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Complex adaptive networks exhibit remarkable resilience, driven by the dynamic interplay of structure (interactions) and function (state). While static-network analyses offer valuable insights, understanding how structure and function co-evolve under external interventions is critical for explaining system-level adaptation. Using a unique dataset of clandestine criminal networks, we combine empirical observations with computational modeling to test the impact of various interventions on network adaptation. Our analysis examines how networks with specialized roles adapt and form emergent structures to optimize cost-benefit trade-offs. We find that emergent sparsely connected networks exhibit greater resilience, revealing a security-efficiency trade-off. Notably, interventions can trigger a "criminal opacity amplification" effect, where criminal activity increases despite reduced network visibility. While node isolation fragments networks, it strengthens remaining active ties. In contrast, deactivating nodes (analogous to social reintegration) can unintentionally boost criminal coordination, increasing activity or connectivity. Failed interventions often lead to temporary functional surges before reverting to baseline. Surprisingly, stimulating connectivity destabilizes networks. Effective interventions require precise calibration to node roles, connection types, and external conditions. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about connectivity and intervention efficacy in complex adaptive systems across diverse domains.

The world is currently grappling with challenges on both local and global scales, many of which demand coordinated behavioral changes. However, breaking away from the status is often difficult due to deeply ingrained social norms. In such cases, social systems may require seemingly exogenous interventions to set off endogenous, largely irreversible processes that drive change -- social tipping. While studies have looked at targeted interventions, real-life constraints faced by policymakers, like minimizing costs while ensuring a quick and fair transition, remain understudied. To address this complexity, we introduce a game-theoretic framework that accounts for individual heterogeneity and networks of local influence. We implement various heuristics based on information about individual preferences and commonly used local network properties. Results show that where the change is initiated in the population and the direction in which it propagates is essential to the effectiveness of interventions. We identify optimal strategies under different scenarios, such as varying levels of resistance to change, preference heterogeneity, and homophily. These results provide insights that can be experimentally tested and help policymakers to better direct incentives.

The interplay between criminal organizations and law enforcement disruption strategies is crucial in criminology. Criminal enterprises, like legitimate businesses, balance visibility and security to thrive. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze criminal networks' dynamics, resilience to interventions, and responses to external conditions. We find strong hysteresis effects, challenging traditional deterrence-focused strategies. Optimal thresholds for organization formation or dissolution are defined by these effects. Stricter punishment doesn't always deter organized crime linearly. Network structure, particularly link density and skill assortativity, significantly influences organization formation and stability. These insights advocate for adaptive policy-making and strategic law enforcement to effectively disrupt criminal networks.

Recently, social debates have been marked by increased polarization of social groups. Such polarization not only implies that groups cannot reach a consensus on fundamental questions but also materializes in more modular social spaces/networks that further amplify the risks of polarization in less polarizing topics. How can network adaptation bridge different communities when individuals reveal homophilic or heterophilic social rewiring preferences? Here, we consider information diffusion processes that capture a continuum from simple to complex contagion processes. We use a computational model to understand how fast and to what extent individual rewiring preferences bridge initially weakly connected communities and how likely it is for them to reach a consensus. We show that homophilic and heterophilic rewiring have different impacts depending on the type of opinion spread. First, in the case of complex opinion diffusion, we show that even polarized social networks can reach a population-wide consensus without reshaping their underlying network. When polarized social structures amplify opinion polarization, heterophilic rewiring preferences play a key role in creating bridges between communities and facilitating a population-wide consensus. Secondly, in the case of simple opinion diffusion, homophilic rewiring preferences are more capable of fostering consensus and avoiding a co-existence (dynamical polarization) of opinions. Hence, across a broad profile of simple and complex opinion diffusion processes, only a mix of heterophilic and homophilic rewiring preferences avoids polarization and promotes consensus., Comment: 10 pages. 4 figures

Complex adaptive systems (CASs), from ecosystems to economies, are open systems and inherently dependent on external conditions. While a system can transition from one state to another based on the magnitude of change in external conditions, the rate of change -- irrespective of magnitude -- may also lead to system state changes due to a phenomenon known as a rate-induced transition (RIT). This study presents a novel framework that captures RITs in CASs through a local model and a network extension where each node contributes to the structural adaptability of others. Our findings reveal how RITs occur at a critical environmental change rate, with lower-degree nodes tipping first due to fewer connections and reduced adaptive capacity. High-degree nodes tip later as their adaptability sources (lower-degree nodes) collapse. This pattern persists across various network structures. Our study calls for an extended perspective when managing CASs, emphasizing the need to focus not only on thresholds of external conditions but also the rate at which those conditions change, particularly in the context of the collapse of surrounding systems that contribute to the focal system's resilience. Our analytical method opens a path to designing management policies that mitigate RIT impacts and enhance resilience in ecological, social, and socioecological systems. These policies could include controlling environmental change rates, fostering system adaptability, implementing adaptive management strategies, and building capacity and knowledge exchange. Our study contributes to the understanding of RIT dynamics and informs effective management strategies for complex adaptive systems in the face of rapid environmental change., Comment: 25 pages, 4 figures, 1 box, supplementary information

Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy-makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population towards a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively.

The rate of adoption of new information depends on reinforcement from multiple sources in a way that often cannot be described by simple contagion processes. In such cases, contagion is said to be complex. Complex contagion happens in the diffusion of human behaviours, innovations, and knowledge. Based on that evidence, we propose a model that considers multiple, potentially asymmetric, and competing contagion processes and analyse its respective population-wide dynamics, bringing together ideas from complex contagion, opinion dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and language competition by shifting the focus from individuals to the properties of the diffusing processes. We show that our model spans a dynamical space in which the population exhibits patterns of consensus, dominance, and, importantly, different types of polarisation, a more diverse dynamical environment that contrasts with single simple contagion processes. We show how these patterns emerge and how different population structures modify them through a natural development of spatial correlations: structured interactions increase the range of the dominance regime by reducing that of dynamic polarisation, tight modular structures can generate structural polarisation, depending on the interplay between fundamental properties of the processes and the modularity of the interaction network., Comment: 18 Pages, 5 Figures

How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies have shown that the update rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically modify the evolutionary outcome of the population as a whole. This hints at the complexities of considering the personality of individuals in a population, where each one uses its own rule. Here, we investigate whether and how heterogeneity in the rules of behavior update alters the evolutionary outcome. We assume that individuals update behaviors by aspiration-based self-evaluation and they do so in their own ways. Under weak selection, we analytically reveal a simple property that holds for any two-strategy multi-player games in well-mixed populations and on regular graphs: the evolutionary outcome in a population with heterogeneous update rules is the weighted average of the outcomes in the corresponding homogeneous populations, and the associated weights are the frequencies of each update rule in the heterogeneous population. Beyond weak selection, we show that this property holds for public goods games. Our finding implies that heterogeneous aspiration dynamics is additive. This additivity greatly reduces the complexity induced by the underlying individual heterogeneity. Our work thus provides an efficient method to calculate evolutionary outcomes under heterogeneous update rules.