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The article examines the contributions of German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to the study of modern physics. Topics discussed include Leibniz's claim that studies in physics and mature metaphysics have an intimate, explanatory connection and the results of his seminal investigation of the strength of extended, rigid beams. A model for understanding Leibniz's perspectives on the relationship between the derivative and primitive forces is presented.

This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz’s defense of teleology within the order of nature. The first section explores Leibniz’s contributions to the study of geometrical optics, and argues that his “Most Determined Path Principle” or “MDPP” allows him to bring to the fore philosophical issues concerning the legitimacy of teleological explanations by addressing two technical objections raised by Cartesians to non-mechanistic derivations of the laws of optics. The second section argues that, by drawing on laws such as the MDPP, Leibniz is able to introduce a thin notion of teleology that gives him the resources to respond to the most pressing charges of his day against teleological explanations within natural philosophy. Finally, the third section argues that contemporary philosophers have been overly hasty in their dismissal of Leibniz’s account of natural teleology, and indeed that their own generally thin conceptions of teleology have left them with few well-motivated resources for resisting his elegant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines George Berkeley's discussion on human agency. The author explores the concepts of divine concurrentism, occasionalism and mere conservationism during medieval and early modern eras. He discusses Berkeley's position on concurrentism, his reasons for adopting concurrentism, and his understanding of human activity. He analyzes several passages from the works of Berkeley and claims that his texts consistently endorse concurrentism as opposed to occasionalism or mere conservationism. He notes that Berkeley provides a coherent, philosophically interesting, and characteristically subtle view of human agency.

Discusses philosopher David Hume's account of memory in his 'Treatise of Human Nature.' Isolation of puzzles in Hume's account of memory; Hypothesis that Hume did not fully appreciate the analytic connection between memory and causation; Ways in which the reading of Hume's account of memory fits into the larger context of Hume's work; Roles that Hume assigns to memory in his account of personal identity.