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This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant's philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant's philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant's philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant's philosophy of science in crucial respects., (Copyright © 2024 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

In the field of observational and experimental natural sciences (as is the case for microbiology), recent decades have been overinfluenced by overwhelming technological advances, and the space of abstraction has been frequently disdained. However, the predictable future of biological sciences should necessarily recover the synthetic dimension of "natural philosophy." We should understand the nature of Microbiology as Science, and we should educate microbiology scientists in the process of thinking. The critical process of thinking "knowing what we can know" is entirely based on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. However, this book is extremely difficult to read (even for Kant himself) and almost inaccessible to modern experimental natural scientists. Professional philosophers might have been able to explain Kant to scientists; unfortunately, however, they do not get involved this type of education for science. The intention of this review is to introduce natural scientists, particularly microbiologists and evolutionary biologists, to the main rigorous processes (aesthetics, analytics, dialectics) that Kant identified to gain access to knowledge, always a partial knowledge, given that the correspondence between truth and reality is necessarily incomplete. This goal is attempted by producing a number of "images" (figures) to help the non-expert reader grasp the essential of Kant's message and by making final observations paralleling the theory of scientific knowledge with biological evolutionary processes and the role of evolutionary epistemology in science education. Finally, the influence of Kant's postulates in key-fields of microbiology, from taxonomy to systems biology is discussed., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

In this paper I extend the case for a necessitation account of particular laws in Kant's philosophy of science by examining the relation between reason's hypothetical use in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the legitimate hypotheses identified in the Doctrine of Method. Building on normative accounts of reason's ideas, I argue that reason's hypothetical use does not describe the connections between objects and their grounds, which lie beyond the reach of the understanding, but merely prescribes the relations between appearances and their conditions, for which the understanding must seek. A legitimate hypothesis, I suggest, is a proposition we hold to be true that fills in one or several of those relations. The problematic character of hypotheses requires that we evaluate our reasons for holding them to be true. While natural modality is grounded in the nature of things, which cannot be fully known, our reasons for assent can and must be grounded on features of objects that are epistemically available to us., (Copyright © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Scientific models typically contain idealizations, or assumptions that are known not to be true. Philosophers have long questioned the nature of idealizations: Are they heuristic tools that will be abandoned? Or rather fictional representations of reality? And how can we reconcile them with realism about knowledge of nature? Immanuel Kant developed an account of scientific investigation that can inspire a new approach to the contemporary debate. Kant argued that scientific investigation is possible only if guided by ideal assumptions-what he calls "regulative ideas". These ideas are not true of objects of nature, and yet they are not heuristic tools or fictional representations. They are necessary rules governing the construction and assessment of scientific explanations. In this paper, I suggest that some idealizations can be interpreted as having necessary regulative value and as being compatible with scientific realism. I first analyze the puzzle of the nature of idealization and present the main approaches to this topic in the literature. Second, I reconsider the puzzle vis-à-vis a restricted, Kantian definition of idealization and a novel characterization of the relation between idealization and truth. Finally, I discuss in detail an example of idealization (the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) along the suggested Kantian lines., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Many historical studies tend to underline two central Kantian themes frequently emerging in Georges Canguilhem's works: (1) a conception of activity, primarily stemming from the Critique of Pure Reason, as a mental and abstract synthesis of judgment; and (2) a notion of organism, inspired by the Critique of Judgment, as an integral totality of parts. Canguilhem was particularly faithful to the first theme from the 1920s to the first half of the 1930s, whereas the second theme became important in the early 1940s. With this article, I will attempt to show that a third important theme of technique arose in the second half of the 30s also in the wake of Kant's philosophy, especially Sect. 43 of the Critique of Judgment. This section, which states that technical ability is distinguished from a theoretical faculty, led Canguilhem to a more concrete and practical conception of activity. I will then suggest that it was by considering technique that the concept of normativity, which characterizes Georges Canguilhem's philosophy of life, also took shape., (© 2023. Springer Nature Switzerland AG.)

This article examines Kant's overlooked concept of "active play," as opposed to "free play," in connection with the influence of the Brunonian system of medicine, both of which, I propose, are central to understanding the broader significance of intoxication in Kant's post-1795 work. Beginning with a discussion of the late-18th century German reception of Brunonian theory, the idea of vital stimulus, and their importance for Kant, I assess the distinction drawn between gluttony and intoxication in The Metaphysics of Morals and Anthropology from a Practical Point of View. Both are analysed in the context of the Brunonian system of medicine, having establishing Kant's commitment to the Brunonianism system, as corroborated by Wasianski. What emerges is a novel understanding of intoxication in the work of Immanuel Kant, which brings to light a previously unexamined dynamic between imagination, intoxication, and the aesthetic., (© 2022. Springer Nature Switzerland AG.)

Kant's forthright rejection of rampant, ungrounded speculations in natural science, including in natural history, is well known. For instance, he dismisses the wild, unwarranted developmental histories of other early natural historians, such as Buffon and Herder, as "daring adventure[s] of reason." However, as I show in this paper, Kant himself made use of teleological speculations in natural history, particularly in his three essays on race. I argue that, for Kant, speculations about nature's purposes are necessary to explain and to buttress the unification of organisms in real species, despite observable and heritable variations among members of these species. Without hypothesizing about nature's intentions, a mechanical, efficient-causal account of nature cannot appropriately ground the unity of species. Hence, I depict Kant's account of natural history as threading a needle between merely mechanical accounts of nature - which are incapable of achieving the goals of the science - and freewheeling, conjectural narratives about the origin and development of the Earth, life, and humanity. In the end, I conclude that my account reveals a substantive role for the faculty of reason in natural history, which dovetails with recent work on Kant's views on the non-physical sciences., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

This paper distinguishes two ways in which Kant's ideas concerning the relation between teleology and biological organization have been taken up in contemporary philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. The first sees his account as the first instance of the modern understanding of teleology as a heuristic tool aimed at producing mechanistic explanations of organismal form and function. The second sees in Kant's concept of intrinsic purposiveness the seed of a radically new way of thinking about biological systems that should be developed by turning teleology into a legitimate concept of natural science. We name the two approaches heuristic and naturalistic, respectively. Our aim is to critically evaluate these approaches and suggest that the naturalistic option, which remains a minority position, deserves to be taken more seriously than it currently is in contemporary biological theory. While evolution by natural selection closes the case on intelligent design, it does not close the case on teleology in general. In fact, the current return of the organism and the recent calls for an agential perspective in evolutionary biology point out that we still have some thinking to do concerning this side of Kant's legacy., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None to declare., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

A testimony is somebody else's reported experience of what has happened. It is an indispensable source of knowledge. It only gives us historical cognition, however, which stands in a complex relation to rational or philosophical cognition: while the latter presupposes historical cognition as its matter, one needs the architectonic "eye of a philosopher" to select, interpret, and organize historical cognition. Kant develops this rationalist theory of testimony. He also practices it in his own work, especially while theorizing about race as a subject of natural philosophy. In three dedicated essays on this subject, he treats race from the standpoint of a philosophical investigator of nature (Naturforscher), who (as Kant puts it in the first Critique) learns from nature "like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them." This view underwrites Kant's use of travel reports (a type of testimony) in developing and defending his theory of race., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. It remains disputed what this conclusion amounts to. Does Kant argue only for the Weak Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing interpretations have assumed that, by Kant's lights, there is a substantive difference between the two. I argue that this is false. Kant holds that the concept of cause contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate according to universal laws. He is explicit about this commitment, not least in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III. Consequently, Kant's move from causal rules to universal laws is much simpler than previously assumed. Given his commitments, establishing the Strong Causal Principle requires no more argument than establishing the Weak Causal Principle., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Kant's views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant's views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant's views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant's position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant's views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Reconstructions of Romantic-era life science in general, and epigenesis in particular, frequently take the Kantian logic of autotelic "self-organization" as their primary reference point. I argue in this essay that the Kantian conceptual rubric hinders our historical and theoretical understanding of epigenesis, Romantic and otherwise. Neither a neutral gloss on epigenesis, nor separable from the epistemological deflation of biological knowledge that has received intensive scrutiny in the history and philosophy of science, Kant's heuristics of autonomous "self-organization" in the third Critique amount to the strategic capture of epigenesis from nature, for thought, in thought's critical transcendence of nature. This essay looks to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and his English contemporary Erasmus Darwin to begin to reconstruct the rigorously materialist, naturalist, and empiricist theories of epigenesis (still) marginalized by Kantian argumentation. As theorists of environmental and social collaboration in the ontogeny of viable forms, Lamarck and Darwin illuminate features of our own epigenetic turn obscured by the rhetoric of "self-organization," allowing us to glimpse an alternative Romantic genealogy of the biological present.

In this paper, I argue that Kant adopted, throughout his career, a position that is much more akin to classical accounts of epigenesis, although he does reject the more radical forms of epigenesis proposed in his own time, and does make use of preformationist sounding terms. I argue that this is because Kant (1) thinks of what is pre-formed as a species, not an individual or a part of an individual; (2) has no qualm with the idea of a specific, teleological principle or force underlying generation, and conceives of germs and predispositions as specific constraints on such a principle or force. Neither of these conceptions of what is "preformed", I argue, is in strict opposition to classical epigenesis. I further suggest that Kant's lingering use of preformationist terminology is due to (1) his belief that this is required to account for the specificity of the specific generative force; (2) his resistance towards the unrestricted plasticity of the generative force in radical epigenesis, which violates species-fixism; and (3) his insistence on the internal, organic basis of developmental plasticity and variation within species. I conclude by suggesting that this terminological and interpretative peculiarity is partly due to a larger shift in the natural philosophical concerns surrounding the debate on epigenesis and preformation. Specifically, it is a sign that the original reasons for resisting epigenesis, namely its use of specific, teleological principles and its commitment to the natural production of biological structure, became less of a concern, whereas unrestricted plasticity and its undermining of fixism became a real issue, thereby also becoming the focal point of the debate.

This interdisciplinary article takes a philosophical approach to The Interpretation of Dreams, connecting Freud to one of the few philosophers with whom he sometimes identified - Immanuel Kant. It aims to show that Freud's theory of dreams has more in common with Bion's later thoughts on dreaming than is usually recognized. Distinguishing, via a discussion of Kant, between the conflicting 'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams, it shows that one specific contradiction in the book - concerning the relation between dream-work and waking thought - can be understood in terms of the tension between these conflicting aspects. Freud reaches the explicit conclusion that the dream-work and waking thought differ from each other absolutely; but the implicit conclusion of The Interpretation of Dreams is quite the opposite. This article argues that the explicit conclusion is the result of the epistemological aspects of the book; the implicit conclusion, which brings Freud much closer to Bion, the result of the anthropological approach. Bringing philosophy and psychoanalysis together this paper thus argues for an interpretation of The Interpretation of Dreams that is in some ways at odds with the standard view of the book, while also suggesting that aspects of Kant's 'anthropological' works might legitimately be seen as a precursor of psychoanalysis., (Copyright © 2016 Institute of Psychoanalysis.)

Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kant's critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Most recently, scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kant's understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbach's conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herder's attempts to naturalize it., (Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life., (Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

In his 1785-review of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Kant objects to Herder's conception of nature as being imbued with active forces. This attack is usually evaluated against the background of Kant's critical project and his epistemological concern to caution against the "metaphysical excess" of attributing immanent properties to matter. In this paper I explore a slightly different reading by investigating Kant's pre-critical account of creation and generation. The aim of this is to show that Kant's struggle with the forces of matter has a long history and revolves around one central problem: that of how to distinguish between the non-purposive forces of nature and the intentional powers of the mind. Given this history, the epistemic stricture that Kant's critical project imposes on him no longer appears to be the primary reason for his attack on Herder. It merely aggravates a problem that Kant has been battling with since his earliest writings., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

This paper contributes to recent interest in Kant's engagement with the life sciences by focusing on one corner of those sciences that has received comparatively little attention: physical and comparative anatomy. By attending to remarks spread across Kant's writings, we gain some insight into Kant's understanding of the disciplinary limitations but also the methodological sophistication of the study of anatomy and physiology. Insofar as Kant highlights anatomy as a paradigmatic science guided by the principle of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a more careful study of Kant's discussions of anatomy promises to illuminate some of the obscurities of that text and of his understanding of the life sciences more generally. In the end, it is argued, Kant's ambivalence with regard to anatomy gives way to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility that anatomy, natural history, and, by extension, the life sciences more generally might one day become true natural sciences., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Kant believed that the ultimate processes that regulate the behavior of material bodies can be characterized exclusively in terms of mechanics. In 1790, turning his attention to the life sciences, he raised a potential problem for his mechanically-based account, namely that many of the operations described in the life sciences seemed to operate teleologically. He argued that the life sciences do indeed require us to think in teleological terms, but that this is a fact about us, not about the processes themselves. Nevertheless, even were we to concede his account of the life sciences, this would not secure the credentials of mechanics as a general theory of matter. Hardly any material properties studied in the second half of the eighteenth century were, or could have been, conceived in mechanical terms. Kant's concern with teleology is tangential to the problems facing a general matter theory grounded in mechanics, for the most pressing issues have nothing to do with teleology. They derive rather from a lack of any connection between mechanical forces and material properties. This is evident in chemistry, which Kant dismisses as being unscientific on the grounds that it cannot be formulated in mechanical terms., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend promote incommensurability as a central component of their conflicting accounts of the nature of science. This paper argues that in so doing, they both develop Albert Einstein's views, albeit in different directions. Einstein describes scientific revolutions as conceptual replacements, not mere revisions, endorsing 'Kant-on-wheels' metaphysics in light of 'world change'. Einstein emphasizes underdetermination of theory by evidence, rational disagreement in theory choice, and the non-neutrality of empirical evidence. Einstein even uses the term 'incommensurable' specifically to apply to challenges posed to comparatively evaluating scientific theories in 1949, more than a decade before Kuhn and Feyerabend. This analysis shows how Einstein anticipates substantial components of Kuhn and Feyerabend's views, and suggests that there are strong reasons to suspect that Kuhn and Feyerabend were directly inspired by Einstein's use of the term 'incommensurable', as well as his more general methodological and philosophical reflections., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

This essay examines possible reasons as to why Plato wrote dialogues. Hypotheses raised include the notion that dialogues were designed for public consumption, Plato's Idea of the Good and his protection of himself from the power elite. It describes the features of each variety of Platonic dialogues and discusses the essence of human wisdom, knowledge acquisition and the theoretical pessimism embedded in Plato's book "The Apology of Socrates."

The paper presents an analysis and interpretation of axiology and ethics as seen by the writer and philosopher Ayn Rand. The author follows the assumption that, in a situation where indifference is observed with regard to values (cf. Simmel, Sloterdijk), a return of philosophical reasoning to the idea of objectivity of values could be worthwhile. Therefore, he examines a specific type of axiological objectivism that can be found in Rand's work. In the present paper, the suggested comparison with Baden neo-Kantism as well as phenomenological axiology serves to capture the specifics of Rand's axiological approach. These lie in placing emphasis on such a relationship between facts and values in which values result from the facts of reality, as well as in the very understanding of the objectivity of values that Rand identifies with long-term life goals and identifies them as an objective necessity for an individual's life. Following the analysis of Rand's axiology, the author focuses on her understanding of ethics, which he places in contrast to Kant's deontology, as well as morality, which he views through the prism of a business relationship based on the exchange of values. The aim of the paper is to, by means of an analysis and interpretation of Rand's ideas, show that objective values can be understood as a necessary prerequisite for consequential ethics and an individual living a happy life without being anchored in transcendence or social consensus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces trenchant difficulties here—resulting in the problem of missing value. I first propose that Kant's project of a critique of pure reason faces this problem: he supposes that the notion of ground is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics. This investigation reconstructs his response. I argue that, for Kant, a notion is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics if (and because) it is required for the successful exercise of reason. By analysing the requirements on undertaking a critique of pure reason, we will see why his notion of ground would be objectively theory-guiding in this sense. I conclude that his response generalizes to yield a potentially promising response to the problem of missing value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant describes intellectual intuition as a kind of non-sensible intuition that creates its objects and provides knowledge of them as noumena. Although he precludes intellectual intuition from the human mind, Reinhold attributes it to the human mind. Pioneering research has already shown that Reinhold deviates from Kant in this way to explain the possibility of a priori self-cognition. It has also already shown that Fichte follows Reinhold by deviating from Kant in the same way. Yet, other aspects of Reinhold's doctrine of intellectual intuition remain largely overlooked. Among the few Reinhold scholars who study it, the extant view is that intellectual intuition does not yield cognition of an absolute knower, and that only Fichte makes this assertion. However, this view ignores Reinhold's claim that I must attribute all my representations to an absolute knower to explain the unity of experience. In this paper, I argue that we must take this claim seriously, and I show that, for Reinhold, my cognition of myself as an absolute knower in intellectual intuition enables me to attribute all my representations to myself as such a knower, and he does so prior to Fichte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In international philosophy of music education, there are some philosophers who are important points of reference. One of them is the German Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). While his philosophy is complex, an oversimplified understanding of his ideas turned him into the "bad guy" of international music education philosophy, being in favor for instance of art for its own sake. His assumed ideas are thought to be the foundation of aesthetic education, in opposition to music education concepts promoting praxis and social change. The prominent role Kant plays leads to questions: Can an eighteenth-century philosopher be blamed for twentieth-century music education concepts and their supposed aberrations? And what did Kant really say? By addressing these and related questions, this paper offers fresh perspectives on Kant's original concept and the role his assumed ideas play in international music education philosophy, aiming at revising some discourses around them. Furthermore, Kant as a case in point, can lead to general considerations about the function of philosophy in music education philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant is said to be the first to distinguish between consciousness of oneself as the subject of one's experiences and consciousness of oneself as an object, which he calls transcendental and empirical apperception, respectively. Of these, it is empirical apperception that is meant to enable consciousness of any empirical features of oneself; what this amounts to, however, continues to puzzle interpreters. I argue that a key to understanding what empirical apperception consists in is Kant's claim that each type of apperception corresponds to a distinct type of unity of apperception—that is, a distinct way in which representations can be related for a subject. Whereas transcendental unity of apperception requires that representations be actively combined by the understanding, empirical unity of apperception obtains when representations are passively combined by the reproductive imagination. In light of this, I develop a novel account of Kant's two types of apperception, according to which they correspond to a cognitive subject's consciousness of two essential aspects of herself—namely, her spontaneity and receptivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the philosophies of the late Heidegger and the young Marx side by side to show how, while differing radically in some important aspects, both philosophies are motivated by similar concerns and are not so different as to preclude a productive dialogue between them. In so far as both thinkers can be said to have thought, taking the word in a Heideggerian sense, the "same", the way both philosophies diverge from each other can be especially illuminating when it comes to offering a clear interpretation of them (a task which is especially important to gain an understanding of Heidegger's philosophy which is often obscure). We'll see how Heidegger's notion of finitude implies a series of criticisms of Marx's philosophy. Finally, I'll pose a question regarding the limits of Heidegger's criticism of Marx, considering that this criticism goes as far as to criticize the idea that all human beings are equal and so implies a rejection of the idea of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mary Shepherd assigns reason a central role in her philosophical system, and so to understand that system we must understand her conception of reason. Does she, like Hume, take reason to be a mere matter of factual process that operates over independently contentful representations? Does she, like Descartes, take it to be a process that is intended to track the rational relations among such representations? Or does she, like Kant, take reason to be a structural feature of representations without which they would not have content at all? I argue that Shepherd's understanding of reason is broadly Kantian. Reason is a causal process whereby non-representational sensible qualities are combined in order to form representations of objects as loci of causal powers. These representations represent their objects as the external, continuously and independently existing, causes of the sensible qualities from which they have been constructed, and also as having causal powers to combine with other objects to have other effects. These representations are not only the result of a process of reasoning, but are also constituted by the rational relations into which reason puts them. Reason is both the causal process that forms such representations, and the structure of those representations themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the theory-practice relationship is one of the core questions of philosophy and the social sciences. How should the proportions between theory and practice best be determined? Social work joins this discourse from a logic of applied sciences. It can develop an appropriate answer that can be generalized if it first participates on that discourse. For that, the theory-practice relationship is first distinguished from the theory-practice proportion. Because while a proportionality points to communication, which could be determined vertically in one way, in the case of the relationship is horizontality at the centre of the debate, which refers to the consent of the other actor. Therefore, the following paper will first distinguish the philosophical question of how the relationship between knowledge and action should be determined from the sociological question of how the proportion between knowledge and action is in a given profession. After an introduction, the genesis of the theorypractice communication the question is put what can be deduced from this distinction for social work. Depending on the viewpoint, the relationship can either be transformed into communication through mediation between theory and practice, or theory can be separated, decoupled from practice. In a third proposal developed here, this theory-driven relationship and/or proportion can be viewed from the logic of theory-practice complementarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

C.C.E. Schmid's doctrine of intelligible fatalism was immensely influential in the immediate reception of Kant's philosophy. Existing treatments of this doctrine, largely neglected by modern scholarship, echo uncharitable interpretations espoused by Schmid's contemporaries. I demonstrate that Schmid's intelligible fatalism is more coherent and philosophically robust than hitherto recognized. I argue for a novel interpretation of Schmid's account of rational agency, showing that intelligible fatalism is compatible with his conceptions of freedom, obligation, and imputation. Specifically, I argue that the role of consciousness in this account carves out conceptual space for a distinction between the theoretical and the practical that is sufficient to render intelligible fatalism consistent with these conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks first at the scope of religious experience, offering some representative examples of phenomena that typically give rise to spiritual experiences. This leads on a consideration of the phenomenology of such experiences – the particular way in which they present themselves to the conscious subject. Lastly, the paper tackles the vexed question of the source of such experiences, and suggests that this is best understood in terms of a (certain kind of) theistic framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Determinism which denies freedom of action is a common philosophical view. Is the action of such determinists incompatible with Kant's claim that a rationally willed being "cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom" [G 4, 448]? In my paper, I examine Kant's argument for this claim at the beginning of the Third Section of the Groundwork and argue that it amounts to the assertion that one cannot act while being aware of being guided by invalid principles. Belief in determinism does not necessarily amount to such awareness. A structurally similar argument based on the contrast between deliberation and prediction is examined and similarly found wanting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text presents fifteen theses on the notion of political rationality, whose origin can be traced back to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, particularly in the ideal of public use of reason. This project emphasizes the critical examination and justification of norms that can cause a personal impact. Autonomy is regarded as both a condition and a limitation of rules, while the possibility of determining their validity through discourse is acknowledged. The proposal continues a line of interpretation of public reason that Hannah Arendt, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas developed in contemporary philosophy. It is a free reading of this philosophers, drawing from the essay on enlightenment and the critique of judgment that contain most of the keys for thinking about political rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant's approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists' perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists' discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant's question "What may I hope?" and presents the outlines of his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one's hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant's account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore elements from Kant's philosophy of right to develop a relational account of the wrong of poverty. Poverty is a relational wrong because it involves relations of problematic dependence, inequality, and humiliation. Such relations infringe the rights to freedom and equality of the poor. And the called-for response is one of public recognition and protection of the rights of the poor. This position means we must radically reconceptualize our individual duties to the poor: not private beneficence, but private remedies for public failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article explores a set of questions about the ‘idea of freedom’ that Kant introduces in the fourth paragraph ofGroundworkIII. I develop a reading that supports treating it as a normative notion and brings out its normative content in some detail. I argue that we should understand the idea as follows: that it is a general feature of reasoning and judgement that it understands itself to be a correct or sound application of the normative standards of the relevant domain of cognition, not influenced by irrelevant or external factors. Reasoning and judgement are thus normatively committed to these standards of correctness. A second and related concern is to explore connections between the idea of freedom and Kant’s conception of autonomy and to identify different points at which autonomy plays a role in the argument ofGroundworkIII. In the final section, I mine the idea of freedom for a set of normative commitments specific to rational agency that play a foundational role in Kant’s moral conception.

For a long time, the transcendental dialectic was not at the center of Kant scholarship but was often treated simply as Kant’s reckoning with contemporary metaphysics. Accordingly, the main interest was in the transcendental analytic, especially the transcendental deduction. It is all the more gratifying that in recent times a rethinking seems to be taking place on this issue. In the following, I shall attempt to show why the transcendental dialectic is something more than an addendum to the core business of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, it forms the culmination of the work, demanding our full attention. Indeed, it provides the key to the entire critical philosophy by exhibiting reason itself as the ultimate founding principle in the form of its Idea.