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The article discusses the efforts of the U.S. military's Central Command and security forces in Iraq to exploit fragmentation of Sunni extremist groups in Iraq that have aligned with the militant groups Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Baath Party. Topics include the militants' focus on the government of Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, research conducted by U. S Intelligence officials, and provinces battling with the extremists.

The article reports that Iraq's Parliament passed three laws designed to foster political reconciliation between its Shia, Sunni, and Kurd communities. A federal budget, a law setting a date for provincial government elections, and an amnesty for prisoners held in Iraqi jails, a key issue for Sunnis. Many of the most disputed details of the three proposals were omitted, leading to fears conflicts had been postponed rather than resolved.

The article focuses on the decline in violence in Iraq in the second half of 2007. Iraqi and U.S. officials in that country state that the decline stems from three factors, the number of Sunni insurgents who have begun cooperating with U.S. troops rather than fighting them, the halt of military action by the Shiite militia led by Moktada al-Sadr, and the increase of the U.S. forces. All of these developments are subject to sudden change. U.S. troop levels will decline in 2008.

The article reports that Abdul al-Rishawi, the Sunni tribal sheikh who aligned himself with U.S. forces in Anbar Province, Iraq, was assassinated in a bomb attack. Al-Rishawi had met with U.S. President George W. Bush in September, 2007 during Bush's visit to Iraq. His death comes as a setback to the U.S. alliance with Sunni tribal leaders in the region, a policy often cited as one of the few U.S. successes in the Iraq War.

The article reports on the control of Sunni militants to major Iraqi post on the border of Syria.