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Russia's war against Ukraine has accelerated international competition for influence in Africa. Structural weaknesses and post-pandemic instabilities continue to threaten achievements in the fields of democratic governance, peace and security, as well as development. We present a select list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2023. Politics: Democratic quality will depend on the nature of polls, as the electoral calendar is heavily packed. Important general elections that could trigger social unrest are scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Peace and security: Against the backdrop of continued structural-conflict risks, Jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions pose a major security challenge that may spill over to neighbouring states, especially from the Sahel to West African coastal countries. The recent ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region could be a first positive step towards peace. International arena: Amid Russia's war against Ukraine, many African governments were reluctant to join the international coalition condemning the Putin regime. Continued Western pressure on African countries to isolate Russia fosters African agency. At the same time, we expect to see an intensifying "new scramble for Africa" that includes both China and Middle Eastern countries. Socio-economic development: African countries will slowly rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic's socio-economic effects, but high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth. Progress on joint efforts to counter the climate crisis remains slow. Western support for African countries in their struggle for democracy, peace and security, as well as development requires a "new start" that focuses on prevention rather than ad hoc responses to current crises. The European Union and United States should avoid lapsing into Cold War habits of only assisting African governments if they "break away" from Russia. Germany needs to formulate a sound Africa policy that balances values and national interests with realistic assessments of the policy's potential in light of bigger players like China.

Leseprobe ----- Abstract Morocco and Tunisia, two progressive Muslim-majority countries, took vastly different approaches to women’s sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR). Sharing a French colonial past and Maliki Islamic tradition, Tunisia is an emerging democracy with a long history of top-down women’s rights advances and state-promoted SRHR. Tunisian women have benefitted from SRH education, access to contraception, emergency contraception, and state-funded first trimester abortion. Tunisia targets vulnerable populations, including unmarried, minor, rural, and poor women, with special clinics and subsidies. Finally, Tunisia holds men responsible for children they father outside of wedlock. In contrast, Morocco’s bottom-up feminist-driven approach to SRHR, including access to contraception, emergency contraception, and abortion, is circumscribed and exclusionary, targeting married couples. The criminalization of extramarital sexual relations and most abortions force single women with unwanted pregnancies to resort to unsafe abortion. Moroccan men who father children outside of marriage enjoy legal impunity from paternal responsibilities. Nevertheless, the recent rise of Islamic parties in both countries poses a potential threat to Tunisia’s proactive laws and policies governing SRHR, while adding another obstacle to adequate SRHR provision in Morocco. ----- Proaktive versus reaktive sexuelle und reproduktive Gesundheit und Rechte: Eine vergleichende Fallstudie zu Marokko und Tunesien Zusammenfassung Die beiden progressiven Lander Afrikas mit muslimischer Mehrheit, Tunesien und Marokko, zeichnen sich durch enorme Unterschiede in ihren reproduktiven Rechten und Masnahmen aus. Gepragt von sowohl einer franzosischen Kolonialherrschaft als auch von einer malikitisch ausgerichteten Tradition des Islams, ist Tunesien heute eine aufstrebende Demokratie mit einer langen Geschichte Top-Down gepragter Fortschritte bei Frauenrechten und staatlich geforderter Reproduktionspolitik. Tunesische Frauen erhalten Bildungsmasnahmen im Bereich reproduktiver Rechte, Zugang zu Verhutungsmitteln und Notfallverhutung sowie staatlich finanzierte Unterstutzung bei Abtreibung im ersten Trimester einer Schwangerschaft. Mit ihrem Angebot spezieller Kliniken und Zuschusse zielt Tunesien auf gefahrdete Gruppen wie unverheiratete, minderjahrige, landlich lebende und arme Frauen. Nicht zuletzt mussen Manner das Sorgerecht fur von ihnen auserehelich gezeugte Kinder ubernehmen. Im Gegensatz dazu zeichnet sich Marokko durch einen von feministischen Gruppen betriebenen Bottom-Up-Ansatz aus. Zugang zu Verhutungsmitteln, Notfallverhutung und Abtreibung ist begrenzt und nur fur verheiratete Frauen moglich. Ausereheliche sexuelle Beziehungen werden kriminalisiert und in den meisten Fallen mussen ungewollt schwangere Frauen auf unsachgemas vorgenommene Abtreibungen zuruckgreifen. Marokkanischen Mannern, die ausereheliche Kinder zeugen, wird hingegen Befreiung von rechtlicher Verantwortung und Straffreiheit zugestanden. Der jungste Aufstieg islamischer Parteien in beiden Landern stellt jedoch eine Bedrohung fur Tunesiens proaktive Rechte und Masnahmen dar und ein weiteres Hindernis fur die Sicherstellung adaquater reproduktiver Rechte in Marokko. ----- Bibliographie: Feather, Ginger: Proactive versus Reactive Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of Morocco and Tunisia, Femina Politica – Zeitschrift fur feministische Politikwissenschaft, 2-2020, S. 76-89. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v29i2.07

When Israel signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 reactions were diverse. Experts were divided - some fearing a deepening of regional divisions, others hoping for a positive impact on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Two years later normalisation has intensified, but differs in degree and scope. Israel's normalisation process has strengthened her acceptance in the region and reaches beyond security issues. While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates lead these dynamics, eager to benefit from exchange in science and technology, in Morocco the United States' recognition of the latter's sovereignty over the Western Sahara has hardened Rabat's position on that issue. With Sudan, the process has not developed beyond contact between the Israeli government and the internationally contested military leadership. Normalisation is not a decisive factor for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. On the contrary, it was not an incentive in the past for Israel to make concessions; clashes with the Palestinians in Gaza or recently on the Temple Mount could not derail the process either. The real test, however, would be another Palestinian intifada or a return to the annexation plans of early 2020. Iran remains an important uniting factor which has led to a shared threat perception. Nevertheless, the Gulf monarchies and Israel differ in approach towards Iran. While Arab-Israeli joint military exercises mark a historical shift, talks about a military alliance in the Middle East with Israeli (and US) involvement are premature. The European Union and its member states should build on these positive dynamics and look at developments in the region not merely through the lens of the MEPP. Trilateral projects with Israel and Arab partners are a good starting point here. Also, Europe should become more involved in the broader Middle East through strategic dialogue with partners in the region as well as the US on the new order in the making.

The Moroccan elections of September 2021 were unusual for various reasons. As electoral campaigning took place under pandemic circumstances, social media played a role previously unseen and contributed significantly to the unexpected victory of the National Rally of Independents (RNI), a liberal party, against the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist party. The use of social media for campaigning purposes is not a completely new phenomenon in Morocco, given its prominent use by numerous social movements in the past. However, social media became a game-changer during the last elections. Considering the COVID-19 measures imposed, political parties shifted much of their campaigning online. Today, online spaces are no longer exclusively used by grassroots activists but have become increasingly popular among Moroccan political parties. While political parties converged in resorting to online spaces to compensate for the restrictions on offline campaigns, they diverged in their approaches; additionally, not all parties have the same financial capacity to exploit the full potential of social media. The huge disproportion in resources invested in online platforms was a main contributor to the victory of the RNI and the unexpected electoral wipeout of the PJD. To ensure equal opportunities for all involved political actors, a more effective legal framework is needed to guarantee the transparency and fair funding of digital electoral campaigns. This can be achieved by strengthening those institutions already in place and developing new ways to monitor the use of online media during elections.

The global pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of governance in countries of the Maghreb. It has underscored Morocco’s lagging human development and infrastructure amid growing authoritarianism. In Algeria, where the government is struggling with an ongoing legitimacy crisis, the pandemic has exposed the state's weak public services. In Tunisia, the pandemic has emphasised the disarray of the coun­try's political elites and the effects of the protracted transition on state output. Yet, the pandemic crisis has pushed some of these governments to seize opportunities, in­cluding speeding up digitalisation, allowing for citizen engagement, and even seeking some self-sufficiency in terms of medical production. As these countries pursue eco­nomic relief and support to overcome the growing economic impacts from the crisis, European partners have the opportunity to use their leverage to promote policies that reduce inequality, prioritise investment in critical infrastructure, and encourage transparent and responsive citizen-government relations. (author's abstract)

Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since 2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap­prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par­ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management. (author's abstract)

Internationale Indizes und Rankings, wie der Mitte April 2021 publizierte World Press Freedom Index, spielen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle im Maghreb. Maghrebinische Regierungen vermarkten Verbesserungen der eigenen Position, polemisieren gegen schlechte Einstufungen anderer oder nutzen eigene bessere Platzierungen, um ihre Kontrahenten herabzusetzen. Gleichzeitig ermöglichen Rankings Oppositionellen, auf Missstände im eigenen Land hinzuweisen. Externen Kooperationspartnern, allen vor­an der Euro­päischen Union (EU) und ihren Mitgliedstaaten, dienen sie als Entscheidungs­grundlage für Politiken gegenüber Algerien, Marokko und Tunesien. Auch wenn Indi­zes und Rankings Objektivität und Vergleichbarkeit insinuieren, sind sie oftmals pro­b­lematisch in ihrer Genese, Aussagekraft und Verwendung. Nur wenn sie in die quali­ta­tive Forschung zum Maghreb eingebettet und ihre Kehrseiten reflektiert werden, können sie dazu beitragen, Reformbedarf zu identifizieren und Missstände zu beheben. (Autorenreferat)

International rankings and indexes, such as the World Press Freedom Index pub­lished in mid-April 2021, are increasingly influential in the Maghreb. The region's governments promote improvements in their own performance, protest where they score poorly, and celebrate outranking their rivals. Rankings also allow opposition groups and activists to spotlight grievances in their own country. External coopera­tion partners, above all the European Union (EU) and its member states, use them as a basis for decision making and policies towards Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. While rankings and indexes insinuate objectivity and comparability, their sources, validity and utilisation are frequently problematic. Only if they are embedded in qualitative research on the Maghreb and their downsides reflected can they make a meaningful contribution to identifying reform needs and addressing deficits. (author's abstract)

2020/21 unterzeichnete Israel Abkommen mit vier arabischen Staaten, die international als Durchbruch gefeiert wurden. Von der Öffentlichkeit weitgehend unbemerkt vollzieht sich unterdessen seit 2018 eine Wiederannäherung arabischer Staaten an Syrien. Schließlich beendeten mit dem Treffen des Golfkooperationsrates (GKR) im saudischen Al-Ula im Januar 2021 Ägypten, Bahrain, Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) ihren Boykott Katars. Veränderte Lagebeurteilungen und das Konvergieren von Interessen haben die (Wieder-)Annäherungen ermöglicht. Damit bewegt sich die Region aber nicht auf Frieden und Stabilität zu; langanhaltende Konflikte werden nicht beigelegt, Bedrohungsperzeptionen dritter Akteure verstärkt. Deutschland und seine Partner in der EU sollten sich nicht von lokalen und regio­nalen Konfliktparteien vereinnahmen lassen, sondern Ansätze regionaler Konflikt­bearbeitung unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

This paper evaluates the United Nations' (UN) involvement and efforts in Western Sahara, and assesses its perceived effectiveness in settling this conflict in the post - Cold War international order. The dispute in Western Sahara is the most protracted conflict in the history of the UN. Its settlement would provide a crucial platform for the progress of other unresolved conflicts under UN auspices. As a mediator and an intervening party, the UN has played a major role in the dispute, especially since the establishment of the UN Mission for Western Sahara, MINURSO. After outlining the history of the Western Sahara conflict, this paper elucidates the stages the UN has managed therein, and clarifies the reasons and motives behind the deadlock in the Sahara. The UN's efforts are evaluated, and the negotiating perspectives of the concerned parties in the conflict and role of Algeria, which considers itself not formally part of the conflict despite its role in preserving the current impasse, analyzed.

Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag werden wir anhand unserer Forschungserfahrungen mit Mitgliedern der spanischen Polizeieinheit Guardia Civil die Vorteile und den Gewinn einer Kombination biographischer Fallrekonstruktionen mit einem ethnographischen Vorgehen diskutieren. Die Erforschung der Perspektiven, Alltagserfahrungen und Handlungsmuster von Guardia-Civil-Mitgliedern, die im spanisch-marokkanischen Grenzraum um die Enklaven Ceuta/Melilla eingesetzt sind, findet im Kontext einer starken Kontrolle ihrer Handlungsmuster und Wir- sowie Selbstprasentationen durch die Organisation statt. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellen wir die Herausforderungen und Potentiale aus dieser forschungspraktisch nicht seltenen, aber methodisch und auf Basis konkreter Forschungserfahrungen eher wenig diskutierten Kombination von zwei prominenten Methoden der interpretativen Sozialforschung vor. Schlagworter: Biographieforschung, Ethnographie, Grenzen, Marokko, Spanien, Polizeiforschung ----- Understanding We-images, They-images and Patterns of Action within an Organization by using Biographical and Ethnographic Methods. The Spanish police unit Guardia Civil in Ceuta and Melilla Abstract Drawing from our field research with members of the Spanish police unit Guardia Civil, in this paper we will discuss the advantages and gains of a methodological combination of biographical case reconstructions with an ethnographic approach. The Guardia Civil heavily controls the patterns of action as well as we- and selfpresentations of its members. In this context, we conducted our research on perspectives, everyday life experiences and patterns of action of Guardia Civil members, who are employed in the Spanish-Moroccan border zone around the enclaves of Ceuta/Melilla. Against this background we will illustrate the challenges and potentials of combining two prominent methods of interpretative social research, which are often used together in the field. However, their combination has rarely been discussed and evaluated with respect to concrete field experience. Keywords: biographical research, ethnography, borders, Morocco, Spain, research on police. ----- Bibliographie: Bahl, Eva/Worm, Arne: Biographische und ethnographische Zugange zu Wir-Bildern, Sie-Bildern und Handlungspraktiken in einer Organisation. Die spanische Polizeieinheit Guardia Civil in Ceuta und Melilla, ZQF – Zeitschrift fur Qualitative Forschung, 1-2/2018, S. 233-251. https://doi.org/10.3224/zqf.v19i1-2.15

Research on migrant transnationalism has mostly focused on particular transnational activities, their salience in various contexts and populations, and their relationship with migrant incorporation. Less attention has been paid to the interplay between the different domains of transnationalism (economic, political, and socio-relational) and to the way in which they affect migrants’ identity. This study investigates whether and how one domain of migrant transnationalism—transnational entrepreneurship—influences migrants’ (1) transnational involvement in other domains and (2) sense of belonging to different social groups and places. Focusing on the case of Moroccan entrepreneurs in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Milan, Italy, we compare transnational migrant entrepreneurs, whose business is based on cross-border relationships and exchanges, with domestic migrant entrepreneurs, who are active exclusively in the destination country. Combining quantitative and qualitative data, we find that transnational entrepreneurs differ from domestic entrepreneurs mostly in terms of socio-relational transnational involvement. On the other hand, transnational entrepreneurship does not substantially change transnational practices in other domains or sense of belonging among Moroccan migrants., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The article explores the relation between identity definition and trust in different information sources in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia following the 2011 Uprisings. While prior to 2011 literature mostly highlighted the role of pan-Arab news channels in consolidating a transnational Arab public sphere, recent studies argued that there has been a reinforcement of national media and identities in the Middle East and North Africa, as a consequence of a partial liberalisation of national broadcasting. Our study is based on the Arab Transformations survey (2014), which unlike previous surveys included questions covering both media consumption and identity definition. We looked at how in the three countries the choice of Muslim, Arab or national identity definition was associated with the preference for distinct sources of political news. The results only partially confirmed the hypothesis of a renewed importance of national media and showed that in the three countries people tended to attribute very different values to the same news sources.

Social networks have been resorted to as effective platforms for social mobility in many parts of the world. This mobility occurs when social media users exploit their interpersonal relationships, especially their ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973). Social networks enable their users to be producers of information, rather than mere consumers, and to be socially and politically well-informed. They have come to function as the alternative media serving citizens rather than governments’ agendas. The paper investigates whether or not social networks are used for social and political mobility in Morocco. Practically, the boycott campaign 2018 in Morocco is considered to uncover the new services these networks are offering. All these issues are investigated in this paper through administering a survey questionnaire to a Moroccan population. A quantitative and a qualitative analysis of 112 questionnaires show that the majority of the participants not only follow social and political content on social media but also share, post, and re-tweet content. The paper indicates that social media are useful platforms for political and social mobility since they are risk-free, costless, and accessible by everybody. The participants do not deny the outstanding roles that social networks play in organizing campaigns as forms of social mobility, yet they do not consider social media a prerequisite for making such events a success because the world has been witnessing successful mass street protests wherein no use of social media platforms has been mentioned.

Projekte zu Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Globalen Süden operieren mit impliziten und expliziten Vorstellungen, Ansprüchen und Zielen. Die kritische Reflexion zu den Rahmenbedingungen, dem ethischen Status und den Konsequenzen solcher IKT-Interventionen und -Projekte kommt dabei oft zu kurz. Durch eine interdisziplinäre Perspektive und unter Rückgriff auf post- und dekoloniale Theorie können die Bedingungen und Partizipationsmöglichkeiten von "Nord-Süd-Kooperationen" problematisiert und die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Begriffe, Konzepte und deren Konnotationen kritisch beleuchtet werden. Auf der Basis eigener Erfahrungen mit designorientierten Herangehensweisen in einem entwicklungs- und bildungspolitischen Projekt im Hohen Atlas in Marokko sollen diese Kritiken und Problemstellungen veranschaulicht und reflektiert werden. Indem eigene Vorannahmen, Erwartungen und Ansprüche auf den Prüfstand gestellt und Projektverlauf, Technikaneignung und interne Kommunikation nicht als gesetzt, sondern als prozesshaft und wechselseitig aushandelbar verstanden werden, können die Bedingungen für Kooperation in eine dekoloniale Richtung weisen. Information and communications technology (ICT) interventions and development cooperation projects in the Global South operate with implicit and explicit ideas, expectations, and goals about the course of the project and cooperation. Critical reflection on the framework conditions, ethical status, and consequences of such ICT interventions and projects is often neglected. Through an interdisciplinary perspective and recourse to post- and decolonial theory, the conditions and participation possibilities of "North-South cooperation" can be problematized, and the underlying concepts and connotations can be critically examined. Based on our own experiences with design-oriented approaches in a development and education project in the High Atlas in Morocco, we will illustrate and discuss these critiques and problems. The conditions for cooperation can point in a decolonial direction by putting one’s own assumptions, expectations, and demands to the test and by understanding project progress, technology appropriation, or internal communication not as given but as process-oriented and mutually negotiable.

Since coming to power in 1999, Morocco's King Mohamed VI has strengthened his rule by reinforcing his father's strategy of elite co-optation and ­rotation. However, after two decades of economic predation, the gradual waning of rent-distribution channels, and the lack of genuine democratisation, the king's ­strategy of power consolidation may be running out of steam. Mohamed VI's rule has coincided with the adoption of large-scale neo-liberal reforms, which have created new opportunities for economic co-optation and strengthened the monarchy's alliance with local economic and political elites. However, this neo-liberal turn has come with important costs for low-income groups. The last 20 years have been marked by an increase in the obedience of the local elite and the weakening of formal channels of political participation. The king has also been able to take credit for successful policies while simultaneously blaming the administration or elected officials for failed ones and contributing to the de-institutionalisation of the country's politics. Increased inequality and an established culture of contempt towards the "losers" of liberalisation and privatisation policies mean that those dissatisfied with the regime will increasingly turn to coping mechanisms that have a direct impact on European security (e.g. drug and human trafficking, international terrorism, and violent political contestation). A stable and prosperous Morocco is vital to Europe's security. However, inclusive and sustainable economic growth is only possible if genuine democratic reform allows for effective implementation of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the development of robust democratic participatory channels through which popular grievances can be addressed.

Transnational marriages of migrants in Western Europe tend to be seen as hampering integration. In response, policies have been tightened, despite little knowledge on transnational marriages and the effects of such measures. This paper investigates the role of individual preferences and contextual factors such as family reunification policies, group size and development levels of the regions of origin in partner choice of the children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. We draw on a novel dataset collected in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Our findings suggest that transnational marriages are partly associated with contextual factors such as a rural origin and family reunification policies. The analysis indicates higher rates of transnational marriages under open family reunification policies, providing tentative evidence of policy effects. On the individual level, the choice of a partner from the parents' origin country is associated with religiosity. © 2014 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.

In Morocco it is still the king who defines the boundaries of political discourse and action. The palace is increasingly placing obstacles in the path of its strongest adversary, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD). This was seen most recently in the difficult and protracted coalition negotiations following the October 2016 parliamentary elections. At the same time, pressure on civil society critics is steadily intensifying. The inherent promise of political reform in Morocco’s comparatively inclusive model is increasingly eroding and gradually substituted with the promise of economic modernisation, potentially undermining the very bases of the kingdoms domestic stability. It is thus also in Europe’s interests for Morocco to uphold the progress it has achieved through the political reforms of recent decades. (author's abstract)

In 2009, Morocco initiated an ambitious energy transition program. The aim is to increase the country’s independence from energy imports until 2030. The plan targets the reduction of the import of fossils and large investments into renewable energies. The goal set is to meet 42% of its power generating capacity needs through renewables by 2020 and 52% by 2030. Morocco’s bold and ambitious plans are often highlighted as a model for how to invest into future technologies and bring about clean energy transition. Due to its geography, weather conditions and solar irradiance, Morocco is considered to have huge potentials regarding wind and solar energy production. Morocco’s energy transition program includes the construction of a number of large and medium scale solar plants until 2020. Their planning and construction is often managed by MASEN (Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy), a public limited company. Recently, Noor 1, the first of several large scale solar plants was completed. Noor 1 is situated in Ouarzazate in the East of the country. Currently Noor Tata is in the planning phase. Similar with Morocco, energy transition has been also a hot topic in Austria. However, different from Morocco, planning, decision-making and governance structures have rather reflected the country's federal system. Austria's energy transition strategy is a decentralized one. As much as this often entails strong involvement and ownership on societal level, as much its success is dependent on a complex set of diverse political entrepreneurs on different political and administrative levels (national-federal-district and local). LINKS project aims at learning from both; Austrian and Moroccan experiences. In its last phase, the project deals with the question whether decentralized small-scale energy production models as implemented in some of the Austrian energy model regions are transferrable to Morocco. This assessment takes place against the background of the Moroccan state's ambitions to decentralize and strengthen the regional and provincial levels. Accordingly, this report elaborates the structural, political, social and societal setting in which Morocco's energy policy is embedded. The report tries to define the major actors, analyse the decision-making structures, and review the socio-technical imaginaries which have shaped national energy policies. "Socio-technical imaginaries" define mind-sets and frames which do not only guide policies and strategies but also give insights about the expectations connected with technological developments. The report aims at providing a background for the preparation of the stakeholder forum to be held in Tata/Morocco in October 2017. The forum aims at bringing together local and regional stakeholders and to debate at eye level experiences, expectations and ideas for solar energy production in their region. This working paper was produced within the LINKS project (Linking climate change mitigation, energy security and regional development in climate and energy model regions in Austria) (funded by the ACRP).

In Marokko definiert der König nach wie vor den politischen Spielraum. Dabei legt der "Palast", eine gängige Chiffre für den König und sein Patronagenetzwerk, seinem stärk­sten Gegenspieler, der moderat islamistischen Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (PJD), immer mehr Steine in den Weg. Dies hat zuletzt die langwierige Regierungsbildung nach den Parlamentswahlen vom Oktober 2016 gezeigt. Auch der Druck auf zivilgesellschaftliche Kritiker steigt stetig. Indem das Versprechen politischer Reformen Schritt für Schritt durch ein Modernisierungsversprechen ersetzt wird, droht der rela­tiv inklusive Charakter des "marokkanischen Modells" verlorenzugehen - damit ent­fiele zugleich ein wichtiger Faktor für den inneren Frieden des Landes. Dass Marokko den Fortschritt nicht zurückdreht, der mit den Reformen der letzten Jahrzehnte erzielt wurde, liegt daher auch im Interesse europäischer Außenpolitik. (Autorenreferat)

Why do some authoritarian governments respond beneficently to political protest while others opt for repression? This article argues that beneficent government responses in the form of concessions or institutional inclusion are fostered by three interrelated mechanisms working at three distinct levels: institutionalization of political protest within the polity, external certification of protest demands by legally legitimized authorities, and interest polarization between protesting groups and the government. Empirical comparison of government responses to youth protests before and during the 2011 uprisings in Morocco and Egypt proves that the divergent strategies in the two countries were not the result of spontaneous decision-making in times of heightened regime contention. Rather, they mirror established patterns of protest politics that are relatively resistant to ad-hoc manipulations. By extending the focus beyond a particular episode of contention, this study offers important insights into government-challenger relations in authoritarian regimes.

Die am 7. Oktober 2016 durchgeführten Wahlen zum marokkanischen Repräsentantenhaus setzten den bereits bei den Kommunalwahlen im September 2015 erkennbaren Trend fort: eine Polarisierung der Parteienlandschaft zwischen der islamistischen Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (PJD) und der säkular ausgerichteten Partei für Authentizität und Moderne (PAM). Der PJD erzielte 125 Sitze, der PAM kam auf 102 Sitze. Laut Verfassung aus dem Jahr 2011 fiel damit der Auftrag zur Regierungsbildung an den PJD, der jedoch Schwierigkeiten hat, die notwendigen Koalitionspartner für eine Regierungsmehrheit zu finden. Politische wie verfassungsmäßige Probleme sind deswegen vorprogrammiert.

With a contingent of around 1,500 fighters, Morocco is considered one of the main exporters of foreign fighters to Syria. Until 2014, Moroccan authorities, who were content to see their own jihadis leave and add to the pressure on Bashar al-Assad, mostly turned a blind eye to networks of recruitment. Since the dramatic rise of the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, concern over local repercussions and the return of war-hardened radicals has prompted Rabat to adopt a hardline, security-oriented approach instead. Repression, however, is unlikely to uproot these networks. Instead, a comprehensive strategy for de-radicalization should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate returning fighters, and use their example to dissuade others from violent militancy. (author's abstract)

Im Januar 2015 leitete die tunesische Regierung mit ihrem "Strategieplan zur Reform der Hochschulen und der Wissenschaft" einen weiteren Schritt zur Demokratisierung des Hochschulwesens ein. Solche Reformen sind derzeit die Ausnahme in der arabischen Welt, denn Universitäten in Tunesien und in anderen Staaten der Region werden zunehmend zum Schauplatz von Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem Regime und Oppositionellen sowie zwischen säkularen und islamistischen Studenten. Nach Jahrzehnten der Entpolitisierung haben sich die nordafrikanischen Universitäten seit den Aufständen des "Arabischen Frühlings" im Jahr 2011 zu Orten der politischen Aktion entwickelt. Gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien zeigen sich hier besonders intensiv. Obwohl sich die Entwicklungen im Hochschulwesen regional unterscheiden, nehmen allgemein gewaltsame Ausschreitungen an den Universitäten zu. An Tunesiens Universitäten unterstützen deutsche Hochschulen Projekte zur Demokratieförderung. Daneben ist die Stimme des islamistischen Spektrums an den Universitäten lauter geworden und äußert sich vor allem in salafistischen Protesten. An Ägyptens Universitäten sind seit dem Sturz Mubaraks akademische Freiheiten, aber auch der islamistische Diskurs gestiegen. Gegen den Militärputsch in 2013 durch General Sisi formierte sich studentischer Protest, der häufig in Gewalt eskalierte. In Marokko hat sich die regimekritische Protestbewegung von der Straße in die Universitäten verlagert. Die Fronten zwischen linksgerichteten Studenten und Anhängern der an der Regierung beteiligten islamistischen "Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung" (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) haben sich verhärtet. In Libyen und in Syrien hat der Bürgerkrieg zum Zusammenbruch der akademischen Infrastruktur geführt.

Given the tremendous energy challenges Morocco faces, and its potential role as an exporter of green electricity to Europe, the country has been particularly targeted by Germany’s efforts to promote the uptake of renewable energies abroad. This paper explores whether ideas and policies in the field of renewable energy effectively traveled through transfer channels established between Germany and Morocco. In particular, the question of how Morocco’s policy objectives shaped the result of transfer processes is discussed, shedding light on a currently under-researched determinant for policy transfer. Drawing upon forty-five semi-structured interviews with Moroccan, German, and international stakeholders, as well as card-ranking exercises, the article provides first-hand insights into the dynamics and drivers of Morocco’s “energy transition”. Findings presented in the article show that differing policy objectives did not preclude the transfer of ideas between Germany and Morocco, but shaped its outcome with regard to policy instrument selection. While basic policy orientations in favour of renewable energies were facilitated by transferred knowledge, a perceived incompatibility between domestic policy objectives and the policy instruments used in the foreign model led to selective lesson-drawing from the German example. This finding underlines the importance for “senders” who wish to actively promote sustainable energy policies abroad to adapt outreach strategies to the policy objectives of potential followers.

Am 4. September 2015 fanden in Marokko erstmals seit der Einführung der neuen Verfassung von 2011 Kommunal- und Regionalwahlen statt. Sie gelten als Test für die erweiterten Reformversprechen des Königs einer demokratischen Transformation des Landes, die er während des "Arabischen Frühlings" gegeben hatte. Am 23. Juli 2015 veröffentlichte das Amtsblatt (Bulletin Officiel) die Gesetze zu den Reformen der Gebietskörperschaften. Demnach erhalten die Regionalräte mehr Legitimität und Kompetenzen. Gleichzeitig verlieren aber die Kommunalräte an Entscheidungsbefugnis. König Mohammed VI. hat die "fortgeschrittene Dezentralisierung" zum Leitmotiv seiner Reformpolitik erklärt. Die regionale Entscheidungsebene wird durch die neue Verfassung von 2011 und die Reformen vom Juli 2015 aufgewertet und erhält weitreichende Kompetenzen. Vorsichtig formuliert wird jedoch das Innenministerium weiterhin Kontrolle über die lokalen Parlamente ausüben. Die islamistische PJD (Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung) erzielte bei den Regionalwahlen vom 4. September 2015 das beste Stimmenergebnis. Bei den Kommunalwahlen verdoppelte sie gegenüber 2009 ihre Stimmenzahl. Die hinzugewonnenen Wählerstimmen bei den Regionalwahlen spiegelten sich allerdings nicht in der Besetzung politischer Schlüsselpositionen wider; hier war die hofnahe PAM (Partei für Authentizität und Entwicklung) am erfolgreichsten. Drei Motive stehen hinter den Reformen der Dezentralisierung in Marokko: Sie soll durch die Gewährung von mehr regionaler Autonomie das Problem der marokkanischen Südprovinzen lösen, Verantwortlichkeiten auf regionale und lokale Ebenen des Regierens übertragen und den Ruf nach mehr politischer Teilhabe befriedigen. Damit dient sie auch der Stabilisierung bestehender Machtstrukturen.

In contrast to other North African and Middle Eastern rulers, the Moroccan monarchy has been able to maintain and stabilize its reign in the face of popular protest. In response to demonstrations by the 20 February Movement (M20) in early 2011, King Mohammed VI announced the reform of the constitution and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy. In addition, the regime has successfully bought off opposi-tion by appropriating the main reform demands and by bringing in figures from the former opposition Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développement, PJD) to lead the government. But although the regime was able to absorb social unrest and to pull the rug from underneath the M20, protests and discontent have continued in Morocco, as major issues such as fighting corruption, establishing social justice and dealing with youth unemployment have not been addressed. Thus, although the moves of the monarchy have earned it the label of being “politically smart” and Morocco being “exceptional,” the country is far from immune to the unrest that has rocked neighboring countries. Europeans should therefore support a peaceful path of more substantial reforms to avoid regression and potentially violent escalations. (Autorenreferat)

In Morocco, unlike in other Arab countries, Islamists and seculars tend to cooperate in formal as well as informal politics. Political opportunities and pragmatic interests trump ideology most of the time, providing a suitable environment for a broadly inclusive political order. However, two factors stand in the way of sustained cooperation between Islamist and secular currents: on the one hand, sporadic upsurges of identity politics, and on the other, the strategies of divide and rule traditionally pursued by the “Makhzen” and its close allies. Rather than focusing on a set of partners who appear at first to be compatible with their values, Europeans should promote an inclusive political process that integrates all actors with significant popular outreach, such as the social movement Jama’at Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Association, AWI). (Autorenreferat)

Based on an original dataset of merged electoral and census data, this article is a study of electoral support for the Islamist Party in Morocco in the 2002 and 2007 elections. It differentiates between the clientelistic, grievance and horizontal network type of supporters. We disentangle these profiles empirically on the basis of the role of education, wealth and exclusion for Islamist votes. We find no evidence of the clientelistic profile, but a shift from grievance in 2002 to a horizontal network profile in 2007. World Values Survey individual level data are used as a robustness check, yielding similar results. Qualitative evidence on a changing mobilization pattern of the party between 2002 and 2007 supports our conclusions.

Das Königreich Saudi-Arabien hat die Revolutionen in der arabischen Welt unbeschadet überstanden und sich als unumstrittene Führungsmacht der Monarchien und reichen Öl- und Gasförderstaaten etabliert. Darüber hinaus jedoch verbindet sich in Saudi-Arabien und den Golfstaaten die Furcht der Herrscher vor der aufbegehrenden Bevölkerung mit dem Konflikt, der zwischen Iran und seinen regionalen Gegenspielern besteht und von wachsenden konfessionellen Spannungen begleitet wird. Saudi-Arabien und seine Verbündeten sehen in den Unruhen der Schiiten in der saudi-arabischen Ostprovinz und in Bahrain keine Protestbewegungen gegen autoritäre Regime, sondern in erster Linie den Versuch Irans, mit Hilfe der arabischen Schiiten legitime Regierungen zu stürzen. Saudi-Arabien fürchtet schon seit längerem, dass Teheran darauf aus ist, im Nahen Osten eine Vormachtstellung einzunehmen. Deshalb versucht das Königreich seit 2005, Iran mit einer zunehmend entschlossenen Regionalpolitik entgegenzutreten. Dabei fährt das Land seit Frühjahr 2011 zweigleisig. Erstens versuchte es, die Monarchien in Jordanien und Marokko zu stabilisieren, und stellte sich auf die Seite des Militärs in Ägypten, so dass Saudi-Arabien zum wichtigsten Vertreter des autoritären Status quo (ante) in der Region wurde. Zweitens ging Riad immer häufiger in die Offensive. Im März 2011 eilte Saudi-Arabien gemeinsam mit den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten, Kuwait und Katar der bahrainischen Führung zu Hilfe, als die dortigen Proteste einheimischer Schiiten außer Kontrolle zu geraten drohten. Noch entschlossener geht Saudi-Arabien in Syrien vor, wo es - verstärkt seit September 2013 - die Opposition und Aufständische mit Geld und Waffen unterstützt, um zum Sturz des mit Iran verbündeten Assad-Regimes beizutragen. (Autorenreferat)

The October 2013 government reshuffle in Morocco marks the latest round in the drawn-out tug of war between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développement, PJD), which heads the ruling coalition. The Palace came out as the clear winner, and thereby managed to roll back some of the limited concessions granted in response to the protests in early 2011. Regional dynamics – support from the Arab Gulf monarchies and authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt after the July 2013 coup – and the dispute between the PJD and its coalition partner, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party (Parti de l’istiqlal, PI), worked to the Palace’s advantage. Even though the relation between the PJD and the Palace has ameliorated considerably compared to one decade ago, the Palace’s strategic aim is to weaken the party while at the same time using it to stabilize the regime. In the short term, and as long as the PJD is able to retain popular support, it will remain in office and retain a limited margin of maneuver for reform. Profound political reforms as well as structural socio-economic and judicial reforms, however, are likely to be postponed to the mid to long term. European Union policy makers should use the EU’s long and close relations with the Palace to encourage it to allow more substantial reform and cede power to the elected government. (Autorenreferat)

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has survived the revolutions in the Arab world largely unscathed and entrenched itself as the undisputed leader of the Arab monarchies and the wealthy oil- and gas-producing states. More broadly, though, Saudi and Gulf rulers' concerns about their restive populations meld with confessional tensions associated with the pre-existing conflict between Iran and its regional adversaries. Saudi Arabia and its allies interpret unrest among the Shiites in the Saudi Eastern Province and Bahrain not as protest movements against authoritarian regimes but as an Iranian plot to topple legitimate governments with the assistance of the Arab Shiites. Riyadh has long feared that Tehran aspires to hegemony in the Middle East, and has consequently been pursuing an increasingly determined anti-Iranian regional policy since 2005. Since spring 2011 Riyadh has adopted a twin-track approach. Firstly, the Saudis have worked to stabilise the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and backed the Egyptian military, making Saudi Arabia the central proponent of the authoritarian status quo (ante) in the region. Secondly, Riyadh has increasingly taken the offensive. In March 2011 Saudi Arabia led the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar to rescue the Bahraini House of Khalifa after protests by Shiites threatened to spin out of control. The Saudis are operating even more decisively in Syria, where since September 2013 they have stepped up their supplies of money and arms to opposition and insurgent groups in order to bring about the fall of Iran's ally Assad. (author's abstract)

Die Maghreb-Union ist eine Idee, die seit den 1950er Jahren als erstrebenswertes Ziel gilt. 1989 schien ein entscheidender Schritt getan, als sich die fünf Maghreb-Staaten Algerien, Marokko, Mauretanien, Libyen und Tunesien in der Arabischen Maghreb-Union (AMU) zusammenschlossen. Politische Differenzen zwischen den Maghreb-Staaten, insbesondere zwischen Algerien und Marokko, sowie innen- und außenpolitische Probleme einzelner AMU-Mitgliedsstaaten führten 1994 zu einer Blockade der AMU. Die Regimewechsel in Tunesien und Libyen 2011 stimulierten zwar seit 2012 Treffen auf Ministerebene, die politische Blockade der AMU wurde jedoch nicht gelöst. Die sicherheitspolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme, eine Folge der politischen Entwicklungen nach 2011, begünstigten stattdessen eine nationale Rückbesinnung und Abschottung. Die anhaltende institutionelle Instabilität und der Aufschwung der Islamisten in Tunesien und Libyen wirken sich zudem kontraproduktiv auf die AMU aus. Regionale Kooperation wird ein Wunschbild bleiben, wenn sich die Vorstellungen von Staat und Gesellschaft und von der Rolle der Religion im Staat in den einzelnen Maghreb-Staaten weiter auseinander entwickeln., The idea of a Maghreb Union has been considered a worthy goal since the 1950s. In 1989 a decisive step seemed to have been taken, as the five states of the Maghreb - Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, and Tunisia - came together to form the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). However, political differences among the states, and Algeria and Morocco in particular, combined with domestic political difficulties and foreign policy differences among individual AMU member states, led to a freeze of AMU activities in 1994.Although the regime changes of 2011 in Tunisia and Libya did indeed stimulate meetings at the ministerial level in 2012, the political blockade of the AMU has yet to be lifted. Security issues and economic problems, the results of political developments in the wake of 2011, are encouraging a return to national compartmentalization instead of reviving the idea of a union. Ongoing institutional instability and the rise of Islamism in Tunisia and Libya are also making a negative contribution to the AMU. As long as attitudes about the state and society and ideas about the role of religion in state affairs continue to move further apart from one another within the individual Maghreb states, the idea of regional cooperation will remain but wishful thinking.

Salafis, including former “Salafi-Jihadis”, have become a presence in the public sphere through their participation in the protests – side-by-side with secular forces – of the so called 20 February Movement. There are also numerous indications that Salafis will play a role in shaping Morocco’s future political landscape, albeit while proposing less radical objectives than what they used to profess. The trend is leading towards greater acceptance of political plurality, more cooperation with moderate Islamists, and less aggressive attitudes towards seculars and Western governments. Most importantly, they are explicitly renouncing violent means in the domestic power struggle. Moroccan Salafis have begun aiming at assuming a political role, attempting to influence policy-making, and are increasingly prepared to play by the rules of the democratic game – thus following the example set by their peers in other Arab countries such as Egypt. (Autorenreferat)

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Conceptualizing Power 7 2.1 Europe as a Power and the Power of Europe 7 2.2 Power, Governance or Steering? Towards a Conceptual Framework 8 2.3 Framework for Analysis 13 3\. The Case of EU Democratization Policies in Morocco 15 3.1 Case Study Design 15 3.2 Democratization Policies as Security Practices 16 3.3 Institutional Context 17 4\. Steering Modes at Work 19 4.1 Hierarchic Steering Mechanisms 19 4.2 Indirect Steering Mechanisms 20 4.3 Soft Steering Mechanisms 22 5\. Patterns of Power? Analyzing the Results 27 5.1 Steering Strategies and their Resonance in Morocco 27 5.2 Assessing Political Steering as Framework for Analysis 29 6\. Conclusion 30 Literature 32, This paper conceptualizes a framework of political steering that includes modern conceptions of power as formulated by Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and others and applies it to the empirical analysis of the EU neighborhood policies. Analyzing the promotion of human rights and democracy as part of a comprehensive security strategy in Morocco since 2003, the authors scrutinize the use and the resonance of hierarchic, indirect and soft steering modes in EU external governance in the Southern Mediterranean. The findings suggest that Europe employs a complex strategy that targets governing officials, civil society actors and society at large, each with a respective mix of steering modes. Whereas classic incentives failed to initiate reforms at the government level, they proved effective in empowering Moroccan civil society actors. Soft modes are shown to play a decisive role in shaping the self-image of the administration officials vis-à-vis the EU and the parameters of public discourse on human rights and democracy, thus allowing for non-governmental actors to encroach on the government and demand democratic reforms. The integrated perspective on steering mechanisms in EU neighborhood policies thereby reveals the need to further explore micro-techniques of power in external governance analysis.

Morocco is situated in a peculiar geo-political position, which makes it a catalyst of Western attention. This position is not only represented by the spatial proximity to Europe and the few kilometres of sea that separate it from Spain. The closeness to Europe and the western world is political and economic. Despite the lack of a vast amount of natural resources as in Algeria, the country has been integrated in the international economy for most of its post-independence existence. This not only for being favourable to some sort of a market economy, but most of all for its links with the West. In the last years this geostrategic relevance for the American and European interests has been increasing due to the "necessity of reliable partners in a volatile region". "Morocco is generally well respected by world powers as a stable constitutional monarchy... and an Islamic voice of moderation". This fundamental characteristic of Morocco, the fact that is an Arab-Islamic country with western pronounced features, makes it a fundamental bridge with the Arab world for the EU and the US. The US after having lost credibility with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, needs now more than ever the support of the Moroccan regime to take part in the dialogue which involves the region, and so they granted Morocco major non-Nato ally status in June 2004 . Everything is explained much better if we recall the relatively good relationship between Morocco and Israel. Although the natural and genetic brakes in the relations of the two states, as the Moroccan Islamic sensibility first of all, the interaction between Morocco and Israel still continues on a positive binary, promoted by the confluent interest of both. For the Moroccan authorities, a positive attitude towards Israel and the pacific conclusion of its conflict are useful for “bolstering the country’s image in the West and bringing in foreign currency” . So we arrive to a crucial point. Morocco owes its importance and its sparkling inclusion in the Western economic market to this image that it has been able to build during its post-independence history. The image of an economic liberal, pro-Western and Islamic-moderate country in a democratizing process makes it attractive not only for tourists, but for the USA, the EU and Israel policymakers as well. The problem is the following: in order to maintain this façade, Morocco had and still has to face very strong challenges like terrorism, Islamism and the democratisation issues. This paper aims to analyze how the country is dealing with these issues and how the image that it wants to show for maintaining its international relations influenced its attitude towards those questions. The analysis focuses on how Morocco responded to those three challenges. Exploring these issues, terrorism (par. 2), Islamism (par. 3) and democratisation (par. 4) I will highlight the particular attitude that it took, which I would define the Moroccan cosmetic approach.

Most of the analysis of the Arab spring revolved around the immediate causes of the events and the role of social media in spreading the protests, in countries that succeeded in toppling their regimes. For this reason, this study adopts a different approach to tackle the long-term development of the Political opportunity structures that set the grounds for the emergence of these movements. To avoid the bias of focusing only on movements that succeeded, the paper compares the conditions of the emergence of the Egyptian movement that toppled the Mubarak regime in eighteen days, to the Moroccan movement that faded after a year of weekly protests. Instead of discussing the immediate context in which the movements appeared, or the course of events that the movements followed, the paper adopts a historical approach to review the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial historical, economic and political developments that created different structures of opportunity and threat in each of the two countries.