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“Distorted Picture: on the Relationship Between Forgiveness and Deformity on Walter Benjamin’s Worka”. The hunchback we find here and there in Benjaminian texts, an image that Benjamin himself describes as the prototype of the distortion (“dem Urbilde der Entstellung”) is also the prototype of the subject in need of forgiveness. A critical reading of the places in which Benjamin refers to this “distorted image” offers the possibility of raising a theory of forgiveness (and, indirectly, of guilt and justice) that does not reduce forgiveness to a legal form, to some specific emotional dynamics, or to an exchange of moral conditions. Instead, I argue the Benjaminian hunchback endows our common understandings of forgiveness with a clear bodily dimension that is simply absent in most contemporary considerations of the matter. La imagen del jorobado que aparece aquí y allá en el corpus benjaminiano, una imagen que el mismo Benjamin califica como el prototipo de la distorsión (“dem Urbilde der Entstellung”) es también el prototipo del sujeto necesitado de perdón. Una lectura crítica de los lugares en los que Benjamin refiere a esta “imagen distorsionada” ofrece la posibilidad de levantar una teoría del perdón (e, indirectamente, de la culpa y de la justicia) que no reduce el perdón a una forma jurídica, a una particular dinámica emocional, o a un intercambio de condiciones morales, sino que la dota además de una clara dimensión corporal que está simplemente ausente en la mayoría de las consideraciones a propósito del perdón desarrolladas en el siglo XX. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Departamento de Humanidades

First published online: 28 September 2018 Much of the recent debate on immigration to Europe has focused on how many refugees should be allowed to enter and how refugees should be distributed among EU member states, but there has been less academic focus on under what conditions, if any, human smuggling is morally permissible. How should we morally assess those who make a business out of helping migrants reach their desired destination and those who pay smugglers to reach their destination? We argue that human smuggling is morally permissible under some conditions even if it is illegal. Human trafficking, by contrast, is immoral and should be illegal. The moral conditions for permissible human smuggling are sometimes being met on the route from Africa to Europe (but are all too often grossly violated). We consider and rebut objections based on the arguments that a legal prohibition on human smuggling must translate into a moral one, and that human smuggling violates the rights of individuals to freedom of association in receiving countries. We conclude with policy implications.

The risks of novel technologies, such as nano(bio)technology cannot be fully assessed due to the existing uncertainties surrounding their introduction into society. Consequently, the introduction of innovative technologies can be conceptualised as a societal experiment, which is a helpful approach to evaluate moral acceptability. This approach is illustrated with the marketing of sunscreens containing nano-sized titanium dioxide (TiO(2)) particles. We argue that the marketing of this TiO(2) nanomaterial in UV protective cosmetics is ethically undesirable, since it violates four reasonable moral conditions for societal experimentation (absence of alternatives, controllability, limited informed consent, and continuing evaluation). To remedy the current way nano-sized TiO(2) containing sunscreens are utilised, we suggest five complementing actions (closing the gap, setup monitoring tools, continuing review, designing for safety, and regulative improvements) so that its marketing can become more acceptable.

Chapter 5 of John Locke's Second Treatise, ‘Of Property,” is a text that undermines itself, stammering to an unresolved and irresolvable conclusion because the structure of conditions upon which most of its moral argument about private property is based cannot be stretched to encompass the sudden twist Locke tries to make at the end. The moral conditions by which Locke defines a virtuous private possession within God's gift of the world to all mankind in common resist being extended to include an economy of money and limitless, unequal possession. The text comes to an end in total uncertainty, pointing simultaneously in two opposite directions. This paper explores just how deeply and hopelessly these distortions affect the text.

This dissertation has the task of highlighting the role of Nietzsche.s life experience in view of his philosophical and psychological production. Giving importance on how the philosopher understood himself, in his book Ecce Homo, in the Fragmentos Postumos and in his correspondence, and taking an interest in his |Clinica Moral| as a foundation for moral criticism, the present research aims at to demonstrate what Nietzsche´s philosophy owes to the meeting of his life.s experience and, especially, the disease. One sought to show that the philosopher, buy imputing his | moral psychology| to his illness, relating as well, like no other philosopher life and work, states that the illness is the nexus between one and another, being thus able to unfold the theme of Nietzsche.s health and disease to health and disease in Nietzsche and, more, psychology in Nietzsche to Nietzsche.s psychology . It is evident, therefore, that the first impulse and inspiration for Nietzsche´s philosophy arose from the need to take care of his own health, transforming all his work in medical records, a therapy that he himself used. Understanding the clinic as a space where one seeks healing, as a technique for restoring balance to the body and considering the body as the essence of nature (physis) that exists, one can take the philosophy of Nietzsche as engendering a new therapy: technique for the maintenance of the great health, departing from a new moral proposal, the moral of overcoming oneself. Esta dissertação tem a tarefa de evidenciar o papel da experiência de vida de Nietzsche diante de sua produção filosófica e psicológica. Dando importância como o filósofo se autoentendeu, em seu livro Ecce Homo, nos Fragmentos póstumos e em sua correspondência, e interessando-se por sua Clínica Moral , enquanto fundamento da crítica à moral, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo demonstrar o que a Filosofia de Nietzsche deve ao seu encontro com a sua vivência e, sobretudo, a doença. Procurou-se mostrar que o filósofo, ao atribuir sua psicologia moral à sua doença, relacionando, assim, como nenhum outro filósofo, vida e obra, explicita que a enfermidade é o nexo entre uma e outra, podendo-se, dessa forma, desdobrar o tema em saúde e doença de Nietzsche para saúde e doença em Nietzsche e, mais, a psicologia em Nietzsche para psicologia de Nietzsche. Evidencia-se, assim, que o primeiro impulso e inspiração para o filosofar nietzschiano surgiu da necessidade de cuidar da própria saúde, transformando toda a sua obra em prontuário médico, uma terapia que ele próprio usou. Entendendo a clínica, espaço onde se procura a cura, como técnica de restaurar o equilíbrio do corpo e considerando o corpo como a essência da natureza (physis) existente, pode-se tomar a filosofia de Nietzsche como o engendramento de uma nova terapia: técnica de manutenção da grande saúde, a partir de uma nova proposta moral; a moral da superação de si.

This article addresses the issue of whether and to what extent moral values can be attributed to collective actors. The paper starts from the premise that business ethics as the ethics of an organization is to be distinguished from the virtues of its members. This point is elaborated in both economic- and organization-theoretic terms within the framework of the New Economics of Organization. The result is the development of a concept of governance ethics. The ethics of governance is about the incorporation of moral conditions and requirements in the management, governance, and control structures of a firm. This is the contextual precondition for the long-lasting and beneficial effects of the virtues of individuals within the organizations.

In H.L.A. Hart’s now famous Postscript to The Concept of Law,H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–86 (2nd ed., 1994). Hereinafter referred to as CL. he embraced the Incorporation Thesis, according to which it is possible for a legal system to have a rule of recognition that incorporates moral criteria of validity.Nevertheless, Hart had some reservations about the Incorporation Thesis. Hart, a skeptic about moral objectivism, believed that the Incorporation Thesis presupposes that moral norms have an objective status and hence conditioned his acceptance of the Incorporation Thesis on the truth of moral objectivism. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Incorporationism and the Objectivity of Moral Norms, 5 LEGAL THEORY 415 (1999), for a discussion of Hart’s worries on this count. In such legal systems, a norm must satisfy certain moral conditions as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for it to be legally valid. According to the Incorporation Thesis, then, the criteria of validity need not consist exclusively of standards that define validity in terms of a norm’s source or pedigree.