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A central argument for public funding of elite sport is the claim that success at the Olympic Games or world championships leads to increasing international prestige for cities and states. While this assumption seems plausible in general, it clearly lacks specification. Given this, we first discuss here several theoretical approaches in order to unpack which forms of prestige can be sought by states in which kind of sports and events. Second, we summarize the (rather limited) state of empirical research on the topic. Third, secondary data, offering possible indicators for sport-induced changes in international prestige, are presented and discussed. The resulting picture reveals that the formula ‘the more success, the more prestige’ is too simple. The paper concludes by suggesting methodological approaches towards a more systematic analysis of states’ use of sport to acquire international prestige.

There is little doubt that China is becoming one of the most powerful countries in the world, in both economic and political terms. The Beijing Olympics in 2008 arguably acted as an extra impetus to the inexorable rise of China. Since then, China has been feted in the UK, playing a leading role in developing the UK’s nuclear power station at Hinkley Point, has begun creating the £900 billion ‘One Belt, One Road’ economic development initiative and has won the right to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Sport is just one area that China seeks to become more dominant, including building a domestic sports industry worth $850 billion, investing heavily in reforming its own football league to make it world-class and equally heavily in European football clubs. Sport policy clearly falls into line with China’s global economic, political and even cultural aspirations.

‘Soft power’ is becoming a very popular term used by academics, politicians, journalists and commercial organisations. Its widespread use has added to its lack of clarity and obfuscated its meaning. Combining it with sports mega-events—large-scale sporting spectacles—has added to the confusion. This chapter sets about explaining both sports mega-events and the concept of soft power. Moreover, we show how the latter can be used to understand the former through the development of an ideal type of a state’s soft power package. Such a package consists of five interlinked dimensions: culture, tourism, branding, diplomacy and trade. This—the first attempt to develop a heuristic to assess a state’s soft power package—enables us to understand the mechanisms at work behind states’ attempts at pursuing policies to promote their interests.

The story of Brazil’s double host status—hosting two first-order SMEs within just two years of each other—is, in general, one of disappointment and unfulfilled promise. After being awarded the right to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup in 2005, successfully hosting the Pan American Games in 2007, winning the right to host the 2016 Olympics and with an economy that overtook the UK to become the sixth largest in the world in 2011, most commentators thought that this was finally Brazil’s time. Long seen as a ‘sleeping giant’ just waiting for favourable conditions to blossom, this naturally endowed, resource-rich country was starting to look like it would move beyond a regional hegemon towards a world power. Widespread corruption against a backdrop of an economic downturn, however, resulted in Brazil spending close to $30 billion on a few weeks of sporting spectacles and desolate, underused, overpriced sports facilities.

It is fair to say that sport politics has played a significant role in South Africa’s identity in global affairs. As this chapter shows, the case of apartheid and debates around South Africa’s subsequent inclusion and exclusion from international sporting membership and competition demonstrates sport’s political nature; the country’s decision to stage the 2010 FIFA World Cup to showcase South Africa’s emerging status on the world stage aptly—and perhaps ironically—acts as a case study for how states seek to acquire politics-through-sport, in part as an attempt to rid themselves of their negative historical connotations. Since 2010 and the staging of the first ever African football World Cup, the country’s continued desire to use sport for state objectives is demonstrated through South Africa’s failed bids for the 2011 and 2015 Rugby World Cup, and the initial securing of the rights to the 2022 Commonwealth Games in 2015, which were later stripped due to concerns over Durban’s financial capabilities to stage the tournament.

When seeking out an example of how sport and politics intertwine, few case studies compare to that of Qatar and its acquisition of the rights to stage the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals. As we go on to show in this chapter, Qatar’s use of sport seeks to serve specific emerging- and small-state objectives, a key part of which centres on the desire to showcase the country to the world, and, in doing so, exercise soft power on the global stage. As arguably the quintessential example of sports-soft disempowerment, however, in a multitude of ways—which we discuss here—Qatar’s attempts through sport have significantly backfired, leading to severe international critique over its social policies and laws at home, which, in turn, led to the fall of ex-FIFA President Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter after 17 years at the head of football’s world governing body.

Russia, like Brazil, also hosted two first-order sports mega-events in quick succession (2014 and 2018). Yet, a key reason for choosing Russia as an example of an ‘emerging state’ using sports mega-events is because, in general, the academic literature fails to recognise the variety of motives behind the hosting of such prestigious sporting spectacles. While it is relatively clear that the vast majority of states seek to use sports mega-events (SMEs) to ‘showcase’ their nation, others, Russia included, have a number of different motives behind hosting. As this chapter shows, Russia does not follow the logic of a standard SME host, but rather is pursuing a path of foreign policy in Russian interests and domestic soft power creation both to shore up the incumbent government’s political legitimacy and to engender and bolster a sense of Russian national identity. The result is that Russia—viewed through a Western lens—is ‘failing’ to capitalise on its soft power potential.

The economic achievements of the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—have shifted economic power away from the West and led to the development of a more decentred international economy and alternative models of international economic development. As this chapter highlights, the rise of new economic centres of power and the shifting balance of power have raised concerns about a possible endgame to the current international order. This chapter explores these concerns and analyses the extent to which they are based on assumptions around BRICS’ unity and the sustainability of their continued economic success.

© 2016 Taylor & Francis. Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” has become an increasingly used term to help explain why states—including so-called “emerging states”—are paying greater attention to acquiring various forms of cultural and political attraction. However, within mainstream International Relations, Political Science, and Sport Studies literature, a continuous debate remains as to what actually constitutes soft power, how national leaders go about acquiring it, and how forms of attraction convert into power outcomes in both the short- and long-term. This analysis endeavours to overcome these issues by offering an “ideal type” model that details states’ soft power strategies, the mechanisms they use, and the tangible future outcomes they gain.

Through conducting document analysis, field work, and semi-structured interviews at five major tournaments in Asia, North America, Europe and South America, the paper examines the perspectives of international football supporters on the Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) decision to award the 2022 World Cup finals to the State of Qatar. The paper is separated into five sections. First we ground Qatar’s sporting strategy within the concept of ‘soft power’, as well as pinpoint the negative consequences that have manifest since the state’s acquisition of the 2022 finals. Second, we disclose and defend our chosen data collection strategy. Third, we uncover and discuss our results with reference to three key themes: the state’s suitability as a football destination; the dubious awarding of the 2022 World Cup; and, Qatar’s cultural backdrop and domestic policies. Fourth, we align our findings to Qatar’s foreign policy intentions and ‘soft disempowerment’ consequences, locating in the process the opportunities and challenges that accompany the state’s hosting of the 2022 finals. We conclude by reflecting upon the contribution we have made here, as well as acknowledging the importance of Qatar for current and future sports mega-event research.

In 1990, Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ to refer to the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion. Since its inception, the concept has featured as a consistent analytic tool for explaining the motives underpinning states’ international affairs. There are, however, four areas in which soft power is open to critical scrutiny. First, research has centred on large and/or developed nations, notably in North America, Europe, and South and East Asia. Second, scholars have called for greater clarity of the concept, noting that it lacks clear explanation of how instances of attraction equate to various power outcomes. Third, others suggest Nye produces an Americanized-centric understanding of soft power, equating to a narrow-focused account of what constitutes ‘attraction’. Finally, research has failed to examine how states’ soft power attempts can backfire, leading to what we call ‘soft disempowerment’. Drawing on the case of Qatar – with a particular focus on the state’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals - we seek to offer responses to these criticisms, by refining the concept of soft power to take account of variegated power outcomes, to do so in relation to a small-state, non-American context, and to explore the intersections of soft power and soft disempowerment. In doing so, we introduce the ‘soft power-soft disempowerment nexus’ which, we go on to argue, affords an analytical framework for examining how soft power works and how it may be hampered through negative international scrutiny.

© 2015 University of Kent. Central to this article is the use of sports mega-events as part of a state's “soft power” strategy. The article offers two things: first, a critique of the “soft power” concept and a clearer understanding of what it refers to by drawing on the political use of sports mega-events by states; second, the article seeks to understand how and why sports mega-events are attractive to states with different political systems and at different stages of economic development. To this end a case study of an advanced capitalist state (London Olympics, 2012) and a so-called “emerging” state (FIFA World Cup, 2014; Rio Olympics, 2016) will be undertaken in order to shed light on the role of sports events as part of soft power strategies across different categories of states.