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This chapter examines the cases of Mexico and Central America. It begins with an analysis of the issues of drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico, which have contributed to the high levels of corruption and violence within the country. The chapter focuses on President Felipe Calderon’s drug war and the consequences of such policies. It examines the underlying structural problems, focusing on the high levels of corruption and impunity that the country faces. The chapter also assesses the challenges that Mexico will likely continue to face in the future and the impact on regional security. It then turns to corruption and organized crime in Central America, focusing on the major trends in El Salvador and Honduras. It highlights the issue of immigration, focusing on the major trends as well as the current policies of the Trump administration.

This chapter underscores the importance of institutions, specifically the constitution, on certain fragile Latin America countries and Lebanon. The political culture in these areas encourage constitutional ineffectiveness, whether the executive branch of government manipulates it to protect itself like in Latin America, or, a static, unwritten agreement that solidifies the power of patronage and clientelism as in Lebanon. The end result is the same in these cases: the inability of the state to encourage economic development and progress.

This chapter illustrates the explanatory power of our theory expounded on in Chapters 2 and 3. It explains the proliferation of corruption, illicit trafficking, and terrorism in Central Asia and the Middle East. Beginning in Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking spreads through corruption as traffickers attempt to get their goods to market. Culture plays an important role in the spread of corruption, and this chapter takes time to illustrate this, especially in the Middle East. Thus, dealing with corruption increases in complexity, given the embedded normative system of the region.

This chapter looks at the global power of the Russian mafia, tracing its roots and its success in the post-Cold War system. Corruption became endemic in the 1980s, when organized criminal groups anticipated the end of the Soviet Union. The institutional weakness of the new state of Russia and the power of Russian oligarchs created the perfect storm for the mafia as well as extra-judicial practice. This chapter also discusses the Putin regime and its use of corruption as a lever of power.

This chapter provides the book with a theoretical framework applied to cases. It explores contemporary conceptualizations of fragility, corruption, and institution building. Building on previously established literature, the chapter explores why domestic institutions matter to international stability, as corruption tends to spread from weaker states to regional locations.

States within the system have two choices given systemic change: war or peace. This book began with the supposition that states are psychopaths and inclined to go to war. If states are left to their own devices this may indeed happen. The second option, peace, requires action from the grassroots. States as led by elites have failed to guarantee world peace. This chapter suggests social and economic stability embedded by the promotion of human development over extravagant, psychopathic prestige-seeking activity. Such focus may be able to avoid war. Here, I will explore the cognitive mechanisms, which result in such a decision. It will also explore the concept of forgiveness as a productive part of systemic practice. This will serve as this work’s normative offering, imagining new forms of governance.

This chapter looks at the conflict of regionalism between neoempires currently organizing: the European Union led by Germany and the Eurasian Union led by Russia. The European Union was a project to end war among European states. After the Cold War, it expanded into space perceived by Russia to be sacred. This action forced Russia to create the Eurasian Union to strengthen its own position in a way similar to that of the European Union. Russia is now seeking to recover some of its lost space which explains action in Ukraine today. This chapter will try to make sense of systemic competition between these two groups.

States seeking security and power will inevitably fall into traps intrinsic to the makeup of the international system. The security dilemma and imperial overstretch describe these predictabilities. States are led into these snares by leaders and their need to survive, not always to survive as independent units, but in some instances to defend their position as, or to become, a hegemonic power. This chapter examines two sources of vulnerability. First, systemic state vulnerabilities, the security dilemma, tests the limits of any state’s expansion. Second, states, seeking security or domination, will face serious challenges from the natural world which only drain resources. The importance of containment and a Fabian strategy becomes absolutely essential to curtailing the expansion of revisionist powers by targeting their economic faculties.

Terrorism is an asymmetrical tactic that communicates a particular message as part of a wider strategy. Military strikes will enhance terrorist networks and will only advance tensions, increase radicalization and lead to more violent reprisals. This would explain Islamic State’s increasingly barbaric actions in the world. If states persist in their futile attempt at trying to subdue Islamic State by force, they will have to accept serious responsibility. The author suggests establishing the motive of these groups before action is taken. Policy-makers can then deal with the problem efficiently by targeting motivations. Violent reactions will only illicit further violence from terrorist networks, exacerbating and strengthening the power of political vulnerabilities.

Chapter 5 discussed the power of aid over weak states. Buying votes at the United Nations General Assembly presents the United States, and other great powers, with ample ability to pursue their interests under the guise of legitimacy gained by the democratic process. Weak states may not always bandwagon; they may take aid from great powers, however, especially if they assist in development. There are of course repercussions for such behavior, especially with the emergence of new powers. This chapter will utilize Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war—his international political economy theory of Economic Nationalism—to explain the politics of emerging donors and their pursuit of interest. This chapter specifically confronts this book’s theoretical expectation that describes the change in great power grand strategy and the competition for weak state political support In other words, if emerging powers use the same strategy of vote buying as described in chapter 5, we can expect a significant change in great power grand strategy regarding weak states—from security and balancing, using alliances, to economic development and the game of Go. This chapter will describe the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an example of an emerging state (or one that is perceived by many to be emerging; whether or not this is true is a subject for another work).

The discussion of great powers and weak states is a timeless one. It dates back to the times of the Ancient Greeks. The Melian Dialogue portrays the clash between Athens, a rising great power and the island of Melos, a weak, neutral nation east of Sparta. Melos is an important asset to Athens because of its strategic importance. Annexing this island also communicates to Sparta that Athens is a regional power. Why did Melos exist in the first place? What did it do and how did it relate to other powers? Why do weak states exist at all? It could very well be argued that weak states owe their very existence to great powers—“either to the balance of power, or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialist inspirations” (Morgenthau 1948, 196). As Morgenthau says, a weak state is seen as “attractive” to great powers only to the extent that it helps achieve regional or world domination against another great power. Weak states are sheltered by the international system; they are a part of it, but remain separate from great power struggles for survival since they are deemed unnecessary. Weak states rely on great powers and use the international system to their advantage.

In an article titled “Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States,” Gvalia et al. attempt to explain away the abnormality of Georgian action as against the supposition that small states are limited to bandwagoning. They argue that Georgia balanced against Russia due to elitist nationalist and Western ideology that constructed Georgian foreign policy after the Rose Revolution (Gvalia et al. 2013, 99). Ideas about identity and the purpose of the state combined to form Georgian reaction to the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, despite their deep economic relationship with, and close proximity to, Russia at the time (Ibid., 100). They did so because “The European idea is based on the long-term development of the country. If we are with the West, Georgia will mature as a state and society” (Ibid., 113). This Westward movement for development’s sake led Russia to support separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a way to counter Georgian foreign policy. All this occurred as Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia increased between 2003 and 2006, even during the Rose Revolution. What does all this mean? More importantly, was Georgian military action in 2008 simply an effort to retake Georgian lands, depending on Western support to counter Russian responses, given their simultaneous relationship with these two rivals?