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To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00342.x Byline: Douglas Lemke (1) Abstract: In order to evaluate the applicability of power politics theories of war and international stability to interactions among nonstate actors, I test hypotheses from power transition theory and from neorealist arguments about systemic polarity against the behavior of 20 state and nonstate actors in nineteenth-century South America. I find considerable support for two of the three hypotheses tested and conclude that existing IR theory has more explanatory power within the empirical domain of nonstate relations than critics of such theory claim. Author Affiliation: (1)Pennsylvania State University Article note: Douglas Lemke is associate professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, 205 Pond Lab, University Park, PA 16802 (dwl14@psu.edu).

In an otherwise careful and thorough replication and reevaluation of empirical findings reported by Organski and Kugler (1980) and by Houweling and Siccama (1988), de Soysa, Oneal, and Park (1997) [...]

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.

The chances of war between rival states increase significantly with the achievement of power parity and willingness of the challenger for a change in status quo in a multi-hierarchical international system. Moreover, extraordinary military buildups help to challenge or maintain status quo by the challenger and the dominant power, respectively. This is an improvisation over the power transition theory which considers opportunity, and willingness to challenge status quo as the necessary preconditions of war. However, it suffers from a lack of generalizability and inadequate conceptualization.

We combine analysis of rivalry with consideration of a possible selection bias. We discover that what makes great powers more likely to be rivals is statistically related to their propensity to experience war. A censored probit allows simultaneous estimation of the influence of six covariates on the probability great powers experience rivalry and war, while controlling for statistical linkage between the two dependent variables. Consequently, we recast some past research. For example, contiguity and parity actually reduce the probability of war between great power rivals once we control for their influence on the probability great powers are rivals in the first place. Our results compliment other research highlighting various problems of selection bias in world politics and suggest a new direction for future research on rivalry.

International relations researchers study the interactions of states in the international system. Excluded from almost all such analyses is any consideration of how those states became members of the international system in the first place. State making researchers, in contrast, focus on the formation experiences of states. Drawing on insights from both approaches, we argue that states with positive birth legacies should be more successful at state making and achieve more favorable outcomes than states without positive birth legacies. As fighting and winning wars are a common pathway to political development, states with positive birth legacies should be more likely to participate in and win interstate and civil wars. Statistical analyses of all states in the international system from 1816 to 2002 support our expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers an interpretation of the international situation from the perspective of power transition theory. Understanding the meaning of the end of Cold War on international relations; Meaning of power transition theory; Use of the power transition theory to interpret the prospects of the future.

Investigation of the causes of war requires analysis of the characteristics and behavior of only those dyads of countries that are potential belligerents. Several scholars have offered rules for delineating such "relevant dyads". One common element of such rules is contiguity. A second common element is major power status. Any dyad involving either contiguous states or a major power is defined as relevant. Such definitions of relevant dyads are simple and useful. Nevertheless, I contend that some contiguous dyads are not relevant to study of the causes of war, while some non-contiguous dyads are relevant. For example, Israel and Iraq are neither contiguous, nor major powers. With existing definitions this dyad is not deemed relevant. I offer an operational definition of relevant dyads that delineates which dyads are proximate enough in terms of distance and terrain to be potential war fighters, regardless of major or minor power status. Adapting existing work on the loss-of-strength gradient, I argue that each member of the international system has an area of the globe within which it can act militarily. This area is the relevant neighborhood of that country. Relevant dyads are found where relevant neighborhoods overlap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]