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WAHL, Jean. Transcendence and the Concrete: Selected Writings. Edited by Alan D. Schrift and Ian Alexander Moore. New York: Fordham University Press, 2016. Cloth, $125.00--Jean Wahl, a central figure in [...]

This is a paper about Hegelian constructivism in relation to theory of knowledge. Constructivism, which is known at least since Greek antiquity, is understood in different ways. In philosophy, epistemological constructivism is often rejected, and only occasionally studied. Kantian constructivism is examined from time to time under the heading of the Copernican revolution. Hegelian constructivism, which is best understood as a reaction to and revision of Kantian epistemology, seems never to have been discussed in detail. This paper will sketch the outlines of Hegelian constructivism in relation to the critical philosophy. Hegelian constructivism amounts to an intrinsically historical view of epistemology as a trial and error process situated in the social context. Knowledge emerges from a trial and error process in which we construct a cognitive framework to grasp objects constructed in and through this process. I suggest that the considerable interest of a historical, constructivist, phenomenological approach to knowledge, such as Hegel's, lies in its largely unexplored possibilities for advancing the epistemological debate.

The aim of this informal paper is to direct (or redirect) attention to the importance of Croce's historicism. Though he is sometimes described as the best known Italian intellectual since Galileo, and though his influence remains strong in Italy, his impact outside Italy is not as important as it should be. Other than through Collingwood, his only well known English-language disciple, Croce has had very little influence on those writing in English. His theories, including his historicism, on which I will be focusing here, are only infrequently discussed in English, especially by philosophers. Historicism is a doctrine which receives almost no attention in English-speaking lands but looms very large in Italian thought. For purposes of this paper, I will treat Croce's historicism as arising out of his readings of three very different thinkers, different from himself and from each other, who are committed to varying forms of epistemological historicism, and who are important for the development of his own position, Vico, Hegel and Marx. Croce studies these thinkers early in his very long career in inverse chronological order, beginning with Marx (1900), turning next to Hegel (1907), and then concerning himself later with Vico (1911). In considering Croce's interpretation of three other historicists, it will be useful to keep in mind that, as an original thinker, he is never only an interpreter of other theories, always in the process of thinking for himself with and against whatever ideas he is interpreting. In each case, he made important contributions to our understanding of these thinkers while continuing to work out his own view.

THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW CENTURY provides a good time to reflect on the most influential philosophers of this period, or those most likely to survive, or again whom we [...]

MOLAND, Lydia. Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011. xii + 223 pp. Cloth, $69.95--Lydia Moland has written a comprehensive, informed, intelligent, critical and interesting [...]

The notion of intellectual responsibility must be reconsidered if certain kinds of knowledge are no longer the exclusive domain of intellectuals. If knowledge is not absolute but relative, intellectuals may not be able to claim a special aptitude for discerning truth. Although intellectuals do not have special access to a Platonic realm of truth, they do at least have a comparative advantage in understanding which should be used responsibly. Richard Rorty's skeptical views on philosophy and literature, Martin Heidegger's concept of poetry as a source of philosophic truth, and Paul de Man's claim that knowledge is impossible are considered in the light of modern intellectual responsibility.

Georg Lukacs is generally identified with Hegelian Marxism, but his version of Marxism also contains Kantian, Fichtean and neo-Kantian elements. Lukacs interpreted classical German philosophy as well as Marxism as an attempt to solve the Kantian problem of the thing-in-itself. According to Lukacs, Marxism solves the problem through the notion of activity; the proletariat is able to know the object because the object is its product. Both Fichte and Emil Lask influenced Lukacs's Marxism. The identification of Marxism with materialism has tended to obscure the idealist elements in its philosophy.

WAHL, Jean. Transcendence and the Concrete: Selected Writings. Edited with an introduction by Alan D. Schrift and Ian Alexander Moore. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017. 304 pp. Paper, $35.00; [...]

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. vi + 302 pp. Cloth, $35.00--This excellent study of the theme of polemos shows a detailed grasp of the entire range of Heidegger's writings [...]

STERN, David G. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xv + 208 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $23.99--Stern's introduction to Wittgenstein's [...]

Villa, Dana R. Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. xv + 329 pp. Cloth, $55.00--If Hannah Arendt has not already achieved recognition as [...]

Kovacs, George. The Question of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990. xxi + 326 pp. Cloth 39.95; paper, $15.95--In this book Kovacs interrogates Heidegger's thought in order [...]

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796/99). Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. x + 494 pp. $49.95--Fichte is one of [...]

Westphal's new book is marked by clarity and simplicity of style, a rare quality in the often turgid Hegel discussion, whose obscurity often approaches that of the master's own writing. [...]