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The essential aim of the Special Rapporteur's Draft Articles for Part HI on the settlement of disputes arising in connection with counter-measures is to ensure that clear restrictions on the taking of counter-measures are agreed and met. This is to be achieved by affording to the States involved in the counter-measures the right to submit any resulting dispute to conciliation or, failing settlement by conciliation, to arbitration, or, failing settlement by arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. The question to be considered in this paper is how the intervention of the Security Council will affect this system for allocating responsibility. For, in principle, the Security Council could either authorize counter-measures or prohibit counter-measures. In either case the question will arise whether such a decision by the Council will be regarded as conclusive of the legality, or illegality, of the measures taken. There is an apparent illogicality in making the right of a State to take counter-measures subject to carefully-formulated conditions, but leaving the Security Council free to authorize institutionalized counter-measures, subject to no such conditions. It is this illogicality which has seemingly worried the Special Rapporteur. The question had, of course, been anticipated in Riphagen's earlier drafts, although not limited to situations of counter-measures and peaceful settlement. Article 4 of Part Two provides as follows

This was an important award because it concerned the implementation of the Treaty of Peace of March 1979 between Israel and Egypt. Israel's obligation to withdraw “behind the international boundary” could not be implemented to the satisfaction of both parties so long as there existed a disagreement over the location of that boundary.The Joint Commission established pursuant to Article IV of the Peace Treaty, a body of military personnel, finally identified some 14 boundary pillars the location of which remained disputed. And, since Article VII of the Peace Treaty required reference to conciliation or arbitration of disputes not resolved by negotiations, the dispute over the location of these boundary pillars was referred to arbitration by the Compromis of 11 September 1986.

This chapter describes International Military Force. States have combined their military forces for a specific operation on several occasions. Examples are the three-power, namely, Britain, France, and Spain military expedition against Mexico in 1861. However, it was in connection with the supervision of plebiscites after World War I that States combined their military forces for an international purpose rather than to promote their own interests. Whilst the costs of maintaining international forces are met in part by the States which contribute contingents, and in part by voluntary contributions, most operations result in a financial burden on the organization. The Soviet Union had also opposed the degree of freedom which UN organs have in practice left to the Secretary-General in such matters. Although in recent practice the Secretary-General's actions have been more circumscribed, the matter remains controversial within the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.