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Do renewable terms compromise judicial independence? Scholars of various courts have demonstrated relationships between judges' voting patterns and the interests of actors responsible for their (re)appointment. However, it is typically unclear if such relationships are (at least partially) explained by judges acting strategically to achieve reappointment or if they are (fully) attributable to selection effects. I exploit a 2010 reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to estimate the casual effect of removing reappointment opportunities on judges' independence. The ECtHR bench consists of one judge from each member state and judges sit ex officio on cases involving their nominating state. Prior to 2010, terms were renewable. Judges seeking reappointment were therefore incentivized to favor their nominating states. In 2010, the terms were made nonrenewable with immediate effect for judges on the Court. I show that removing reappointment opportunities signifficantly reduced judges' tendency to favor their nominating states.

Objetivo: El presente artículo tiene por objetivo analizar la manera y la forma como el Supremo Tribunal Federal de Brasil y la Corte Constitucional de Colombia definen, caracterizan o fundamentan la independencia judicial. Metodología: Se utiliza una metodología deductiva, descriptiva y comparada, conjugada con una técnica de investigación empírica jurisprudencial y de documentación indirecta doctrinaria y normativa. Resultados: Se concluye que: (1) Aunque existen elementos comunes, persiste una preocupación sobre la competencia atribuida por parte de los tribunales constitucionales en la definición y el entendimiento de la independencia judicial, siendo saludable que se someta su entendimiento a la Constitución y la ley, pues el juez en su condición humana es falible; (2) Más allá de entender la imparcialidad, la objetividad y de considerar la deliberación, la participación directa de los ciudadanos en el proceso de decisión, así como otros instrumentos, puede ser una idea sana y racional para mitigar el excesivo poder judicial; (3) El destinatario de la garantía de la independencia es la sociedad, pero no solo el que tiene acceso y conocimiento a la justicia, sino todos en condiciones de igualdad; (4) Superándose la posición de la supremacía del poder judicial, la teoría del principio negativo de Sieyès sobre le pouvoir constituant, brinda un análisis al fomento de un constitucionalismo que permite a las otras ramas electas del gobierno tomar y ejecutar sus propias decisiones. Contribuciones: El artículo profundiza sobre la morfología de la independencia judicial. Si bien usualmente se identifica como un principio genérico, no por eso menos fundamental del Estado Social de Derecho, la investigación contribuye al sumergirse en la profundidad de su implicancia como principio, el sentido y las fuentes de su invocación genérica, sus presupuestos teóricos, sus perspectivas, la legitimidad de sus destinatarios y titulares. En general, sobre los límites, las formas y las estructuras, más aún cuando son los propios tribunales constitucionales quienes lo invocan, particularmente la Corte Constitucional de Colombia y el Supremo Tribunal Federal de Brasil.

O presente artigo procura avaliar como os juízes de primeiro grau de jurisdição, em especial os que se encontram em processo de vitaliciamento, veem o sistema de decisões vinculantes instituído pelo CPC/2015, principalmente quando lidam com demandas de massa. Parte-se da premissa de que a independência judicial, como um pressuposto do Estado de Direito, significa que o jurisdicionado tem o direito de receber uma tutela jurisdicional necessariamente fundamentada no ordenamento jurídico (direito pré-existente) e que o convencimento do julgador seja livre de pressões estranhas ao processo. Por isso, o julgador necessariamente deve considerar as decisões vinculantes, assumindo, caso entenda existir a hipótese de distinguishing ou overruling, um dever adicional de argumentação, sob pena de nulidade da decisão. Defende-se, nessa linha, que a vinculação a precedentes não afronta a independência judicial. Dito isto, realizou-se pesquisa empírica junto aos juízes que participaram do módulo nacional do curso de formação inicial da Escola Nacional de Formação e Aperfeiçoamento de Magistrados, obrigatório para todos que ingressam na carreira da magistratura, na qual é possível verificar a forte adesão dessa parcela de magistrados brasileiros ao sistema de decisões vinculantes.

The objective of the article was to determine the essence and legal implementation in Russia of principles such as: independence of the judiciary, relative truth, contradictory nature, legal certainty of judicial acts and discretion. In the countries of the Roman-Germanic legal order, it is no coincidence that legal principles are of great scientific and applied importance. The presence of a certain system of procedural principles makes it possible to assess the existence of justice in the country, the stability of a judicial decision and the fairness of judicial acts. Thus, the principles of the law directly affect the level of legality in each state. Currently, some procedural principles give rise to a discussion in Russian doctrine about their essence and content. The topic is presented from the point of view of general scientific methods (systems analysis, structural and functional, historical), the method of theoretical analysis, specific scientific methods (comparative jurisprudence, technical and legal analysis, concretization, interpretation). The theoretical basis was cognitive theory. It is concluded that the principle of the independence of the judiciary is not fully operational in the Russian Federation.

During the rule of law backsliding crisis in Poland since late 2015, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been active in the struggles to defend judicial independence. CSOs cooperate closely with judges and support their ‘judicial resistance’. This Article has three main objectives: describe and analyze the relationship between judges and CSOs; show the evolution — both continuity and discontinuity in their relations over time; assess whether CSOs’ activities are of any practical significance and therefore worth attention. The CSO-judicial relationship is analyzed for three periods: 1976–1989, the years before the transformation of Poland from a ‘people’s republic’ to a democracy; 1989–2015, the time of building liberal democracy and the rule of law; 2015–2020, the time of defending the rule of law from a populist attack.Drawing on sources including years of participant observation providing unique and insider knowledge, the author analyzes the activities and outputs of CSOs and judges focusing on their interactions and cooperation. The author argues that CSOs play a significant role in the struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence. This Article demonstrates that CSOs’ current engagement and input is not an extraordinary, ad hoc phenomenon, but rather one that arose from the previous interactions between the judiciary and civil society. The author argues that what we witness in Poland is an unprecedented phenomenon, both in the character of the relationship between judges and CSOs, and the scale and diversity of their cooperation. At the same time, the author claims that CSOs are underappreciated, including by academia, their work is taken for granted, and their role in the legal complex can be seen as a partly lost opportunity. If noticed, appreciated, and supported CSOs activities and their role could be more meaningful.

The study seeks to answer the question of whether there are similarities between the methods used to limit judicial independence in Hungary during the last phase of the communist regime, i.e. before the democratic transition, and today, when many scholars believe that an authoritarian transition is taking place in this country. For this purpose, I argue that despite the undeniable fundamental differences between the political and legal system of these two periods, the mechanisms and ways as the independence of judiciary were and are influenced by the government can plausibly be compared. The analysis seems to support this presumption: both the formal instruments and the informal channels of influence in the hands of the ruling political forces show a number of similarities. Thus, even if there are differences in the degree of their application and result, from centralizing the system of judicial administration to replacing court leaders with politically loyal people there are a number of instruments that enable central government to influence the judiciary, while maintaining the appearance of judicial independence.

This Article summarizes the features of modern non-democratic legal systems and draws the relevant conclusions. Some of these systemic issues have long-term consequences. The Article illustrates the defining effects of the historical traditions with concrete examples based on empirical researches. Judicial independence as part of the rule of law is not only institutional guarantees but cultural, mental dispositions too. This Article shows how non-democratic legal heritage led to backsliding democracy in post-communist Hungary. However relative autonomy of judges could emerge during the last three decades of the communist rule, skills and habits of professional self-defense could not stabilize.

This article offers an opening to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) situation and attacks against the judiciary in this region since 2010. The focus is not primarily on historical path dependence like the rest of this issue. Instead, the focus aims at the nature of attacks on the judiciary. Such attacks have appeared in CEE and the US in recent years. Its interest lies in explaining similar patterns visible in the judiciaries of CEE. Particularly, it looks at the current conditions in the Czech judiciary, political interventions in Poland since 2015 and in Hungary since 2010, and undermining of trust towards judiciary in the U.S., where attempts for delegitimizing the judiciary have happened since 2016. The article draws on similarities of attacks of authoritarian governments and responses of judiciaries. The authors highlight similarities and diversities of CEE countries 30 years after the fall of the communist regime and a path of these resemblances and varieties.

In this Article, I suggest considering linkages of a theoretical, and continuities of a sociological nature between on the one hand, the concept and the practical use of socialist legality in Socialist Hungary—with particular regard to the period following the judicial reform of 1954—and on the other hand, the concept of constitutional identity as it has developed in the Fundamental Law in Hungary, with particular regard to the period since the 2011 judicial reform. The Article highlights surprising similarities in the politically determined legislative intention in these two periods to form embracing, quasi legal concepts, which in themselves seem to differ fundamentally, although the similarities in their nature and in the specific constitutional practice are attention-grabbing. The interpretation of the role of state institutions, and especially the judicial role, lead one to think that despite the explicit rejection of the Socialist era in Article U) of the Fundamental Law in Hungary, the new constitutional regime has familiar attitudes to the understanding of the rule of law and the role of the judiciary in promoting the enforcement of the new, supra legal concepts of a transformative nature, which, however, are filled in with the ruling political ideology, whether it be socialist legality or national constitutional identity.

An independent judiciary is a centrally important economic institution, and one that facilitates and promotes the protection of property rights, thereby fostering economic growth and development. On the other hand, extrajudicial lynchings, at least in the context of US states, have been tied to a lack of property rights and their protection (Carden in Institutions and southern development: lynching as a signal of insecure property rights. Ph.D. Dissertation. Washington University, 2006). However, these two areas of research have not been simultaneously explored. This study rectifies that by evaluating how a relatively independent judiciary might affect lynching rates across US states between 1883 and 1930. Overall, the results suggest that a relatively more independent judiciary (as measured through the method of selection and term length) is associated with a lower likelihood of observing a lynching in a given jurisdiction. This is true for both state courts of last resort and state courts of general jurisdiction.

Jacob Levy describes three variants of the separation of powers in the 31st Annual McDonald Lecture in Constitutional Studies, only one of which is germane to this reflection. The first variant he describes is based solely on the independence of the judiciary from both the executive and legislative branches of governments; consequently, this variant encompasses both presidential and parliamentary systems under its conceptual ambit. Another variant, which Levy attributes to Montesquieu, envisages the separation of powers between executive, judicial, and legislative branches as a way of allowing for the “pooled”1 rule of “the one” (i.e. monarch), “the few” (i.e. aristocrats), and “the many” (i.e. the people). Levy also describes a distinctly American variant of the separation of powers undergirded by a system of checks and balances. This variant was designed to ensure “mutual monitoring between executive and legislative”2 and it vests the legislative branch with the power to impeach the executive in order to “maintain effective limits on the political power and the political ambition of the president.”3

Democracies exist all over the world. In democratic states, elected officials make collective decisions on behalf of the people. People of a state are allowed to regulate their elected officials by unique institutions such as regular elections, the right to free political participation, universal adult suffrage. Similarly, the freedom of the press. In the state where democracy is assured, government agencies (executive, judiciary, and legislature) operate in individual and collective domains to fulfil their constitutional responsibilities. Every person has a direct relationship with these critical institutions, especially the judiciary. The parties' grievances are filed with the state's administrative body in the event of a violation of duty or citizens' rights. Judicial independence is essential for the state's citizens' rights to be protected. If there is judicial independence, there will equal rights for the citizens.

Research on tradition can be approached from various perspectives. It can be a study of key personalities or important scholarly works, or influential positions or documents adopted by the State within the international normative process. Concepts such as statehood, territorial integrity, equal participation in international decision- making and, recently, the rule of law in international law, have been of relevance and interest both in practice and academic research in the field of international law in Latvia. The proposition is put forward that research in international law by the scholars of a particular State is closely linked to the interests and issues which that State is confronted with in practice.

EnglishAs a central principle of democracy and the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary is a fundamental value with a universal vocation. It has been guaranteed by many international agreements, yet it is not recognized everywhere and is the object of blatant violations in certain states, even in Europe. In France, the multiplication of reference documents, the different modalities of guarantee depending on the categories of judges, the discussion about its scope of application, the confusion between judges and public prosecutors, and political resistance have given a controversial image of this value which weakens it in the eyes of citizens. And yet, apart from rare mishandlings, its value is clearly perceived and rigorously implemented by judges in their ordinary activity. francaisPrincipe central de la democratie et de l’Etat de droit, l’independance de la justice est une valeur fondamentale a vocation universelle. Garantie par de nombreuses conventions internationales, elle n’est cependant pas partout reconnue et fait l’objet de violations spectaculaires dans certains Etats, meme en Europe. En France, la multiplication des textes de reference, les modalites variables de la garantie selon les categories de juges, les discussions sur son champ d’application, la confusion entre juges et procureurs, ainsi que les resistances politiques, en donnent une image controversee qui affaiblit son credit dans l’opinion des citoyens. Et pourtant, a quelques rares derives pres, sa valeur est clairement percue et rigoureusement pratiquee par les juges dans leur activite ordinaire.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo investigar qual é o papel das Cortes Constitucionais na América Latina, considerando as peculiaridades institucionais e regionais dos diferentes países, bem como os seus contextos mais ou menos democráticos. A partir desse recorte, pretende-se analisar, especificamente, como os Tribunais Constitucionais da região se comportam quando confrontados com interesses governistas e de elites políticas, quais são suas peculiaridades e semelhanças, como são moldados por suas instituições, sua cultura jurídica, seus contextos, bem como pela sua inter-relação com os demais Poderes. A fim de atingir os seus objetivos, a pesquisa se desenvolve com base na opção de uma linha crítico-metodológica, a partir de estudos da ciência política e de análises comparativas. Ao final, conclui-se que, na América Latina, diante dos sistemas presidencialistas adotados, há um grande potencial para que Cortes Constitucionais entrem em confronto com o Presidente para buscar o equilíbrio entre os Poderes; comumente é realizado um cálculo estratégico pela Corte quando a decisão tende a desagradar o governo ou as elites políticas; as garantias institucionais de independência judicial, a cultura jurídica e fatores conjunturais, relacionados à unidade ou à fragmentação da base governista, tendem a influenciar na decisão das Cortes; a atuação dos Tribunais Constitucionais nos países latino-americanos possuem grande complexidade, e a sua real capacidade de melhorar as condições democráticas é muito mais limitada do que teorias constitucionais standard sugerem.

The article considers the goals and process of formation of the European Union as a regional intergovernmental organization. The general concept of the values of the European Union in the light of the Lisbon Treaty is given. The role and place of the EU normative documents - the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, in the formation of the fundamental values of the union are analyzed. The author notes that the basis of the values of the European Union is a set of fundamental human rights.The significance of the Copenhagen criteria for promoting the implementation of EU values by the state is analyzed. The Copenhagen Declaration identifies three sectors of requirements for a country aspiring to join the Community: the political sector, which requires the establishment and observance of the principles of democracy and the rule of human rights, and the economic sector, which requires fair competition. The third set of requirements is purely procedural and concerns the state’s obligation to adhere to the EU accession procedure.The author examines the state of implementation of the fundamental principles of the Union in the founding states on the example of the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, as well as the implementation of Union values in countries that have recently become full members of the European Community. Thus, in Germa-ny and France today there is a fairly high level of implementation and compliance with the basic principles of the European Union, while in Poland recently there are some problems with this. Thus, for the last 7 years, this state has violated the values of the EU in two categories at once - in the category of personal and political rights. In 2020, the number of legal grounds for abortion in the Republic of Poland was limited, violating the right to the integrity of the person and his or her inviolability, which is one of the core values of the European Union.Іn 2017, the European Commission filed a lawsuit against Poland in the European Court of Justice for violating the requirements of the EU Treaty regarding the principle of judicial independence.

We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges by analysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favour of the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does the government actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? To answer these questions we construct a dataset of all Supreme Court of India cases involving the government from 1999 till 2014, with an indicator for whether the decision was in its favour or not. We find that pandering incentives have a causal effect on judicial decision-making. The exposure of a judge to pandering incentives in a case is jointly determined by 1) whether the case is politically salient (exogenously determined by a system of random allocation of cases) and 2) whether the judge retires with enough time left in a government’s term to be rewarded with a prestigious job (date of retirement is exogenously determined by law to be their 65th birthday). We find that pandering occurs through through the more active channel of writing favourable judgements rather than passively being on a bench that decides a case in favour of the government. Furthermore, we find that deciding in favour of the government is positively associated with both the likelihood and the speed with which judges are appointed to prestigious post-Supreme Court jobs. These findings suggest the presence of corruption in the form government influence over judicial decision-making that seriously undermines judicial independence.

Anthropologists, historians, and political economists suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and enforces agreements in the absence of a state. We ground these accounts in a series of formal models that shows the relationship between feuding, informal arbitration, and formal judicial resolution. Feuding enables cooperation by deterring exploitative behavior, but its ability to do so is conditioned by two credible commitment problems that affect both militarily weak and strong actors. These commitment problems can be partially ameliorated through arbitration, even in the absence of coercive authority, by providing information that makes the wronged party’s threat to feud more credible. Transitioning to a formal, coercive justice system, however, represents a qualitative change to the nature of disputing—a change that can be universally beneficial. We therefore provide a new explanation for the creation of independent courts rooted in the logic of dispute resolution and illustrate this explanation with reference to the creation of the Imperial Chamber Court of the Holy Roman Empire.

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.

Az Alaptörvény bíróságokat érintő része az elmúlt tíz év alatt többször módosult. A tanulmány nem érint minden változást, így nem tárgyai az elemzésnek a közigazgatási bíráskodással kapcsolatos kérdések. E munkában a bírói függetlenség szempontját előtérbe helyezve mutatunk be néhány olyan – egykor közérdeklődésre számot tartott – ügyet, amellyel összefüggésben az Alaptörvény is módosult. Így foglalkozunk – a túlzott munkateher csökkentése és a jogviták észszerű határidőn belül történő elbírálása céljából létrehozott – ügyáthelyezés lehetőségével, továbbá a bírók korai nyugdíjazásával, valamint a bíróságok központi igazgatására létrehozott alkotmányos konstrukcióval. A tanulmány második része a bírói függetlenség egyes kérdéseit az ítélkező bíró szemszögéből elemzi. Nem titkolt célunk gyakorlati érveket felhozni a mellett, hogy az igazságszolgáltatás jogállami működését az elmúlt tíz évben nem érte csorba.

The rule of law is a principle of constitutional importance under the European Convention on Human Rights. For decades, it has guided the work of the Strasbourg Court. The article discusses the principle’s ideological core as a fundamental component of “European public order” and its three normative dimensions, as they find their expression in the case-law of the Court. The author then discusses in detail the rule of law’s most important structural principle under the Convention, the independence of the judiciary.

Aim. This research aims to discuss the importance of the principle of rule of law in protecting the judiciary’s role, especially the independence of constitutional adjudication and its functions. Methods. The study applies the case study approach and comparative method to investigate the constitutional court systems of some countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their independence. Results and conclusion. The resultsreveal a lack of the judiciary’s independence, even among the top branches that are trying to implement democracy in Myanmar. The judiciary is under the control of the executive and legislature branches as their members belong to political parties. Moreover, a constitutional court is established with the members who are elected and nominated by the legislature and executive. Sometimes there can be conflicts when constitutional law does not mention the division of powers among governmental organisations like Myanmar, which results from the impractical functions of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar. Cognitive value. This research highlights possible ways to solve the constitutional issues among the three great branches. This initiative is in the interest of Myanmar citizens and citizens of all nations as these are international issues.

This article discusses the role of the institute of judicial review in ensuring the independence of the judiciary; its importance in ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens; its differences from fair trial; its types and forms of implementation; its subjects and objects; its purpose and content; its characteristics of execution through legal and disciplinary norms; its functions in law enforcement, regulation, organizational maintenance, education; as well as its prospects in strengthening the independence of the judiciary from other branches of government.

In a context where the criminal courts have been drastically affected by coronavirus, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the presumption of innocence risks becoming a further casualty of Covid-19. It will argue that prolonged pre-trial detention of unconvicted defendants has been sanctioned by the senior judiciary under the Custody Time Limit (CTL) Regulations. Following a series of important CTL decisions, a universal position of the senior judiciary, one supportive of government, is emerging: despite the case backlog resulting in defendants facing trial delays of unknown length, the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic which the executive faces, amounts to ‘good cause’ to extend CTLs. It will be argued that the correct approach for courts to follow is that that they must hear evidence that justifies why no court rooms are available before using that to mandate extensions. It will be further contended that these far-reaching decisions came from the senior judiciary's perceived need to mop up the problem posed by widespread refusals to extend CTLs, raising questions as to their ability to act independently of political pressure.

This paper addresses the relationship between civil liberties and socio-economic development in post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis focuses on three categories of civil liberties: private civil liberties, political civil liberties, and physical integrity rights. The methodology used in the study consists of a panel vector autoregressive model. Our results imply that GDP growth in post-socialist states positively reacts to changes in civil liberties, while civil liberties positively react to changes in GDP growth. Moreover, the outcomes of the model suggest the presence of various intermediaries in the relationship between civil liberties and economic development in post-socialist states. These are domestic investment, foreign direct investment, total factor productivity, and judicial independence.

This project studies public opinion towards the enforcement of rule of law and judicial independence in particular in the European Union. The project aims to understand the drivers of perceived legitimacy of enforcement actions in the eyes of the citizens of a country being 'punished' by the EU for violations of the rule of law. The study is based on a survey experiment conducted in Poland - a target of EU financial sanctions with respect to judicial independence.

Previous research has analysed a range of domestic stakeholders that make national governments’ commitments to international human rights law credible, including an independent judiciary, legislative veto players, political opposition groups, and non-governmental organizations. But how do the power dynamics within the government affect state compliance with international human rights law? Building on the basic understanding that international human rights law needs to pass through domestic political and administrative processes before it can be implemented on the ground, this article articulates a reputation-based theoretical framework to explain how the lack of reputational mechanisms at the local level and national leaders’ shifting of blame for non-compliance to sub-national officials and the internal governance structure – two salient characteristics in a decentralized political system – make international human rights law less effective. A case study of US compliance with Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations sheds light on how international reputational concerns interact with divided authority structure to shape national leaders’ and subnational authorities’ policy responses to the enforcement of international human rights standards.

The article covers the international standards and reveals their features in the context of the formation of the judiciary as a basis for improving the guarantees of independence of the court and judges. It is established that the reorganization of the judiciary will affect the relationship between the Supreme Council of Justice and the Supreme Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine. Ensuring the independence of the judiciary is currently one of the main priorities of this reorganization. It is determined that the main principles of independence of the judiciary and judges are legality, freedom of personal beliefs, in particular, a high level of legal awareness. It is established that one of the guarantees of the independence of the court and judges is the procedure of selecting candidates for the position of a judge. It was found out that a judge could not be subject to disciplinary action for a court decision that he had made, except in cases of a crime or disciplinary misconduct. It is proved that the main grounds for bringing a judge to disciplinary responsibility are: 1) cases of frequent reversal of court decisions made by a particular judge, based on the grounds of their illegality and/or unfoundedness; 2) non-compliance by a judge with the requirements of procedural decisions, which provide the basic principles of the tasks of court proceedings, or failure to take into account some evidence that is present in the case file during the trial and the relevant court decision. It is established that the international standards of formation of the corps of judges are divided into 1) standards that determine the procedure for selection of staff for the position of a judge; 2) standards that contain requirements for personnel applying for the position of a judge; 3) standards that define the features of the training of judges; 4) standards that define guarantees in the course of judges’ performance of their duties. It is proposed to identify areas of legal and organizational improvement of forming the judiciary in Ukraine as the prospects for further research in this direction., У статті висвітлено міжнародні стандарти та розкрито їх особливості у контексті формування корпусу суддів як основи вдосконалення гарантій незалежності суду та суддів. Встановлено, що реорганізація судової системи вплине на взаємовідносини між Вищою радою правосуддя та Вищою кваліфікаційною комісією суддів України, причому забезпечення незалежності судової системи є на сьогодні одним із головних пріоритетів реорганізації. Визначено що основними засадами незалежності судової системи та судді безпосередньо виступають законність, свобода особистих переконань, зокрема високий рівень правосвідомості. Встановлено, що однією із гарантій незалежності суду та суддів виступає процедура добору кандидатів, що претендують на посаду судді. З’ясовано, що суддя не може бути притягнений до дисциплінарної відповідальності за судове рішення, яке ним ухвалено, окрім випадків вчинення ним злочину чи дисциплінарного проступку. Доведено, що основними підставами притягнення судді до дисциплінарної відповідальності виступають: 1) випадки частого скасування судових рішень, що ухвалені конкретним суддею, виходячи із підстав їх незаконності та/або необґрунтованості; 2) недотримання суддею вимог процесуальних рішень, якими передбачено основні засади виконання завдань судового провадження, чи не взяття до уваги деяких доказів, які є присутніми у матеріалах справи у ході розгляду судової справи та ухвалення за нею відповідного судового рішення. Встановлено, що міжнародні стандарти формування корпусу суддів поділяються на: 1) стандарти, які визначають процедуру добору кадрів на посаду судді; 2) стандарти, що містять вимоги до кадрів, що претендують на посаду судді; 3) стандарти, якими визначено особливості підготовки суддів; 4) стандарти, що визначають гарантії у ході виконання суддями покладених на них посадових обов’язків. Запропоновано перспективами подальших досліджень у цьому напрямі визначити напрямки правового та організаційного удосконалення концепції формування корпусу суддів в Україні.

For more than a decade, Nepal has been undergoing a process of re-democratisation, its third transition to democracy since the 1950s. Among the key pillars of the new democratic regime has been the...

This article analyzes judicial tenure and its impact on judicial independence in jurisdiction of Uzbekistan and the United States. The author gains critical insight into judicial tenure in both countries and offers a proposal to reconsider judicial tenure in Uzbekistan based on his empirical research.

The legal system of Oman is a junction of the locally inherent religious legal norms and foreign influence of the French and British legal systems. The legal documents of the country, such as Constitution Articles 60 and 61, may claim that the judiciary is independent, yet the Omani experience within the executive branch, and its role in legislation, demonstrate that the Middle-Eastern state stands in contrast to the United Kingdom (UK), where the separation of powers (SOP) has been in effect since at least 1701. As is indicative of the common historical theme, considering the powers of the sultan, Oman may be said to be in need of popular participation through the parliamentary branches, for the creation of a regional prosecutorial body, and the enforcement of international judicial independence and conduct resolutions. Oman showed a positive response during the peaceful protests in 2011. Still, Oman may require national conferences to discuss such cases with popular participation.

While an independent judiciary is considered an indispensable component of the rule of law, attacks of the domestic political power on the independence of the judicial branch are observed today in several European States. The European judges (CJUE, ECtHR) appear to be the “last soldier standing” in the defense of judicial independence and they have in no case remained indifferent. This contribution contains an analysis of the dynamic approaches that the CJEU and the ECtHR have adopted in order to reinforce the guarantees of independence that domestic judges enjoy under European Law (EU and ECHR law). An emphasis is put on the international judicial function of these Courts as protective and promoting judicial independence at the national level, arguing that both Courts assumed their role as guarantors of the common European value of the rule of law through a proactive stance, without going, however, to the extremes. Furthermore, the paper provides an examination on the fact that the European Courts have adopted measures in order to assure the effectiveness of the European guarantees of judicial independence. A particular focus is put on the protection through interim measures as a means of assuring an effective protection of the independence of national judges. Considering a comparative analysis, the issue of the ECtHR’s potential in this regard is hereby tackled, notably after the recent evolution in the case-law of the CJEU.

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing serious crisis, which has impeded its normal function. To address this impasse, this article suggests a reform of the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism: the establishment of a new megamultilateral court to substitute for the Appellate Body. The first part of this paper addresses the reasons for considering this approach. The second part identifies how to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO. The third part puts forward an idea of the function of the Dispute Settlement Body, which would serve as a forum for adjudicators and State Parties of the mega-multilateral court, in order to balance judicial independence, judicial accountability, and consistency. In discussing the reason for this reform, approaches to implementing it, and other examples of what form it might take, this article concludes that it is appropriate to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO.

Accumulated empirical studies have examined how various qualities of governance affect happiness across countries. This study contributes to prior studies by testing a hypothesis that when developing countries lack effective legal and political institutions, capable government may substitute for their functions to promote happiness via effective policy planning and implementation. To test this expectation, this study compares which qualities of governance—government capacity, democracy, and legal system—matter for happiness in developing countries. While prior studies have overwhelmingly relied on the World Governance Indicator to measure government capacity, we introduce a new measure—government competitiveness—developed by the Center for Government Competitiveness, which overcomes some criticisms. Using this indicator, we employ pooled Ordinary Least Square and two-way fixed effects panel data analysis for 80 non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries spanning the years 2015–2018. As a robustness test, we conduct instrumental variable estimation, using geography as an instrument for government competitiveness. Our analysis shows that government competitiveness has a positive and statistically robust effect on happiness across all estimations, while quality of democracy and judicial independence display ambivalent effects. Our instrumental variable results suggest that judicial independence and quality of democracy display a substituting and complementing relationship with government competitiveness, respectively. Points for practitioners This article suggests that institutional arrangements for promoting happiness in developing countries differ from developed countries. In developing countries: (1) government competitiveness may play a more important role than judicial and democratic institutions; and (2) government competitiveness may complement democratic institutions but substitute for judicial institutions. For developing countries facing resource constraints, this article recommends policymakers to prioritize fostering competitive government for promoting happiness.

The right-wing populist Law and Justice party , which came to power in 2015 in Poland, sought not only to implement its conservative and Christian ideas through the executive and the legislative powers, but also to influence the justice. This article presents an analysis of legal acts adopted or amended on the initiative of this ruling party, which shows how the judicial power has been systematically usurped by this political party, in spite of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, and states that the principle of judicial independence has been violated.

Admissibility of questions for preliminary ruling – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as Dorsch Consult criterion under Article 267 TFEU – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as element of the Rule of Law value under Article 19 TEU – Structural inadmissibility of questions for preliminary ruling as perverse consequence of the attempts to safeguard independence of the EU judiciary

Indonesian democracy from every period of government will continue to experience development towards maturity. In the life of the state, corruption cannot be separated. The role of political institutions and democratic maturity is very large in eradicating corruption, collusion and nepotism. This study uses secondary data, with used the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) and the Anti-Corruption Perspectives Index (Indeks Persepsi Anti-Korupsi/IPEK) which is sourced from the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency. Data processing using multiple linear regression statistical analysis. The Indonesian Democracy Index consists of variables of the role of the DPRD, the role of political parties, the role of the local government bureaucracy and the role of an independent judiciary. It was found that the role of DPRD has a significant positive effect on IPAK, the role of political parties has a significant negative effect on IPAK, the role of local government bureaucracy is significant positive and the role of an independent court is not significantly negative for IPAK. It is hoped that to improve the social community that is aware on anti-corruption, it is necessary to increase the role of the DPRD and the role of the local government bureaucracy in accordance with their duties and functions in the government together to eradicate corruption and form a new culture oriented towards the prevention and eradication of corruption.

En tiempos recientes el recurso por incumplimiento ha cobrado protagonismo como mecanismo estratégico, en manos de la Comisión, para perseguir desviaciones de los principios del Estado de Derecho en los Estados miembros. Los asuntos relativos a la independencia de los jueces en Polonia han concitado un gran interés académico, pero es en las causas por incumplimiento abiertas contra Hungría donde, por primera vez, se han hecho juicios negativos de conformidad de leyes estatales con la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales. Estas sentencias pioneras producen un impacto más fuerte de las disposiciones de la Carta sobre los Estados miembros y ya constan como precedentes para futuros casos.