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On several occasions, Finn Collin has engaged in discussions surrounding social constructivism, a relatively recent theoretical orientation emerging through the development of naturalized science studies from the 1970s. Inspired by Finn's work, this paper explores the distinction between 'social constructivism' and 'social constructionism' and their origins in various strands of the sociology of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an overlooked similarity between three classic accounts of the conditions of object experience from three distinct disciplines. (1) Sociology: the "inversion" that accompanies discovery in the natural sciences, as local causes of effects are reattributed to an observed object. (2) Psychology: the "externalization" that accompanies mastery of a visual–tactile sensory substitution interface, as tactile sensations of the proximal interface are transformed into vision-like experience of a distal object. (3) Biology: the "projection" that brings forth an animal's Umwelt, as impressions on its body's sensory surfaces are reconfigured into perception of an external object. This similarity between the effects of scientific practice and interface-use on the one hand, and of sensorimotor interaction on the other, becomes intelligible once we accept that skillful engagement with instruments and interfaces constitutes a socio-material augmentation of our basic perceptual capacity. This enactive interpretation stands in contrast to anti-realism about science associated with constructivist interpretations of these three phenomena, which are motivated by viewing them as the internal mental construction of the experienced object. Instead, it favors a participatory realism: the sensorimotor basis of perceptual experience loops not only through our body, but also through the external world. This allows us to conceive of object experience in relational terms, i.e., as one or more subjects directly engaging with the world. Consequently, we can appreciate scientific observation in its full complexity: it is a socio-materially augmented process of becoming acquainted with the observed object that—like tool-use and perceiving more generally—is irreducibly self, other-, and world-involving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experimental practice in contemporary molecular biology oscillates between the creativity of the researcher in tinkering with the experimental system, and the necessity of standardization of methods of inquiry. Experimental procedures, when standardized in lab protocols, might definitely be seen as actual recipes. Considering these protocols as recipes can help us understand some epistemological characteristics of current practice in molecular biology. On the one hand, protocols represent a common ground, i.e. the possibility of reproducibility, which constitutes one of the essential properties for contemporary science to define an actual discovery. At the same time, however, protocols are flexible enough to be adapted by the individual researcher (within a space of maneuver given by the experimental system and by the practices that each individual discipline gives to itself) to his/her specific needs. These variations, just like the recipes, remind us that the legitimacy of an experimental practice, involves both objective and subjective constraints and it is articulated on a fuzzy background rather than a rigid and clear context. Moreover, looking at experiments according to this perspective can provide a key to understanding how different forms of science (which adopt different methodologies but which investigate the same phenomena), such as computational biology, are precisely different in the use of a different “cookbook”. Indeed, given the procedural/operational realism of biologists towards phenomena, the clash of different procedures has opened a discussion also about the nature and the meaning of the obtained results. Thus, according to the recipe-perspective that, we propose a constructivist account arguing that the methodological struggle over the nature of biological phenomena (and their ways of discovery) among scientists, might be seen as a not always explicit, philosophical debate, however coming from the practice of science itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We agree with Kwan and Tsang (2001) that critical realism represents an important point of epistemological departure from mainstream realism, and that it has the potential to inform strategy research. To that end, Kwan and Tsang's argument for a critical realist perspective is valid. There however exist substantial nontrivial differences between constructivism and critical realism. While critical realism contests some of the default assumptions of empiricism and realism which treat social systems as closed systems, it is still predicated upon an inherent order of things that is graspable by research. Constructivism instead focuses on the manner in which researchers constitute theories in the act of describing them. This important distinction makes constructivism far more of a departure from empiricism than critical realism, and therefore it has a different set of implications for strategy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mir and Watson (2000) advocate that constructivism has the potential to inform strategy research. In their discussions, they compare constructivism with realism, and highlight certain alleged strengths of the former over the latter. Although their paper provides some insights, their version of constructivism is problematic and their understanding of realism is inaccurate. In this note we clarify some key issues concerning constructivism and realism. Moreover, we argue that Mir and Watson's insights can be accommodated within a critical realist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we suggest that constructivism has the potential to inform research in strategic management. The realist paradigm currently dominates strategy research, and constructivism, a well-established tradition in the philosophy of science, is often ignored. However, a study of strategy literature and research reveals that it is drawn upon more frequently than is explicitly acknowledged. Constructivism occupies a methodological space characterized by ontological realism and epistemological relativism. Ontological realism is an important cornerstone of a field as applied as strategy, while epistemological relativism helps us explore the constructed nature of the field, where the researcher is an active participant rather than a reactor or information processor. In this paper, we demonstrate the precedents and possibilities for constructivist research in strategic management. We examine some of the existent constructivist works in the strategy literature, and point to specific techniques, including historical analysis, to demonstrate how this perspective may advance the boundaries of strategy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most Kantian constructivists try to ground universal duties of interpersonal morality in certain interactions between individuals, such as communication, argumentation, shared action or the second-person standpoint. The goal of this paper is to present these, which I refer to as arguments from the second-person perspective, with a dilemma: either the specific kind of interaction that is taken as a starting point of these arguments is inescapable, but in that case the argument does not justify a universal principle of interpersonal morality. Or interaction does have a principle of interpersonal morality among its necessary conditions of possibility, but such forms of interactions are merely optional. I argue that proponents of arguments from the second-person perspective have failed to provide a convincing response to this dilemma and that this failure is systematic. This suggests that the success of Kantian constructivism depends on the success of arguments from the first person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the iterative conception, each set is formed out of sets that are, in some sense, prior to it. Because priority plays an essential role in explanations of why contradiction-inducing sets, such as the universal set, do not exist, the success of these explanations depends on our ability to make sense of the relevant priority relation. I argue that attempts to do this have fallen short: understanding priority in a straightforwardly constructivist sense threatens the coherence of the empty set and raises serious epistemological concerns; but the leading realist interpretations–ontological and modal interpretations of priority—are deeply problematic as well. I conclude that the purported explanatory virtues of the iterative conception are, at present, unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Context · In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem · Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects - notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition - have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method · We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the "middle way"; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between "enaction" and "enactivism." Results · We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications · Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains - theoretical, empirical, and existential - where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content · All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on two questions: (1) Is understanding intimately bound up with accurately representing the world? (2) Is understanding intimately bound up with downstream abilities? We will argue that the answer to both these questions is 'yes', and for the same reason-both accuracy and ability are important elements of orthogonal evaluative criteria along which understanding can be assessed. More precisely, we will argue that representational-accuracy (of which we assume truth is one kind) and intelligibility (which we will define so as to entail abilities) are good-making features of a state of understanding. Interestingly, both evaluative claims have been defended by philosophers in the literature on understanding as the criterion of evaluation. We argue that proponents of both approaches have important insights and that, drawing on both their own observations and a few novel arguments, we can construct a more complete picture of understanding evaluation. We thus posit the theory of there being Multiple Understanding Dimensions. The main thing to note about our dualism regarding the evaluative criteria of understanding is that it accounts for the intuitions about cases underlying both previously held positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don't state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant's moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant's answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interest of communication scholars in (radical) constructivism is fuelled by the need to radically rethink the theoretical assumptions that have governed most media and communication research for the past three or four decades. > Problem On at least two points, constructivism poses difficulties that need to be overcome by scholars of communication. These are the attitudes of many radical constructivists towards reality and the constructivist position with regard to society. The article seeks to clarify the constructivist position with regard to social interaction and society by determining how successful communication among individuals is possible, despite their cognitive autonomy. > Method In order to contribute to a discussion about the current situation in communication and media studies, the article takes up the authors argument that communication cannot be understood unless models describing it are centred on the individual. Based on this conceptualisation, considerations about the ontological assumptions of constructivism and the constructivist position with regard to social interaction are revisited. > Results It is argued that (a) cognition is not pure self-reference; (b) society cannot be considered simply as an individual construct; selforganisation also occurs at the supra-individual level, where shared knowledge and socio-cultural meanings emerge in the operatively closed motion of the successive communicative elements. > Implications Clarifying the constructivist position with regard to society can contribute to innovative theory building and research in communication science, and in the social sciences more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Circularity is multifarious indeed. Some aspects, however, seem related to current developments and therefore may deserve more attention than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the authors' response to their article on the need to increase the role for second-order science in climate change research. They discuss the possibility of maximising choices in scientific debate, the challenge faced by climate change researchers in explaining their findings to the public, and the need to further explore the political and cultural context of the crisis.

The article presents the author's response to commentaries on his article on the integration of phenomenology and cognitive science. He discusses the question of the rationality of nondualism and the role of meditative/contemplative practices in cultivating its experiential/existential dimension. He also examines the relationship between the project of phenomenologisation and the establishment of second-order science.

Context This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce "varieties of scenarios" instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC). This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a "less polarized" scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the authors' response to commentaries on their article on a second-order science of interdisciplinary research. They discuss some questions that reflect important common themes in the commentaries including the reason for starting in wicked problems and the nature of second-order research processes. They also justify the advantage of polyocular research as a framework for interdisciplinary work.

Context The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are "wicked problems," such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response to commentaries on his article on the need for a new scientific method or a second-order science. He explains his position on the existence of several epistemologies and that constructivism is more versatile compared with the other epistemologies. He also discusses the four models used in science and supports the suggestion that second-order science will preserve the practical powers of current science.

Problem The inclusion of the observer into scientific observation entails a vicious circle of having to observe the observer as dependent on observation. Second-order science has to clarify how its underlying circularity can be scientifically conceived. Method Essayistic and conceptual analysis, sporadically illustrated with agent-based experiments. Results Second-order science -- implying science in general -- is fundamentally and ineluctably circular. Implications The circularity of second-order science asks for analytical methods able to cope with phenomena of complex causation and "synchronous asynchrony," such as tools for analyzing non-linearly interacting dynamics, decentralized, clustered networks and in general, systems of complex interacting components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that there is no need for a new scientific method or a second-order science and that the application of scientific theories may affect the systems they describe. He comments on the position of U.S. cybernetician Stuart Umpleby on rethinking and expanding the philosophy of science. He also suggests that knowledge about the world should not be considered as scientific knowledge.

Context Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. Method We provide the necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first- and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. Results Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. Implications Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. Constructivist content Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of second-order science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is "second-order science." Method We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the seven target articles that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science and a reflection on the diversity of the content of these articles. Results The seven contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a critical analysis of Tamar Szabó Gendler's view of thought experiments, with the aim of developing further a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science. While the execution of a thought experiment cannot be reduced to standard forms of inductive and deductive inference, in the process of working though a thought experiment, a logical argument does emerge and take shape. Taking Gendler's work as a point of departure, I argue that performing a thought experiment involves a process of self-interrogation, in which we are compelled to reflect on our pre-existing knowledge of the world. In doing so, we are forced to make judgments about what assumptions we see as relevant and how they apply to an imaginary scenario. This brings to light the extent to which certain forms of skill, beyond the ability to make valid logical inferences, are necessary to execute a thought experiment well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview of the argument in Robert Scharff's paper 'Displacing epistemology: Being in the midst of technoscientific practice' (Scharff ), focusing on his central objective, to articulate a hidden ground of the current controversies in the philosophy of science and technology studies, between objectivism and constructivism, through a deeper confrontation with Heidegger's legacy. The commentary addresses two aspects of Scharffs argument that deserve to be developed further, namely how it both criticizes and cultivates itself an ideal of the meta-knower, and how the idea of thinking from the perspective of life in Dilthey's sense can be critically reflected through Heidegger's later criticism. By rehearsing Heidegger's understanding of truth as aletheia, and also his gradually increased criticism of the very concept of life, the commentary tries to show how Scharff's intervention can in fact be strengthened against possible criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this comment I want to clarify five topics. The first topic concerns the importance of looking back at the very principles of the foundations of Western society. The second comment argues for the original position of Latour within the field of (social) constructivism. In the third comment, I argue that Haraway adds to the science-politics discussion by elaborating her philosophy beyond dichotomy. In the fourth comment, I argue that the terms 'objective' and 'rational' are central philosophical concepts which should be retained. Finally I will make the connection between 'what' is represented and 'how' to represent it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Whether or not the Philosophy of Technology has "come of age" as a unique philosophical discipline or is still in search of its identity depends on how it develops its potential for reconciling the split between those who emphasize the human/social significance of what is philosophically analyzed and those who stress the importance of the adequacy of the language involved in philosophical analysis. Critics of the Philosophy of Technology believe that it is an unclearly defined discipline because of the broad scope of its interdisciplinary methodological stance plus the unresolved differences between Anglo-analytic and Continental methodological and epistemological perspectives. What The Philosophy of Technology must clarify is how it contributes both to science and philosophy with its ability to address the issue of the dilemma of knowing or the dilemma of knowledge. This dilemma is traced back to Kant's infamous claim that the human conceptual faculty acts as an interpreting of phenomena - making data subject to conceptual bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's epistemology as well as his more substantial comments regarding the natural sciences indeed result in a (sophisticated version of) scientific anti-realism which bears certain resemblances to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism; b) This scientific anti-realism can be defended against the two most common objections raised in the secondary literature; c) It is only by means of this sophisticated version of scientific anti-realism that phenomenology can circumvent the problem of “scientific objectivism”. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On the naive reading, 'radical social constructivism' would be the result of 'deconstructing' science. Science would simply be a contingent construction in accordance with social determinants. However, postmodernism does not necessarily abandon fidelity to the objects of thought. Merold Westphal's Derridean philosophy of religion emphasizes that even theology need not eliminate the transcendence of the divine other. By drawing an analogy between natural and supernatural transcendence, I argue that science is similarly called to responsibility in the encounter with that which lies outside its horizon of expectation. Science's rational autonomy is overcome by the heteronomy of realities that precede it. Understanding species as homeostatic property clusters is an example of nonessentialist, postmodern, and scientific realism. Science is still a vehicle for encountering natural alterity, thus decentering the relativism thought to characterize postmodernism. However, natural science must not attempt to place the whole of being at human disposal if it is to fulfill the potential of Westphal's philosophy of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a forum in which two scholars discuss the philosophy of classification, focusing on issues of classification related to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (D.S.M.) and on the philosophy of natural kinds. Philosopher John Dupré's work on biological classification is highlighted, including a discussion of causal significance in classification, and the influence of theory and application on the D.S.M. is noted. Natural kind realism and scientific realism are discussed in terms of monism and pluralism, and special attention is paid to a constructivist approach to realism.

This article draws a parallel between personal construct theory and intuitionistic logic i, in order to account for Kelly's claim to have departed from classical logic. Assuming that different theoretical paradigms correspond to different logical languages, it is argued that the constructivist paradigm is linked to intuitionism. Similarities between some key syntactic and semantic features of i logic and the underlying logic of Kelly's theory are made explicit. The strengths and limitations of such an approach are discussed in light of issues emerging from clinical observation and from the philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose • The article pursues three aims. First, it intends to differentiate between two different approaches for knowledge studies, namely an empirical and a normative mode. In a second move, two different epistemologies in the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld will be introduced under the labels of "Epistemology I" and "Epistemology II." Epistemology I relates to empirical research, Epistemology II is normative in nature. Third, the article makes the point that while Ernst von Glasersfeld's Epistemology II has already been presented in a finite and mature form, his empirical analysis of cognitive processes still provides a rich pool of tools and designs that should be further developed and advanced in the years and decades ahead. Method • The article is analytical in nature, identifying the different building blocks and relational networks of von Glasersfeld's two epistemologies. By this, the article intends to contribute to a further advancement of von Glasersfeld's Epistemology I. Results • The main finding lies in recognizing the radical and innovative elements of von Glasersfeld's Epistemology I and on the still-challenging research designs of Epistemology I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson's paper, "Characterizing Quantum Theory in terms of Information-Theoretic Constraints" (2003) invokes the theoretical significance of principle theories in contrast with constructive theories. However, a more thorough discussion of the merits of principle theories and constructive theories is required to justify this approach towards quantum mechanics. Looking at Einstein's original use of the distinction to characterize special relativity, this paper argues that it is best understood in terms of explanatory preferences. The distinction depends fundamentally on the kinds of scientific explanation the respective types of theories provide. This conceptual clarification can shed light on principle theory approaches to quantum mechanics by delineating both the specific strengths of principle theories and pinpointing the explanatory motivation guiding this strategy. The aim of this paper is to establish the broad philosophical justification for a principle theory approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the opening chapter of Theory of International Politics Waltz makes an interesting distinction between scientific laws and theory construction. Recent special issues of this journal have suggested that this distinction allows Waltz to be read in different ways — for example, as a scientific realist who conceives of unobservable entities, or as a constructivist interested in how we create models. This contribution argues against both these interpretations by analysing the first chapter of Waltz’s book and suggesting that his distinction between theories and law-like statements is fully consistent with mainstream discussions in the philosophy of social science. It argues that Waltz’s position still depends on the identification of empirical regularities, something that makes him an empirical realist, but which undermines the claim that he is a scientific realist. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Problem • How can radical constructivism gain wider recognition and acceptance? > Method • Based on informal direct observation of other social and intellectual movements, the social and psychological dynamics and organizational imperatives of radical constructivism as an intellectual movement are discussed. > Results • Various means of structuring the movement in order to gain wider acceptance are proposed. > Implications • We hope that the paper has value in helping the radical constructivism movement evaluate where it has been and where it might go in terms of wider social recognition and acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem • What alternative strategies from our experiences using a Piaget-based radical constructivist pedagogy might have more and better results than the current practice of responding in debate form, each side trying to prove the other wrong? > M ethod • Use of Slezak's paper to illuminate the point that the central problem with the interpretation of RC generally used in such writing is that the authors seem not to be able to operate from the central tenet of RC, which is the opposite of that used in realism. Description of how this failure to use the central tenet of RC results in claims that RC is irrelevant to education and to definitions of good teaching. > R esults • A specific approach shown to be useful in facilitating the construction of new understanding in science is adapted in order to guide interaction between an RC and a realist, which can result in the realist understanding the RC point of view. > I mplications • Instead of debating with critics of RC, where each side is trying to prove the other side wrong, we need to change the interaction to one in which members of opposing sides attempt to understand the other's position. In this situation we are in a position to use a pedagogical strategy in which the realist examines her own fundamental assumption that we can know a mind-independent world, and considers the implications of a starting assumption that is exactly the opposite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The current situation in philosophy of science includes central, ongoing debates about realism and antirealism. The same question has been central to the theorising of radical constructivism and, in particular, to its implications for educational theory. However the constructivist literature does not make significant contact with the most important, mainstream philosophical discussions. > Problem • Despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, I suggest that the "radical constructivism" of Ernst Glasersfeld is an example of fashionable but thoroughly problematic doctrines that can have little benefit for practical pedagogy or teacher education. My critique has a positive goal: it is important to understand why constructivism has generated such severe polarization and disputation. A symptom of the problem is the concern with the most abstruse and obdurate problems of philosophy that have no conceivable bearing on educational practice or anything else, for that matter. The diagnosis is confirmed by those pedagogical recommendations that are allegedly derived from radical constructivism that are touted as revolutionary but are platitudes of common sense. I suggest that, ironically, this observation itself provides some pedagogical insight. > M ethod • The approach adopted for the topic is critical, philosophical analysis of the various claims and theses of radical constructivism in the light of philosophy of science and psychology. > Results • The findings of the paper are that central theoretical claims of constructivism are couched in an unclear and unnecessary jargon that obscures the implausibility or banality of these claims. > I mplications • The value of the paper lies in providing an analysis and critique of central, influential claims of radical constructivism both in relation to issues in epistemology and also in relation to the alleged bearing of these claims on pedagogy. It is suggested that, contrary to the claims of radical constructivists, there are few if any implications for practice and applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose • Describing how radical constructivism was introduced to communication science and analyzing why it has not yet become a mainstream endeavour. > Situation • Before radical constructivism entered the relevant debates in communication sciences, moderate constructivist positions had already been developed. > Problem • Radical constructivists' argumentation has often been provocative and exaggerating in style, and extreme in its position. This has provoked harsh reactions within the mainstream scientific community. Several argumentative strategies have been used to degrade radical constructivist arguments and their relevance. > Solution • Beyond such rhetorical devices, radical constructivism has become established within the field of communication science, although it has not become mainstream. One should probably not even wish to make radical constructivism a mainstream approach in case it loses its sceptical ability for second-order-observation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Despite many obvious advantages (radical) constructivism seems to have over other philosophies - such as a dynamical understanding of knowledge, the inclusion of interdisciplinary aspects, and practical applications such as tolerance and pluralism as well as active learning - it has failed to become a mainstream philosophy that is widely taught and discussed. > Problem • What are the reasons for this failure? Can we identify attributes that make it difficult for scholars to accept and even embrace radical constructivist ideas? What is the best way to characterize, explain, and eventually refute objections? > Method • By collecting articles from both proponents and opponents of radical constructivism, the editors of this special issue have tried to present a range of answers to these questions. > Results • Some problems are due to known objections to radical constructivism, in particular the idea that being responsible for one's own constructions opens doors to a "whatever" attitude. Another important insight is that constructivism seems to resemble a river delta with ever branching new sub-disciplines that become increasingly incompatible with each other. Its practical aspects seem to find wider acceptance than its philosophical assumptions. > Implications • The insights gained from the contributions to this issue may lead to a re-orientation of (radical) constructivism, which will include fewer misunderstandings among its critics, and to a higher acceptance of radical constructivism in the academic community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The main problem is the rather marginal status of radical constructivism within its core domains of brain research, cognition and learning. > Problem • The basic goal is to provide a short history of radical constructivism and its institutionalization processes. Additionally, the article specifies critical conditions that should be met in order for radical constructivism to become a mainstream endeavor. > Method • The main methods used are those of comparative historical research. > Results • The main results lie in the specification of missing elements that have blocked radical constructivism becoming a mainstream endeavor. > Implications • The paper might serve as a common reference for necessary steps to be taken over the following years in order to move radical constructivism out of its current weak position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • A number of objections that are frequently raised in the literature against radical constructivism, including: the charge of solipsism, allegations of self-refutation, social and moral reservations, and the accusation that RC cannot explain the success of science. > Problem • These four objections are sought to be refuted. > Results • 1. Solipsism is only troublesome against the background of a realist ontological perspective. 2. The truth-value of any proposition is only defined relative to some ontological context; hence self-refutation, as constituting a logical problem, does not arise. 3. Any ethical argumentation derives from one's own personal views on ethical matters: their construction being a personal responsibility such that no one else can tell a person how to construct the "right ethics." 4. In the relativist ontology of radical constructivism, a scientific theory is regarded as a model imposed on natural phenomena; its success is due to the capabilities of its constructor (the scientists). > I mplications • It is found that the objections to radical constructivism are based on an (overt or tacit) adoption of the antithetical viewpoint of scientific realism. In other words, radical constructivism is being criticised for not promoting a realist ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem • An answer to the question of whether or not Radical Constructivism RC can or will become a mainstream endeavour is difficult, because what is called RC is a bundle of quite divergent approaches and not a homogenous (super) theory. Therefore the article concentrates upon "classical" RC as developed first of all by von Glasersfeld, von Foerster and Maturana and Varela. The pros and cons of their approaches are discussed and evaluated. > S olution • In order to overcome the most obvious problems of RC, a strict process-oriented kind of argumentation is developed that replaces is/is not assertions with descriptions of processes and their results, thus answering the question of what might reasonably be called "construction." > Benefit • The paper presents a way of rewriting RC, i.e., avoiding its evident problems, without abandoning the insights that RC thinkers have gained in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A decade after the 'Sokal Hoax,' Alan Sokal and Paul Boghossian still claim that postmodern arguments are incoherent attacks on reason and truth. However, both also continue to mischaracterize 'constructivist' epistemology, to engage in highly problematic logical gymnastics to defend their own views, and to ignore changes in philosophy of science and science studies since 1996. I offer a brief description of my own, rather different understanding of postmodern science criticism in order to contextualize my dissatisfaction with Sokal and Boghossian's arguments, and to highlight the value of cross-subfield anthropological collaboration based on the constructivist perspective articulated by Barbara Herrnstein Smith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]