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In a well‐ordered society, democratic officials face an assurance problem. They want to ensure that others will act reasonably when they do the same. According to political liberals, public reason can solve this problem, but the details of how assurance is generated are unclear. This article explains the assurance mechanism in political liberalism. Apart from public reason, mutual assurance is also provided by a long‐term record of civic deeds. By performing civic deeds over time, officials signal their reasonableness to each other. This record of civic deeds is costly to unreasonable officials and thus represents a reliable way to differentiate trustworthy fellows from others. The article also shows that a recent critique of political liberalism, which argues that public reason is merely cheap talk and thus political liberalism fails to provide mutual assurance, misses the point. It overlooks that assurance is created through talks and deeds together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become commonplace to argue that Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville form a distinct French liberal tradition going back to Montesquieu. Yet Tocqueville showed little interest in Constant, and early nineteenth-century French liberals did not recognize Montesquieu as the father of French liberalism. Based on these observations, this essay demonstrates that the French liberal tradition is a belated construction and explains how, when, and why it was invented. Exhuming the origins of the French liberal tradition, I argue, is important for our understanding of the history of liberalism and the mechanisms behind ideology formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An experiment (N = 209) investigated whether terms about the scientific method impacted processing fluency similarly to other forms of jargon. Political ideology emerged as a significant moderator of the effects of method jargon on processing fluency. Specifically, liberals reported a more negative processing experience after exposure to the jargon condition, in line with expected general effects of jargon, while conservatives did not report a similarly negative experience. This preliminary result adds to accumulating evidence that suggests political ideology poses a challenge for science communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The philosopher Akeel Bilgrami's notion of identity is original and challenging to liberal political theory, but still largely unaddressed by it. In a nutshell, Bilgrami characterizes identity as holding certain values and commitments with a crucial addendum: as we want to continue living by those values and commitments in the future, we erect some social and legal barriers to prevent them from change. Liberals of a Millian and/or Rawlsian cast of mind, in turn, arrange political institutions to enable such change, as they assume that we are the kind of creatures that change their minds. In this sense, the identitarian and the liberal mindset are, as the philosopher claims, "mirror opposites". This article engages with Bilgrami's view in two senses: on the one hand, it highlights some potentially problematic areas that may call for further clarification and reinterpretation of the liberal canon, as well as offering other set of tensions that arise with non-liberal philosophical traditions. On the other hand, it contends that Bilgrami's ultimate claim is not merely that the identitarian mindset is more rational than the liberal mentality, as he does, but that it makes political demands that should be assessed against the liberal ideal of justification. While it may be the case that identitarianism is rationally superior to certain versions of comprehensive liberalism, the paper concludes that it loses out to political liberalism, to the extent that Bilgrami's identitarianism is willing to display the state's coercive muscle in oppressive ways, in a way that political liberalism does not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To successfully battle climate change, it is crucial to reach people across political camps and national borders. Research from dual-party systems indicates that climate change communication is most effective when it addresses how climate action promotes recipients' political values. Yet, to our knowledge, there is no such evidence from multi-party systems. To fill this gap, we conducted three studies in two Central European, German-speaking countries: Germany and Austria. In Study 1, we framed conservative and liberal climate protection messages using values from Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Liberals agreed more with the liberally framed than with the conservatively framed climate protection message. In Study 2, we framed the climate protection message based on moral foundations. Conservative participants agreed more with the conservatively framed climate protection message than with the liberally framed one. Study 3 integrated values from multiple frameworks, and ultimately conservatives as well as liberals agreed more to climate protection statements that touched on values reflecting their political ideology. Thus, empirical findings from dual-party systems hold for countries with more than two parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines what the author calls 'the dispute about words and things': that is, the Mid-Nineteenth Century international debate on the location of Spanish American ideas and Neogranadan Liberalism (1849-1853). The debate sought to define the position occupied by European ideas in Spanish America and its correspondence, or lack thereof, with the continent's reality. The dispute's principal arguments are organized and unpacked via the comparison and juxtaposition of manifold primary sources such as periodicals and pamphlets: it analyzes how European ideas in Spanish America were accused of being (1) extemporaneous, (2) artificial and (3) potentially barbarous and bloody, before inspecting (4) the reasoned replies wielded by the Neogranadan Liberals, forced to refute their critics and re-think their peculiar position as Spanish American intellectuals. The text offers a structured introduction to a very complex, and still present ad vital, debate in which many actors intervened; and it contributes to Spanish American Intellectual History exploring how it was conceived, invisibilized and legitimated during a crucial juncture -the 1850's- characterized by rising imperialism, a vague consolidation of a 'Latin American conscience' and vigorous political and social mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political liberals have regularly been accused of being antidemocratic. The standard version of this objection maintains that in prioritizing liberal rights, political liberals leave insufficient room for democratic self-legislation. Leading political liberals like Jonathan Quong have denied the force of this objection, by arguing that certain liberal rights are beyond reasonable dispute and that there is nothing objectionably undemocratic about having constitutional guarantees in place to protect them. In this article, I argue that the democratic problem with Quong's political liberalism is not the emphasis on constitutional safeguards for liberal rights. Rather, Quong's theory cannot ensure that even a basic desideratum for democratic decision-making is met. We are thus faced with the choice of granting citizens the right to make democratic decisions and Quong's antidemocratic political liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aumann's theorem states that no individual should agree to disagree under a range of assumptions. Political liberalism appears to presuppose these assumptions with the idealized conditions of public reason. We argue that Aumann's theorem demonstrates they nevertheless cannot be simultaneously held with what is arguably political liberalism's most central tenet. That is, the tenet of reasonable pluralism, which implies we can rationally agree to disagree over conceptions of the good. We finish by elaborating a way of relaxing one of the theorem's axioms that arguably lends itself to a coherent account of political liberalism, namely, the condition of indexical independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The stark divide between the political right and left is rooted in conflicting beliefs, values, and personality—and, recent research suggests, perhaps even lower-level physiological differences between individuals. In this registered report, we investigated a novel domain of ideological differences in physiological processes: interoceptive sensitivity—that is, a person's attunement to their own internal bodily states and signals (e.g., physiological arousal, pain, and respiration). We conducted two studies testing the hypothesis that greater interoceptive sensitivity would be associated with greater conservatism: one laboratory study in the Netherlands using a physiological heartbeat detection task and one large-scale online study in the United States employing an innovative webcam-based measure of interoceptive sensitivity. Contrary to our predictions, we found evidence that interoceptive sensitivity may instead predict greater political liberalism (versus conservatism), although this association was primarily limited to the American sample. We discuss implications for our understanding of the physiological underpinnings of political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the issue of gender inequality dominates the public discourse, the country is sharply divided along party lines about its importance and the way to deal with it. In this polarized context, marketers struggle to devise brand communication strategies that will successfully connect with equality-conscious female consumers. By integrating research in political ideology, sexism, and brand communications, this research uncovers the types of sexual appeals that are more likely to resonate with female consumers who endorse a liberal (vs. conservative) ideology. Results of three lab experiments and a secondary data set demonstrate that liberal (vs. conservative) women are more likely to reject brands that are associated with a sexually objectified image of women. Furthermore, this effect is driven by liberal women's rejection of benevolent sexism. These results are discussed in terms of the contributions to political ideology and brand communications research, as well as the implications for marketers' communication strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies examined how political ideology relates to attitudes towards opposing scientific and nonscientific perspectives on apolitical topics. Participants read an article excerpt containing quotes from a researcher debunking a common misconception, such as the existence of lucky streaks in games of chance. They also read the perspective of someone who rejected the researcher in favor of personal experience, either in the form of a quote in the article from a relevant professional (e.g., a casino manager, Study 1) or a comment from a purported previous respondent with no clear expertise (Study 2). In both studies, conservatives, compared to liberals, evaluated the views of the scientist and the person rejecting the science as closer in legitimacy. Differences in evaluation of the science rejecter were mediated by conservatives' heightened intuitive thinking. By spotlighting how partisans evaluate nonscientific perspectives alongside science and by focusing on apolitical topics, these results bring new clarity to the debate on whether conservatives are more biased than liberals in attitudes towards science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to investigate Weibo users' political ideologies in China. It argues that a left-right spectrum cannot adequately depict the ideological landscape, and proposes a typological framework to guide the analysis of competing ideologies. Based on a sample of 3440 Weibo users, this article uses latent class model to identify sub-types of ideologues. It discerns five ideological groups, namely Maoists, regime defenders, full-fledged liberals, economic liberals, and political liberals, as well as one politically silent group. The results show that liberal leaning Weibo users are not a homogeneous group, and should not be holistically conceived as regime challengers in opposition to regime defenders. To a certain degree, economic liberals are more similar to regime defenders than Maoists, and this can be better understood from a typological perspective than a spectrum perspective. This article concludes with a discussion on the political implications of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before (n = 362) and after (n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis (r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on American core political values, partisanship, and ideology often concludes that liberals and Democrats believe equality to be one of the most important values while conservatives and Republicans place greater emphasis on social order and moral traditionalism. Though these findings are valuable, it is assumed that they generalize across various groups (e.g. socioeconomic classes, religious groups, racial groups, etc.) in society. Focusing on racial groups in contemporary American politics, I challenge this assumption. More specifically, I argue that if individuals' value preferences are formed during their pre-adult socialization years, and if the socialization process is different across racial groups, then it may be the case that members of different racial groups connect their value preferences to important political behaviors, including partisanship and ideology, in different ways as well. In the first part of this study, I fit a geometric model of value preferences to two different data sets-the first from 2010 and the second from 2002-and I show that although there is substantial value disagreement between white Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives, that disagreement is smaller in Latinos and almost completely absent in African Americans. In the second part of this study, I demonstrate the political implications of these findings by estimating the effects of values on party and ideology, conditional on race. Results show that where whites' value preferences affect their partisan and ideological group ties, the effects are smaller in Latinos and indistinguishable from zero in African Americans. I close by suggesting that scholars of values and political behavior ought to think in a more nuanced manner about how fundamental political cognitions relate to various attitudes and behaviors across different groups in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical republicanism and classical liberalism divide on the understanding of freedom, the one taking it as non-domination, the other as non-interference. And essentially the same division survives today, with serious policy implications, between neo-republicanism and neo-liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses his goal of offering a taxonomy of constitutionalism in the hope of unsettling the view that liberal constitutionalism is just constitutionalism and all other varieties are defective. He cites examples of adjectival constitutionalism which are studies of regional constitutionalism such as Latin American constitutionalism, East Asian constitutionalism and the like. He suggests that a richer taxonomy of varieties of constitutionalist may be useful.

When voters learn about candidates' issue positions during election campaigns, does it affect how they vote? This basic question about voters remains unanswered in part because of a methodological obstacle: learning candidates' issue positions may influence not only voters' vote choice but also their issue positions. To surmount this obstacle, we attempt to answer this question by examining statewide primary elections, which are arguably less vulnerable to this reverse causation problem because they lack partisan cues and are of much lower salience than presidential elections. Using both existing polling data and our own panel Internet surveys, we find that voters learn about the ideologies of candidates during statewide primary campaigns and that this learning affects their voting decisions in senate and gubernatorial primaries. We fail to find similar results for down-ballot primaries, raising questions about voters' ability to make informed judgments for these types of elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three studies, we tested whether prejudice derives from perceived similarities and dissimilarities in political ideologies (the value-conflict hypothesis). Across three diverse samples in Study 1, conservatives had less favorable impressions than liberals of groups that were identified as liberal (e.g., African Americans, homosexuals), but more favorable impressions than liberals of groups identified as conservative (e.g., Christian fundamentalists, businesspeople). In Studies 2 and 3, we independently manipulated a target’s race (European American or African American) and political attitudes (liberal or conservative). Both studies found symmetrical preferences, with liberals and conservatives each liking attitudinally similar targets more than dissimilar targets. The amount of prejudice was comparable for liberals and conservatives, and the race of the target had no effect. In all three studies, the same patterns were obtained even after controlling for individual differences on prejudice-related dimensions (e.g., system justification, social-dominance orientation, modern racism). The patterns strongly support the value-conflict hypothesis and indicate that prejudice exists on both sides of the political spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on C. B. Macpherson's project of reconstructing liberal-democratic theory. The author mentions that the two key components of reconstruction project include a structural portrayal of liberal-democratic theory and a thesis about historical development that offers the lynchpin that structures and enables the narrative that Macpherson constructs about the two competing ontologies. He also provides description of the two components and their relation.

Abstract: Political conservatives are happier than liberals. We proposed that this happiness gap is accounted for by specific attitude and personality differences associated with positive adjustment and mental health. In contrast, a predominant social psychological explanation of the gap is that conservatives, who are described as fearful, defensive, and low in self-esteem, will rationalize away social inequalities in order to justify the status quo (system justification). In four studies, conservatives expressed greater personal agency (e.g., personal control, responsibility), more positive outlook (e.g., optimism, self-worth), more transcendent moral beliefs (e.g., greater religiosity, greater moral clarity, less tolerance of transgressions), and a generalized belief in fairness, and these differences accounted for the happiness gap. These patterns are consistent with the positive adjustment explanation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper examines the permanence of differences in the psychological underpinnings of ideological self-identifications. Previous research has suggested that conservatives differ from liberals insofar as their self-identifications as such are best explained as the product of a negative reaction (both to liberalism generally and to the groups associated with it in particular) rather than a positive embrace. However, this paper demonstrates that the dynamics underlying the formation of ideological self-identifications are not static reflections of inherent differences in liberal and conservative psychologies but rather evolve in response to changes in the political environment. Whereas feelings (positive or negative) toward liberalism played a decisive role in shaping individuals' ideological self-identifications during the New Deal/Great Society era of liberal and Democratic political hegemony, the subsequent resurgence of political conservatism produced a decisive shift in the bases of liberal and conservative self-identifications. In particular, just as conservative self-identifications once primarily represented a reaction against liberalism and its associated symbols, hostility toward conservatism and its associated symbols has in recent years become an increasingly important source of liberal self-identifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars in many fields have long noted the importance of social context in the development of political ideology. Recent work suggests that political ideology also has a heritable component, but no specific gene variant or combination of variants associated with political ideology have so far been identified. Here, we hypothesize that individuals with a genetic predisposition toward seeking out new experiences will tend to be more liberal, but only if they are embedded in a social context that provides them with multiple points of view. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we test this hypothesis by investigating an association between self-reported political ideology and the 7R variant of the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4), which has previously been associated with novelty seeking. Among those with DRD4-7R, we find that the number of friendships a person has in adolescence is significantly associated with liberal political ideology. Among those without the gene variant, there is no association. This is the first study to elaborate a specific gene-environment interaction that contributes to ideological self-identification, and it highlights the importance of incorporating both nature and nurture into the study of political preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study used longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample to examine long-term effects of loss on political views. Drawing on terror management theory, it was predicted that individuals would reinforce their political views in response to the loss of relatives or close friends. Results were consistent with this hypothesis, though the effects were more pronounced among conservatives than liberals. By showing that the death of loved ones can shape political attitudes, the findings shed new light on the long-term effects of death confrontation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses some arguments on Sonia Sotomayor as new junior associate justice for 2009 in the U.S. Supreme Court. It notes that the professors will examine her opinions and reflect her philosophical approach. Furthermore, the conservatives seized her speeches and claimed that she was a liberal activist who deeply rely on her emotions when deciding a case. However, Ruth Bader Ginsburg a women's right advocate, says that Sotomayor has different ideologies but did not adapt liberal jurisprudence.