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This Perspective examines the interests that inspire Russia's use of subversion, the means involved, and recent events that illustrate Russia's attempts at subversion. The authors propose ensuring that any responses to such actions are closely and clearly linked with particular acts of subversion, conducting additional research on what makes some Russian subversion effective, and improving rapid attribution of subversion.

This report examines current Russian hostile measures in Europe and forecasts how Russia might threaten Europe using these measures over the next few years. This report observes that Russia has the most strategic interest in influencing western Europe, but it has the most leverage over countries of eastern Europe, and offers a range of recommendations for the U.S. government and for the U.S. Army on countering hostile measures.

RAND researchers analyzed how political warfare is practiced today and identified ways that the U.S. government, its allies, and its partners can respond to or engage in this type of conflict to achieve U.S. ends and protect U.S. interests.

African-led missions are often the peacekeepers of last resort, taking on tasks rejected by others. Two of the six African operations examined helped set a relatively peaceful trajectory. Three of the missions contributed to improving security.

The authors of this report assess how the unconventional defense plans and capabilities being pursued by the governments of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) can deter and counteract Russian hybrid aggression and outright military attacks. It offers a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of such strategies and of associated technologies, and identifies ways in which other NATO and partner governments could provide support.

A substantial literature urges delaying elections and liberalization in postwar societies. There is little work, however, on when and how international missions that intend to delay elections and the transfer of sovereignty, such as those in Kosovo and Iraq, are able to do so. To fill this gap, I propose a theory that identifies conditions under which two forms of domestic opposition—elite objections and mass demonstrations—can at times force the international community to adopt an earlier transition plan. Following the predictions of the theory, I show that international occupations in Kosovo and Iraq were only able to implement their preferred transition plans when conditions were unfavorable for domestic opposition: when the absence of centralized authority within key groups makes an elite boycott unlikely, and when international policy does not threaten a major group's nationalist goals, making the emergence of widespread mass demonstrations doubtful. The implication for policy is that attempt...

Public opinion in postconflict societies toward international missions is widely believed to be important. We offer a theory that local satisfaction critically depends on an individual’s perception of whether the mission is furthering the wartime political agenda of his or her social group. To test this theory and competing hypotheses, we examine Kosovo Albanian satisfaction with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We use data from seventeen different representative surveys conducted in Kosovo from 2002 to 2007 as well as focus group and other primary and secondary sources. Consistent with our theory, we find that aggregate satisfaction over time reflected UNMIK’s growing acceptance of Kosovo’s independence and individuals with more radical views tended to be less satisfied with UNMIK. Our analysis implies that missions can achieve greater local satisfaction by doing what is possible to be responsive to, or at a minimum recognize, the wartime political agendas of the key social groups.

Russia employs a sophisticated social media campaign against former Soviet states that includes news tweets, nonattributed comments on web pages, troll and bot social media accounts, and fake hashtag and Twitter campaigns. Nowhere is this threat more tangible than in Ukraine. Researchers analyzed social media data and conducted interviews with regional and security experts to understand the critical ingredients to countering this campaign.

This report analyzes trends in strategic stability between Russia and the United States, examines Russian views on the subject, and assesses current prospects for stemming the erosion of strategic stability between the two countries. Such prospects exist, but they would require a sustained effort and greater political will on both sides.

This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances — political, historical, geographical, and military — that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented — and perhaps ill-conceived — effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere.

In developing U.S. intervention policy in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, and most recently Syria, the 1992 to 1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina1 has repeatedly been used as an analogy. For example, John Sha...

Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, the European Union deployed a rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). While EULEX and its supporters have argued that the mission has the potential to succeed, critics claim that the mission has failed to significantly improve Kosovo's rule of law institutions, to address the rule of law vacuum in the north of Kosovo, and to prosecute high-level organized crime and corruption. I argue that the critics are correct, and explain that the mission is fundamentally flawed due to its neutrality about Kosovo's independence, its rejection of conditionality and capacity building, and its difficulty investigating politicized crimes. Consequently, the mission cannot overcome the inherent challenges of building the rule of law in Kosovo, namely the desire of the Kosovo Albanian majority for independence and the connection between politics and criminality. The paper concludes that EULEX should not be renewed, since the mission's main functions could be better fulfilled by other international organizations, namely the NATO-led Kosovo Force and the European Union Office.

Establishing an effective police force has eluded both the Afghan government and ISAF. Increasing the prominence of Islamic policing will complement current efforts to defeat the insurgency.