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This paper studies the impact of software piracy on prominent and non-prominent software developers in markets based on a two-sided platform business. User behavior is imperfect and, when adopting a platform, users only take prominent software into account. We show that prominent software exhibits higher piracy rates than non-prominent software. However, contrary to intuition, this does not necessarily mean that prominent software developers benefit more from increased software protection. Indeed, we show that prominent developers may lose out whereas non-prominent developers may gain from better software protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze a method for detecting software piracy. A metamorphic generator is used to create morphed copies of a base piece of software. A hidden Markov model is trained on the opcode sequences extracted from these morphed copies and the resulting trained model is used to score suspect software to determine its similarity to the base software. A high score indicates that the suspect software may be a modified version of the base software, suggesting that further investigation is warranted. In contrast, a low score indicates that the suspect software differs significantly from the base software. We show that our approach is robust, in the sense that the base software must be extensively modified before it is not detected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sided-market setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]