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Research on far-right extremism has grown substantially over the last decade, owing to the rise of Trump, attacks such as the one in Christchurch and Buffalo, as well as the mainstreaming of hate speech and polarization. In addition to research, there have been antifascist activists who have been engaged in doxxing members of the far right who are part of our schools, our militaries, and governments. Releasing the private information of members of far-right movements to the public has created interesting policy and law enforcement dilemmas. With respect to law enforcement, can doxxing be used as a tool to force individuals to disengage from groups? For social media companies, doxxing violates their terms of service, but should an exception be made in these instances since it purportedly serves a public interest? For this paper, we interviewed 10 former members of the far right who have experienced doxxing over the last several years. The paper explores what happened, the immediate and long-term effects of doxxing on their lives, and ongoing challenges of being exposed against their will. We conclude with some policy recommendations related to the costs and benefits of doxxing on these individuals but also society at large.

Establishing trust and building a strong Working Alliance are crucial challenges when working with violent extremist offenders (VEOs). Extensive literature highlights the significance of these elements for effective interventions with this group. However, research has not yet approached the specific steps involved in creating a Working Alliance. This article fills this gap by drawing on in-depth interviews conducted with eight professionals from six European jurisdictions. The article also contrasts insights from practical work with academic state of the art. By offering these insights, the article aims to facilitate the creation of effective Working Alliances and contribute to the academic debates on the disengagement of VEOs.

The rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan has had profound implications for Pakistan's border regions, particularly in terms of the resurgence of militant groups. This study investigates the potential policy failures of the Pakistani government in effectively utilizing its resources for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants. While some ex-combatants have undergone rehabilitation, a significant majority have been left without adequate support, possibly due to resource constraints. Notably, the rehabilitation process has been exclusively under the control of the military, with no civilian involvement allowed. This approach has created a substantial gap between the community and the ex-combatants attempting to reintegrate into society. Consequently, the ex-combatants have often encountered unwelcoming communities and stigmatization, leading many of them to opt for recidivism. This study employs a micro-ethnographic approach, with the researcher spending considerable time collecting primary data from the affected communities, administrators of rehabilitation centers, and the ex-combatants who have undergone rehabilitation. The findings suggest that a community-based approach to rehabilitation, involving the local community in the process, holds significant promise for successful reintegration. By assessing the consequences of current rehabilitation and reintegration approaches, this study sheds light on the urgent need for a more inclusive, community-driven strategy to address the issue of ex-combatant reintegration in Pakistan's border regions. Implementing such an approach could potentially mitigate the resurgence of militant groups and foster long-term stability in the region.

This article uses a qualitative analysis of 25 interviews with experts from German secondary and tertiary level P/CVE programs countering Islamist Extremism to examine the influences of discrimination and stigmatization on deradicalization and disengagement efforts. Drawing on the experiential and interpretative knowledge of the interviewees, we found that both discrimination and stigmatization may have an obstructing influence on the clients’ social and socio-economic stabilization. Discrimination, whether manifested in labor market disadvantages, within the education system, or individual racist acts of devaluation, can impede progress in deradicalization and disengagement processes. Further, stigmatization due to a prior association with Islamist groups and ideologies may result in similar experiences of rejection and devaluation across various areas of social life. In this context, most interviewees warn of the consequences of security authority investigations and caution against the dangers of disclosure and exposure to the public, particularly the press. Our findings show that P/CVE programs strive to address the issues of discrimination and stigmatization with multi-layered interventions designed to prevent setbacks in deradicalization and disengagement processes. Common strategies are to raise awareness in the personal reference system as well as on an institutional level to reduce discriminatory and stigmatizing actions. Client-centered approaches encompass counseling methods on the one hand aiming to overcome prejudices against state institutions and respective actors, and on the other hand empowerment measures and help in dealing with challenging situations, such as social grievances that potentially derive from discrimination and stigmatization. Further to this, the article discusses our findings against the backdrop of empirical studies, evaluation reports, and gray literature and analyzes the P/CVE strategies within theoretic process models of deradicalization and disengagement.

Radicalization of women within far-right extremist networks is a timely issue. Evidence suggests women’s participation in terrorist activity is likely to grow in the next few years, as extremists continue to find new ways to recruit women. Women’s involvement in far-right extremist networks is greater than frequently thought, yet the underlying radicalization pathways are often understudied. At times, radicalization pathways of women are stereotyped; or women are dismissed due to the perceived complexity of understanding their support for extreme misogynistic networks. Exploring these radicalization pathways is important in understanding deradicalization and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practices. Existing research often regards radicalized women as anomalies, deviating from traditional gender norms, meaning policy considerations relating to deradicalization are still based on outdated stereotypes. Far-right extremism is one of the most significant domestic threats currently facing the United States. Leveraging the extant literature on gender and radicalization, this paper provides an overview of women’s presence and radicalization pathways within the contemporary American far right. I present case studies of two women, who have participated in contemporary American far-right extremist networks, providing an in-depth content analysis of their personal social media accounts and secondary sources. I find that these women are motivated by, and radicalized through, perceived threats to their status. Such threats need not be real and can be derived from real political and cultural events, or conspiracy theories. I conclude by arguing that this evidence provides avenues for our understanding of deradicalization pathways.

Prior scholarship has suggested that women of color and other outsiders (i.e., those not affiliated with White supremacist hate groups) have significantly facilitated the deradicalization of White supremacist hate group members. However, few empirical studies focus on the lived experiences of outsider women who have helped hate group members disengage and deradicalize. Thus, the purpose of the current study was to explore the experiences of women who facilitated the disengagement and deradicalization of White supremacist hate group members. The first author conducted interviews among four women who had significant experience regarding the phenomenon of interest. Using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) as a methodological framework, the authors identified five themes from participants’ rich descriptions of their experiences facilitating hate group exit: (a) identifying love as driving force behind exit facilitation, (b) developing their exit facilitation approach, (c) experiencing costs of helping others exit, (d) identifying areas for increased external exit support, and (e) offering recommendations for hate group exit facilitation. By examining this specific population, we hoped to gain insights into new avenues of development for disengagement and deradicalization interventions.

Over the past decade Islamist mobilization has resulted in numerous departures from Germany towards the civil war zones of Syria and Iraq. As a determined response to this trend, the scope of prevention efforts in Germany has increased significantly, combatting Islamist radicalization at the federal and state level with a variety of projects and approaches. This article analyzes the approaches to counseling by deradicalization practitioners in Germany, based on two qualitative interview studies (n=25) and (n=9) with experts in secondary and tertiary prevention. Drawing on the experiential and interpretative knowledge of the interviewees, we identified four prevalent approaches to deradicalization, composed of activity-oriented concepts that explain counseling efforts within a specific set of goals, contents, methods, and techniques. Herein imperatives of action are, firstly, religiously and/or ideologically oriented, secondly, oriented towards acceptance, thirdly, systemically oriented, and lastly, oriented towards life management. However, these are not static approaches, characterized by oft-intersecting efforts. Our findings indicate that confrontational means of dealing with the ideological are uncommon, even though in theory ideological reappraisal is widely considered a core objective of deradicalization practices. More emphasis is placed on an appreciative relationship between counselors and clients as well as collaborations with other support systems and institutions to meet individual needs. Further to this, this article discusses our findings with regard to the theoretical and empirical research framework, taking into account interdisciplinary perspectives as well as experiences from the prevention of right-wing extremism.

Although several prevention and countering radicalization programs in correctional institutions have been carried out in Europe and worldwide, little is known about their effectiveness. Thus, the current scoping review aimed at reporting on the state of the art of the literature assessing and evaluating such actions, identifying knowledge gaps, and examining methods used to assess their successfulness and impact. A total of eight studies that met eligibility criteria were reviewed after performing a search on Scopus, Web of Science, and PsychInfo (Ebsco) databases: Two studies evaluated a reintegration initiative based in the Netherlands; four focused on an Australian disengagement program; and two offered insights on a rehabilitation program carried out in Sri Lanka. Findings were discussed according to their evaluation methods (qualitative, mixed-methods, and quantitative) and instruments. Results highlighted that the evaluation process is still confronted with several methodological difficulties, such as a lack of agreement on how to univocally define and measure success and the identification of uniform indicators of deradicalization and disengagement. Additionally, results revealed that the effectiveness of these interventions is predominantly based on anecdotal evidence rather than on rigorous, empirical proofs. As such, it was not possible to compare these programs and determine which worked best. Suggestions for future research and practical implications for policymakers, prison governors, and practitioners are offered in the concluding section of this work.

This paper presents the findings of an assessment of a government-run deradicalization program called Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) in northeast Nigeria. OPSC is a restricted custodial program through which 900 ex-combatants have passed since 2015. The major aim of OPSC is the deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of repentant ex-combatants in the war-ravaged zone. Using a qualitative research framework, primary data were collected through Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with stakeholders across Borno, Adamawa, and Gombe, Nigeria. Using purposive sampling, a sample of 122 was drawn from the population of the study. which includes ex-combatants in holding, graduates of the OPSC, staff of the OPSC, community members, government officials, and representatives from the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). A total of 50 KIIs and 6 FGDs were conducted with 72 participants across the three selected states. This was supplemented by a literature review. The findings show that while the OPSC has been lauded in terms of receptivity, deradicalization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, the program is challenged by issues of credibility and acceptance in the wider community. This paper documents the challenges associated with the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-terrorists in the context of ongoing terrorist attacks by their former group, particularly in communities that have been or continue to be affected by terrorism. It presents recommendations to address resentment and grievances in the affected communities, support community participation, and improve communications to combat popular resistance to OPSC.

This systematic literature review focuses on the evaluation of programs or interventions designed to deradicalize, disengage, rehabilitate, and/or reintegrate terrorists and/or extremists. Though a robust literature describing such interventions exists, it has long been recognized that more data are needed on the effectiveness of programs designed to facilitate reintegration. Thus, the objective of this review is to present an overview of academic and grey literature on the evaluation of programming designed to facilitate the deradicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and/or reintegration of terrorists and/or extremists. Our initial queries yielded 271 seemingly relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature articles, but after a more robust screening we determined that only 37 of those articles directly related to the evaluation of interventions. These articles are presented by evaluation design (e.g., quantitative, qualitative); we also review the evaluation mechanisms (e.g., survey, interviews, note review), study design (e.g., experimental, quasi-experimental), data types (i.e., quantitative or qualitative), and findings. Finally, we include ten articles discussing theory of program evaluation. Though the review is limited to available data (e.g., not including unpublished evaluations or government evaluations), we conclude by discussing the state of program evaluation relating to interventions designed to deradicalize, disengage, rehabilitate, and/or reintegrate terrorists and/or extremists, and offering several recommendations for how to improve evaluation methods and overcome barriers to evaluation.

In response to a complex world, radicalized individuals tend to retract into black-and-white thinking, preference for easy solutions for complicated problems, or belief in conspiracy theories. These individuals are often characterized by low cognitive complexity, lack in ability for perspective taking, as well as intolerance of ambiguity. Hence, it stands to reason that successful deradicalization processes might require addressing such patterns of thinking, ideally resulting in improved critical thinking skills. With this goal, a governmental deradicalization program in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany (Competence Centre Against Extremism, konex), is field testing innovative cell phone application-based methods since June 2021. The utilized tool is a news aggregation application that presents different perspectives on current (socio-) political topics based on editorial curation. Since deradicalization work is recommended to be tailored to individual needs, the application allows for context specific discussions and creative interventions (e.g., storytelling) based on the featured topics. This article presents the theoretical framework and underlying theories of change for the application’s implementation in day-to-day deradicalization work, especially focused on the improvement of critical thinking skills, tolerance of ambiguity, and perspective taking. Furthermore, the tool is being used to address existential uncertainties, conspiracy beliefs, as well as a lack of media literacy skills.

Review of "The Routledge Handbook on Disengagement and Deradicalization” (Routledge, 2020) by Stig Jarle Hansen and Stian Lid.

This paper presents findings from semi-structured interviews with 17 practitioners representing 14 exit interventions in 7 European countries. Drawing from the literature, the study identified analytical dimensions that provided the semi-structured interview script’s analytical framework (e.g., programme characteristics, implementation team, type of intervention, contact approach, programmes’ duration, the use of risk and needs assessment tools, follow-up/monitoring strategies/aftercare procedures). Results suggest that the goals, role of ideology and contact approach differ considerably across exit programmes. The use of risk and needs assessment tools is inconsistent across the programmes. The programmes’ evaluation was unstructured and primarily qualitative. The study has practical implications, namely the significant effort required to train exit practitioners in risk and needs assessment tools. A multi-agency approach will help improve the follow-up and aftercare practices.

The church on mission, especially in the Middle East, has been a controversial topic with memories of the Crusades and colonialism burned deep in the psyche of the region. While much attention has been paid to the implications of Islamic Theology in conversations about extremism and radicalization in the Middle East, Christian Theology and Missiology, have been largely neglected. The great migratory people movements of the last few years, especially in the Middle East, have brought the church into more intimate contact with historic enemies and the results are arguably unprecedented. Unexpected stories of worldview change among former extremists and exponential church growth in the Levant are widespread. This paper illustrates the phenomenon with stories from Lebanon which provide an interesting laboratory for research into how the church has contributed to the deradicalization of Syrian Muslim refugees. Common ground between the fields of missiology and de/counter radicalization is explored and time is taken to orient those who may be new to missiology to the concepts of doing justice, loving neighbor and loving enemy as integral practices of the Christian faith. Finally, this paper attempts to demonstrate that the church may have a role to play in de/counter radicalization if it is given space to carry out its natural mission and intervene pragmatically in social ills that are often drivers of radicalization, ideological re-pluralization and the creation of spaces for societal belonging. The paper closes with some practical suggestions for both fields and suggest that in our increasingly pluriform and globalized society we cannot afford continued isolation and kinetic measures as the primary tactics for countering and preventing extremism.

Policies to prevent radicalization and violent extremism (PRVE) frequently target a number of social movements seen as threats to national security. Often, this includes militant Islamist, right-wing and left-wing extremist milieus. In this article, we ask what distinguishes the ways in which local practitioners perceive and respond to these three milieus. Based on in-depth interviews with public servants in Sweden, we show how the milieus are seen to represent different types of threats, hold core values that resonate differently with dominant values in mainstream society and require responses that challenge public servants in diverging ways. Building on our analysis, we introduce a multidimensional model that clarifies why practitioners relate differently to each milieu. By including the rarely examined left-wing milieu, we are able to showcase the complexity of local PRVE work. Our study sheds new light on the challenges experienced by practitioners who are tasked to implement PRVE policy and demonstrates the problems of approaching “violent extremism” as a uniform phenomenon.

This article explores the relationship between disengagement and deradicalization processes among 15 individuals who have left the neo-Nazi movement. The participants in this study were initially interviewed in 2015, and the interview process is still ongoing. In this particular study, the differences between individuals who disengaged publicly, that is, those who did not or could not conceal their engagement with the movement, and individuals who were able to and/or wanted to keep their past a secret, are studied. The analysis of the interviews has focused on the outcomes of revealed or concealed stigmatization, in particular in relation to how disengagement was or was not followed by deradicalization. The findings suggest that those who disengaged publicly followed a clear path from disengagement to deradicalization, whereas those who tried to conceal their former involvement in the neo-Nazi movement showed a more complex pattern. Among the latter are individuals who are not yet deradicalized. However, they want to live “ordinary” lives and to have a family, free from fear that neighbours or people at work will stigmatize them and dissociate themselves from them. It is also clear that these participants were to a greater extent less satisfied with life in general. The findings also stress the ethical problems involved in using former neo-Nazis as public examples, as this traps them into a former neo-Nazi identity, thus creating new trauma.

Research in the field of countering violent extremism (CVE) has grown significantly in the last few decades. This research project contributes to the CVE literature by studying narratives as tools of reflections on self-identity designed intentionally within gaming exercises to help contextualize and account for as much environmental complexity as possible. This paper provides theoretical understandings of narratives (and their role in our lives), discusses narratives as they relate to violent extremist ideologies, and proposes how narrative reflections may serve as a deradicalization tool within cooperative games. Additionally, this article highlights elements of narrative reflection within current CVE resources and provides a list of exercises (games) that can be used in the field to promote narrative reflections.

Is there a visual discursive space for the radical(ized) woman or is she invisible? The following paper develops an analytical framework to further the understanding of the interplay between gender and security in radicalization studies. Drawing on visuality research and feminism in security studies, this paper provides a new perspective on the visual representation of female agency. The agency of the violent extremist woman is, for the most part, visually (re)constructed through or with a masculine gaze - as defiance, allure and/or coercion. We argue that the connotations of images are shaped within and by an intervisual and intertextual dynamic that (re)produces understandings of female violence as pathologized, victimized and/or sensationalized and contingent on/in relation to male politics. Using this framework, we analyze the interplay between a textual and visual representation of Hasna Ait Boulahcen labeled ‘The first Europan female suicide bomber’ in Danish media following a violent incident in Paris in 2015. Our analysis illustrates how gendered markers of identity continuously reproduce what is possible in securitized discursive realms insofar that a process of Othering Hasna is gendered. This gendered discursive approach contributes to the understanding of deradicalization by underscoring the role of Silencing and Othering of violent extremist women in shaping and narrowing the discursive realm of political opportunities. The paper thus highlights the role of media representations in limiting the discursive possibilities within and therefore efficacy of deradicalization research, policy and programs.

This paper presents the results of a mixed-methods survey of the perspectives of 208 Dutch Muslim women on the reintegration of female returnees from the Islamic State (IS). Based on the responses and written statements made by Dutch Muslim women of Moroccan, Surinamese and Turkish ethnicities, respondents perceived greater risks associated with different female returnees, especially if the community in which respondents lived were resistant to the idea. However, Muslim female returnees were seen in sympathetic terms when perceived as presenting fewer risks to national security. The study demonstrates how receptive different Dutch Muslim women are to the reintegration of female returnees from IS, where issues of identity and political culture also play a role. The findings suggest that successful reintegration also needs sustainable reintegration into an emotionally supportive social network on the one hand and that programs need community support and acceptance on the other. The gendered approach offers valuable insights on how Muslim women can play a crucial role in deradicalization.

This empirical study examines intensive interview data collected from eight (N=8) former members of white supremacist organizations in order to understand the meanings of exit – that is, disengagement and deradicalization – from the extremist’s perspective. Using a thematic analysis approach, our findings build on the distinction in the existing exit literature between push and pull factors and the process of role exit identified by Ebaugh (1988). These push and pull factors as well as social identity, we argue, are subsumed within a complex exit process, which includes disengagement, identity deconstruction, and transgressive and transitional relationships. For some, this process culminated in an accomplished identity reconstruction and deradicalization. Most importantly, our findings suggest that exit is linked to entry by a developmental drive that we call the participant’s core need. The core need was the background motivator of entry, disengagement, exit, and ultimately deradicalization. We think that this identity reconfiguration and core needs framework may help make heterogenous exit trajectories that have remained puzzling for researchers more understandable.

UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (Returnees and Relocators) urges nations to improve information and evidence sharing while developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies; including programs addressing radicalization in children associated with “Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” The need for such programs has gained urgency since the collapse of Islamic State (IS)/Daesh, with the detainment of IS family members in overcrowded camps in Syria, and their uncertain fate following the Turkish military Operation PEACE SPRING, in October 2019. Approximately 2 million children underwent Daesh indoctrination June 2014 – 2019, and this process continues to be led by women in many detention camps. The heightened sense of vulnerability to terrorist attacks in Western nations has led many nations to refuse the return of children to their home country, or initial entry - fearing that their past radicalization will lead to future terrorism. Such decisions contravene, among other instruments, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Convention on Refugees (1951), Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC, 2000). This paper examines emotional traumas experienced by Daesh “camp followers,” particularly the children, and the psychological rehabilitation and social reintegration challenges they face as they grow to adulthood. This paper argues that the psychosocial support needed for rehabilitation and reintegration is better found in Western societies than in refugee camps, which are often incubators for future terrorists.

In an era of international terrorism, interviews with high-value detainees may have the dual purpose of extracting useful information and of disengagement. We conducted a small-scale, qualitative study using in-depth, individual interviews with 11 experienced interviewers in the Southeast Asia region and Australia, in order to provide insights into the types of interviewing strategies employed in terrorist rehabilitation. Our findings highlight the potential efficacy of creating a physically comfortable and relaxed interview setting, and of using interview strategies that focus on rapport-building, principles of social persuasion and elements of procedural justice, along with a patient and flexible stance to questioning. We suggest that interviewers performing rehabilitation interviews with high-value detainees ought to be trained to use the social approach to interviewing.

Though the study of deradicalization is relatively new, in the last several decades many countries have undertaken the task of building programs within the space to address the growing threat of extremism and radicalization – both from a religious and political perspective. This paper examines the birth of deradicalization programs in Norway and Sweden, which were two of the first – if not the first – countries to create holistic programmatic approaches to tackling disengagement and deradicalization. Both of these programs sprang up in the mid-to late 1990s and were tasked with growing far-right extremist groups. The paper outlines the opportunities and challenges that facet of the program presented and if and how they were able to adjust. Finally, the paper looks at the data collected by each program, specifically on the number of their participants and if they remained separate from radical ideologies to determine if the programs were success and similar programs could be replicated and expect similar successes. With the resurgence of white power and Neo-Nazi extremism across Europe and the United States, a consideration of the programs developed in Sweden and Norway two decades ago may provide a replicable template for current issues with extremism.

This paper aims to describe and provide an assessment of the rehabilitation and reintegration programme for Indonesian deportees in 2017. Hundreds of Indonesians aspired to join the militant jihad in Syria, but many were arrested before entering the country. Deportees without criminal charges were sent to the Ministry of Social Affairs’ (Kemensos) shelters in East Jakarta to undergo a one-month rehabilitation programme. The rehabilitation was executed prematurely with the absence of clear guidelines. A reintegration programme should play a pivotal role in a long-term deradicalisation process. Yet, the acute problem of “sectoral ego” among Indonesian institutions hampers the effectiveness of the reintegration programme, as there are overlapping responsibilities between state agencies and non-governmental organisations. Severe competition among relevant stakeholders also slows down information sharing in the handling of deportees. This paper finds that sectoral ego has created significant obstacles for the reintegration programme. There are “too many hands” on one deportee, which makes it hard to assess which programme works more effectively. In addition, the deportees also receive several visits from various stakeholders that have similar offers and provide repetitive discussions, leading to some deportees becoming reluctant to cooperate. As a result, “too many cooks spoil the broth”. The relevant stakeholders must enhance transparency and coordination that is not limited to an agreement on paper. The management of deportees can also provide lessons for policy makers to improve broader CVE efforts in Indonesia.

The rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised offenders has become an increasing area of concern internationally. This has led to investment in interventions aimed at the de-radicalisation and disengagement of terrorist/radicalised inmates. However, little is known about the delivery, content and outcomes from such formal interventions. This paper fills this gap by providing results from an evaluation of a disengagement program in the Australian state of New South Wales called PRISM. The Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) is an intervention delivered by Corrective Services NSW aimed at prison inmates who have a conviction for terrorism or have been identified as at risk of radicalisation. Data reported here is part of a larger second evaluation of PRISM and draws on interviews with PRISM staff (N=10) and PRISM clients (i.e., inmates and parolees; N=12). The paper examines outcomes from the intervention in relation to the benefits PRISM clients derived from participation and explores different qualitative dimensions of client progress. The responses of PRISM clients are compared against the observations of program staff who work with these individuals. Results provide lessons for how formal interventions can facilitate disengagement and reintegration. Broader lessons for the delivery and evaluation of CVE interventions are identified. Limitations in the study design are also acknowledged.

This article presents an in-depth evaluation of a specialized reintegration initiative within the Dutch Probation Service focused on individuals convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism. Using 72 interviews with program staff as well as several of their clients, the authors assess the initiative’s program theory, its day-to-day implementation and provide a qualified assessment of its overall effectiveness in the 2016 to 2018 period. The results suggest that the initiative is based on a sound understanding of how and why individuals may deradicalize or disengage from terrorism behaviorally, but that it continues to face serious challenges in terms of accurately defining success and systematically gathering objective indicators of its attainment. As terrorism remains a key challenge for societies across the globe, the relevance of these findings extends beyond the Netherlands to all academics, policymakers and practitioners working to design, implement and assess terrorist reintegration programs.

This article is intended to share the U.S. District Court of Minnesota Probation and Pretrial Services’ experiences, knowledge, practices, and processes for working with extremist/terrorist defendants and offenders with other criminal justice professionals. Over the past decade, the District of Minnesota has been challenged with meeting the demands of more jihadist-type extremist cases than any district in the United States. The Federal Judiciary’s Probation and Pretrial Services national system does not have specialized risk and needs assessment tools, intervention strategies for disengagement and rehabilitation programming, or specific supervision practices for working with this new generation of extremist/terrorism participants. After conducting extensive research, the District selected international experts to provide training and tools for working with extremists that range from jihadists to white supremacists. The District has implemented a team-based approach for working with extremists to include combining current Probation and Pretrial Services practices with programming developed by Expert Consultant Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS), and a risk assessment tool and manualized intervention strategies developed by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service of the United Kingdom. By necessity, the District of Minnesota has become both a training hub and experimental lab for developing the first of its kind of practices for working with extremist cases in the United States. The District of Minnesota has developed the Minnesota Probation and Pretrial Services Justice Model of Intervention, Disengagement, and Rehabilitation for working with extremists. This model of specialized tools, training, and knowledge has been incorporated into assessing release or detention of defendants pending trial, identifying pretrial release conditions, determining appropriate sentence recommendations, and developing the necessary special conditions for community supervision to ensure both public safety and disengagement from extremism as components of the rehabilitation process.

There is a growing field of studies on exit processes from extremist and militant organizations. At the same time, however, what is missing is a more developed oral history of exit processes in different European countries. Interviewing individuals who left the neo-Nazi movement five or ten years ago, we have studied and analyzed how the interviewees’ narratives of exit processes are re-constructed and told today. Their reconstruction of narratives and stories on the exit process was influenced by several different factors, such as the time axis, education, intimate relations, employment situation, gender, and class. The results pointed towards a number of push and pull factors. The exit processes were seldom straightforward and linear, but instead dependent upon many social-psychological factors and processes.

In recent years the use of sport as an intervention to reduce crime in the community and prisons, and to reduce radicalisation of young adults, has become more common. Studies suggest that participating in sport may improve self-esteem, enhance social bonds and provide participants with a feeling of purpose. The introduction of an education element can improve outcomes following completion of the programme, providing participants with a pathway towards employment. Although it is recognised that sport may form only one aspect towards the reduction of crime and radicalisation, effectiveness, may be enhanced with a combination of other services such as religious re-education and assistance with housing. This article aims to appraise the literature on sports interventions in the UK, and worldwide, in order to highlight the positive and negative consequences of the approach, and identify limitations.

At present, the issue of leaving terrorism behind is a widely discussed but poorly understood subject. When compared to the extensive body of literature on the process of radicalization, research on terrorist desistance is both theoretically and conceptually lagging behind. As a consequence, policy makers and practitioners are currently operating in a theoretical vacuum. This article aims to address the pressing need for a better understanding of the discontinuance of terrorism by introducing a social identity perspective to the existing field of re-search. Social identity can be understood as the part of an individual’s self-concept that is derived from membership within personally relevant social groups. As such, the concept of social identity is vital to making sense of the identity transformation intrinsic to walking away from terrorism. Exploring the role of social identity in terrorist desistance gives prominence to the intersection between the individual and the social group. Framing terrorist dis-continuance as a process that emanates from the interface between individual and group-level mechanisms corresponds to the interactive nature of rebuilding a life after terrorism. Additionally, the explanatory value of a social identity perspective has already been demonstrated in the field of radicalisation research. Extending this theoretical framework to the subject of terrorist desistance enables us to connect the dots between two processes that are inherently linked, though frequently analysed as isolated entities.

Radicalisation is fast becoming one of the most acute and pressing safeguarding and child protection issues of the whole century (NSPCC, 2016). However, the issue of looked-after children as potential recruits for extremist groups has been largely overlooked, despite the universal acknowledgement that looked-after children represent the most vulnerable of all demographics within society. This research collected rare and vital primary data by interviewing practitioners within looked-after children’s, residential, and respite services. The study established that practitioners lacked basic awareness of radicalisation and extremism, the Prevent strategy, and the Channel programme. It was discovered that practitioners were unsure of what constitutes the potential indicators of radicalisation, and how and to whom such concerns should be reported. It became apparent that radicalisation as a safeguarding and child protection issue has not been afforded a level of focus adequate and proportionate to the risk posed, and that other issues, namely child sexual exploitation, remain the primary concern in safeguarding contexts.

EU member-states target families in order to prevent or counter radicalization. However, there is little empirical knowledge to confirm that parents influence the radicalization and de-radicalization process. Because there is little known about the role that parents play in radicalization and de-radicalization, this qualitative study explored the family dynamics in these processes together with 11 former radicals and their families. The study consists of 21 in-depth interviews with Dutch former radicals and their family members and it was found that formers and their families do not recognize a direct influence of parents on radicalization and de-radicalization. However, a more indirect influence seems to be in place: a (problematic) family situation may influence the radicalization process and family support can possibly play a role in de-radicalization. It is also stressed that parents have need for knowledge about the different ideologies and for tools on how to respond to their children’s radicalization. Family support programs could focus on these lacunas in order to help families counter radicalization.

Youth radicalization leading to violence has become a growing fear among Canadians, as terrorist attacks are carried out in Western states. Although Canada has suffered relatively fewer acts of violence, this fear has intensified and a de-radicalization strategy is needed in the Canadian context. In a qualitative case study methodology, interviews were conducted with school counsellors, religious leaders, and academics to explore solutions to youth radicalization. Youth de-radicalization approaches from the United Kingdom were analyzed and found that community-based initiatives were missing from programming. Social identity theory is used to explain that youth join radicalized groups to feel a sense of belonging and have to be provided an alternative and moderate group identity to de-radicalize. This study found youth de-radicalization in Canada is best served through a community collaboration approach.

This article debates the justifications behind the practice of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization. It emphasizes the concepts as shrouded in confusion, and highlights that the practices continue to develop and expand despite claims of counter-productiveness, wholly subjective evaluation, and significant doubt around their premises. The aim of this article is to encourage a greater awareness of the potential costs to society of promoting policy with no rigorous basis of evidence. Focussing on both (rehabilitative) prison counter-radicalization schemes and (preventative) non-prison based de-radicalization, the discussion explores the evaluative methods that remain chaotic despite a growing need for ‘evidence-based’ public policy-making, examines the tenuous link between terrorism and ideology which upholds the principles behind attempts to combat radicalization, and then analyses the possible outcomes for society of relying on these schemes to minimize extremist violence. It concludes that taking the link between terrorism and ideology as causal is deeply flawed, and that by persisting with no systematic method of evaluation combating radicalization in these ways will continue to fail. Indeed, in prisons, they have been found to be distrusted, ineffective and even detrimental. Outside of prisons, where preventative counter-radicalization programmes exist, these will continue to divide societies among the lines where suspect communities are drawn. It takes the view that whilst we continue to elevate de-radicalization as a ‘useful tool’ in combating terrorism, we will also continue to associate certain people groups with terrorism and only add to grievances that exist in our societies.

Unlike other European countries, Austria has so far been spared from terrorist attacks in the context of radical Islamism. However, the perceived threat, several criminal cases of terrorist involvement as well as being indirectly affected by attacks in other countries led to a high level of public and governmental attention to the issues of radicalisation, terrorist involvement and deradicalisation in Austria. Due to strong public pressure and growing recognition of the existing problem and hazard areas by governmental and non-governmental actors, a number of (1) initiatives providing support and counselling in case of radicalisation have been launched (e.g. Extremism Information Centre; DERAD) or extended. Furthermore, (2) governmental agencies and political stakeholders have been pushing for enhanced means for the criminal prosecution and conviction of criminal offenses in the context of terrorism. The article presents an overview and review of new and renewed initiatives as well as (planned) policy changes countering radicalisation and deradicalisation and terrorist involvement (support of terrorist organisations, membership, plans for terrorist attacks, etc.) and thus a summarising insight into the case of Austria.

Nestled in the SWAT valley lies Pakistan’s earliest known deradicalization initiative for former militants, the Mishal Deradicalization and Emancipation Program (DREP). The Deradicalization program was launched following a military operation in 2009 against the Pakistan wing of the Taliban, namely, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The program aimed to deradicalize and rehabilitate arrested militants, with what officials claim is a 99 percent success rate and with more than 2,500 former Taliban fighters now ‘reformed’. The program abides by a ‘no blood on hand’ policy, whereby it only takes in militants who have not caused any bodily harm to others. In this paper, we analyze the deradicalization program and highlight the limits and challenges it faces. The paper also highlights the common individual and environmental factors among the beneficiary population of the deradicalization program. This study finds that most participants of the program belonged to large or broken families with weak socio-economic profiles. Additionally, these individuals had very little technical knowledge of religion. This study also finds that the program is more oriented towards re-integration rather than deradicalization due to its policy of inducting only low and mid-level cadre militants. The program also has other severe limitations including lack of credible religious scholars, limited financial and human resources.

Decreasing the rise of extremism remains a priority for governments worldwide. Motives behind joining an extremist organisation are complex and often unique to the individual, making prevention strategies difficult to design and implement. This article explores several facets of this complex problem, particularly in relation to young adults, including links between extremism, criminality and incarceration, mental health, socioeconomic status and the rise of radicalisation ‘hotspots’ in Muslim majority states in the Western Balkans, where lack of government leadership allows extremist organisations to flourish. Potential counter radicalisation measures are also discussed in various contexts, including healthcare systems, the community, internationally and within the Balkan region.

The article analyzes the commonalities and differences of counterterrorism (CT) practices applied by governments in France and Germany and their effects on the local ground. Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of CT responses. Paris has launched more extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the differences, the policies of both governments lack attention towards the unintended effects of these specific measures. For instance, the concern raised by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) about the prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis. AI accused the French authorities of abetting home-grown radicalization as a result of the discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris. The paper’s argument is twofold: First, decision-makers in Paris and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in a one-sided and linear way. Second, they disregard that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. In this light, polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based on this discussion, policy recommendations will be presented. Amongst other things, these recommendations include a more symmetric integration of local actors in the overall de-radicalization effort. This refers to the content and tone of public debates as well as to the equal treatment of prison imams.

Although the United States (US) is leading the fight against transnational terrorism, and the United Nations (UN) has strongly encouraged an interdependent approach, the US still lacks guidance for a coherent US Deradicalization Program. This is of critical concern given that the US recently received its first publicly known US Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant defector, but currently lacks a policy or program to handle this population, outside of standard incarceration. Moreover, this population, along with homegrown extremists and returning fighters from Syria pose the most likely continued jihadi presence in the US. The purpose of this paper is to review successful program options, and establish a basis on which to develop an effective US program. This paper outlines the known triggers for deradicalization, the known characteristics of the US jihadi population and analyzes the most useful deradicalization program components based on successful international models. Using a qualitative, cross-national content analysis of former jihadi personal narratives, international deradicalization program structure evaluations and major research findings, this paper concludes that a standardized UN sponsored program, with comprehensive services which include credible ideological and psychological support, and amnesty incentives tailored to the US jihadi population, would be the most effective way to address former jihadi population needs while enhancing US national security objectives. Key Middle Eastern stakeholders and Western states must cooperatively develop best methodologies for target populations, by leveraging each other’s competencies and capabilities.

The aim of this working paper is to explore common issues between the process of reconciliation in post-conflict societies, negotiations and the renouncement of violent means. This paper brings forward the argument that reconciliation, negotiations as well as disengagement or de-radicalization processes are important for a non-violent communication between extremists and the society they should re-integrate. Re-opening communication channels after terrorist violence can help to build trust and chance former conflict party’s mindsets. Comparing the principles of victim-oriented instruments of transitional justice to the disengagement process of perpetrators demonstrates some reasons for successful collective disengagement. Furthermore, especially amnesties, ore milder punishment are important incentives for negotiations and disengagement. This is often evaluated as unjust by victims and may suppress a further truth-finding process. Choosing completive restorative justice instruments like public apologies and public discussions in truth-finding processes can increase justice for victims and makes de-radicalization processes more lasting.

Counterterrorism strategies that mainly rely on hard power have long been used to defeat terrorism. In recent years, governments have begun incorporating soft power approaches not as a substitute, but as a complementary strategy to be applied alongside hard power approaches. Disengagement and deradicalization programs are important components of soft power approaches, and are regarded as significant contributors to traditional counterterrorism methods. In this paper, we analyze a locally developed counterterrorism program in Turkey, which resulted in the disengagement and deradicalization of hundreds of militants. In this paper we present an examination of a pilot program that focused on applying individual disengagement and deradicalization counterterrorism measures that was conducted by the Adana Police Department in Turkey between 2009 and 2015. This program was designed to reach out to the members of extremist groups and their families for the purpose of persuading them to disengage from their groups, change their radical mindsets, and help them reintegrate into society. We also discuss how the change in the government’s counterterrorism strategy from one which prioritizes the use of soft power approaches to another, which mostly utilizes the hard power approach, and almost completely discards the soft power method, influenced the implementation of the program.

This paper explores why the Prevent strand of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is failing to achieve success in reducing radicalisation of young Muslims. By refusing to engage with extremists, and denying ‘extreme’ ideas a platform for expression, this paper will explain how the importance of cultural-linguistic epistemologies, and their role in extremism, has been overlooked. Rather than striving to understand how socio-political factors influence one’s reading of religious doctrines or interpretation of ideology, Prevent understands ideology to be the core radicalising agent, used by influential figures who can exploit the grievances of the vulnerable. The problematic repercussions of this will be addressed throughout, highlighting the various, and extensive, criticisms that Prevent has faced from academics, practitioners and commentators – primarily that it is counter-productive. The importance of the post-9/11 neoconservative paradigm in underpinning Prevent will be explained, but a Neo-Weberian approach, as a better lens through which to understand radicalisation, will be proposed, to ultimately trump the simplistic, yet currently dominant, ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory. Based on this, recommendations are made for an improved Prevent, rooted in the notion that radicalisation, extremism, or terrorism cannot be prevented, without knowing the motives, the views, and the assumptions of the radicals, the extremists, and those vulnerable to engaging with them.

This study explores the explanatory value of two theories of desistance – the cessation of criminal behavior – in explaining why 27 individuals left the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The article focuses specifically on jihadists that turned away from ISIS after March 2011, asking why individuals desist from ISIS and choose to leave the caliphate. A dataset of 27 narratives of desistance was analysed to answer the question to what extent desistance from ISIS by jihadists can be explained by the Laub & Sampson’s life course theory and by Altier, Thorogughood & Horgan’s model of push and pull factors. The primary pathways for desistance are coded according to the two theories. The results show that of the 27 individuals, the majority desisted from the caliphate because of their perception of the excessive use of force by ISIS and their inability to cope with the effects. A minority desisted because of their perception of alternative options outside the terrorist group or because of important life events that happened ‘at home’. Thus, the article concludes that the push and pull factors model is valid in the explanation of desistance from the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq whereas life course theory does not hold explanatory value

This research analyzes security sector reform in Tunisia, and focuses on Tunisia’s Community Policing (CP) program in particular. CP is identified as an effective form of policing in the context of Tunisia’s political transition and continuing security concerns. This work pinpoints a number of gaps in the existing pilot CP program and areas for improvement, and proposes additional ways to address separate but interrelated problems by means of new policing methods, based on comparative research into methods used in the United States and Germany. It proposes to expand the existing private-public partnerships, which are at the heart of CP, and it identifies some areas of cooperation between the police and society that can be generalized across nations. Finally, the argument is put forth that police reform is a multi-pronged, multi-sectoral effort, relying on the efforts of many actors other than the police

The problem of insurgency has for several decades occupied a good part of the attention of IR scholars. This paper explores the various perspectives on the formation and radicalization of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The focus is on the extent to which illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, weak state capability, the almajiri crisis and the mobilization of ethno-religious identity explain simmering insurgency in Nigeria. The group has experienced ferocious onslaught on their activities by the Nigerian Military. The article relies on secondary data. This has enabled the author to draw heavily from literature espousing the diverse perspectives put forth as explanations for the uprising. Fragile state theory serves as a framework for analysis. On this basis, the article demonstrates the low-cost availability of foot soldiers from the almajiri pool, resulting from the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide better education, and employment opportunities, and widespread poverty has exposed youths to indoctrination, criminalization and terrorism. In order to ensure the effectiveness of counter terrorism efforts, the military option should not be solely relied on. Rather, efforts should be geared towards addressing the various underlying social, political and economic triggers of violent insurgency, especially in northern Nigeria where such triggers are pervasive.

Islamist militancy and terrorism, a major sociopolitical issue of Bangladesh today, has largely remained under-researched. This paper mainly explores the forms and ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism based on the content analysis of media reports and interviews with some experts in Bangladesh. Ecologies, in this paper, refer to the multiple interrelated and interdependent environments: social, political, and religious, that foster, germinate and nurture the growth of militancy and terrorism. Despite Bangladesh being globally identified as a moderate Muslim country located in South Asia, Islamist radicalization, extremism and militancy have become a major concern since the incidence of nationwide serial bomb blasts in 2005. Although an estimation of the group operatives may not be possible because these groups change names or members change groups from time to time, the presence of seventy Islamist militant outfits with thousands of militant members was identified during 1999-2010. Islamist militants carried out over 203 attacks killing 164 innocent people and injuring more than 2,658 people in this period. Using bomb explosions, these attacks targeted political parties, cultural groups, intellectuals, diplomats, movie theatres, NGO offices, and minority religious institutions. In response to these attacks, the government has adopted mostly a law-enforcement centric approach, but this study suggests a comprehensive strategy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention urgently needed for de-radicalization and counterterrorism in Bangladesh --- the 8th most populous country and the 3rd largest Muslim country of the world. Although foreign journalistic and intelligence-based reports have argued that Islamist militants have links with madrassas (Islamic seminary institutions), this system has actually been in vogue for many years in the country. Research suggests that unemployment problems, poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance about religious matters among the youths are the common drivers for Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. An unfocused national educational policy on madrassas, the narrow and dated madrassa curriculum, and frustrations felt by madrassa graduates who cannot find jobs are likely to instigate the madrassa students to get involved in militancy. Political, educational, and religious interventions are must for countering radicalization effectively. Improving education policy and creating employment opportunities for the unemployed youth can begin to address the problem of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh.

Is it possible to dissolve the violent religious ideology behind the majority of terrorist behavior and keep the ‘person’ intact? This proposal suggests a potential method to assess the impact of religious re-education on reducing future instances of terrorist behavior. The paper addresses current terms, problems and limits surrounding deradicalization. It also appraises empirical evidence behind current deradicalization programs. It attempts to analyze one component of the Saudi Arabian Deradicalization program (religious re-education) through a behavior analytic framework. It builds on previous research to suggest that social reinforcement through moderate Muslim clerics may reduce the frequency of terrorist behavior. This proposal hopes to successfully argue the necessity of putting each component of the Saudi Arabian Deradicalization program under similar scrutiny.

The deeply engrained nature of social media in modern life have provided ease of access to information and speed of use within almost every aspect of a person’s life. These same benefit are also available to terrorists and their organizations. The same technology that allows for a globalized world to interact without regard for distance or physical location is also utilized, exploited and adapted to by terrorist organizations to conduct operations, reach candidates and ensure organizational longevity. This article takes the position of observer of these advancements with the end goal of informing counter-violent extremism strategists of the advances that terrorist groups have already made in digital technology; and where the priority of intervention strategies should be aimed. Further, this is intended to guide policy makers to embrace and utilize digital technologies as a mechanism to carry counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism interventions through the same digital potential and reach the same audiences as terrorist organizations. What appears strongly apparent is that social media will not abate from its intrinsic position graphed into daily life. This means that counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism strategies must take up the same technology in order to effectively discredit and nullify extremist groups – a digital problem needs a digital solution.

The Nigerian Counter Terrorism Strategy recognised that force alone was not enough to combat violent extremist elements in Nigeria and that a multi-faceted approach was required to counter the threat of violent extremism. The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) was tasked with developing an ambitious countering violent extremism (CVE) programme consisting of three elements: community-based counter radicalisation; strategic communications; and de-radicalisation. The de-radicalisation element of the CVE programme included establishing a prison based de-radicalisation programme for sentenced and pre-trial prisoners. The challenge facing ONSA and the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) in setting up the de-radicalisation programme was considerable. Prison conditions were basic; there were no existing offending behaviour programmes on which to build; risk assessment was rudimentary and focussed on escape risk; awareness among staff at all levels of de-radicalisation programmes, their content and how they should be managed, was minimal; specialist staff were in short supply and had no training in running interventions; and resources, both physical and financial, were limited. This paper sets out how ONSA and NPS went about establishing the de-radicalisation programme and describes key elements of that programme, including: creating a supportive operating environment; risk and needs assessment; types of intervention; and programme management and staffing. It highlights the challenges and lessons that can be drawn from the operation of the programme during its first 18 months, which will be of particular interest to low resource, post-conflict and fragile states that are seeking to establish their own basic de-radicalisation programmes.

This article explores the disengagement and deradicalization experiences of Northern Irish loyalist paramilitaries from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC). Interpretative phenomenological analysis was employed to develop an understanding of how the former combatants interpreted and made sense of their disengagement from violence extremism in Northern Ireland after the Belfast Agreement. The analysis of the interviews focusses around push and pull factors which either promote or hinder their ability to move away from violent extremism. The results find a resonance with recent research exploring disengagement and deradicalization processes with terror groupings across the globe and the ideological spectrum. The findings are discussed in relation to a number of topics, including the role of prison, barriers to disengagement, continued commitment and radicalization after desistence from violent extremism, the role of life changes in promoting disengagement and how organizational pressures contain and influence individual disengagement.