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My dissertation has two aims: (1) The primary aim of my dissertation is to present St. Thomas’s response to the question of whether there exist any uninstantiated universals. Contemporary proponents of universals are typically split between (i) adopting some Platonic-inspired view, which holds that universals/Forms are ontologically prior and more real and hence can exist in the absence of any instance of it, and (ii) adopting some Aristotelian-inspired view which holds that universals exist in the particulars and hence there cannot be any universals if there are no particulars to instantiate them. A key task of this project is translating this question as it is asked in our contemporary discussion into Thomistic terms. St. Thomas uses the term ‘universal’, but he does not use that term in the same way as it is used in contemporary discussion. Further, St. Thomas’s view does not fall neatly within contemporary positions on universals such as conceptualism, nominalism, and realism, which has led contemporary commentators to classify his view in a variety of ways. I explain that a better way to translate this question is to phrase it in terms of the absolute consideration of the essence. The second aim (below) deals with the issue of interpreting this notion. (2) The second aim is to defend a specific interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s three-fold division of essence. In his early treatise On Being and Essence, St. Thomas explains that the essence can be understood either absolutely according to what belongs to it because of its proper notion or in one of its two concrete acts, namely in the intellect or in some particular thing (eg in Socrates). The absolute consideration of the essence disregards what does not belong to its proper notion, and thus, St. Thomas argues, the absolute consideration of the essence is neither one nor many. Many scholars following the work of Joseph Owens have taken this to be an unqualified denial of unity or plurality to the absolute consideration of the essence. Following the lead of an early 16th commentator, Cajetan, I argue that we should understand St. Thomas as instead making a qualified claim which denies only numerical unity and plurality of the essence absolutely considered. And furthermore, I explain what sense of unity we should attribute to the essence considered in this sense, namely a unity which is proper to it because of the undividedness of its notion (ratio). I conclude that just as we can attribute unity to the essence absolutely considered we can likewise do so with uninstantiated universals, but that this does not warrant us attribute to either of them a subsisting being or any lesser sense of being that is still proper to them (esse proprium, esse essential). I pay particular attention to St. Thomas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and track his reception and development of certain Aristotelian doctrines. By ‘development,’ I do not mean to imply that St. Thomas adds further doctrinal elements to what we find in Aristotle, but simply that he expresses those doctrines in ways that are not explicitly stated by Aristotle. The three-fold division of the essence and the distinction between and essence are sometimes considered by scholars as inventions by later commentators of Aristotle, including St. Thomas. Whether or not this, at the end of the day, is true, what I have tried to do in my dissertation is to show the basis for such ‘developments’ can be found in the works of Aristotle, and that such ‘developments’ are not Un-aristotelian.

Introduction Dans ce chapitre, je propose d’examiner une question à l’interface de la métaphysique, de la philosophie des sciences, et de l’épistémologie. Cette question est celle de savoir si nous pouvons découvrir l’essence des « espèces naturelles » (natural kinds), dont les instances paradigmatiques seraient les espèces chimiques et biologiques. Depuis les années 1970, nombreux ont été ceux à répondre par l’affirmative à cette question, dans le sillage des travaux fondateurs de Saul Kripk...

Depuis une dizaine d’années, les recherches menées sur la nature de la connaissance philosophique, le défi de l’intégration, et la connaissance des essences se sont beaucoup enrichies. En faisant appel à des philosophes engagés sur ces sujets, cet ouvrage se donne pour ambition de faire le point sur ces recherches brûlantes et d’en dégager les perspectives. On s’interrogera sur les relations entre connaissance métaphysique et connaissance philosophique, sur la nature des essences et sur leur connaissance, sur les liens entre essences et modalités, sur la place que joue, pour élucider celles-ci, une réflexion sur l’essentialisme et sur les espèces naturelles, sans oublier la manière dont doit se faire l’articulation entre les formes a priori et a posteriori de la connaissance.

Introduction Les métaphysiciens ont longtemps conçu l’essence comme une notion modale : ils traitaient les vérités essentielles comme des vérités modales d’un certain type, nécessaires et de re, et les propriétés essentielles comme des caractéristiques qu’une entité possède nécessairement, si cette entité existe. Cependant, cette approche a été critiquée dans une série de travaux entrepris par Kit Fine dès les années 1990 (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). Fine montre que l’approche modale classe, ...

Une réponse négative à cette question caractérise la philosophie moderne. Ma réponse en revanche sera positive. Pour l’expliquer j’entremêlerai des considérations spéculatives et historiques. La principale sera qu’après Descartes, la désintégration de l’épistémologie et de la métaphysique a été jugée inévitable. Ce qui s’opposait à la tradition aristotélico-thomiste. Dans cette tradition, nous sommes faits pour connaître. À mon sens, elle est dans le vrai. Mais dire qu’à la réponse positive d...

As a preface to the paper proper, let me share a brief anecdote, told to me some years ago. The details aren’t entirely veridical (notably, names have been changed to protect the innocent), but the gist of the story remains. R and F, two metaphysicians at a major R1 university on the US eastern seaboard, were sitting around a table, debating whether there really was a table or just some simples arranged table-wise. During a lull in the argumentative to and fro, R let out a deep sigh and said,...

Introduction Je m’intéresserai ici au rapport entre l’essence et la nécessité, et plus exactement à la question qui est de savoir si l’essence peut fonder la nécessité. La question est revenue sur le devant de la scène depuis une vingtaine d’années, avec l’émergence d’un courant de métaphysiciens néo-essentialistes tels que Kit Fine (Fine 1994, 1995, 2000), Jonathan Lowe (Lowe 2007, 2008, 2012), Bob Hale (Hale 2013) ou Gideon Rosen (Rosen 2010, 2015). Ces auteurs ont pour point commun de défe...

Introduction Pourquoi étudier l’œuvre de Christian Wolff dans la cadre d’un colloque plutôt centré sur la « métaphysique analytique » ? Pour le comprendre, il convient de rappeler brièvement une remarque du philosophe français Léon Brunschvicg en 1922 rapprochant l’interprétation des textes de Leibniz par Russell et la pensée de Christian Wolff : […] les travaux de M. M. Couturat et Russell, appuyés sur la publication de très importants textes inédits, ont remis en faveur l’interprétation que...

« On définit communément l’essence ce par quoi une chose est ce qu’elle est ; mais comme une chose est par elle-même ce qu’elle est, la définition de l’essence se termine à dire que l'essence d'une chose est d’être cette chose : ce qui ne nous fait guère plus connaître l’essence, en général, que si on ne s’était point mêlé de l’expliquer. » (Buffier 1724, paragraphe 197) Les métaphysiciens, classiques ou contemporains, ont de nombreux désaccords concernant l’essence des choses. Une propriété...

Martial Gueroult écrivait : La défense de l’autonomie de la métaphysique se confond avec celle de l’esprit philosophique. La définition de la philosophie comme ancilla scientiae est tout aussi périlleuse pour elle que la définition de la philosophie comme ancilla theologiae. Dans les deux cas, elle subit un joug étranger. Dans les deux cas, elle vient « à la suite » ; un intérêt extérieur à elle est la lisière étroite qui limite a priori ses pas. Tout ce qui excède ou déborde dans les différe...

Introduction Selon Michael Dummett, le problème philosophique de la nécessité se résume aux deux questions suivantes : quelle est sa source ? Comment peut-on la reconnaître ? (Dummett 1978, p. 169). Mutatis mutandis, les deux mêmes questions ne nous semblent pas moins pertinentes pour cerner le problème philosophique de l’essence. En particulier, la question de la reconnaissance du caractère essentiel ou non d’une propriété est une question dont la difficulté est plus souvent appréciée qu’ef...

Que peut-on espérer apprendre de la métaphysique ? On peut attendre d’elle des savoirs sur l’être, la substance, le temps, l’espace, les universaux et les particuliers, les modalités, les propriétés, les catégories, les classes, les genres, etc. De ces notions on peut espérer avoir connaissance de la nature, au sens de leur nature intrinsèque, ou profonde, ou essentielle – leur essence –, éventuellement au moyen de la connaissance de leur structure. Par nature essentielle ou essence il suffit...

Si l’on suppose que la causalité maintient l’univers dans son ensemble, comme l’a clairement exprimé J. L. Mackie (1974), quel est le « moteur » qui fait en sorte que les mécanismes causaux continuent à se déclencher ? Cette question représente un défi important dans l’histoire de la philosophie, au point que certains philosophes ont préféré nier l’existence de la causalité en tant que phénomène réel dans le monde. Cependant, à travers l’histoire de la philosophie, ceux qui ont estimé que les...

As M. Loux has recently reminded us, there are two basic strategies for explaining the character of particular objects, the ‘relational approach’ and the ‘constituent approach’. The prime example of a constituent approach would be Aristotelian hylomorphism. This article reveals three things. First, it gives a roadmap towards what the author considers to be the exegetically correct reconstruction of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory. Second, it provides a presentation of the basic claims of a neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, the one argued for by M. Johnston. Finally, it argues that regardless of whatever shortcomings it may have, Aristotle’s theory has an advantage over that proposed by Johnston. Unlike Johnston’s theory, it may give us a complete account of the character of a particular object.

U doktorskoj se disertaciji analizira i kritički razmatra uloga umjetnosti u kontekstu pokušaja uspostave sustava filozofije Friedricha Wilhelma Josepha Schellinga. Općeprihvaćeno je stajalište u povijesti filozofije da se Schellingova ranija filozofija može sagledati kao dovršenje transcendentalnoga idealizma i pokušaj uspostave sustava cjelokupne filozofije, a kasnija kao pokušaj dovršenja idealizma uopće u pozitivnoj filozofiji. Dovršenje transcendentalnoga idealizma Schelling je pronašao u umjetnosti, kao trećemu osnovnomu dijelu filozofije u kojemu se objedinjuju filozofija prirode i filozofija povijesti. Umjetnost u Schellingovoj filozofiji nije shvaćena kao estetika ili teorija umjetnosti, nego kao znanost, odnosno kao osnovni dio filozofije real-idealizma. Premda Schelling za života nije objavio filozofiju umjetnosti, posthumno su ipak objavljena njegova predavanja o filozofiji umjetnosti, koja je održao u Jeni 1802./1803. godine te ih je u više navrata ponovio u Würzburgu 1804./1805. godine. Uz Schellingova predavanja, umjetnost ima značajnu ulogu u djelu Sustav transcendentalnoga idealizma (1800.) te u Schellingovu govoru u Akademiji likovnih umjetnosti u Münchenu pod naslovom O odnosu likovnih umjetnosti prema prirodi (1807.). Bitno različita forma i zadaća pojedinih djela u kojima je umjetnosti pridana značajna uloga, te Schellingovo očitovanje o vlastitoj filozofiji identiteta kao negativnoj filozofiji naspram kasnije pozitivne, rezultirali su uvriježenim shvaćanjem nekonzistentnosti uloge umjetnosti u Schellingovoj filozofiji. S obzirom da je od sredine dvadesetoga stoljeća pa sve do danas pronađen i objavljen niz rukopisa i zapisa Schellingovih predavanja, razumijevanje pojma umjetnosti u Schellingovoj filozofiji u novije se doba bitno izmijenilo. Cilj je disertacije hermeneutičkom i imanentno-kritičkom metodom protumačiti Schellingovu osnovnu misao, kako bi se iz cjeline njegova sustava odredila uloga umjetnosti. Na taj se način nastoji ukazati na konzistentnost i kontinuirani razvoj kako pojma umjetnosti tako i cjelokupnoga sustava Schellingove filozofije. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schellingʼs lectures on the philosophy of art can be considered a unique attempt in the history of philosophy at providing art with a scientific basis. However, they are not notable for being the only such endeavor, as similar attempts were made even before Schelling, but because he made art an essential and indispensable part of the entire system of philosophy. Schellingʼs notion of art is not limited to establishing art as a science, but in his system, it is understood as the organon and document of philosophy and, therefore, as the completion of transcendental idealism. Schelling’s lectures on the philosophy of art were first held in Jena in 1802/1803 and were repeated several times in Würzburg, where he continued his academic work after leaving Jena. Unlike philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy, Schelling’s philosophy of art was not published during his lifetime. These lectures, entitled Philosophy of Art, were posthumously published by Schellingʼs son, Karl Friedrich August Schelling, in the fifth volume of Schelling’s Complete Works, containing lectures both from Jena and Würzburg. Since Schelling did not intend to publish these lectures, he did not finalize them. From the middle of the twentieth century to the present day, nine more lecture transcripts have been found. The Jena transcript by Johann Friedrich Heinrich Schlosser, published in the second part of the sixth volume of the Historical-Critical Edition, is of a particular note. Bearing in mind Schellingʼs ambiguous statement about his own earlier philosophy as a mere negative philosophy and many later interpretations by his critics of the role of art he presented in the last chapter of the System of Transcendental Idealism, it is the newly found transcripts that provide new insights into the interpretation of the role of art in Schellingʼs system. The sixth volume of the Historical-Critical Edition is dedicated to the Philosophy of Art and was published in two volumes in 2018 by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, which has been republishing his works together with newly found manuscripts and transcripts. Furthermore, the sixth volume provides not only new insights into common interpretations that his earlier philosophy has been surpassed in the later works and that the notion of art is presented inconsistently in various works but also sheds new light on the relationship between Jena and Würzburg lectures. Considering the subsequently gathered manuscripts and transcripts of Schellingʼs lectures, our doctoral dissertation examines the role of art in specific periods of Schellingʼs philosophy in order to support the hypothesis that art has a continuous and consistent role in the development of his system of philosophy and that seemingly contradictory views on art should be viewed in terms of the task and context of a particular work. In order to consistently substantiate the hypothesis, the first three chapters are divided according to these periods and consider works that have directly or indirectly contributed to the understanding of the concept of art. The first chapter examines the earliest period of Schellingʼs philosophy from 1794 to 1800, focusing on a collection of articles entitled A General Review of the Latest Philosophical Literature, in which philosophy of art is for the first time mentioned as the third basic part of philosophy, combining the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy. Furthermore, it focuses on the final sixth chapter of the System of Transcendental Idealism, in which art is understood as the completion of transcendental idealism, therefore, the general organon and capstone of the overall philosophy. The second chapter presents the period of the philosophy of identity from 1800 to 1806. It is particularly significant as the lectures on the philosophy of art were held on several occasions during that period. After elaborating on the philosophy of nature in the period from 1797 to 1799 and completing the system of transcendental philosophy with the notion of aesthetic intuition in art in 1800, Schelling focused on establishing a system of the overall philosophy. The chapter aims to demonstrate that Schelling, with the unity of philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy, laid the foundation for presenting his overall system, which only confirms that in the philosophy of identity, art is no longer regarded as the main subject matter. Instead, he treats art concerning the whole system. In doing so, the second chapter considers the basic concepts of the Philosophy of Art, thus accentuating the general views of real-idealism in Schellingʼs interpretations of specific forms of formative and verbal arts. The fact that Schelling relied heavily on other authors in preparing his lectures gave many later interpretations reason to challenge his originality, therefore, the chapter emphasizes his original thought based on the interpretation of general views. After considering the role of art in Schellingʼs early philosophy, having concluded that the role of art has not fundamentally changed, the third chapter discusses the notion of art in the first Munich period from 1806 to 1815. Just as in the second chapter the role of art is viewed concerning philosophy, so in the third chapter it is considered concerning religion. The emphasis is placed on Schellingʼs speech at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich in 1807 entitled On the Relation of the Formative Arts to Nature. Furthermore, the notion of art is placed in the broader context of Schellingʼs attempt to establish historical philosophy. After covering the historical context of the development of Schellingʼs system of philosophy from 1795 to 1815 and pointing out the consistent role of art in the overall system, the fourth chapter elaborates on the romantic idea of the return of science to poetry, present in all periods of his work. By presenting the elementary moments of the fall from the absolute and the return to it, the chapter seeks to substantiate the view that Schellingʼs system of realidealism is fundamentally aesthetic. The final section of the fourth chapter summarizes the relationship between earlier negative and later positive philosophy to further consistently elaborate on Schellingʼs overall philosophy, and confirms that art has the same role in positive philosophy, although it is no longer the issue under consideration.

İslam düşüncesi, hangi gelenek içerisinde yer alırsa alsın on ikinci yüz-yıldan sonraki düşünürlerin önemli bir kısmının İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) şârihi olduğu bir sürecin içerisinden geçti. Bu olgu Fahreddîn er-Râzî’nin (ö. 606/1210) sorunsallaştırma kabiliyetiyle birleşince, onun eleştirel okumaları, kendisinden sonraki kuşakları meşgul edecek aporiaları su yüzüne çıkarıp çözülmeyi bekleyen birer probleme dönüştürdü. Gerek ontoloji, epistemoloji ve aksiyolojinin kesiştiği birçok hususla yakından ilintili olması gerekse İslam düşünce geleneklerinin varlık anlayışlarının doğrudan yansıdığı bir problem alanı olması açısından bilginin mahiyeti, bunlar arasında önemli bir yere sahiptir. Râzî başta olmak üzere birçok düşünürün çözümlemelerinde görüldüğü üzere, Meşşâî felsefede bilginin ontolojisi, mahiyeti ve kategorisi, sistemin bütünü dikkate alındığında önemli meydan okumalarla karşılaşmaya elverişli unsurlar içermektedir. Buna bağlı olarak Şemseddin İsfahânî (ö. 749/1349), Teftâzânî (ö. 792/1390), Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî (ö. 816/1413), Ali Kuşçu (ö. 879/1474), Devvânî (ö. 908/1502), Sadreddîn Deştekî (ö. 903/1498) gibi düşünürler gerek sorunun tespiti ve imalarının açığa çıkarılması gerekse çözüm teklifleri açısından tartışmayı daha ileri bir noktaya taşımışlardır. Elinizdeki çalışma işte bu birikimi tevarüs eden on altıncı yüzyıl düşünürü Kutbüddin el-Îcî’nin (ö. 955/1548) soruna yaklaşım biçimini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Değerlendirmelerini özellikle Ali Kuşçu’nun, Devvânî’nin ve Deştekî’nin konuyla ilgili yorumları üzerinden yapan Îcî, bu düşünürlerin kategori sorununun çözümüne dair tekliflerini analiz etmek ve kendi yaklaşımını ortaya koymak suretiyle önemli katkılar sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Îcî, Ali Kuşçu’nun husûl-kıyâm ayırımını, Deştekî’nin dönüşüm teorisini çeşitli açılardan sorunlu bulmaktadır. Filozofların sisteminde bilginin gerçek anlamda nitelik kategorisinde yer alamayacağına dair Devvânî’nin iddiasının da tatmin edici olmadığını düşünen Îcî, hariçte var olan türsel hakikat ile fert arasındaki ilişkiyi yorumlayarak kategori sorununun çözümü için araçsallaştırmakta ve nesnenin mahiyetine özdeş olan cevherî anlamın, nefste araz olarak bulunan bilginin zihnî varlığa sahip bir parçası olabileceğini öne sürmektedir., Islamic thought, no matter what tradition it belonged to, went through a process in which almost all thinkers after the twelfth century were also commentators of Avicenna (d. 428/1037). When this phenomenon combined with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) ability to problematize, his critical readings revealed the aporias and turned them into problems which would occupy the thinker’s mind after him and waiting to be solved. The quiddityof knowledge has an important place among these, both in terms of being closely related to many issues where ontology, epistemology and axiology intersect and being a problem area where the Islamic intellectual traditions’ conception of existence is directly reflected. As seen in the analyses of many thinkers, notably Râzî, the ontology, quiddity and category of knowledge in Avicennian philosophy contain elements that are conducive to encountering important challenges when the system as a whole is taken into consideration. Accordingly, scholars like Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānî (ö. 749/1349), al-Taftāzānī (ö. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (ö. 816/1413), Alî al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502), Sadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (ö. 903/1498) have taken the discussion to a further point both in terms of identifying the problem and revealing its implications and proposing solutions. This study aims to analyze the sixteenth-century thinker Kutb al-Dīn al-Ījī’s treatment of this problem who inherited the debates of past on the matter in question. He carries out his evaluations especially through the Alī al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502) and al-Dashtakī’s comments on the subject. He makes important contributions by analyzing these scholars’ solution offers con-cerning the problem of categorical status of knowledge and putting forward his own approach. He thinks that Alī al-Qūshjī’s distinction between realization (husūl) and subsistence (qiyām), al-Dashtakī’s theory of transformation and al-Dawwānī’s offer to not put the knowledge under the category of quality are problematic from various aspects.

The paper is dedicated to the philosophical debate on the notion of sobornost in the Russian religious philosophy of Sergei Nikolaevich Bulgakov and Vladimir Nikolaevich Lossky. As a universal concept it grasps the state-of-being-joined, the unity in both religious and civil, societal aspects. Both these forms of sociality are also rooted in personal attitudes and are manifested in the sphere of reflection and in the spiritual. The extent to which both views on sobornost differ lies on the level of individual and group aspirations, in various schemes of the sobornost formation, in the religious—secular dichotomy. In this way the concept of dialectics arises. All the aforenamed controversies and the historical development of collective forms (e.g. a conflict of sobornost in the social field of a secular society) (see Bulgakov) can be seen as the dialectical self-development of sobornost as the very being, being mediated by the essence (Lossky). It is found that the dialectics inevitably lead to personal, social and divine integrity, thus illustrating the inherent unity of sobornost as essence and as being. Conflicts and misunderstandings are only due to personal misinterpretations and sacred quest. Only in a threefold form can sobornost thrive, which is more profoundly reflected in the works of Bulgakov.

An essentialist theory of modality claims that the source of possibility and necessity lies in essence, where essence is (obviously) then not to be defined in terms of necessity. Hence such theories owe us an account of why it is that the essences of things give rise to necessities in the way required. A new approach to understanding essence in terms of the notion of generalized identity promises to answer this challenge by appeal to the necessity of identity. I explore the prospects for this approach, and argue that it fails. If one favours an account of essence in terms of generalized identity, then one will not, I argue, be able to satisfactorily defend an essentialist theory of modality against the challenge; if one wishes to defend an essentialist theory of modality, and thereby to give an explanation of how necessity arises from essence, one should not understand essence in terms of generalized identity.

Uno de los temas más debatidos en el período inmediatamente posterior a la muerte de Tomás de Aquino fue cómo interpretar fielmente de acuerdo a sus textos el concepto de esse, dada la cualidad metafísica particular que éste adquiría en esta nueva ontología. Teniendo en cuenta que durante la escolástica los pensadores trataban de servirse de la filosofía como instrumento para explicar la fe, la comprensión del esse como distinto realmente de la esencia, fue el centro del debate por ser la base del principal argumento para mostrar la diferencia ontológica entre Dios y las criaturas. One of the most debated issues in the period immediately following the death of Thomas Aquinas was how to interpret faithfully according to his texts the concept of esse, given the par-ticular metaphysical quality that it acquired in this new ontology. Bearing in mind that the scho-lastic thinkers tried to use philosophy as an instrument to explain Christian faith, the under-standing of esse as distinct from essence, was the center of the debate for being the reason of the main argument to state the ontological difference between God and creatures.

Dispositional Essentialism, as commonly conceived, consists in the claims that at least some of the fundamental properties essentially confer certain causal-nomological roles on their bearers, and that these properties give rise to the natural modalities. As such, the view is generally taken to be committed to a realist conception of properties as either universals or tropes, and to be thus incompatible with nominalism as understood in the strict sense. Pace this common assumption of the ontological import of Dispositional Essentialism, the aim of this paper is to explore a nominalist version of the view, Austere Nominalist Dispositional Essentialism. The core features of the proposed account are that it eschews all kinds of properties (be they universals, tropes, or sets of particulars), takes certain predicative truths as fundamental, and employs the so-called generic notion of essence. As I will argue, the account is significantly closer to the core idea behind Dispositional Essentialism than the only nominalist account in the vicinity of Dispositional Essentialism that has been offered so far—Ann Whittle’s (2009) Causal Nominalism—and is immune to crucial problems that affect this view.

To be an Aristotelian about universals is to hold that universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. An argument against Aristotelianism about universals has recently been put forward by Costa to the effect that a contradiction follows from assuming a certain formulation of Aristotelianism together with some highly plausible principles governing the notions employed in that formulation. In this paper, we provide different ways of articulating the Aristotelian position which, while being related with some of the main contributions in the current Aristotelian tradition, do not fall prey to the argument.

The article searches to retract the theme of the inversion of theology in (on the )anthropology in(of) Ludwig Feuerbach, achieving the context of the philosophical tradition to create another vision in what sense it is correct to comprehend what the 19th century philosopher is not an atheist and also does not reduce to serving as a little point between two great authors: Hegel and Marx. Focusing (Proposing) on the an important question on the history of the philosophy, in those who looked deeply to the man, that claims a lot to find spur (encouragement),sense or peace, if in font of emptiness, of pain, produced by uncertainty, scarcity, anguish, impotency and suffering, can be realized all of this density that brought on the Feuerbach's philosophical work, which will be so much understood by inserting it in the context of discussions, tied on the field of our presenting world, because the problem that it is concerned there is the central themes of the philosophy leading to meditations on God, religion, theology, and everything that will be related to it in theoretical and practical life. Reviewing the structure and functioning of religion and the religious events as such, to the beyond that can be judge an atheist by the way.