definition stands affront while modernization process and the reactions to it constitute the gist of this identity. It can also be observed that various political discourses spawned by this confrontation inherently focused on issues such as the identity, culture and country?s position against the West, effected the Russian foreign policy. This discourses which also left their imprint in contemporary Russian thought survived throughout ages. Hence, it is vital that, aforementioned discourses approaches to identity and culture matters is well understood for without a clear grasp of this, contemporary Russian-Western relations and Russian policy cannot be comprehended. 288