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This article seeks to understand multiparty cabinets in presidential systems. The article applies theories developed for parliamentary systems to the case of Brazil and uses ministerial endorsements of executive bills to test whether multiparty cabinets are anchored in an office or a policy-seeking compact. The analysis shows that participation in policy making within the cabinet is highly concentrated in technical ministries and ministries occupied by the president's party. The analysis also shows that ideological heterogeneity is a significant predictor of ministerial endorsement, indicating that under conditions of ideological proximity, presidential cabinets are able to share policy-making responsibilities., Coalitions govern a large portion of the countries in the world. Even the United Kingdom, the paramount case of a majoritarian electoral system and the Westminster style of government, is [...]

The executive branch has increasingly become the key player in democratic regimes, superseding the legislative branch in the leadership of formulating and proposing policies, while maintaining its role in conducting [...]

Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quantitative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, center-right, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explaining why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of policies and articulation. Keywords: partisan theories; political economy; political uncertainty; sovereign risk; Latin America

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00190.x Byline: Andy Baker (1), Barry Ames (2), Lucio R. Renno (3) Abstract: In new democracies party systems are often young, so partisan cues and roots in the electorate tend to be weak. The results, in many instances, include volatile campaigns with comparatively high degrees of short-term preference change among voters. We explore the mechanisms of voter volatility and, more broadly, the ways in which citizens learn about issues and candidates in weak-party systems. We claim that citizens in such settings rely heavily upon persuasive information gathered from their immediate social contexts. Utilizing a unique panel survey implemented during Brazil's historic 2002 presidential election, we demonstrate the importance of political discussion within social networks and neighborhood context for explaining preference change during election campaigns. We also demonstrate the concrete political consequences of social context by showing how candidate momentum runs can be driven by waves of discussion. Author Affiliation: (1)Northeastern University (2)University of Pittsburgh (3)University of Arizona Article note: Andy Baker is assistant professor of political science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115-5000 (a.baker@neu.edu). Barry Ames is Mellon Professor of Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 (barryames@yahoo.com). Lucio R. Renno is assistant professor, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 (lucio_renno@yahoo.com).

The emerging literature on executive decree authority has generated important insights, but it has tended to select oil the dependent variable (decrees), rather than view decrees as one of several possible ways that presidents can initiate policies. This article examines the conditions under which presidents resort to extraordinary rather than ordinary means of legislative initiative. Unilateral action theory claims that presidents will resort to decrees in unfavorable political environments, while delegation theory claims that decrees will flourish when the president is more politically secure. A study of four Brazilian presidents between 1988 and 1998 yields inconsistent support for both theories. Presidential popularity is only weakly related to the use of decree authority, but executive-legislative relations especially coalition management via multiparty cabinets is a more reliable predictor. Neither unilateral action theory nor delegation theory can fully account for the wide variation in the legislative strategies of presidents.