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The group-centered theory of party development provides a new theoretical framework for understanding early party development. Specifically, it provides a logical framework to understand why early state legislators were motivated to engage in partisan gerrymandering during a period without national organizations. I use Pennsylvania as a case study to determine if partisanship influenced the creation of congressional district maps in 1802, 1812, and 1822. Using county-level congressional election returns and state legislative journals, I provide evidence of strategic partisan gerrymandering by the Democratic-Republicans during each apportionment year. I also show that the Federalist minority in Pennsylvania knew the national political impact of the process and attempted to influence congressional maps for their own partisan advantage. Lastly, I demonstrate how multi-member districts were the Democratic-Republicans' weapon of choice to engage in partisan gerrymandering throughout the period. These results highlight the connection between state legislatures and congressional party politics during the first party era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social science has established that political parties have been indispensable to American democracy and their most active members as keepers of the democratic flame. The aftermath of the 2020 presidential election raised questions about the role of the parties in protecting democracy, particularly the fundamental democratic norm of "loser's consent." We argue that recent political developments—close elections, ideological polarization, participatory party nominations, and changes in campaign finance and media—have worked to undermine the parties' commitment to loser's consent. We use recent survey data to show that party activists no longer demonstrate greater commitment than do ordinary citizens to democratic norms—especially to loser's consent. We also examine how parties and voters responded to the post-2020 crisis of democratic legitimacy, finding that both parties prioritized their political interests over democratic health. However, a small number of voters did deviate from normal partisanship and helped to shore up American democracy in the 2022 elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Racial/ethnic minorities and women continue to be underrepresented in public office in the United States. Here, we evaluate the role of general election political party support for women and minorities in structuring these inequalities, as a key part of general election success is support from party networks. With detailed data on party support and the demographics of congressional candidates, we use two difference-in-differences strategies to leverage within-district and candidate-constant change over time. Thus, we are able to separate the effect of race/ethnicity and gender from other factors we demonstrate to be associated with party support. We find that, all else equal, Democratic and Republican minority nominees do not receive less support than their white counterparts. We also find that white women receive more party support from Democrats than Democratic men or minority women in the general election and that this support is more responsive to changes in electoral competitiveness. These findings suggest that party elites may provide additional support to candidates from underrepresented groups in the general election to broaden their appeal to voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a new data set of state political party bylaws and demographics of state party chairs, I evaluate whether women were more likely to run for Congress during the 2018 midterm elections from parties with higher levels of gender diversity. I construct three measures of gender diversity, whether each party was chaired by a woman, granted committee membership to an allied women's group, and required gender parity among their committee members. Democratic parties are more likely to be chaired by a woman and to require gender parity among their members, but Republican parties are more likely to grant membership to allied women's groups. Considering the implications of these rules, I find Democratic women were more likely to run for Congress representing parties that grant membership to an allied women's group and parties chaired by a woman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a good deal of discussion currently among political scientists about the nature of political parties and the impacts of changing party–group relations. Are so-called outside groups promoting extreme candidates and, thus, contributing to polarization? Or perhaps, party-allied groups follow the party’s lead and support the same candidates the party supports. We view parties as extended party networks (EPNs) and examine the campaign spending practices of formal party organizations (the House congressional campaign committees) and some of the groups that are seen as allied with each party and some we expect to be outside each party’s network. We analyze the levels of congruence and divergence in party and group spending in the 2014 House elections. We find that most nonparty groups support the same candidates favored by the party with which they most identify, and very few are outside each party’s EPN-supporting candidates who are challenging the party’s picks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nomination of ideologically extreme candidates in party primaries has led many scholars and observers to speculate about the role played by different kinds of primary systems. Models of candidate competition that account for the two-stage nature of the electoral process suggest that more restrictive primary systems produce more ideologically extreme candidates. In contrast with previous research that examines the relationship between primaries and legislative ideology, we focus on how primary systems affect the ideological extremity of candidates’ campaign platforms. Using data on more than 85,000 major party candidates for Congress and state legislatures from 1980-2012, we find no evidence that the restrictiveness of primary participation rules is systematically associated with candidate ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on retrospective voting argue that voters under presidentialism tend to assign co-responsibility for the president’s performance to her party in congressional elections. However, it is not uncommon for presidential parties to distance themselves from an unpopular president or for opposition parties to cooperate with a popular president. In doing so, parties can signal to voters that they side with a popular (or against an unpopular) president. Yet little is known about whether this strategic behavior has electoral payoffs. This study proposes a popularity-response model, where parties’ electoral outcomes are a product of how they respond to public opinion on the president. I hypothesize that parties defecting from an unpopular president (or cooperating with a popular president) minimize electoral losses and obtain a further electoral boost. Analysis using an original dataset coding issue congruence between presidents and parties prior to 35 elections in 18 Latin American countries supports this claim. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To understand the extent to which partisan majorities in Congress influence economic policy, we compare financial market responses in recent midterm elections to Presidential elections. We use prediction markets that track election outcomes as a means of precisely timing and calibrating the arrival of news, allowing substantially more precise estimates than a traditional event study methodology. We find that equity values, oil prices, and Treasury yields are slightly higher with Republican majorities in Congress, and that a switch in the majority party in a chamber of Congress has an impact that is only 10%–30% of that of the Presidency. We also find evidence inconsistent with the popular view that divided government is better for equities, finding instead that equity valuations increase monotonically, albeit slightly, with the degree of Republican control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Were the 2006 midterm elections a Big Deal or No Big Deal? On the surface, the outcome seems ordinary: a setback for the president's party in his sixth year, and a return to divided government. Taking a longer view, these elections are historically important. Democratic victories interrupted the work of a sustained Republican "revolution" rolling back the bipartisan Progressive project of the 20th Century in regulation, public provision and civil rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For only the sixth time since 1900, control of both the House and Senate switched during a midterm cycle in the 2006 congressional elections. Although the magnitude of the changes was not as great as 1994, the results from 2006 more fully aligned the two parties' control of Congress with their presidential performance in the Electoral College. Democrats now dominate the Northeast in the same way Republicans dominate the South. For the first time in decades, Democrats will govern as a solidly non-Southern party. At the same time, Republicans face the challenge of overcoming the perils of regional over-representation and a drift to the right, as suggested by the recent comeback of Mississippi Senator Trent Lott. In coming cycles, election battles will focus most fiercely on the 20 competitive Midwest and Interior West states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the 2006 midterm elections, the press wrote about the conflict over campaign strategy between Howard Dean, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and his counterparts in Congress, Chuck Schumer and Rahm Emmanuel, the heads of the Senate and House campaigns, respectively. Schumer and Emmanuel, as well as other Beltway strategists, disagreed with Dean's "fifty state strategy" to build the party across the nation, arguing that DNC funds should focus on the races targeted by the congressional parties. This essay explains, in part, why Dean's popularity suffers in Washington -- even after decisive Democratic victories -- and why he continues to have support outside the Beltway. It also provides preliminary evidence that Dean's fifty-state strategy paid off in terms of increasing the Democratic vote share beyond the bounce of a national tide favoring Democrats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes a model for forecasting the outcomes of congressional elections based on national political conditions and candidate behavior. Pre-election Gallup Poll data on the generic vote and presidential approval are used to measure national political conditions and data on open seats and challenger quality are used to measure the behavior of congressional candidates. The model is tested with data on U.S. House elections between 1946 and 2004. A simpler model based only on national political conditions is tested with data on U.S. Senate elections from the same period. The results indicate that Democrats have a good chance to regain control of the House of Representatives in November. Democratic gains are also likely in the Senate but it will be difficult for Democrats to pick up the six seats that they need to take control of the upper chamber because only 15 of the 33 seats up for election in 2006 are currently held by Republicans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on several theories of congressional election change, this article presents a forecasting equation for seat change in U.S. House elections. The equation addresses the problem of the over time comparability of seat change when levels of competition at the congressional district level have declined dramatically, a decline that has substantially reduced the magnitude of net partisan seat change in recent decades. The equation is estimated using both on-year and midterm elections since 1944. It indicates that the 2006 midterm will likely be a good year for the Democrats. However, because of reduced levels of competition restricting the number of seats that are effectively "in play," Democratic Party gains are likely to be in the teens. Though Republicans may narrowly retain their control of the House, there is a very real possibility that Democrats will end the six election string of Republican House majorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]