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Despite centuries of joint investigation of philosophy and neurological interventions, a founding account for the philosophy of neurosurgery has yet to be rigorously constructed or defended. This paper reviews recent work on the philosophy of neurosurgery, spanning metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory, to establish a framework and clinical relevance for study in the philosophy of neurosurgery. A systematic review of an online database was conducted using the broad search terms, "Philosophy AND (Neurosurgery OR Neurological Surgery)." Records were included if they demonstrated relevance to the philosophy of neurosurgery and analytical rigor, but were excluded if solely legal, clinical, or ethical principles were considered without substantive discussion of underlying ethical frameworks and philosophical principles. Of 8025 candidates from online and print records, 16 records (14 from online sources and 2 from an edited volume) met inclusion criteria for the systematic review. Three dealt with metaphysics, 3 dealt with epistemology, 4 dealt with value theory, 5 dealt with metaphysics/epistemology, and 1 dealt with value theory/metaphysics. Questions of free will, consciousness, personal identity, neurosurgical knowledge, ascription of other minds, deontology, and minimalism, among others, were considered. Based on identified studies, the philosophy of neurosurgery is defined as the discipline of rigorously and methodically addressing metaphysical, epistemological, and value-theoretic questions arising from physically intervening in the nervous system. We discuss future directions for questions within the philosophy of neurosurgery and consider their relevance for patient care and the practice of neurosurgery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the discussion on research methods pedagogy by adding a technological dimension to Nind's use of Pedagogical Content Knowledge (PCK) in research methods education (RME). Within a Scholarship of Teaching and Learning approach, this research-inspired reflection is based on the literature, on the scholar's praxis and on the on-going design-based research project she has been conducting since 2014. Trained in educational technologies more than 20 years ago, she shares an initial understanding of the use of the TPACK framework for the teaching of research methods in education. Findings include initial definitions of each type of individual knowledge (CK, PK, TK), overlapping knowledge (TPK, TCK, PCK) and a proposal for TPACK as a whole. Secondly, the findings show that technology appears to be a revealing indicator of current praxis in RME, inviting scholars to question methodolatry and technodolatry. As a corollary, Content Knowledge (CK) needs more attention to reconnect RME with its philosophical foundations. Research method teachers and students in the social sciences will foremost benefit from this study and are invited to contribute to the debate within a broader collective intelligence endeavour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for knowledge has been central to the Islamic tradition from its inception in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (aḥādīth). The injunctions to obtain knowledge and contemplate the signs of God in all things undergird a culture of ultimate questions in which there was an underlying epistemic unity among all fields of knowledge, from the religious sciences to the intellectual sciences to the natural sciences. Having lost sight of the underlying metaphysic that provides this epistemic unity, many thinkers in the modern period read the classical Islamic texts independently of the cognitive cartography and hierarchy of which they are a part. This approach leads to further misunderstandings and thus to a sense of hermeneutical gloom and epistemic subordination characteristic of coloniality. Postcolonial theory provides effective tools for diagnosing the process by which this epistemic erosion produces ideologically and epistemically conscripted subjects. But as it, too, arises from within a secular frame, it is only by understanding the cognitive cartography of the sciences within Islam that epistemic confidence and sovereignty can be reinstated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Undoubtedly, the discipline of nursing has been influenced extensively by both Western and Eastern/Asian philosophies. What remains unknown or, perhaps, poorly articulated is the potential influence of African philosophy on the onto‐epistemology of nursing. As a starting point, this article sought to examine the core claims of African philosophy and how they may offer new meanings to the metaparadigm domains of interest in the discipline of nursing. At the core of African philosophy is the notion of personhood (which is distinguished from what it means to be a human being), community, solidarity, and relationality. A major claim of African philosophy is the notion that 'a person is a person through persons' which may mean that nursing will be relevant from the African philosophical perspective if it is able to attain this. Health and illness from the African philosophical perspective are defined relationally which shifts attention from the biomedical framework to holism and relational care. The sick 'person' is also distinguished from the sick 'human being' which has the potential of leading to exclusion from the African philosophical viewpoint. Put together, the African philosophical stance potentially extends the meaning of the metaparadigm domains of interest to the discipline of nursing which warrants further exploration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a rejection and continuous reframing of theoretical humanism, critical posthumanism questions and imagines the human condition in the current context, aligning it with nonhuman and more than human entities, past and future. While this philosophical approach has been referenced in many academic disciplines since the 1990s, it has been gradually garnering interest among nursing scholars, leading to questions such as what it means to be human and what it means to be a nurse in the here and now. As a deeply ethical and political project, posthumanism, which we associate with poststructuralist concepts of power and resistance, questions the formation of posthuman subjects who more accurately reflect complex times, characterized by capitalistic commodification of life—human and nonhuman. In this article, we aim to explore how the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of critical posthumanism, specifically through Rosi Braidotti's works, can be useful to understand a posthuman subjectivity that favors affirmative actions aimed at actualizing our world in becoming. Through examples in nursing practice, education, and research, we will explore not only how critical posthumanism allows us to frame transformations in the current situation that we are embedded in as nurses and more generally as beings but also how these examples allow us to move beyond critique to the actualization of affirmative actions that correspond to the creation of new worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beginning with a critical examination of the humanist assumptions of critical ethnography, this article interrogates and surfaces problems with the ontological and epistemological orientations of this research methodology. In drawing on exemplar empirical data from an arts‐based project, the article demonstrates the limitations in the humanist‐based qualitative research approach and advances a postdualist, postrepresentationalist direction for critical ethnography called entangled ethnography. Using data from a larger study that examined the perspectives of racialized mad artists, what is demonstrated in this inquiry is that the entanglement of bodies, objects, and meaning‐making practices is central to working with the ontologically excluded, such as those who find themselves in various states of disembodiment and/or corporeal and psychic distribution. We propose the redevelopment of critical ethnography, extended by entanglement theory (a critical posthuman theory), and suggest that for it to be an inclusive methodology, critical ethnography must be conceptualized as in the process of becoming and always in regeneration, open to critique, extension, and redevelopment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Recent empirical studies have described and theorized a culture of shame within medical education in the Anglo‐American context (Bynum). Shame is universal and highly social human emotion characterized by a sense of feeling objectified and judged negatively, in contrast to one's own self‐concept. Shame has both an embodied and a relational dimension. Shame is considered especially relevant in healthcare settings (Dolezal and Lyons), and the tenets of patient care within the medical profession include respecting the dignity and upholding the safety of patients. However, shame is frequently deployed as a teaching tool within medical training. Method: Here I ask, what can shame do in medical education (Ahmed)? What epistemic and relational conditions does it construct? I draw from philosophical voices in higher education to illuminate how shaming practices in medical education can undermine dignity safety (Callan), preclude inclusivity, and in the context of the hierarchical and marginalizing medical system, propagate epistemic injustice (Fricker). Discussion: This argument shows how shame in education can be both phenomenologically and normatively problematic and may act differently upon students who experience marginalization and those who are majoritized. I further suggest that a medical education system which upholds the epistemological and relational frameworks of power, shame, and epistemic injustice, underscores those frameworks in the medical system at large, disserving individual patients who are already at risk of suffering epistemic injustice (Carel), and society at large. Conclusion: This analysis of shame in medical education focuses on the highly relational and interpersonal elements of learning to live and work in the medical system, highlighting the need for respect, trust, and resistance to reorient the relational learning environment toward individual and systemic forms of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possibility of consciousness in human brain organoids is sometimes viewed as determinative in terms of the moral status such entities possess, and, in turn, in terms of the research protections such entities are due. This commonsense view aligns with a prominent stance in neurology and neuroscience that consciousness admits of degrees. My paper outlines these views and provides an argument for why this picture of correlating degrees of consciousness with moral status and research protections is mistaken. I then provide an alternative account of the correlation between moral status and consciousness, and consider the epistemic ramifications for research protections of this account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self‐confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How China's social work can establish its own epistemology has remained largely unexplored. This article focuses on Confucianism, Taoism, and Chinese Buddhism to start this epistemological exploration, as they represent Chinese culture and can provide valuable epistemological elements for China's social work. Moving beyond epistemological elements from these philosophies, how social workers in China can further develop social work research and practice based on the unique Chinese context is also discussed, specifically through the processes of indigenization and authentization of epistemology in China's social work. Limitations and future research directions are also presented to guide future discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Spinoza's concept of acquiescentia, which is a central concept of Spinoza's moral philosophy and can be translated into Turkish as "peace of mind", "satisfaction" or "inner peace", and two other related concepts. While one of these two concepts is acquiescentia in se ipso, which can be translated as the affect of "self-esteem", the other is the concept of mentis/animi acquiescentia, which expresses a mental state and can be translated as "satisfaction of mind" or "mental calmness". In the article, it is investigated whether the human being, who is a being in God and subject to necessity in Nature, and therefore determined in terms of existence and action, reaches an "affectual satisfaction" and a "mental satisfaction", which is arising from mental states caused by adequate ideas. In this sense, Spinoza's theory of acquiescentia is put forward as satisfaction of affects and mental states. With the theory of acquiescentia, Spinoza's aim is to provide an epistemological and ethical guidance that will enable man to feel "self-esteem", to fill his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge, to reach non-temporary but supreme affects and to maintain his life in this direction. In the article, studies that deal with Spinoza's theory of acquiescentia independently and fill an important gap in the literature are also investigated and the main theses of these studies are clarified. However, the main ideas of these studies are criticized, new reading suggestions are presented, and different results are reached with different arguments. By the way, it is seen that the authors examining the theory in question, on the one hand, treat both "selfesteem" and "satisfaction of mind" as the same "affect" that expresses "satisfaction" occurring in different degrees. On the other hand, it is determined that the authors in question associate the different degrees of "satisfaction" caused by this same affects with Spinoza's three types of knowledge. In the article, it is especially justified why "self-esteem" and "satisfaction of mind" are not the same affect, and also, it is made clear why the different degrees of "satisfaction" do not directly correspond to each of Spinoza's three types of knowledge. Based on this ground, "self-esteem" is presented as an affect, and "satisfaction of mind" as a comprehensive mental state. Here, while the first one expresses a "satisfaction" that increases from the reason to the intuition, the second indicates a supreme "satisfaction" that occurs only with intuition. In the formation of the aforementioned satisfaction, reason does not function as a type of knowledge, intuition as another type of knowledge; however, "satisfaction" that occurs via reason is a kind of "satisfaction" that makes its deficiency felt and tends to increase, while "satisfaction" achieved through intuition causes a feeling of completeness or perfection. Therefore, "true satisfaction" comes from intuition, reason is only a basis for intuition, a preparation or the providing of needed conceptual tools. In addition, it is seen that, "imagination", which is a type of knowledge together with "reason" and "intuition", and the opinions arising from it are not an adequate source for a theory of satisfaction formed by "self-esteem" and "satisfaction of mind". In this context, in the article, self-esteem is determined as "affectual satisfaction", and satisfaction of mind as "gladness which arises from the true knowledge", "intellectual love of God", "blessedness", and "salvation". This ground is clarified as an occasion or scope to clearly demonstrate that what is expressed by the two concepts in question is not same affect and is not a "satisfaction" or "inner peace" associated with the types of knowledge. In the light of the investigations and criticisms made in the aforementioned framework, the study has two main claims: The first is that the "self-esteem", which is arising from the reason attains its highest form with the "intellectual love of God", which is arising from the intuition. It consists of the "affectual satisfaction" of the human being. The second is that under a species of eternity the mind attains the knowledge of God and the love of God with adequate ideas and "fill with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge", and thus, it brings man to the highest human happiness, "blessedness", and its result "salvation". These are constituting greatest or perfect "satisfaction of mind" of human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of constitutions: 'constitutional institutionalism'. Conventional approaches in law, philosophy or political science tend to reduce constitutions either to their formal, factual or ideal aspects. The constitutional-institutionalist approach, by contrast, seeks to integrate these aspects into a more general perspective by focusing on the dynamic interplay between constitutional actors and constitutional norms. It understands constitutional norms as binding institutions that shape and constrain political action, but never fully determine it. Constitutional institutionalism furthermore asserts that constitutional norms, whatever form they take, only have meaning in relation to other constitutional norms as well as to constitutional actors, who impose meaning on these norms. Therefore, constitutional phenomena ultimately require interpretive explanations. This article concludes with a brief constitutional-institutionalist research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here I explore a new line of evidence for belief–credence dualism, the thesis that beliefs and credences are distinct and equally fundamental types of mental states. Despite considerable recent disagreement over this thesis, little attention has been paid in philosophy to differences in how our mindreading systems represent the beliefs and credences of others. Fascinatingly, the systems we rely on to accurately and efficiently track others' mental states appear to function like belief–credence dualists: Credence is tracked like an emotional state, composed of both representational and affective content, whereas belief is tracked like a bare representational state with no affective component. I argue on a preliminary basis that, in this particular case, the mechanics of mentalizing likely pick out a genuine affective dimension to credence that is absent for belief, further strengthening the converging case for belief–credence dualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nous aborderons les grandes modalités et les principaux jalons dans les conceptions psychiatriques de 1852 à nos jours. L'épistémologie dans l'histoire contemporaine possède une spécificité dans sa démarche qui consiste à examiner l'état du développement historique des sciences. Et l'épistémologie de l'école de Piaget nous aide particulièrement à individualiser les différentes phases de la compréhension de la psychiatrie dans l'évolution de la Société Médico-Psychologique. Les membres fondateurs de notre Société représentent des disciplines très diversifiées (psychiatrie, philosophie, médecine, physiologie, administration, etc.), et nous distinguerons trois domaines : les grands paradigmes des 170 ans d'activité ; les grandes démarches épistémologiques ; les évaluations récentes, au milieu des différentes crises. Les grands paradigmes des 170 ans d'activité ont été particulièrement bien étudiés par Georges Lanteri-Laura. Nous distinguerons avec lui trois grandes phases : la période de l'aliénation mentale (1791–1854), de Pinel à Boismont, où sont bien présents les précurseurs spiritualistes de l'époque. La période des maladies mentales (1854–1926) de Falret, Magnan à Auguste Comte. La période des grandes structures (1926–1977), du Congrès de Genève-Lausanne, avec la présentation en français de Bleuler sur sa conception de la schizophrénie, à la mort de Henri Ey, avec les œuvres de Charcot, Broca, Clérambault, Régis, Guiraud et la présence de Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, et la phénoménologie allemande, jusqu'à la grande œuvre de Henri Ey. Et enfin la période du système classificatoire (à partir de 1975–1980), que nous ajoutons aux études précédentes, avec l'arrivée des différents DSM, et la classification internationale des troubles mentaux CIM 10. Nous citerons la célèbre réunion franco-américaine de 1978, et les contributions de nombreux membres de la Société Médico-Psychologique tout au long de cette période. Les grandes démarches épistémologiques sont importantes à préciser tout au long de ces phases, surtout dans les deux dernières périodes. Les rapports entre la clinique et l'épistémologie sont très concernés dans deux domaines particulièrement : la transformation des concepts, et la dialectique des modèles (avec les très importantes études de C.J. Blanc). Nous distinguerons les quatre grandes démarches : les démarches descriptives et explicatives, les démarches explicitantes et compréhensives. C'est à ce niveau que nous pouvons considérer l'œuvre très importante de Pierre Marchais. Et nous pouvons alors bien situer la place considérable de la démarche compréhensive. Les jalons et les prolongements contemporains concernent les deux grandes dimensions qui apparaissent dans les activités de la Société Médico-Psychologique depuis trente à quarante ans. Les modalités de la connaissance et l'épistémologie sont très concernées dans les courants scientifiques récents de la psychiatrie (neuro-cognitivisme, biochimie, génétique, etc.) et la place de la compréhension des troubles et des personnes est indispensable à associer à toutes les démarches d'explication. Les sciences du vivant sont en rapport avec l'épistémologie en apportant à l'objectivité les dimensions subjectives du vivant, car la vie est, dans son essence, un processus subjectif d'auto-affection, de conscience de soi, et de l'identité (G. Canguilhem ; M. Henry). Les conclusions de cette longue étude dans le temps nous amènent à souligner deux domaines : d'un point de vue général, les approches épistémologiques de la psychiatrie nous confrontent toujours aux différentes conceptions de l'homme, portant en elles diverses modalités du sens de l'existence. D'un point de vue particulier, dans chaque période considérée, nous constatons une certaine diversité des paradigmes, où les psychiatres considèrent la clinique psychiatrique selon des modalités épistémologiques diverses et complémentaires. We discuss the major modalities and milestones in psychiatric conceptions from 1852 to the present day. Epistemology in contemporary history has a specificity in its approach, which consists in examining the state of the historical development of science. And the epistemology of the Piaget school particularly helps us to individualize the different phases of the understanding of psychiatry in the evolution of the Medico-Psychological Society. The founding members of our Society represent very diverse disciplines (psychiatry, philosophy, medicine, physiology, administration, etc.) and we distinguish three areas : The major paradigms of 170 years of activity ; The major epistemological approaches; Recent assessments, in the midst of various crises; The major paradigms of 170 years of activity have been particularly well studied by Georges Lanteri-Laura. We differentiate his three main phases: The period of insanity (1791–1854), from Pinel to Boismont, where the spiritualist precursors of the time are present. The period of mental illness (1854–1926) from Falret, Magnan to Auguste Comte. The period of large structures (1926–1977), from the Congress of Geneva-Lausanne, with the presentation in French of Bleuler's conception of schizophrenia, to the death of Henri Ey, with the works of Charcot, Broca, Clérambaud, Régis, Guiraud and the presence of Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, and German phenomenology, to the great work of Henri Ey. And finally, we deal with the period of the classification system (from 1975 to1980), which we include with the previous studies, with the promulgation of the different DSM, and the international classification of mental disorders ICD10. We mention the famous Franco-American meeting of 1978, and the contributions of many members of the Medico-Psychological Society throughout this period. It is important to specify the major epistemological approaches throughout these phases, especially during the last two periods. The relationship between the clinic and epistemology is greatly concerned in two areas in particular: the transformation of concepts, and the dialectic of models (with the very important studies of C.J. Blanc). We delineate the four main approaches: descriptive, explanatory, explicit, and comprehensive approaches. It is at this point that we can consider the very important work of Pierre Marchais. And we can then clearly situate the considerable importance of the comprehensive approach. The contemporary milestones and extensions concern two major dimensions that have been present in the activities of the Medico-Psychological Society for the past thirty to forty years. The modalities of knowledge and epistemology are very much involved in the recent scientific currents of psychiatry (neuro-cognitivism, biochemistry, genetics, etc.) and the importance of understanding disorders and people must be associated with all approaches to explanation. The life sciences are related to epistemology through including objectivity together with the subjective dimensions of the living, because life is, in its essence, a subjective process of self-affection, self-awareness, and identity (G. Canguilhem; M. Henry). The conclusions of this lengthy study over time lead us to highlight two areas: From a general point of view, epistemological approaches to psychiatry always confront us with different conceptions of man, carrying within them various modalities of the meaning of existence. From a particular point of view, in each period considered, we note a certain diversity of paradigms, where psychiatrists consider the psychiatric clinic according to various and complementary epistemological modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a case study of a session with a subject. The subject's name is philosophy. Philosophy needs a counseling intervention due to the development of an epistemological rupture revealing two routes into or upon knowledge. This problem that philosophy faces arises along two epistemological routes, called truth and reality. The significant issue of philosophy is how to reconcile a true reality. The proposal at hand for this consideration by philosophy is that a reconciliation is most effective though argumentative validation in orientation over argumentative proof in ideological reduction. Our effort here works toward the truth of reality found through validation, while also revealing in its course that the reality of truth suffers from a necessity for an argumentative reductive proof. However, the subject is resistant and generally myopic in its ability to reckon truth sensibly; thus, the proposal of orientation concerns more an ability to consider evidence of the rupture and less the argument to prove the rupture is epistemologically coherent. The intervention for the subject is to interrupt the processual manner that we shall term the real conventional philosophical method. This essay-as-intervention develops the theme through which the philosophical decree of subject material is negotiated as reality. The proposal is that by exposing philosophy to its basic and founding problem, we will find what it is, truly. We call the truth of the subject of the universe, the object of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While counselors are both familiar with and proficient in the use of reflecting skills to identify and articulate client feelings, recent empirical research supports the perspective that emotions are co‐constructed, sociocultural categories rather than triggered, universal internal states. Drawing upon Barrett's (2017) theory of constructed emotion, the authors discuss epistemological considerations, the relationship between emotions and core affect, and the relevance of interoceptive processes in the context of predictive mind. Therapeutic methods to co‐construct feeling experiences and implications for counseling practice and research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops and introduces the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge into the current sports knowledge philosophical debate. This idea is based on my interpretation of Mark Rowlands’ Rilkean memory theory. Broadly speaking, Rowlands proposed that an embodied Rilkean memory is memory content that is then ‘woven into the body and its neural infrastructure’ resulting in new bodily or behavioral dispositions. I propose that elite-level sports knowledge may become contentless bodily and/or behavioral dispositions and take the form of embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge. This version of sports knowledge enriches the current philosophy of sports debate that has centered on the analytical distinction between procedural knowledge (knowing how) and declarative knowledge (knowing that). After presenting the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge concept and providing empirical evidence that supports its existence, I argue that the current distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ may not be exhaustive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although psychology's recent crisis has been attributed to various scientific practices, it has come to be called a "replication crisis," prompting extensive appraisals of this putatively crucial scientific practice. These have yielded disagreements over what kind of replication is to be preferred and what phenomena are being explored, yet the proposals are all grounded in a conventional philosophy of science. This article proposes another avenue that invites moving beyond a discovery metaphor of science to rethink research as enabling realities and to consider how empirical findings enact or perform a reality. An enactment perspective appreciates multiple, dynamic realities and science as producing different entities, enactments that ever encounter differences, uncertainties, and precariousness. The axioms of an enactment perspective are described and employed to more fully understand the two kinds of replication that predominate in the crisis disputes. Although the enactment perspective described here is a relatively recent development in philosophy of science and science studies, some of its core axioms are not new to psychology, and the article concludes by revisiting psychologists' previous calls to apprehend the dynamism of psychological reality to appreciate how scientific practices actively and unavoidably participate in performativity of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an acceptable philosophical account. Social work, which contributes to healthy wellbeing, increasingly uses language of probabilistic causal relationships between harms and subsequent limitations to healthy functioning. This paper explores causal understandings of probabilistic knowledge using concepts of the theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Social welfare terminology regarding risk (such as factors that are 'causative of' child abuse) is explored using epistemological concepts from scholastic philosophy. Aquinas' anthropological concepts related to modern 'risk science' and his concepts of rationality, harm and prudence are applied to contemporary social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both healthcare providers and researchers in the health sciences are well rehearsed in asking the question 'What could be causing this'? and examining beyond the surface of observable symptoms or obvious factors to understand what is really occurring with patients and health services. Critical realism is a philosophical framework that can help in this inquiry as we attempt to make sense of the observable world. The aim of this article is to introduce critical realism and explore how it can help both healthcare providers and health science researchers to better understand causation through the mechanisms that generate events, despite those mechanisms often being unseen. The article reviews foundational concepts and examples framed in the healthcare setting to make the key principles, strengths and limitations of critical realism accessible for those who are just beginning their journey with this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds "standard criticisms" of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response to Harris, this article argues that, like previous criticisms, these criticisms do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the limitations of medical science and the risks associated with medical treatments, we need to re-examine the connotation of medical science from the perspective of philosophy. Medical science is the natural expression of human kindness and human nature of rescuing the dying and healing the wounded. It is a combination of the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. From the perspectives of medical philosophy and humanistic care, this article expounds the concepts and ideas of evidence-based, translational, and precision medicine in modern medicine and emphasizes the importance of avoiding new technical bureaucracy, paying attention to achieving a holistic view and systematic understanding, and avoiding biases in development because of the loss of the humanistic spirit in modern medical practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental health has become an interprofessional service. Historically, differences between professionals in their epistemological orientation toward mental illness and treatment have created substantial tension. However, there are little empirical evidence about professional's epistemological identity. In this article, we first discuss the important relationship between epistemology, practice and ethic and report the results from a survey based on a Norwegian sample (N = 432) of social workers. The overall finding is that social workers seem to be more eclectic than specific in their epistemological orientation and that the eclecticism seems to express epistemological indifference rather than a conscious choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a case study of a session with a subject. The subject's name is philosophy. Philosophy needs a counseling intervention due to the development of an epistemological rupture revealing two routes into or upon knowledge. This problem that philosophy faces arises along two epistemological routes, called truth and reality. The significant issue of philosophy is how to reconcile a true reality. The proposal at hand for this consideration by philosophy is that a reconciliation is most effective though argumentative validation in orientation over argumentative proof in ideological reduction. Our effort here works toward the truth of reality found through validation, while also revealing in its course that the reality of truth suffers from a necessity for an argumentative reductive proof. However, the subject is resistant and generally myopic in its ability to reckon truth sensibly; thus, the proposal of orientation concerns more an ability to consider evidence of the rupture and less the argument to prove the rupture is epistemologically coherent. The intervention for the subject is to interrupt the processual manner that we shall term the real conventional philosophical method. This essay-as-intervention develops the theme through which the philosophical decree of subject material is negotiated as reality. The proposal is that by exposing philosophy to its basic and founding problem, we will find what it is, truly. We call the truth of the subject of the universe, the object of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Decolonisation is a concept that has taken on multiple layers since the end of colonisation and the onset of independence in the Global South. More than ever before, decolonialism, decoloniality and indigenisation have moved to the centre of intellectual inquiry across the broad spectrum of human activity: knowledge production, education, academic disciplines, professions, political life and economic organisation. The evaluation profession and fraternity has also been grappling with the idea of decolonising and indigenising its ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations, which are essentially rooted in the Global North development theory, practice and knowledge systems. Objectives: This article endeavours to provide recommendations on how to make the Made in Africa Evaluation (MAE) paradigm practical (applicable) for evaluators in Africa, based on decolonisation and indigenisation methodological prescriptions. Method: The study is qualitative by design, employing document analysis and the authors' observation on development and evaluation practice in Africa and globally. Results: The emergent practice of evaluation is only experiencing decolonial scrutiny in the 21st century. In the African context, the MAE paradigm appears to be the continent's decolonisation and indigenisation project for the evaluation fraternity. Conclusion: Building an Afrocentric, decolonised and indigenous MAE paradigm and approach requires a coordinated effort on building scholarship on the topic of MAE approaches and methodologies. Once there is sufficient documentation of the MAE approach, it should become easier to advance Afrocentric evaluation as mainstream discourse alongside the more established and neoliberal development and evaluation discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme of this journal issue deals with the opposition between what can be said to be the "inside" and the "outside" of a culture or a civilization, a question that can be approached in different ways. To begin with, one may ask whether certain anthropological constants can be discerned in all of humanity or, to take the opposite approach, whether civilizations possess certain cultural features that are unique to them. An approach focusing on certain anthropological constants gives us access to an "inside" shared by all of humanity, whereas the latter approach is part of how a civilization demarcates itself from its "outside." How "inside" and "outside" relate to each other had best be investigated historically, since cultural and social differentiation grow historically out of the common soil of anthropological constants. This article focuses on Reinhart Koselleck's oeuvre to illustrate this claim. Why Koselleck? To begin with, one may find in his work an "inside" defined in terms of a philosophical anthropology and a culturally defined "outside," both of which he contrasts in an original and thought‐provoking way. As I will argue, the contrast runs parallel to the one between historical ontology and historical epistemology that can be discerned in Koselleck's writings. I will show how the dichotomy between ontology and epistemology reappears in his notion of the saddle time (Sattelzeit)—that is, the period in which Western modern historical writing was born. Prior to the saddle time, history was seen as the product of the anthropological constants of human nature, but afterward, these constants had to give way to the belief in a historical development requiring a historical epistemology to achieve historical truth. This is how the "inside" (ontology) and the "outside" (epistemology) are interwoven in Koselleck's notion of the Sattelzeit. In sum, ontology provides an interculturally shared "inside," whereas epistemology divides it into as many "insides" as there are different civilizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, for which the focus is an intellectual autobiography, examines the development of worldview of a young person who graduated from the Moscow University Faculty of Philosophy in 1970. It highlights the main socially significant events of those times, events that determined the formation of the sociopolitical views of youth who did not accept Soviet ideology. It presents the reading circles and interactions of that period and tells of the outstanding Russian philosophers of the 1960s–1970s under whose influence this professional development took place. It considers the main topics of the key scholarship in philosophy, as well as the dynamics of research interests and problems. Particular attention is paid to the story of the originality of work by the Moscow Methodological Circle, led by Georgy P. Shchedrovitsky. The circle's main task was to put all acts of reasoning and mental operations—naming, defining, describing, building ontological models and theoretical constructions, and so forth—under reflexive control. This was, to some extent, reminiscent of the inquiries of Western analytical philosophy, which made it a "suspicious" activity in the ideological sense in the Soviet Union. Cognition as a whole no longer seemed a "reflection" of reality, as had been proclaimed in the leading epistemological understanding of Marxist–Leninist philosophy. However, this also reflected the desire of intellectuals of the sixties and seventies to rationalize all social life as a whole. These dreams of "rationality" manifested at the time in the development of relevant topics in disciplines such as epistemology, in philosophy and methodology of science, and in sociological and psychological research. The author tells how the discussions of methodological problems of historical reconstruction began from positions like these. The discussion of discourse on knowledge in the humanities required not only intellectual audacity but social audacity as well. These discussions took place in informal, home-based seminars and represented a marginal, "clandestine" phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two philosophical tools are used in this article, namely (1) that of philosophical-pluralism and (2) transcendent pluralism as a kind of glue to enhance our examining of creative pluralism. There is a diversity implant in positive modus of understanding this pluralistic pristine of creative pluralism within transcendence modus. To help facilitate this pluralistic pristine, the author makes use of three constructivist paradigms that are distinguished and used, namely (1) exogenous constructivism (rooted in a mechanistic metaphor) emphasising the reconstruction of structures preformed in the environment; (2) endogenous constructivism (rooted in an organismic metaphor) emphasising the coordination of previous organismic structures and (3) dialectical constructivism (rooted in a contextualistic metaphor) emphasising the construction of new structures out of organism and environmental interaction. Contribution: The aim of this article is to present a coherent metatheory by specifying the boundary conditions in which each root metaphor (constructive pluralism) best applies. These above-mentioned versions of pluralism as tools are a reminiscence and a jubilee of the efforts made by sapiens through diversity onto or into pluralism to enable the religious hamlet to think and share. This pluralistic approach of orientation, I hope, will empower sapiens in their respective hamlets to define, articulate and designate to enhance their own epistemological and ontological vantage points wherefrom their individual, coherent and contextual ways of thinking, acting and projecting their lives in a positive modus by emphasising the reconstructions of their performance in their environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores parallels between the morphological thought of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the structuralism of Claude Lévi‐Strauss, and the formalism of Vladimir Propp, with emphasis on the manner in which each of these three thinkers adopts an "epistemological attitude" critical of, and external to, conventional philosophical discourse. The core commonality between them lies in their skepticism about the separability of the ideal from the real, and in the seeking of meaning within the observable constitutive structures of a phenomenon rather than any noumenal essence. The first part of the article examines the way Goethe and Lévi‐Strauss negotiate the relation between abstract thought and concrete observation; the second part turns to the way Lévi‐Strauss and Propp negotiate that question within the context of twentieth‐century social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Transdisciplinary research and generalist practice both face the task of integrating and discerning the value of knowledge across disciplinary and sectoral knowledge cultures. Transdisciplinarity and generalism also both offer philosophical and practical insights into the epistemology, ontology, axiology, and logic of seeing the 'whole'. Although generalism is a skill that can be used in many settings from industry to education, the focus of this paper is the literature of the primary care setting (i.e., general practice or family medicine). Generalist philosophy and practice in the family medicine setting highly values whole person care that uses integrative and interpretive wisdom to include both biomedical and biographical forms of knowledge. Generalist researchers are often caught between reductionist (positivist) biomedical measures and social science (post‐positivist) constructivist theories of knowing. Neither of these approaches, even when juxtaposed in mixed‐methods research, approximate the complexity of the generalist clinical encounter. A theoretically robust research methodology is needed that acknowledges the complexity of interpreting these ways of knowing in research and clinical practice. Methods: A conceptual review of literature to define the alignment between (a) the philosophy and practice of generalism in primary care and (b) both the practical (Zurich) and philosophical or methodological (Nicolescuian) schools of transdisciplinarity. Results: The alignment between generalism and transdisciplinarity included their broad scope, relational process, complex knowledge management, humble attitude to knowing, and real‐world outcome focus. Conclusion: The concurrence between these approaches to knowing is offered here as Transdisciplinary Generalism – a coherent epistemology for both primary care researchers and generalist clinicians to understand, enact, and research their own sophisticated craft of managing diverse forms of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to be a point of convergence in two areas of relevance to the human sciences: psychology and philosophy. This is achieved through the presentation of a methodological proposal that allows the unveiling of the epistemological assumptions present in the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents. The general theoretical context of the proposal is based on the philosophy of psychology. This focuses on the investigation of the philosophical foundations of psychology. Such foundations can be diverse: ethical, aesthetic, logical, semantic, ontological or epistemological, the latter being central to the development of the proposal. Within the philosophy of psychology, a particular line of research is developed that is theoretically situated in an area of philosophy - epistemology - and in an area of psychology - psychotherapy -, converging in the epistemology of psychotherapy, which grants the particular framework. The epistemology of psychotherapy focuses on the study and critical reflection of the foundations of knowledge in the psychotherapeutic discipline. Research from this line has been approached mainly from three perspectives: (1) from the client, as a personal structure, (2) from the process, as a branch of scientific psychology and (3) from the representations of the psychotherapist. This article proposes the development of a fourth perspective: one that is centered on theories, or in other words, on the epistemological assumptions present in the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents. This task is seen pending in the literature, so an analysis model is proposed that allows uncovering such assumptions in the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents. The foundation of the proposal lies around its epistemological relevance, relative to the construction of knowledge in psychotherapy and the study of the theories through which the reality of the client is known. It also has psychotherapeutic relevance, around the contribution that the epistemology of psychotherapy can give to studies on effectiveness in the discipline. Furthermore, it is presented consistent with the research interests of the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (STPP), division 24 of the American Psychological Association (APA). The central constructs of the model are: (1) the epistemological-type philosophical assumptions, which will be considered, in general, as the philosophical assumptions related to the study of the nature, scope and validity of human knowledge (rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, positivism, positivism logical, phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical theory and configurationism, among others); and (2) the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents that will correspond to the psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioral, humanistic-existential and systemic approach, understood exclusively from their role in psychotherapy. For the unveiling of the epistemological assumptions present in the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents, a methodological proposal is developed based on the analogical hermeneutics of Mauricio Beuchot. This converges into a model of analysis, or interpretative network, that allows us to uncover such assumptions by elaborating a hermeneutical question, a hermeneutical answer, and a series of interpretative arguments that support it. Finally, an example of the application of the model around the humanist-existential current is presented in order to clarify its development and implementation. By way of closing, some reflections are presented around (1) the challenges and implications in the psychotherapeutic practice of the proposal; (2) to the various research possibilities that can be generated with its application and; (3) to the contributions that philosophy can give to psychotherapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against usual interpretations, this article defends that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein presents a completely original and purely logical, not at all epistemological, argument in defense of the truth of the solipsist answer to the philosophical question of the relation between thought, language and world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In psychology, where a natural science epistemology holds sway, relationships between the researcher and the researched are usually hierarchical and transactional, bound in procedural and legal ethics. This limited view of ethics fails to account for issues of power and privilege, as well as inequalities in economic and sociocultural structures. We argue for a more complete philosophy of science (and practice) consisting of complementary first principles—relational ethics and epistemology. Valuing relational ethics as a first principle means that how knowledge is produced and acted on is complementary in importance with what knowledge is produced. Collaborative relationships grounded in sincerity, reciprocity, and shared purpose become the basis for how psychological knowledge is produced, disseminated, and acted upon. We present two case studies to show how taking action in an ethical manner through relationships formed in the process of doing psychology deepens our conception and practice of psychology as human science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last decades it has been common to assert—especially in the field of science and religion—that the aims characteristic of religious practice determine the norms we should employ when evaluating its normative status. However, until now, this issue has not been properly investigated by paying attention to contemporary metanormative research. In this article, I critically examine how different popular theories of normativity relate to the proposed normative significance of the aims characteristic of religious practice. I argue that whether or not, and in what way exactly, the aims characteristic of religious practice are normatively significant is highly dependent both on controversial issues concerning the nature of religion, and on a number of controversial metanormative issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about Latin American philosophy. The main objective is to rebuild the philosophy of Arturo Andrés Roig. This philosopher helps us to reconstruct discourses in a emancipatory way. Latin American philosophy, not only allows us to investigate from an epistemological and political perspective the facts of our present, but also enables us to read our past from our present, because that is the greatest challenge of our author, analyze the contemporary world from Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of Dark Knowledge, an epistemology that acknowledges both alternative knowledge and ways of knowing which are cognizant of the moral and ethical positioning of each. Design/methodology/approach: This is a conceptual paper that uses existing relevant literature to develop the work. The paper uses a four-stage literature search process and draws upon a range of disciplines, including philosophy, computer science and information management, to underpin the evolution of the concept. Findings: As a conceptual paper, no empirical findings are presented. Instead, the paper presents an embryonic model of Dark Knowledge and identifies a number of characteristics, which may be used to explore the concept in more detail. Research limitations/implications: There is a clear need to develop a body of empirical work, adding to the theoretical perspectives presented in this paper. It is anticipated that this paper will provide one of the cornerstones for future studies in this area. Originality/value: The paper makes an original contribution to the study of information behaviours, practices and epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to J. Aaron Simmons' concerns that James K.A. Smith's methodology for confessional pentecostal philosophy prohibits philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other. Its responses specifically address Simmons' proposed personal methodology and his two main concerns about Smith's methodology: (1) confessional philosophy allows an encroachment of theology into philosophy that threatens the autonomy of philosophy; and (2) confessional philosophy discourages philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other, and promotes insularity and defensiveness by utilizing theologically determinate evidence that act as incommensurable authority structures. The first section of this paper exposits Simmons' other works that illumine the reasons for his concern. Specifically, it identifies Simmons' Thomistic view of reason and new phenomenology's commitment to the hypothetical status of God-talk as the reasons for Simmons' opposition to Smith's confessional philosophical method. After clarifying Simmons' own position, the second section addresses Simmons' concerns that confessional philosophy promotes epistemic arrogance, defensiveness, and dialogical insularity. Moreover, it provides five responses to Simmons' concern that confessional philosophy utilizes incommensurate authority structures and that it threatens philosophy's autonomy through the incursion of theology. The paper concludes with a reflection on the current state and future of pentecostal philosophy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentary provides contextual information about the seminar which Bourdieu and Passeron gave in the École Normale Supérieure on 6 December 1963. It appears that the intended series of seminars was curtailed, perhaps because the initial seminar of 6 December exposed the extent to which Althusser was formally managing the intentions of his guest speakers and resisting the implications of their ongoing research on students and their studies. The commentary argues that the conflict between Althusser and Bourdieu/Passeron was inter-generational in that Althusser's attitudes had been shaped by his experience as a victim of Nazi oppression whereas those of Bourdieu/Passeron were defined, instead, by their unwilling participation in the French colonial oppression of indigenous Algerians. Althusser was intent on examining philosophically the validity of various contemporary versions of social science whereas Bourdieu and Passeron were engaged in educational research which was scrutinizing sociologically the validity of precisely this supposedly detached philosophical perspective. In short, the commentary is aligned with the Bourdieu/Passeron position in that it seeks to offer an historical sociology of the encounter of December 1963. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The investigation on how we think and build knowledge has always been central to philosophy. Several theories have already suggested the influence of dominant class and language power on how societies reproduce unjust, inefficient, and even unsustainable ideas and concepts from the environmental and future generations' point of view. In an unprecedented way and seeking to update the debate, this article focuses on two reflections from different contexts on this theme. It aims to verify the pertinence in assigning to a same type of epistemology the dialectic of knowledge and the cognitive history, proposed, respectively, by Caio Prado Júnior and Jeremy Lent. The choice to compare the ideas of the two authors - the first with a work published in 1963 in Brazil and the second in 2017 in the United States - is due to the similarity of some of its background formulations while starting from very different perspectives. In order to reach the announced goal, this work presents a comparative study between both propositions. At the end, it is emphasized that, despite the differences, both authors denounce bias of gnosiology and indicate that the most appropriate approach for the knowledge construction must contemplate the interaction between subject and object of thought as a complex, systemic and relational process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The difference between theology and philosophy is usually marked by the distinction between faith and reason. Paul Ricoeur does not ignore this epistemological difference between these two schools of thought, but he insightfully proposes that the connection between reason and faith must be preceded by the relationship between reason and hope. Hope represents the point of encounter between these two areas of thoughts in the way that it portrays the scope of theological and philosophical investigation. Therefore, the present article aims to articulate the basic components of this perspective of hope as a theological and philosophical horizon. Overall, the scope of hope does not only reaffirm the limits of reason in theology and philosophy, but also highlights the possibilities of reasoning, which emerged through this encounter between theology and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Be problematized and questioned the epistemology by fly a universal true knowledge (episteme) focused on the "investigator", favoring the subject-object relationship, unaware of the knowledge of the "investigated". Intends to set up a philosophy that focuses on the subject relationship, i.e. between a me with another me recognize and make visible the knowledge of the other colonized and subalternizado, their situated knowledge (sophies), thus emerging othersophy as one epistemology "other", one way to "other" to know and love. We characterized the othersophy as a substrate decolonial do, which unfolds through its constituent actions/footprints: see communal, talking alterative and reflect configurative, which characterized the vocation decolonial, allowing the detachment of the research methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an important and fairly straightforward link between necessity and apriority which can shed light on our knowledge of the former, but initially plausible attempts to spell out what it is fall victim to counterexamples. Casullo (2003) discusses one such proposal, argues—following Anderson (Philosophical Topics 21(2):1-20, (1993))—that it fails, and suggests an alternative. In this paper, I argue that Casullo's alternative also fails, before making a suggestion for which I can find no counterexamples and which, notably, handles some recent examples due to Kipper and Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding (to name a few). These are states it's thought good to be in and it's also said that we aim or want to be in them. It is then sometimes claimed that these sorts of thoughts about epistemic goods or values ground or explain our epistemic norms. For instance, we think subjects should follow their evidence when they form their beliefs. But why should they? Why not believe against the evidence or ignore it completely in deciding what to believe? Here's a compelling sort of answer: because epistemic subjects are or ought to be trying to know more and following their evidence is a means to that end or to fulfilling that obligation. In this paper I argue that this compelling thought cannot be right. Subjects who are trying to know more will regularly fail to conform to some of our most familiar epistemic norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy and religion can synthesize a comprehensive worldview and penetrate into otherwise inaccessible areas of transcendent science. The task of science is to deal with natural revelations; that of religion, to deal with the supernatural and the religious cult. Philosophy explores both. Only in conjunction with philosophy, can religion answer the question: Why is there anything at all? What's the point of life? Only philosophy can indicate the place of man in the hierarchy of being. Religion needs the achievements of science and philosophy in order to create a holistic, mentally integrated, view of the world. Science is an endless path without final results. It deals only with external experience. It is divided into sectors and can not cover the world globally, and the scientist excludes him/herself as a subject from the cognitive process. A worldview is a personal position that can be shared by others, but another’s worldview is never identical to mine. Worldview deals with questions like, “man, God and the world”; spirit, matter, soul and body; value assessments; a picture of the world; business and ethical positions – what to DO and what NOT to do; existentially significant personal values and ontological truths: What is the point of existence? What is the fate of the person and the world, is there a path for man after death? Ideology is a social, class, caste or group position based on the interests of group members. The philosophy of religion is reflected in religion as an object. Religious philosophy is an independent direction of study and develops complete systems in synchronicity or diachronicity with theology. The basic principle of the relationship between philosophy and theology, between religion and science is that the two represent correlative but different sets of non-conducible, inalienable nonformal elements, which include respective worldviews, logic, methods, languages, value systems. Thus, philosophy based on the principle of dialectical logic (the third as an ontologically preset truth and the epistemological peak in knowledge and thinking) is the substance-subject that is the truth of both, taking them to the level of its own elements, or is a common subject of two contradictory predicates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the question of which properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. According to conservatives, only low-level properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Liberals, on the other hand, claim that high-level properties, such as natural kind properties, artifacts, and even moral properties, can figure in the contents of perceptual experience. I defend a novel argument in favor of liberalism, the Epistemic Argument, which hinges on two crucial claims. The first is that many perceptual experiences of even neurotypical human beings can justify beliefs in high-level properties without providing justification for their low-level constituents. The second claim, roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p, other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction of the analytical method to the field of the philosophy of education led to a first golden age, which, as the method closed in on itself and isolated itself from educational reality, resulted in an epistemological and institutional crisis. In view of that crisis, the generations following that first period began a lively debate on how to move forward. This article, with the aim of considering the positions proposed, derives from this latter scenario. Its method is characterized by two basic elements. The first is a systematic review of all articles on philosophy of education by the main authors in the discipline. The second is a hermeneutic exercise that attempts to compose a unitary discourse combining the main sensitivities of all of them. This results in the identification of five notable groups that differ mainly in the relationship that philosophy of education must maintain with educational practice and, consequently, in how the philosopher's exercise of education should be considered. This leads into a discussion about whether it is possible to consider all of these positions as integral parts of a whole that seeks to understand the phenomenon of education and improve it overall instead of regarding them as parts in themselves. If there is one reasonably clear conclusion, it is that it seems unlikely that a unifying perspective like the analytical one will reappear and that a dynamic of reciprocal dialogical relations is necessary as a new emerging paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]