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The article discusses how political theorists who self-identify as realists seek to position themselves who either support moralism or international relations (IR) realism. Topics discussed include the blind spot for current varieties of realism; conceptions of power and legitimacy in early twenty-first century political theory (PT) realism; and power and legitimacy in the age of the Internet.

In the study of politics, Cambridge is sometimes associated with a school of political philosophical 'realism.' This article discusses what realism in political philosophy might mean, by examining first what might count as 'unrealistic' political philosophy (looking at Sidgwick and Rawls), and then some recent attempts to identify a more realistic philosophical approach to politics. It argues that realistic political philosophy tends to emerge as a thin account of politics that falls between the stools of either more philosophical (i.e., more idealistic) or less philosophical (i.e., more historical) accounts. It illustrates this in relation to Sidgwick and also Hobbes, who is often held up as the quintessential realist in the history of political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success story of democracy over the twentieth century has given way to doubts in the twenty-first, as democracies struggle to cope with difficult wars, mounting debts, climate change and the rise of China. This essay uses intellectual history to explain the link between long-term democratic success and short-term democratic failure. It distinguishes three distinct views of what can go wrong with democracy, and identifies the third (which I call 'the confidence trap', an idea that originates with Tocqueville) as the key to understanding our present predicament. Democratic success creates blind spots and a reluctance to tackle long-term problems. I use this idea to explain and put in context Fukuyama's claims about the end of history, and to examine the link between democratic failure and market failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accumulated evidence of the last 30 years about the historical circumstances surrounding the composition of the great texts and of many other texts besides, has made it practically impossible to argue that these texts can be understood simply by reading them, regardless of what their authors may have meant by writing them when and as they did. But it does not follow that the history of political thought has simply reconfigured itself as a discipline to accord with precepts of a triumphant methodology. The argument is now about what it would mean to accord with those precepts and what they mean for purposes of political philosophy more generally. On the basis of texts discussed in this article one may conclude that the history of political thought is not, therefore, a unified discipline, despite the apparent termination of the great methodological argument that has dominated so much of its recent history. No piece of historical writing can on its own give the full range of options, nor even a sense that there is a certain point where the range of options must end.

Shows the significance of the comparison of the welfare state to a corporation in contemporary political theory. Definition of a corporation; Meaning of the question of the nature of the welfare state; Conclusions given by philosopher F.W. Maitland to the question of the nature of the welfare state.