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Neoklasik realizm, ortaya ciktigi 1990'lardan gunumuze gerek realist uluslararasi iliskiler gelenegi icerisinde gerekse uluslararasi iliskiler disiplini capinda pek cok hararetli ve bereketli tartismaya kaynaklik etti. Baslarda, yalnizca yapisal realist (ya [...]

The literature on economic sanctions consists of a series of studies assessing whether sanctions 'worked' or not. Very little has been written on the factors that make economic sanctions more effective at achieving their intended purposes. This article examines the threatened 1979 Arab world boycott of Canada after Prime Minister Joe Clark announced the government's intention to relocate its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. After determining that sanctions played a contributing role in motivating a Canadian policy reversal, it generates hypotheses from this misunderstood case about the political and economic factors that can contribute to the success of economic sanctions.

How do war-prone regions stabilize? This article tests realist, liberal, and constructivist hypotheses against the paradigmatic case of regional peacemaking, Western Europe after World War II. It concludes that none of the three theories perfectly explains the process of Franco-German reconciliation after 75 years of bitter conflict. Instead, the transition to stability occurred in two stages. The first stage, the transition, was driven by realist factors, principally the existence of a common Soviet threat and active American hegemonic participation. In the second stage, however, stability and cooperation were entrenched by liberal mechanisms, notably the institution of democratic political regimes and cooperative international institutions. I thus inductively arrive at the novel theoretical position that realist mechanisms may initially be required to compel regional rivals to put aside their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate on the grounds of realpolitik, but liberal mechanisms are ultimately useful to sustain and deepen regional peace.

A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium by Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 297 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $22.95. What is the [...]

A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school's main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalizations school's claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the “symptoms” they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on foreign security policies in democratic countries and German rearmament after World War II. It discusses the studies on democratic countries which primarily examine their commonalities instead of differences, resulting in the notion that they cannot autonomously conduct foreign security policies. The article explores the determinants of structural autonomy in foreign security policies and provides a model which illustrates the effects of the determinants on policy independence of a country. The model is applied to U.S. policies towards German rearmament after World War II.