1. Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
- Author
-
Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala, Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), HEC Research Paper Series, and Haldemann, Antoine
- Subjects
State variable ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,Control (management) ,jel:C73 ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,State (functional analysis) ,Function (mathematics) ,Poisson distribution ,symbols.namesake ,Markov perfect equilibrium ,Terminal (electronics) ,Stochastic Revision Games ,Games Theory ,Equilibria ,symbols ,[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration ,[SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration ,Mathematical economics ,Finite set ,Mathematics - Abstract
We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.
- Published
- 2015