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Noting that the demand for overseas emergency relief increased, the Korean government ambitiously launched disaster-management diplomacy in the 2000s. This paper argues that the Korean gove...

When in the autumn of 1934 Harry Hopkins hired Martha Gellhorn to investigate how the welfare system really worked, he probably had not thought about the kinds of work the seasoned reporter would do for his new agency, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA).1 Typical of her approach to investigative journalism, Gellhorn found people and stories, and processed information at top speed: she did not do quantitative work, she did reporting based on people.

This article refers to selected issues elaborated from my interdisciplinary doctoral thesis accomplished at the University of South Africa in 2019. I investigated the ethical-theoretical frameworks as well as practices of Christian humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Germany by combining a theoretical part (including philosophy, theology, business studies and development studies) and an empirical part. The empirical part was accomplished by interviewing 11 NGOs from the humanitarian field (development and/or relief agencies in an international context). The findings of theory and practice showed that many Christian NGOs typically conform to the secular mindset and regulations in order to be able to function as organisations. The results also revealed that Christian NGOs have difficulties in defining their identity in order to be attractive and convincing to their current and prospective employees and donors. In addition, organisational and hierarchical structures are mostly taken from business companies but do not necessarily always fit to the individual organisations. The research is significant because it shows to what extent these NGOs experience tensions and insecurities having to work in a secular environment, and it helps to identify some typical challenges that Christian organisations face in Western countries. The purpose of the thesis was to impact on the reflection and practice of leaders of NGOs in their quest to understand developments and paradigm shifts, and ensure that they will act in a recognisably Christian way. Contribution: This article has been held as a presentation at the Leadership Conference in Pretoria, South Africa, in 2019. It contributes to the research of specific Christian leadership, and particularly of leadership in Christian non-governmental organisations. This article aims to describe the challenges these organisations face, having to work in the midst of a secular environment.

Mental health advocates and the general public at large stand poised to take action and urge their elected representatives for emergency funding for community behavioral health organizations faced with program closures and other challenges during this pandemic Mental Health America (MHA) sponsored a virtual Hill Day May 11, which sought to establish the case for increased mental health funding as a key component of any upcoming COVID-19 emergency relief legislation

The essay offers an overview of the humanitarian activities of the American Red Cross in Europe during the Great War and its aftermath. In this period, the American Red Cross (ARC) solidified its status as one of the United States’ most important humanitarian aid organizations. Between 1914 and the early 1920s, tens of thousands of Americans volunteered for service with the ARC, both in the United States and in the organization’s overseas commissions. U.S. citizens, meanwhile, contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to the ARC’s war relief campaigns. With these funds, ARC personnel delivered humanitarian assistance to millions of U.S. and European soldiers. They also provided aid to innumerable civilian men, women, and children, targeting both emergency relief needs and longer-term health and social welfare issues. By the early 1920s, this ARC assistance had reached roughly two-dozen countries, spreading throughout Europe, Russia, and the Near East. Collectively, these efforts represent one of the mos...

This Campbell systematic review examines the effectiveness, efficiency and implementation of cash transfers in humanitarian settings. The review summarises evidence from five studies of effects, 10 studies of efficiency and 108 studies of barriers and facilitators to implementation of cash‐based humanitarian assistance. Studies assessing effectiveness of cash‐based approaches were experimental and quasiexperimental studies. Studies analyzing efficiency were experimental, quasi‐experimental or observational studies with a cost analysis or economic evaluation component. Studies examining barriers and facilitators included these study types as well as other qualitative and mixed methods studies. Unconditional cash transfers and vouchers may improve household food security among conflict‐affected populations and maintain household food security among food insecure and drought‐affected populations. Unconditional cash transfers led to greater improvements in dietary diversity and quality than food transfers, but food transfers are more successful in increasing per capita caloric intake than unconditional cash transfers and vouchers. Unconditional cash transfers may be more effective than vouchers in increasing household savings, and equally effective in increasing household asset ownership. Mobile transfers may be a more successful asset protection mechanism than physical cash transfers. Cash transfers can be an efficient strategy for providing humanitarian assistance. Unconditional cash transfer programmes have a lower cost per beneficiary than vouchers which, in turn, have a lower cost per beneficiary than in‐kind food distribution. Cash transfer programs can also benefit the local economy. Voucher programmes generated up to $1.50 of indirect market benefits for each $1 equivalent provided to beneficiaries and unconditional cash transfer programmes generated more than $2 of indirect market benefits for each $1 provided to beneficiaries. Intervention design and implementation play a greater role in determining effectiveness and efficiency of cash‐based approaches than the emergency context or humanitarian sector. Factors which influence implementation include resources available and technical capacity of implementing agencies, resilience of crisis‐affected populations, beneficiary selection methods, use of new technologies, and setting‐specific security issues, none of which are necessarily unique to cash‐based interventions. Plain language summary Cash‐based humanitarian assistance approaches can increase food security and are more cost effective than in‐kind food transfers Both cash‐based approaches and in‐kind food assistance can be effective means of increasing household food security for people who live in areas of conflict. The review in brief Cash‐based approaches have become an increasingly common strategy for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Both cash‐based approaches and in‐kind food assistance can be effective means of increasing household food security among conflict‐affected populations and maintaining household food security among food insecure and drought‐affected populations. Cash transfers are more cost effective than vouchers which are more cost effective than in‐kind food assistance. What is this review about? This review assesses the effects of cash‐based approaches on individual and household outcomes in humanitarian emergencies. It also assesses the efficiency of different cash‐based approaches and identifies factors that hinder and facilitate programme implementation. What is the aim of this review? This Campbell systematic review examines the effectiveness, efficiency and implementation of cash transfers in humanitarian settings. The review summarises evidence from five studies of effects, 10 studies of efficiency and 108 studies of barriers and facilitators to implementation of cash‐based humanitarian assistance. What are the main findings of this review? What studies are included? Studies assessing effectiveness of cash‐based approaches were experimental and quasi‐experimental studies. Studies analyzing efficiency were experimental, quasi‐experimental or observational studies with a cost analysis or economic evaluation component. Studies examining barriers and facilitators included these study types as well as other qualitative and mixed methods studies. Unconditional cash transfers and vouchers may improve household food security among conflict‐affected populations and maintain household food security among food insecure and drought‐affected populations. Unconditional cash transfers led to greater improvements in dietary diversity and quality than food transfers, but food transfers are more successful in increasing per capita caloric intake than unconditional cash transfers and vouchers. Unconditional cash transfers may be more effective than vouchers in increasing household savings, and equally effective in increasing household asset ownership. Mobile transfers may be a more successful asset protection mechanism than physical cash transfers. Cash transfers can be an efficient strategy for providing humanitarian assistance. Unconditional cash transfer programmes have a lower cost per beneficiary than vouchers which, in turn, have a lower cost per beneficiary than in‐kind food distribution. Cash transfer programs can also benefit the local economy. Voucher programmes generated up to $1.50 of indirect market benefits for each $1 equivalent provided to beneficiaries and unconditional cash transfer programmes generated more than $2 of indirect market benefits for each $1 provided to beneficiaries. Intervention design and implementation play a greater role in determining effectiveness and efficiency of cash‐based approaches than the emergency context or humanitarian sector. Factors which influence implementation include resources available and technical capacity of implementing agencies, resilience of crisis‐affected populations, beneficiary selection methods, use of new technologies, and setting‐specific security issues, none of which are necessarily unique to cash‐based interventions. What do the findings of this review mean? Unconditional cash transfers and vouchers can be effective and efficient ways to provide humanitarian assistance. Each assistance modality has different advantages and disadvantages that should be considered in the design of future interventions. However, no definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of cash transfer or voucher programmes could be drawn that are universally applicable for humanitarian policy. Further development of the evidence base, with more rigorous evaluations comparing the effectiveness of different cash‐based approaches and transfer modalities, as well as approaches to comparing costs and benefits of cash‐transfer and voucher programmes, is needed to further strengthen the evidence base. How up‐to‐date is this review? The review authors searched for studies published up to November 2014. This Campbell systematic review was published in December 2017. Executive summary BACKGROUND Humanitarian actors have a responsibility to ensure that assistance is provided in a way that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits to people affected by crisis. However, there are many challenges in evaluating ‘what works’ in addressing the needs of crisis‐affected populations, and translating research evidence into practice in complex environments with limited resources. Humanitarian assistance has traditionally been provided in the form of in‐kind goods and services: temporary shelters, food and non‐food items, water and medical care. However, as the nature of humanitarian crises has shifted over the last few decades, cash‐based approaches have become an increasingly common strategy for the provision of humanitarian assistance and are widely considered an appropriate, and sometimes preferable, substitute for in‐kind assistance when conditions permit. Increasing use of cash‐based approaches has been accompanied by efforts to evaluate cash‐based interventions and develop recommendations for implementation in a range of settings. Systematic reviews of evidence in humanitarian settings are,however,relatively rare, and, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic review of the effects of cash‐based approaches in emergencies to date. OBJECTIVES The primary objective of this review wasto assess and synthesize existing evidence on the effects of cash‐based approaches on individual and household outcomes in humanitarian emergencies. The secondary objective was to assess the efficiency of different cash‐based approaches and identify factors that hinder and facilitate programme implementation. REVIEW METHODS We followed standard methodological procedures for review of experimental and quasi‐experimental studies to assess the effects of unconditional cash transfer, conditional cash transfer and voucher programmes for crisis‐affected populations. We also adapted these procedures to review economic studies assessing the efficiency of cash‐based approaches and observational, qualitative and mixed method studies assessing the factors that facilitate or hinder the implementation of cash‐based approaches in different settings. We conducted comprehensive searches of published and unpublished literature in November 2014. Two independent research assistants screened all identified studies to determine eligibility for inclusion in the review. We then extracted data from all included studies using a standardized coding tool and critically appraised the studies using existing tools appropriate for the different study designs. Due to the heterogeneity of the comparisons and outcomes reported in the included studies, we were not able to synthesize the studies using meta‐analysis. Instead, we have presentedthe results in tables and synthesised the findings narratively. We used narrative and thematic synthesis to address the secondary objective. We conducted these analyses in parallel, and have reported on each separately in subsequent chapters of this review. REVIEW FINDINGS Out of 4,094 studies identified in the initial search, a total of 113 publications (108 unique studies) were included in this systematic review. Only nine studies were found in peer‐reviewed publications. Overall, we have considered the body of evidence reviewed to have been of low quality due to methodological limitations. While the evidence reviewed offers some insights, the paucity of rigorous research on cash‐based approaches limits the strength of the conclusions. This is not uncommon amongtopics related to humanitarian assistance. The following table summarizes the types of studies reviewed in each section of this report: Review Topic Studies Reviewed Study Characteristics Effects of cash‐based approaches on: • Individual and household‐level economic outcomes • Sector‐specific humanitarian outcomes • Cross‐cutting humanitarian outcomes 5 Settings: DR Congo, Ecuador, Niger, Lebanon, Yemen Interventions: Unconditional cash transfers, vouchers Study designs: Randomized control trials (factorial and stratified cluster designs), regression discontinuity Efficiency of cash‐based approaches in achieving humanitarian objectives 10 Settings: DR Congo, Ecuador, Niger, Lebanon, Yemen Interventions: Unconditional cash transfers, vouchers Study designs: Cost, cost‐efficiency, cost‐effectiveness, cost‐benefit, market impact Factors facilitating and hindering realization of cash programme activities and the achievement of humanitarian objectives in different contexts 108 Settings: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chile, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Niger, Malawi, Mozambique, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Interventions: Unconditional cash transfers, vouchers, conditional cash transfers (cash for work) Study designs: descriptive (quantitative), qualitative (narrative or thematic analysis), mixed methods Main findings: Effectiveness of cash‐based approaches (chapter 5): Five studies assessed the effects of cash‐based approaches, four of which assessed effects on household level food security outcomes. Unconditional cash transfers and vouchers may improve household food security among conflict‐affected populations and maintain household food security within the context of food insecurity crises and drought. Studies found that unconditional cash transfers led to greater improvements in dietary diversity and quality than food transfers. Food transfers were found to be more successful in increasing per capita caloric intake than unconditional cash transfers and vouchers. Few studies measure changes in household economic indicators, other sectoral outcomes and cross‐cutting outcomes. Unconditional cash transfers may be more effective than vouchers in increasing household savings, and equally effective in increasing household assets. Mobile transfers may be a more successful asset protection mechanism than physical cash transfers. Efficiency of cash‐based approaches (chapter 6): Ten studies assessed the efficiency of cash based approaches. Cash transfers and vouchers may be more cost‐efficient than in‐kind food distribution. Studies found that unconditional cash transfer programmes have a lower cost per beneficiary than comparison interventions (either vouchers, in‐kind food distribution or both); and vouchers have a lower cost per beneficiary than in‐kind food distribution. In‐kind food distribution has substantially higher administrative costs per dollar value provided to a beneficiary than unconditional cash transfers. Cash‐based approaches may have positive economic multiplier effects. Voucher programmes generated up to $1.50 of indirect market benefits for each $1 equivalent provided to beneficiaries and unconditional cash transfer programmes generated more than $2 of indirect market benefits for each $1 provided to beneficiaries. Factors facilitating and hindering implementation of cash‐based approaches (chapter 7): Evidence suggests that intervention design and implementation play a greater role in determining effectiveness and efficiency of cash‐based approaches than the emergency context or humanitarian sector. Specific factors shown to influence implementation include resources available and technical capacity of implementing agencies, resilience of crisis‐affected populations, beneficiary selection methods, use of new technologies, and setting‐specific security issues, none of which are necessarily unique to cash‐based interventions. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Despite the widespread use and increasing number of evaluations of cash‐based humanitarian assistance, there is a paucity of rigorous evidence about how best to address the needs of crisis‐affected populations. This is not surprising, as studies meeting the methodological criteria for inclusion in most systematic reviews are relatively rare in emergency settings. Findings suggests that both cash‐based approaches and in‐kind food assistance can be effective means of increasing household food security among conflict‐affected populations and maintaining household food security among food insecure and drought‐affected populations; each assistance modality has different advantages and disadvantages that should be considered in the design of future interventions. However, no definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of cash transfer or voucher programmes could be drawn that are universally applicable for humanitarian policy. Further development of the evidence base, with more rigorous evaluations comparing the effectiveness of different cash‐based approaches (or combinations of approaches) and transfer modalities, as well as standardized approaches to documenting and comparing both costs and benefits of cash‐transfer and voucher programmes, is needed to further strengthen the evidence base in this area.

O presente ensaio tem por objetivo abordar o tema da judicialização da saúde, mais especificamente do deferimento de tutelas de urgência; o uso da medicina baseada em evidências como alternativa para arrefecimento dessa crise institucional; e fomentar o debate em torno de propostas viáveis para minimizar os impactos deletérios da judicialização sobre a gestão do sistema de saúde.

When the first British troops entered Bergen-Belsen concentration camp on 15 April 1945 it was obvious the liberators had no idea about what was to confront them. During the following days and weeks, specialized military units, six relief teams provided by the British Red Cross and the Society of Friends, two platoons from the American Field Service and around one hundred medical students, among others, were called to take care of the 60,000 dying, sick, starving, and exhausted people at the camp. While the role the British military and medical students played in providing emergency relief in Belsen has been the focus of intensive research, little is known about the contribution of voluntary organizations. Based on widely unknown archival documents and personal papers, this chapter will examine the work of British and American voluntary organizations in Belsen immediately after liberation.

Food insecurity continues to be prevalent in parts of Africa. In December 2015, there were approximately 21.6 million food insecure people in the Horn and East Africa. Climate change is likely to exacerbate current volatility of agricultural production and lead to further food insecurity. Whilst the academic literature has acknowledged the complexity of food insecurity and systems, it is not clear to what extent this has been translated into practice. We argue that there is a tendency to explain complex failures of food systems as ‘droughts’, with insufficient attention paid to other drivers. We analyse humanitarian documents and climate outlook statements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia and assess how these are reflected in the humanitarian responses to food insecurity in the region by analysing the financing of humanitarian operations. Our findings indicate that the continued evolution in understanding the complex causes of food insecurity and attempts to move away from emergency relief to a more...

With billions of dollars in emergency relief and long-term reconstruction aid on the table, post-earthquake Haiti was supposed to provide an opportunity to “build back better,” as the focusgroup-fr...

This paper considers the damage to household toilets in the aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake through the lens of good performance in progress towards national sanitation targets. In doing so it highlights the very different drivers of development and emergency relief, an issue that is rarely documented. It draws upon expert opinion and first-hand observation to put a spotlight on conflicting approaches in the transition phase and seeks to understand how these were navigated at the national policy level and in practice at the district level. In doing so the paper contributes to discussions about what better preparedness measures could be undertaken and how sanitation gains can be maintained in the face of natural hazards/climate change and supported better after disaster strikes.

In early April, 1934, a report reached the desk of Harry Hopkins, the Director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and a close advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt. A covering ...

As famine takes hold in South Sudan and threatens to spread to northeastern Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, world leaders must immediately step up to fully fund the United Nations' appeal for $6.3 billion. Of this amount, $4.9 billion is urgently needed by July for critical assistance, including health, food, nutrition, and water. If lives are to be saved, humanitarian agencies must be able to rapidly scale up and access people in need. World leaders must not walk away from key meetings, such as the Group of Seven Taormina Summit in Italy and the Group of Twenty Hamburg Summit in Germany, without taking action to increase funding, improve access, resolve conflict and insecurity, and ensure that emergency relief is coupled with long-term approaches to building resilience in affected countries.

In this article, I mobilize key JuD publications to demonstrate that while the JuD preaches murderous jihad against non-believers outside of Pakistan, it collaborates with the state in trying to dissuade Pakistanis from undertaking violence within the state, whether against state or non-state targets, to include Pakistan’s various religious minorities. Unsurprisingly, some of JuD’s numerous publications deal with the Hindu and Christian minorities within Pakistan, which are the largest religious minorities in the country. In this essay, I exposit what JuD says about these non-Muslims who live among Pakistani Muslims, including Ahmadis, about which the organization is generally silent. I argue here that while it supports brutal slaughter of so-called kuffar (pl. of kafar, “nonbeliever”) abroad, it argues for the conversion of religious minorities at home through the provision of medical and other social services, emergency relief and extensive proselytization.

Cuba currently has more than 38,000 health workers providing emergency relief, long-term community-based care and medical education to some of the most vulnerable communities in the world. This current outreach to 76 countries positions Cuba as a leader in global health outreach. This has been well documented and praised by many scholars and policy makers alike. While many acknowledge the importance and impact of the Cuba’s global effort, there is very little understanding as to why Cuba makes such a large global health commitment in the first place. I argue that solidarity is in fact a mixture of national pride, self-interest and humanistic outreach. Ultimately, it is a calculated effort to overcome current structures of inequity and exploitation on a global scale by expanding new opportunities for health professionals dedicated to providing care in marginalized communities.

In this article, we discuss the role of the Netherlands with respect to the Darfur crisis during 2003–2005. From the moment the crisis broke out, the Netherlands was active as a major donor and tried to facilitate political solutions. During the period January 2004–July 2005, it functioned as the (acting) presidency of the Council of the European Union and was therefore involved in creating a common EU position. We discuss how policy was made while observing internal (domestic) and external (international) influences. We conclude that the Netherlands was partially successful in establishing a more active EU position regarding Darfur. However, we also find evidence that, eventually, the EU has lagged behind the response of the UN Security Council, despite being a major donor to emergency relief and the African Union mission in Sudan.

Where does the humanitarian community sit in relation to continuing debates about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)? The third pillar of R2P is often seen as the practical manifestation of an older idea of humanitarian intervention, given much attention after the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica. Many humanitarians have long been reticent about the idea of so-called humanitarian intervention and, thus, of R2P. This article examines the logic behind this reticence and explores the practical relationship between R2P and humanitarian action. In particular, it focuses on three major crises during Holmes’s time as Emergency Relief Coordination – Darfur, Sri Lanka and Myanmar – and goes on to consider briefly how and why R2P has been invoked, or not, in the more recent crises of Libya and Syria. It concludes with reflections about the implications for the future.

Humanitarian action is undergoing profound changes. Beyond the emergency relief phase, it is becoming involved in the processes that enable victims to regain their autonomy and, more recently, in prevention and risk-reduction policies. This trend is similar to that experienced by humanitarian medicine which, after focusing on emergency situations, is now involved in rehabilitation and prevention programs. The concept of resilience is perfectly suited to each phase of humanitarian interventions. Moreover, local communities are increasingly seeking to achieve their humanitarian emancipation. This trend must be anticipated, specifically by profiling future aid workers, and is similar to that faced by humanitarian medicine.

The famine in Somalia 2011–2012 is a call for critical reflection and improvement. This article reviews lessons emerging from the series of articles in this special edition of Global Food Security, and identifies global implications for famine prevention, mitigation, and response in five key areas: the delay in response, the criteria for declaring a famine, the response, humanitarian space, and accountability. Three areas are identified for further research, including implications of Somalia 2011 for practice and policy; linkages to the resilience agenda and the imperative to prevent—not just respond to—famine; and implications for famine theory. Whether or not famines continue to be part of human existence or are finally relegated to history depends on how well we learn from the experience of Somalia 2011–2012, and how well this learning is incorporated into future policy and practice.

Origin. Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders was founded in 1971 by a small group of doctors and journalists who believed that all people have a right to emergency relief.

Since the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in New York in September 2015, increased attention has been placed on fragile states, where most people live under the poverty line. Because the SDGs focus more on marginalized people, it will become necessary to address issues concerning fragile and conflict-affected countries. Eight out of fifty fragile states are located in Asia and 30% of the overall fragile state population is expected to reside in Asia. Thus, there is an urgent need for policy efforts to address problems regarding fragile states such as severe poverty and underdevelopment. Furthermore, five out of eight Asian fragile states are categorized as priority partner countries of Korea for 2016-2020. However, Korea's support to the fragile states has concentrated on emergency relief and humanitarian aid for recovery and reconstruction after conflicts or disasters. This is not enough to resolve fragilities and thus it is necessary to establish cooperation strategies to support fragile states.This paper provides policy implications on why and how Korea should prepare a cooperation strategy for supporting fragile states in Asia by analyzing and reviewing the definition and scope and current development situation, as well as Korea's policy and support for fragile states.

Apres la crise alimentaire tres mediatisee de 2005, le Niger a connu en 2010 une crise de plus grande ampleur. Cet article cherche a analyser pourquoi les populations nigeriennes sont confrontees a la repetition de crises severes a un rythme tendant a s’accelerer. La crise de 2005 a mis en evidence l’important decalage entre le modele explicatif de la crise alimentaire retenu par le Dispositif national de prevention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (DNPGCA), les determinants reels de l’insecurite alimentaire et leurs representations locales. L’origine de la crise n’etait pas liee a un choc, mais au processus d’appauvrissement des menages ruraux qui a conduit a une crise d’accessibilite aux denrees alimentaires. Par rapport aux crises anterieures, la specificite de cette crise tient a la place prise par la question de la malnutrition des enfants, phenomene endemique au Niger, a travers l’apparition d’interventions de grande envergure. Le deroulement de la crise de 2010 presente de nombreuses similitudes avec la crise precedente. De plus grande ampleur en termes de population affectee, sa prise en charge tardive a debouche sur une reponse d’urgence impliquant une assistance humanitaire exceptionnelle de la communaute internationale. Davantage qu’en 2005, la gestion de la crise nutritionnelle s’est imposee aux intervenants humanitaires comme une priorite. Cela s’explique par l’insuffisance d’investissements jusqu’ici dans la prevention de la malnutrition, mais resulte aussi de la tendance a privilegier les indicateurs nutritionnels dans les diagnostics. Cette strategie a permis d’eviter une catastrophe humanitaire, mais a, par contrecoup, reduit la mobilisation pour la preservation des moyens de production. Dans ce contexte d’affaiblissement de la capacite de reponse des populations, la politique de gestion de crise, centree sur la reponse d’urgence, atteint ses limites : toujours plus couteuse, elle ne parvient pas a enrayer la repetition des crises. Les politiques de securite alimentaire doivent evoluer afin de mieux assurer le renforcement des capacites des menages et lier les interventions dans un continuum prevention-urgence-rehabilitation-developpement.

The Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) contributed remarkably to emergency relief activities during the Great East Japan Earthquake. The NGOs/NPOs were successful in coordinating with the government, private companies, the Council of Social Welfare and other NGOs/NPOs to provide substantial assistance to disaster survivors. The rise of the NGOs/NPOs in providing emergency relief assistance was a new phenomenon in Japan. This article attempts to analyze the reason behind such a rise.

Taliban authorities arrested Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry, American aid workers with the German-based group Shelter Now, on 2 August for show ing a video about Jesus in an Afghan home. Two days later, the Taliban ar rested six other Westerners who worked for the group as well as sixteen Afghan staff members. There were four Germans (Georg Taubmann, Katrin Jelinek, Margrit Stebner, and Silke Durrkopf) and two Australians (Diana Thomas and Peter Bunch). The Westerners were indicted on 30 September and allowed to have a lawyer, Atif Ali Khan of Pakistan. On 31 August, the Taliban closed down two other Christian relief agencies: the International As sistance Mission (IAM), which operated eye hospitals and clinics, and Serving Emergency Relief and Vocational Enterprises (SERVE), which worked on shelter and solar energy. The IAM and SERVE workers were expelled from the country. The 11 September attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the succeeding military campaign by the United States in Afghanistan delayed a trial for the imprisoned aid workers. The military campaign then led to the occupation of Afganistan's capital city Kabul by the U.S.-backed Northern Al liance. Retreating Taliban forces took the prisoners with them in a cold metal container truck as far as Ghazni. Taliban authorities agreed to release the prisoners to the International Committee for the Red Cross, but this plan col lapsed as troops from the Northern Alliance subsequently took the jail in Ghazni. These troops took charge of the Westerners, and later U.S. helicop ters airlifted them to Pakistan. Taliban forces meanwhile continued to col

This article documents the humanitarian, political and security dimensions of the current Somali crisis and assesses the external policies that are playing an increasingly central role in the conflict. It advances the thesis that in 2007 and 2008 external Western and UN actors treated Somalia as a post-conflict setting when in fact their own policies helped to inflame armed conflict and insecurity there. As a result there was no peace for peacekeepers to keep, no state to which state-building projects could contribute, and increasingly little humanitarian space in which aid agencies could reach over 3 million Somalis in need of emergency relief. The gap between Somali realities on the ground and the set of assumptions on which aid and diplomatic policies toward Somalia have been constructed is wide and deep.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the issue of post‐disaster livelihood recovery through economic rehabilitation, with the illustration of post‐tsunami promotion of microentrepreneurship activities generating employment and income among the affected populations.Design/methodology/approachThe paper examines two field case studies in Aceh (Indonesia) and Tamil Nadu (India), where a well‐established European NGO carried out economic relief and microentrepreneurship rehabilitation in 2005‐2007.FindingsDespite unlimited trust in rapid reconstruction capacity, post‐tsunami livelihood recovery has been chaotic and uncoordinated. Contrary to humanitarian agencies in charge of emergency relief, only a few development agencies and NGOs were able to deliver a rapid rehabilitation of microeconomic activities existing locally before the disaster.Research limitations/implicationsThere are values but also obvious limits to comparing the micro‐level experiences of a major European NGO in two different locations such as Aceh and Tamil Nadu, and to deducing macro‐ and meso‐level lessons to be learned.Practical implicationsThere are difficulties in benchmarking the divison of labour but necessary coordination among development agencies and their humanitarian counterparts in the field of post‐disaster sustainable economic rehabilitation.Originality/valuePost‐disaster economic security and livelihood recovery are at the forefront of current international policy research in humanitarian and development cooperation circles. Documented case studies and lessons to be learned are still scarce for feeding possible best practices.

Origin. Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders was founded in 1971 by a small group of doctors and journalists who believed that all people have a right to emergency relief.

I live in Kenya and I have a physical disability that was caused by polio at the age of 5. It left my right limb (leg) impaired, so I have mobility difficulties. When a disaster occurs, the government and other emergency relief agencies come to offer different services starting with evacuations, food distribution, health services, and shelters. These services are not disability-friendly and also, no proper identification is made of persons with disabilities in that affected community.

If one were to summarize the major obstacles to solving the Palestinian refugee problem between 1948 and 1951, they would come under the following headings: relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and repatriation. As 1949 came to a close, the contours, although not an agreed solution, of how best to solve these four problems became clear. Take, for example, the problem of relief. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, by the end of 1948, a multi-million dollar mechanism for immediate refugee relief had been established through UN General Assembly Resolution 212. By the end of 1949, this emergency relief programme had been extended for the following year, as recommended under General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV).1

This article is a practice-based reflection on the role social workers can play at the strategic and service intervention level when responding to disasters and emergency events. It discusses two significant events which impacted Australia – the Bali bombings in October 2002 and Victorian bushfires in February 2009 – and shaped policy responses by government. It outlines the lessons learned by social workers from this involvement. The profession needs to examine how it can take a stronger leadership role in emergency response and recovery.

Sri Lanka's armed conflict highlights the relations between war/peace and development, both in terms of impacts of war on livelihoods and in terms of reconstruction and development as means for peace-building. It should be recognised that the grievances behind a conflict may not be identical with post-conflict needs. Such transformation of development needs is demonstrated by the case of Jaffna fisheries. Whereas the fishery sector was peripheral to pre-war Tamil nationalism, the impact of war has made it central to post-war reconstruction and development. The most obvious obstacle to fishery reconstruction is the massive destruction of fishing equipment. While post-tsunami emergency relief has replaced significant proportions of the damaged boats and fishing gear, little has been done to build local institutional capacity for development and peace. Thus, the strategic links from emergency relief to development and peace seem relatively weak. Another pressing concern is the dismantling of army-imposed sec...

Even in today’s world of burgeoning private capital markets, there is much that an organization like the World Bank can contribute toward realizing the dream of a world without poverty. First, of course, there is emergency relief: At any point of time there are people in the world who are in the middle of an acute crisis and need emergency relief. While delivering relief effectively is not easy, there is broad agreement that it is a worthwhile goal. However the World Bank believes, rightly, that this is not enough. As we see it, there are at least three important ways it can contribute to the broader project.

One of the most common generalizations concerning refugee populations is that they are dominated by female heads of households and children. It is claimed that men are either killed in the wars that prompt displacement or are left behind to fight. This assumption has continued to determine the policies of relief and development agencies, as well as governments in countries of asylum and return. On the basis of empirical data from UNHCR and household data from Eritrea, this article questions the validity of such a dominant assumption. The article also problematizes the concept of household headship by showing that it is a cultural construction whose meaning varies from one cultural context to another. There is, thus, no definition of headship that can apply cross-culturally. It also argues that since female heads of households (FHHs) are not socially and economically homogeneous, household headship is not an appropriate method of identifying the poorest of the poor for targeting or provision of emergency relief or for productive inputs in development programmes.

The events of September 11 have forced institutions to reexamine their priorities and practices. Yet the first world war of the twenty-first century has left many wondering if there truly is a war, and what, if anything, different is demanded of them. The philanthropic sector in particular has not changed significantly, and it continues to struggle with fundamental concerns about its directions. If September 11 and its aftermath are to mean anything to philanthropy other than emergency relief, it must be a recognition that now is the time to tackle the problems and tensions that were ignored before the attacks. For nearly a year, philanthropy as a sector has not rallied behind this call for longer-term reform. Philanthropy should take up these tasks, no matter how daunting they may be, for if foundations do not lead the effort, it may be left to the governments and the militaries of the world to respond on their own.

We discuss the role of the Netherlands in the crisis of Darfur during 2003-2005. The Netherlands was active as major donor and tried to facilitate political solutions since the breakout of the Darfur crisis. During the period July-December 2004 it acted as EU President and was as such involved in creating a common EU line. Additionally, it acted as EU representative in Khartoum for an extended period, while several Dutchmen were at high positions at the EU and UN. We discuss how policy was made and which domestic actors had influenced its foreign policy. Subsequently, we see how its foreign policy worked through international politics, especially within the EU. We conclude that the Netherlands was partially successful in establishing a more active EU position regarding Darfur. However, we also find evidence that eventually the EU has lagged behind the response of the UN Security Council, despite being a major donor to emergency relief and the African Union mission in Sudan.

This article analytically compares complex humanitarian emergencies with natural disasters, concentrating on disaster responses and interference with society. There are some important analytical differences between the responses to these two types of disaster, like overlapping and interactions, persistence and duration, access and timing, assistance involvement and intervention, physical and societal recovery, and others. However, the fundamental difference between natural and politically induced disasters is the way institutions are affected. In natural disasters, there can be some significant interference with society and therefore institutional change arising from both the impact effects and the responses, but this is infrequent, mostly incidental and not normally widespread or long-term. In complex emergencies, most aspects of the impact and effects have deliberate institutional aims and overtones. Likewise, the response to this type of calamity is also bound to cause significant interference with soc...

The World Food Programme's largest mission has evolved in the last decade from development to disaster relief. In particular, the rise of emergency food aid delivered in response to civil disorders has presented new challenges. This has led to substantial organizational challenges. Coordination with UN and NGO humanitarian agencies has grown, logistical capacity has adapted to difficult requirements, and strategies for working in an insecure environment have been developed. The reliance on emergency relief makes WFP operations and funding more dependent on unpredictable political events. Owing to this evolution and the variability of emergency needs, WFP's future direction and role in the UN system remain important issues.

The 1967–70 Nigerian Civil War (also known as the ‘Biafran War’) was notorious for the prolonged suffering of the civilian population in the secessionist enclave of ‘Biafra’ and the failure of repeated international attempts to bring about an early end to the conflict. At the time the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was used to denote the international emergency relief operation, rather than a military intervention — which is how the term has subsequently come to be used. Ironically this humanitarian relief operation may have contributed to the prolongation of the war and thereby added to the human suffering. In this chapter, based partly on my experience working on the ground in this conflict, I argue that other forms of intervention, which could just as reasonably be described as ‘humanitarian’, were neglected by the principal international actors engaged with the conflict. I compare this state of affairs with subsequent approaches to intervention in Africa and elsewhere and conclude by suggesting that the lessons from ‘Biafra’ could be used to inform a more enlightened approach to ‘humanitarian intervention’ in present-day crises.

Development has increasingly become a function of the UN peace mission during the 1990s. However, it has tended to be overshadowed in a number of missions by military security and emergency relief issues. The proposition explored in this article is that a greater developmental emphasis during UN missions may be productive in terms of bringing about durable peace processes. However, this implies that development needs to be ‘recast’ in terms of its positioning within UN conflict resolution and peace missions. Development has not been coherently conceptualized within UN conflict resolution, and military security and political modes of thinking have tended to prevail in peace missions. If development is to assume a central role in conflict prevention and resolution, problematic issues relating to contending philosophical, institutional and implementational approaches within the UN Secretariat will need to be addressed.

Based on the experience of five years of work in the midst of the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan, outlines a number of ideas about involving communities in measures to provide emergency relief or support rehabilitation, in order to encourage and assist an indigenous process of social and physical recovery.

Summary Unprecedented drought in 1991/92 affected over 2 million square miles in the SADC region, put 18 million people at risk and entailed costs of $US 2.6 billion, equivalent to 12 per cent of the region's GDP. SADC opted for a common regional strategy for resource mobilization, grain movement and monitoring. The regional effort was successful in early warning, in producing a coordinated appeal and in managing logistics. However, the challenge facing SADC is to link relief and development by tackling long‐term vulnerability and enhancing the level of preparedness: priorities include better information, development of water resources, agricultural activities, training and the development of regional institutions. Resume Allier l'aide d'urgence au developpement en Afrique du Sud: la perspective de la SADC sur l'etat d'urgence souleve par la secheresse en 1991/92 La secheresse sans precedent qui, en 1991/92, a affecte plus de 2 millions de miles carrees dans la region de la SADC (l'Agence de developpement de l'Afrique du Sud) a menace 18 millions d'habitants et a entraine des couts de l'ordre de 2,6 milliards de $ U.S., soit environ 12 pour cent du produit interieur brut de cette region. L'Agence SADC a determine d'adopter une strategie regionale unie pour la mobilisation des ressources, pour les mouvements de cereales et pour la surveillance des progres. Cet effort regional a garanti le succes du systeme de premiere alerte contre la famine, et a permis de coordonner la demande d'aide et le controle logistique. Toutefois, le defi qui reste pour l'agence SADC est d'allier l'aide d'urgence au developpement en s'adressant a la vulnerabilite a long terme et en ameliorant le niveau de preparation: les priorites comprennent l'obtention de meilleures informations, le developpement des ressources en eau, les activites agricoles, la formation, et le developpement des institutions regionales. Resumen Asistencia y desarrollo en Africa del sur: una perspectiva del SADC frente a la sequia de 1991/92 La sequia sin precendentes de 1991/92 afecto a mas de 2 millones de millas cuadradas en la region del SADC, poniendo a 18 millones de personas en peligro a un costo de 2.6 billones de dolares (US$), lo cual equivale a un 12% del PBI de la region. SADC opto por una estrategia regional comun para la movilizacion de recursos, el transporte de granos y el control de las operaciones. Este enfoque regional resulto muy util tanto para el aviso precoz, como para coordinar pedidos de ayuda y para la organizacion logistica. Sin embargo, el desafio al cual se enfrenta SADC es el de unir la asistencia al desarrollo atacando la vulnerabilidad a largo plazo y aumentando el nivel de preparacion anticipada; entre las prioridades se incluyen: mejor informacion, mejor provision de agua, actividades agropecuarias, formacion, y desarrollo de instituciones regionales.

Summary During the prolonged drought in Botswana in the 1980s, the government launched a large‐scale drought relief programme (DRP). It successfully prevented famine, but its performance in terms of linking relief and development was mixed. Institutionally, Botswana succeeded in integrating the administration of the DRP into existing government structures. The DRP attempted to meet both welfare needs and long term development goals. It met the first objective most successfully by expanding existing welfare systems. The second objective was harder to achieve: on the public works programme, relief and development objectives sometimes conflicted; and the design of some components of the agricultural relief programme proved to be at odds with longer term development interests. The DRP also masked underlying structural problems of rural poverty. Although Botswana is a ‘special case’, lessons can be learned from its experience for other African countries. Resume Allier l'aide d'urgence au developpement: une etude de cas au Botswana Durant la secheresse prolongee qui s'est produite au Botswana durant les annees 1980, le gouvernement a instaure un programme de grande envergure pour aide d'urgence pour lutter contre la secheresse – le programme DRP. Ce programme a effectivement empeche la famine; or sa performance en termes des liens eventuels entre l'aide d'urgence et le developpement laissait a desirer. Au niveau des institutions, le Botswana a pourtant reussi a integrer l'administration du DRP dans les structures gouvernementales existantes. Le programme DRP visait a repondre, dans un meme temps, aux besoins en aide sociale et a des objectifs a plus long terme. Le DRP rencontra un tres grand succes relatif au premier de ses objectifs grâce a l'expansion des services d'aide sociale existants. Il fut par contre plus difficile de realiser le deuxieme objectif: car parfois, dans les programmes de travaux publics, les objectifs d'aide d'urgence et de developpement s'entravaient reciproquement; la conception de certains elements du programme d'aide d'urgence agricole faussait meme certains aspects du developpement a plus long terme. Le programme DRP cachait egalement certains problemes d'ordre structurel qui relevaient de la pauvrete rurale. Bien que le Botswana ait ete un “cas special”, son experience offre neanmoins certaines lecons aux autres pays de l'Afrique. Resumen La relacion asistencia‐desarrollo: el caso Botswana En el curso de la prolongado sequia de los anos 80 en Botswana, el gobierno lanzo un programa de ayuda (DRP) de gran envergadura. Este programa evito exitosamente una hambruna general, pero en cuanto al establecimiento de la relacion asistencia‐desarrollo, los resultados no fueron tan positivos. Institucionalmente, Botswana consiguio integrar la administracion del DRP dentro de estructuras gubernamentales existentes. El DRP intento satisfacer tanto las necesidades de asistencia social como las metas de desarrollo a largo plazo. El primer objetivo fue alcanzado con la expansion de los sistemas de asistencia social existentes. El segundo objetivo fue mas dificil de alcanzar: en el programa de obras publicas se encontro que los objetivos de asistencia y desarrollo eran a veces opuestos; algunos componentes del programa de asistencia a la agricultura chocaban con los intereses desarrollistas a largo plazo. El DRP tambien escondia problemas estructurales subyacentes de probreza rural. Aunque Botswana es un ‘caso especial’, es util para otros paises africanos tener en cuenta su experiencia.

Since the end of the cold war, the United Nations (UN) System in regard to humanitarian assistance developed incredibly fast. Numerous resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have been adopted and specialized bodies like the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have been established. Though this forest of humanitarian-related norms within the UN system is constantly developing, two landmark resolutions of the General Assembly are of major importance: (1) An Agenda for Peace (A/RES/47/120[B]) and (2) Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations (A/RES/46/182). While resolution 47/120 further developed the concept and the UN strategy of humanitarian assistance, the latter resolution took concrete action by creating the position of the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. These resolutions prepared the ground for the internationally coordinated humanitarian action we know today.

The Discussion Paper provides a compelling critique of the ‘new humanitarianism, ’particularly the ways in which leading donor states seek to incorporate humanitarian assistance and protection into the toolbox of political intervention in other countries. Drawing upon the history of humanitarianism and its origins in an ethos of neutrality, impartiality and non-violence, the author shows how since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since 9/11, the ‘new’ form of internationational humanitarianism has become deeply politicised and has taken on human rights, strategic-security, liberal and developmental agendas as defined by donor states. The paper frames the critique of linking R2P to humanitarian protection values in the context of the new humanitarianism and the pursuit of the foreign policies of hegemonic states. It therefore provides a critical perspective on the politics of humanitarian aid in Darfur, and opens up a new basis for an alternative discourse on international humanitarian intervention and its connection with the politics of global powers in African conflict arenas. This paper is an important resource for scholars, civil society activists and policy practitioners with a keen interest in international humanitarian aid, international humanitarian law, conflict, peace and security in Africa.