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This article aims at clearing up a widespread misunderstanding in previous research that the classical strategic perspective, based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and his contemporary follo...

This article contributes to an explanation of why Poland, after a period of almost two years’ hesitation, decided to dispatch military forces to the United States-led coalition against the Islamic ...

This article integrates literature on strategic culture with literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy, illustrating how the interaction of culture and domestic political calculation ca ...

This article investigates how strategic culture influenced the decision-making of Australia and Poland regarding the global coalition against the Islamic State. In the coalition, Australia has followed its tradition of active participation in United States-led operations, while Poland has embarked on a more cautious line, thereby breaking with its previous policy of active participation. The article examines how Australian and Polish responses to the coalition were shaped by five cultural elements: dominant threat perception, core task of the armed forces, strategic partners, experiences of participating in coalitions of the willing, and approach to the international legality of expeditionary operations. It finds that Australia and Poland differed on all five elements but that the major differences are found in dominant threat perception and core task of the armed forces.

I’m one of those strange people that inhabits the world in between academia, public policy, and the cultural sector. My work requires me to be a diplomat, a missionary, and a translator. I was ther...

If one were engaged in the wearisome task of anthologising cultural policy grey literature, This England would warrant inclusion, joining such unlikely bedfellows as John Maynard Keynes' 1945 Liste...

The study of place-based cultural policy has tended to favour cities, with occasional forays into rural communities (Bell & Jayne, 2010; Stevenson, 2013). It’s easy to understand why – the world is...

It can’t be easy to write a compelling history of a federal agency dedicated to the sober and sensible disbursement of public money to the arts. Especially when that agency is Canadian: a nation wi...

This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.

The article sets out to further an understanding of how domestic politics can impact on foreign policy change in small states. The case of interest is the change that occurred in the foreign policy of Denmark when its government managed to put an end to the ‘footnote policy’ in mid-1988. The main conclusion is that changes in two particular domestic political factors, in terms of political party opposition and public opposition, facilitated a change in foreign policy for the Danish government. Changes in party and public opposition created opportunities for the government to use foreign policy change as a strategy to increase its political power on the domestic scene. In this case of foreign policy change, domestic political factors and external forces were equally important.