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Die Studie versucht, Husserls Modell einer nicht-wissenschaftlichen Lebenswelt für pädagogische Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Technik und Bildung in der verwissenschaftlichen Welt zu öffnen. Sie diskutiert Entwicklungsprobleme der Spätmoderne unter pluralen Fragestellungen und führt Ansätze und Traditionen zusammen, die unterschiedliche Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der modernen Bildungstheorie beschritten haben. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, wie moderne Technik einerseits als lebensweltliche Entfremdung des Menschen problematisiert und andererseits als Produkt menschlicher Freiheit und Weltgestaltung gewürdigt werden kann. In vier Kapiteln werden die methodischen Ansätze und Antworten vorgestellt, die der Philosoph und Pädagoge Eugen Fink (1905–1975), der Philosoph Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), der Philosoph und Erziehungswissenschaftler Theodor Litt (1880–1962) und der Soziologe Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Bildung und Technik gegeben haben. Im Durchgang durch ihre Positionen wird ein Konzert erarbeitet, dessen Originalität darin liegt, Abstimmungsprobleme von Bildung, Technik und Lebenswelt aus postdualistischer, praxistheoretischer sowie posthumanistischer Perspektive zu thematisieren., The study attempts to open Husserl's model of a non-scientific lifeworld for pedagogical investigations of the relationship between technology and “Bildung” in the scientific world. It discusses developmental problems of late modernity under plural questions and brings together approaches and traditions that have taken different paths to the further development of modern “Bildungs”-theory. The central question is how modern technology can be problematized on the one hand as the alienation of human beings from the world of life and on the other hand be appreciated as a product of human freedom and the shaping of the world. Four chapters present the methodological approaches and answers that philosopher and educator Eugen Fink (1905–1975), philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), philosopher and educationalist Theodor Litt (1880–1962), and sociologist Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) have given to the question of the relationship between education and technology. In the course of their positions, a concert will be developed whose originality lies in addressing the coordination problems of “Bildung” (education), “Technik” (technology) and “Lebenswelt” (lifeworld) from a post-dualist, praxis-theoretical as well as post-humanist perspective.

The text is a review study of Tomáš Koblížek’s book. After an introductory summary of the book, we discuss three main issues: 1) the simplistic conception of Edmund Husserl’s “phenomenology of speech”, 2) the insufficient analysis of basic concepts, especially language as “expression”, 3) the adoption and emphasis of the disjunctive conception of two ways of seeing speech — original and scientific — in the wake of H. Pos. We argue that it is the third issue in particular that undermines the final section of the book, which introduces the conceptual dimension of speech. In Koblížek’s conception, the theorization of ethics becomes possible only by returning to an “originary” consciousness of language and is incompatible with a scientific stance. We suggest that, in our view, the contradiction is not so strong and a merger of the two is — even in the spirit of the “Saussurean postulates” — possible.

The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl’s work, bind together our shared social world (“the spiritual world”) with shared intentionality. It is claimed that, by sharing experiences, persons create social reasons and that these reasons impose a normative structure on the social world. Because there are two ways in which persons can share experiences (depending on whether these experiences rest on mutual communication or on group’s identity), social normativity comes in two kinds. It is either directed (it has an addressee) or it is collective or absolute (it applies to all group members). Social normativity should be distinguished from axiological normativity: The first is grounded in shared intentionality, the second in values.

Pojam ritma u opusu Stephanea Mallarméa zauzima specifičnu poziciju na kojoj se prelamaju gotovo sve najizazovnije pjesnikove ideje. Slijedeći nit koju nam taj pojam pruža, u prvom se koraku utvrđuju paralele između Mallarméovih estetskih postulata i Husserlove fenomenologije. U drugom koraku, paralela Husserl – Mallarmé služi kao matrica za razumijevanje nekih temeljnih paradoksa Derridaove dekonstrukcije. Pokazat će se kako je i Derrida bio u potrazi za određenim, osebujnim ritmom. U trećem koraku bit će pokazano kako je od Mallarméa, preko Derridaove razrade, ritam (ritam pojavnosti i ritam stiha, ritam riječi i ritam bjeline) postao jednom od diskretnih, ali najradikalnijih teorijskih premisa nekih od najvažnijih filozofa postmoderne: Agambena, Kristeve, Rancièrea, Nancyja., The notion of rhythm in the works of Stephane Mallarmé has a specific position upon which all the poet’s most taunting ideas refract. Following the line this notion opens, in the first step established are the parallels between Mallarmé’s aesthetic postulates and Husserl’s phenomenology. In the second step, the Husserl – Mallarmé parallel serves as a matrix for understanding some basic paradoxes of Derrida’s deconstruction. It will be shown that Derrida, too, was in search of a specific, distinctive rhythm. In the third step, it will be shown how from Mallarmé, over Derrida’s workthrough, the rhythm (rhythm of appearance and rhythm of verse, rhythm of words and rhythm of whiteness) became one of the discrete, but most radical theoretical premises among some of the most influential philosophers of the postmodern: Agamben, Kristeva, Rancière, Nancy.

U »Bečkom predavanju« čitava je povijest svijeta u jednom trenutku naslikana u alegoriji valovitog mora bez obala. U Ideji fenomenologije se filozof-pripovjedač zatekao usred nemirnog mora, ali na kraju uspijeva »baciti kotvu na obalu fenomenologije«. S probojem na »kopno apsolutnih danosti« putem fenomenološke redukcije, alegorijsko prikazivanje trebalo je konačno izgubiti svoje filozofsko opravdanje. Međutim, metafore koje prizivaju alegorije nastavljaju bujati čak i u najstrožim fenomenološkim deskripcijama. No, usprkos svojoj inherentnoj metaforičnosti, tako živoj da se na ključnim točkama Husserlovih analiza često iznova pojavljuje mitski sukob zemlje i mora, fenomenološka interpretacija svijeta ipak u bitnom smislu nije alegorična., In the “Vienna lecture”, the whole of the world’s history is at one moment depicted through the allegory of a wavy sea without borders. In The Idea of Phenomenology, the philosopherstoryteller is caught up in a heavy sea, but at the end, they finally manage to “drop the anchor on the shore of phenomenology”. With the break into the “mainland of absolute givenness” through phenomenological reduction, allegorical representation should lose its philosophical justification. However, metaphors which evoke allegories continue to proliferate even in the most rigorous phenomenological descriptions. Despite its inherent metaphoricity, so vivid that at the crucial points of Husserl’s analyses often reappears a mythical clash of land and sea, the phenomenological interpretation of the world seems nonetheless essentially non-allegorical.

This article focuses on the issue of the Other/Alien within the conceptual and aesthetic paradigm of modernism. In the context of modernistic ideas, the author analyses the philosophy of dialogue and phenomenological views on the Other as represented in the intellectual heritage of the twentieth century. Taking into consideration these ideas, the author discusses three mainstream aspects of the Other/Alien in Russian modernist literature: 1) mythological tradition, which provokes the image of the enemy through the image of the Other; 2) Romantic tradition of the double (doppelganger), and 3) philosophical / phenomenological notion of the body, which views personality as “me/Self” and “my body”. Conceptual analysis of these aspects is provided with reference to poetic texts by Alexander Blok, Innokenty Annensky, and Osip Mandelstam. The author stresses the conventionality of such a division, on the one hand, and the influence of the analysed aspects of the Other/Alien onto the conceptual system of Postmodernism. Modernism in European culture, in contrast to other historical periods, is characterised primarily by the fact that many of its ideas and concepts were only proclaimed, but not presented in the form of complete theoretical concepts/systems. In this sense, modernism turned out to be open to the future, which allows us to call it an “uncompleted project” (Jürgen Habermas). Previous eras offered solutions to important existential problems in the form of complete philosophical systems (Immanuel Kant or Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel), ideas or concepts (Kant’s concept of “eternal peace” and a moral imperative, Hegel’s idea of state and law). Modernism, influenced by the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, destroyed the systematic nature of thinking, doubted traditional morality, and offered paradoxical solutions to many problems in the form of conceptual questions, which are discussed to this day. One of these uncompleted modernist projects was the concept of the Other/Alien, discussions about which have been going on for over a century., В статье рассмотрена проблема другого / чужого в идейно-эстетической парадигме модернизма. В контексте модернистских идей проанализирована философия диалога и феноменологические проекты Другого в гуманитарном мышлении ХХ в. На этом фоне предложены интерпретации трех магистральных аспектов другого / чужого в модернизме: 1) мифологическая традиция, которая через образ Другого провоцирует образ врага; 2) романтическая традиция двойничества; 3) философская / феноменологическая традиция телесности, в контексте которой личность рассматривается как Я и «мое тело». Анализ идейного смысла этих аспектов предложен на примере поэтических произведений Александра Блока, Иннокентия Анненского и Осипа Мандельштама. В статье также подчеркнута, с одной стороны, условность такого разделения рассматриваемой проблемы на три аспекта, а с другой стороны — влияние анализируемых аспектов другого / чужого на культуру постмодернизма. Модернизм в европейской культуре в отличие от других культурно-исторических эпох характеризуется прежде всего тем, что многие его идеи и концепты были только провозглашены, но не представлены в виде законченных теоретических концепций / систем. В этом смысле модернизм оказался открытым для будущего, что позволяет назвать его «незавершенным проектом» (Ю. Хабермас). Предыдущие эпохи предлагали решения важных экзистенциальных проблем в виде законченных философских систем (И. Кант или Г. В. Ф. Гегель), идей или концептов (идея «вечного мира» и моральный императив у И. Канта, идея государства и права у Г. В. Ф. Гегеля). Модернизм под влиянием философии Ф. Ницше разрушал системность мышления, сомневался в традиционной морали и предложил парадоксальные решения многих проблем в виде вопросов-концептов, о которых мы размышляем и дискутируем до сегодняшнего дня. Одним из таких незавершенных модернистских проектов была концепция другого / чужого, вокруг которой уже более ста лет продолжаются дискуссии.

With the aim of showing what it takes to see the world and others as they are, this article provides a phenomenological account of what Iris Murdoch has memorably called “the work of attention.” I first show that Aron Gurwitsch’s analyses of attention provide a basis on which to reject a voluntaristic account of attention according to which seeing things as they are is as simple as directing one’s attention to something. Then, in order to elucidate the work that is involved in paying attention, I draw on Edmund Husserl’s descriptions of the activity characteristic of attentive consciousness. I then show how a Husserlian account of the work of attention can help make sense of Murdoch’s pessimistic claim that our consciousness is not “a transparent glass through which it views the world” while also indicating how we, by paying attention, can do better.

This article examines the relation between two key, but seemingly opposed concepts in Jan Patočka’s thought: epoché and the concrete institutional polis. In doing so it attempts to elucidate the inextricable relation between phenomenology and politics in the work of the Czech philosopher, and illustrate more broadly the possibilities for approaching the political from a phenomenological perspective. The article provides a phenomenological interpretation of “care for the soul” as closely linked to Patočka’s reformulation of the core phenomenological notion of epoché. It argues that in Patočka’s work, the epoché, traditionally conceived as a radical stepping back from the world must be rendered differently, not only as a negative freedom, but as the foundation of positive politics. Thus, the authors argue that there is a thematic and conceptual continuity between Patočka’s phenomenological studies and his political work.

I deal with the issue of the environmental crisis from the perspective of a phenomenologically embedded qualitative social ontology. The first point I make is that our environment is a «personal world», and not a «naturalistic world»: a world that is experienced in the «personalistic attitude» and as such is an ontologically qualitative world, in which both natural and social entities are given to us as essentially constituted by value-qualities and meanings, and not as merely material things. The second point I argue for is that our environment is also a «common-surrounding world» whose personal collectives are its essential correlate: «common-surrounding world» and personal collectives existentially depend on one another, and human persons, both individual and collective, are responsible for the existence of their environment and its entities. I apply the tools of phenomenological eidetics to the ideas of «personal world» and «common-surrounding world», and inquire into the ontologically qualitative implications that they have for our environment and its crisis.

This paper turns to the concept of constitution and some to it more immediately related notions contained in R. Carnap's Aufbau and Husserl's works that might have had some influence there, in order to find similarities and differences between them. It hopefully will contribute to this assessment of the plausible hypothesis, recently raised in the literature, of an influence of the father of phenomenology not explicitly sufficiently credited in Aufbau. The argumentative strategy was to expose, firstly in a separate way, the relevant points in each strand and then to make the comparative examination. This first analysis took place by two general aspects, namely, to address, on the one hand, the very relation of constitution and what is a system of it and, given the implicated foundationalism attributed to such notion, the data which are at the base of system like this. Then I move on to examine the differences and similarities between such expositions. As result, similarities were observed in that the two of them imply a broader thesis of foundationalism; they propose, in this, to an encompassing system. In addition, they contend that the fact that there is a difference between a lower-level object and a higher-level object does not imply between them mereological composition or some necessary commonality of properties. However, there are also differences regarding the kind of relationship that the notions of constituting imply in each case. Distinctions were also found about the role of sensations in each system; but in that sense, there is, in both perspectives, also similarities concerning their status. The paper concludes with the notion that there must be husserlian influences in the Aufbau not sufficiently credited. However, it is unreasonable the diagnosis of extreme importance of Husserl's influence.

En el presente artículo proponemos un abordaje de los análisis en torno al cuerpo en trabajos fundamentales de Husserl y Heidegger, a partir de una distinción de diferencias y continuidades. Buscaremos demostrar que las especificaciones de la corporeidad de Heidegger remiten a una aclaración del entramado comprensivo y de significación en el que también se hallan articulados los análisis fenomenológicos de su maestro. Para ello, en primer lugar, especificaremos las consideraciones de Husserl sobre la corporalidad y la inter-corporalidad, distinguiendo su perspectiva gnoseológica y ética. Luego, dedicaremos un apartado a las aclaraciones de Heidegger en la década de 1920 y otro, a sus descripciones específicas en sus seminarios de la década de 1960, donde desarrolla el carácter ontológico de la corporeidad. Finalmente, analizaremos algunas implicancias relativas a estas tematizaciones, distinguiendo sus enfoques y orientaciones comprensivas sobre el cuerpo., In the present article we propose an approach of the analyses around the body in fundamental works of Husserl and Heidegger, from a distinction of differences and continuities. We will try to demonstrate that the specifications of Heidegger’s corporeality refer to a clarification of the comprehensive and meaningful framework in which the phenomenological analyses of his teacher are also articulated. For this, first, we will specify Husserl’s considerations on corporality and inter-corporality, distinguishing his gnoseological and ethical perspective. Then, we will devote a section to Heidegger’s explanations in the 1920s and another, to his specific descriptions in his seminars of the 1960s, where he develops the ontological character of corporeality. Finally, we will analyze some implications related to these thematizations, distinguishing their comprehensive approaches and orientations about the body., Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology has caused puzzlement because of the lack of clarity with which he treats the transcendental turn in Appearance and Sense (1914). I suggest that we find a more comprehensive discussion on the topic in Shpet’s 1917 article, “Wisdom or Reason?” There, Shpet reacts to Husserl’s treatment of a cluster of problems related to the latter’s transition to transcendental idealism. I read “Wisdom or Reason?” not only in relation to Husserl’s Logos article of 1911, but also to his 1907 lecture series “The Idea of Phenomenology.” My analysis of Shpet’s phenomenology reveals that he followed through with the transcendental turn, although his philosophy developed in a direction different from Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Shpet postulates a collective consciousness, in which meaning-constitution takes place, and discovers the “word” as the foundation for any cognition. Shpet’s phenomenology remains ontological, as he considers language or culture as the “form of being” in which human beings live. In “Wisdom or Reason?,” Shpet argues that we can have direct knowledge of this meaningful reality: being is not “represented” but “presented” in a word. A certain compatibility thus exists between Shpet’s phenomenology of cultural reality and Husserl’s search for the absolute validity of knowledge.

The aim of this paper is to explore the theme of history in Husserl’s phenomenology, a theme to which he had a complex relation. While in his programmatic text, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, he opposed himself to the so-called “historicism” of some of his contemporaries, claiming that it leads to relativism, he later in his career sought to incorporate historical reflections into the core of the phenomenological method. The challenge, then, is to understand, or perhaps to reconcile, the tension between Husserl’s early anti-historicism and his later turn toward history and historical reflections. By highlighting some of the key points in the development of his phenomenology, such as the distinction between static and genetic analysis, this tension is shown to be nothing but apparent. By expanding the scope of his notion of essences to also include motivations, origins, and ideals, the later Husserl gives to phenomenology a fundamentally historical and temporal dimension. A central component in this development, it is argued, is the notion of sense-reflection (Besinnung), connecting phenomenology both to historical and ethical concerns. In later texts such as Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, sense-reflection is used in a variety of contexts: as indicating the retrieval of historically lost meaning (such as that within the sciences); as indicating the Socratic ethos of self-knowledge (Selbstbesinnung); and lastly, as indicating the process of performing the phenomenological reduction. Ultimately, according to Husserl, only by engaging in historical sense-reflections can phenomenology become a truly rigorous science, seeking to clarify the meaning of science as an intersubjective project aiming toward the realization of human rationality and reason.

RESUMO Este texto discute alguns problemas metodológicos e históricos concernentes à fenomenologia da consciência de imagem (Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins) elaborada por Edmund Husserl e algumas de suas repercussões teóricas. Primeiramente será tematizado o escopo mais amplo em que a abordagem filosófica das imagens auferiu relevância no século XX, a saber, a assim chamada “virada icônica” (ikonische Wenke) ou “pictórica” (pictorial turn), conforme as respectivas formulações de Gottfried Boehm e William Mitchell. Será situada nesse contexto a fenomenologia da imagem e, mais especificamente, a fenomenologia da consciência de imagem elaborada por Husserl, considerando-se, em especial, os eixos norteadores dos três direcionamentos que sobressaem nas teorias contemporâneas da imagem, a saber: as abordagens antropológica, semiótica e perceptiva. A partir da retomada de nuances semióticas remanescentes na fenomenologia da consciência de imagem, serão apresentados alguns pontos críticos acerca da classificação das análises de Husserl no escopo do direcionamento perceptivo e, finalmente, apontadas implicações do copertencimento à apresentação intuitiva da imagem (anschaulicher Darstellung des Bildes) daquilo que se denominará “circunstancialidade indicativa”. ABSTRACT This text addresses some methodological and historical problems concerning the phenomenology of image consciousness (Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins) elaborated by Edmund Husserl as well as some of its theoretical repercussions. At first, I examine the broader scope in which the philosophical approach to images became relevant in the 20th century, the so-called “iconic turn” (ikonische Wenke) or “pictorial turn”, according to the respective terms proposed by Gottfried Boehm and William Mitchell. In this context I situate the phenomenology of image and, more specifically, the phenomenology of image consciousness elaborated by Husserl, considering, in particular, the guiding axes of three directions that stand out in contemporary theories of image, namely: the anthropological, the semiotic and the perceptual approach. By the resumption of semiotic nuances remaining in the phenomenology of image consciousness I present some critical points about the classification of Husserl’s analyses in the scope of perceptual approach. Finally, I point out some implications of the co-belonging to the intuitive image presentation (anschaulicher Darstellung des Bildes) of what can be called “indicative circumstantiality”.

The phenomenon of the body has been neglected or placed lower in the hierarchy of importance for the almost entire philosophical tradition. This is especially noticeable in the problems of modern dualism, which struggled to reconcile the gap between the soul and the body. Although placed in the lowest position on the ontological scale, the phenomenon of the body played a very important role in Ancient Greek philosophy, especially in poetics and praxis philosophy. German idealism, which, led by Hegel, tries to overcome modern dualism and adopt classical ancient dialectics, reaffirms the important role of the phenomenon of the body, showing its mediating place both in the field of theoretical truths and in the field of objective spirit. Although contemporary philosophy departed from idealistic logic, this paper emphasizes how the phenomenological method led by Husserl also affirmed the phenomenon of the body. By distinguishing between the perceptual (Gegenwärtigung) and the imaginary consciousness (Vergegenwärtigung), Husserl allows us to approach the phenomenon of the body in different ways, also showing its independence in the field of aesthetics. This made an influence on structuralist tradition, especially Rancière, who develops the idea of the free field of praxis through the notion of the sensible which represents the mediating role of the body and conceives of the sphere of aesthetics as a free regime., Fenomen tijela zanemarivan je i stavljan u najniže hijerarhijske razmjere kroz gotovo čitavu filozofsku tradiciju. To je posebno uočljivo u problemima modernoga dualizma, koji je imao metodološke teškoće prilikom pomirenja jaza između duše i tijela. Iako smješten najniže na ontološkoj ljestvici, fenomen tijela u antičkoj je filozofiji igrao značajnu ulogu, posebno u poetičkoj i praktičkoj filozofiji. Njemački idealizam koji, na čelu s Hegelom, pokušava prevladati suvremeni dualizam i usvojiti klasičnu antičku dijalektiku, ponovno potvrđuje važnu ulogu tjelesnog fenomena pokazujući njegovo posredničko mjesto kako na polju teorijskih istina, tako i na polju objektivnoga duha. Iako je suvremena filozofija napravila pomak od idealističke logike, ovaj članak naglašava da je fenomenološka metoda, čiji je osnivač Husserl, također afirmirala fenomen tijela. Razlikujući perceptivnu (Gegenwärtigung) i imaginacijsku (Vergegenwärtigung) svijest, Husserl nam omogućava pristup fenomenu tijela na različite načine, pokazujući njegovu neovisnost u polju estetike. To je utjecalo na strukturalističku tradiciju, posebno Rancièrea, koji razvija slobodno polje prakse kroz pojam senzibilnoga svijeta. Taj je pojam predstavljen na temelju medijacijske uloge tijela, čime se omogućuje polju estetike da se pojavi kao slobodan režim djelovanja., Das Phänomen des Körpers wurde für fast die gesamte philosophische Tradition ausgeklammert oder in der Bedeutungshierarchie nach unten geschoben. Dies macht sich vornehmlich in den Problemen des modernen Dualismus bemerkbar, der sich abmühte, die Kluft zwischen Seele und Körper zu überbrücken. Obgleich an unterster Stelle auf der ontologischen Skala platziert, spielte das Phänomen des Körpers eine sehr bedeutsame Rolle in der antiken griechischen Philosophie, insbesondere in der Poetik und Praxisphilosophie. Der deutsche Idealismus, der unter der Führung von Hegel danach trachtet, den modernen Dualismus zu überwinden und die klassische antike Dialektik anzunehmen, bekräftigt erneut die wichtige Rolle des Phänomens des Körpers, indem er dessen vermittelnde Stellung, sowohl auf dem Gebiet der theoretischen Wahrheiten als auch auf dem Gebiet des objektiven Geistes offenbart. Obwohl die zeitgenössische Philosophie von der idealistischen Logik abwich, kehrt dieser Aufsatz hervor, wie die von Husserl angeführte phänomenologische Methode auch das Phänomen des Körpers affirmierte. Durch die Distinktion zwischen dem perzeptiven (Gegenwärtigung) und dem imaginativen (Vergegenwärtigung) Bewusstsein ermöglicht uns Husserl eine Herangehensweise an das Phänomen des Körpers auf verschiedenen Wegen und zeigt desgleichen seine Unabhängigkeit in den Gefilden der Ästhetik. Dies nahm Einfluss auf die strukturalistische Tradition, insbesondere Rancière, der die Idee des freien Feldes der Praxis durch die Notion des Sinnlichen ausbaut, das die vermittelnde Rolle des Körpers darstellt, und die Sphäre der Ästhetik als freies Regime erscheinen lässt., Le phénomène du corps a été négligé et situé à un rang inférieur dans presque la totalité de la tradition philosophique. Cela est particulièrement visible parmi les problèmes du dualisme moderne, ce dernier s’efforçant à concilier le fossé entre l’esprit et le corps. Bien que placé à une position inférieure dans l’échelle ontologique, le phénomène du corps joue un rôle éminemment important dans la philosophie de la Grèce antique, particulièrement dans la poétique et la philosophie de la praxis. L’idéalisme allemand, qui, mené par Hegel, s’applique à dépasser ce dualisme et adopter la dialectique classique, réaffirme le rôle important du phénomène du corps en montrant la place médiatrice qu’il occupe, autant dans le domaine de la vérité théorique que dans celui de l’esprit objectif. Même si la philosophie contemporaine s’est éloignée de la logique idéaliste, ce travail souligne que la méthode phénoménologique, fondée par Hegel, affirme également le phénomène du corps. En distinguant la conscience perceptive (Gegenwärtigung) et la conscience imaginante (Vergegenwärtigung), Husserl nous permet d’aborder le phénomène du corps de différentes manières, en montrant également son indépendance dans le champ de l’esthétique. Cela a influencé la tradition structuraliste, et particulièrement Rancière, qui développe l’idée du champ libre de la praxis à travers la notion du sensible qui représente le rôle médiateur du corps et est conçu, dans la sphère de l’esthétique, comme un régime qui agit librement.

There is a distinctive wonder bordering on and awakening to the philosophy of religion within Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is not primarily a wonder directed to how things are or that they are, but rather the wonder connected to the most fundamental principle of transcendental phenomenology. That principle is the ancient principle of the convertibility of being with what is true or the inseparability of being and manifestation. Phenomenological wonder is primarily at the correlation of being as what is true or made manifest with consciousness. And yet there is an even more basic phenomenological wonder which founds this correlation, and that is the manifestness of first-person experience within which all other wonder emerges.

PTDC/FER-FIL/32042/2017 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0040 UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 Developed through a series of conceptual analyses (Edmund Husserl, Vilém Flusser, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin) and case studies (Fernando Lopes’s Belarmino and Jeff Wall’s Mimic), this article delves into the relationship between gesture, attunement and atmosphere and how it unfolds in photographic works dealing with urban space. The first section focuses on the role played by photography in the film Belarmino, which raises questions about both the representation of urban phenomena and issues related to expression and gesture in boxing. The second section discusses Husserl’s thinking on image consciousness and his surprising reference to a “photograph” of a boxer, which reveals the relevance of his phenomenological approach when it comes to defining the aesthetic properties of gesture-images. The third section examines the principles of Flusser’s philosophy of gestures, focusing on the semantic field of attunement and its connection with various elements related to photography, gesture, moods and affects. The question of gesture in photography—both the gestures of the photographed and those of the photographer—can be articulated with the notions of attunement and atmosphere, which go beyond semiological, psychological and communicational approaches and are important for our understanding of aesthetic and artistic experiences. Finally, if photography is a privileged way of studying atmospheres and gestures (as suggested by the Benjaminian notion of optical unconscious) and their connection with the inner life of the subject, in relation to urban space this study often acquires an intersubjective, social and political dimension, as in Jeff Wall’s Mimic. publishersversion published

RESUMEN La fenomenología es una corriente filosófica que nace en los albores del siglo XX y continúa hasta nuestros días, enmarcada en un proyecto que toma forma durante el primer cuarto del siglo pasado, se diversifica en el segundo y prosigue múltiples caminos a partir de la década 1950. Resulta, por tanto, imposible hablar de "la" fenomenología, y necesario, en cambio, referirnos a un "proyecto" fenomenológico. En este artículo, ofrecemos un acercamiento a los problemas generales, la metodología y las posibles aplicaciones de la filosofía fenomenológica. En un primer momento, se abordará el sentido del proyecto fenomenológico general y el de tres de sus representantes clásicos y fundamentales: nos referimos a Husserl, Heidegger y Merleau-Ponty. En un segundo momento, buscaremos desplegar algunos de los conceptos más significativos en las propuesta de estos autores, destacando sus continuidades y rupturas. Finalmente, propondremos una ejemplo concreto de aplicación de la perspectiva y método fenomenológico a partir de nuestra experiencia contemporánea de la distancia corpórea. ABSTRACT Phenomenology is a philosophical perspective first established at the beginning of the twentieth century and remains being developed. It was shaped during the first quarter of that century, diversified during the second one, and took multiple roads since the 1950s. As a result, it is not possible to talk of 'the one' phenomenology, but instead it is necessary to speak of a phenomenological 'project'. The article presents an approach to the issues, method, and possible applications of phenomenological philosophy. First, it addresses the meaning of the general phenomenological project and that of the project of three of its classical representatives: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Secondly, it introduces some of the key concepts of these philosophers, highlighting the continuities and breaks. Finally, it suggests a concrete example of a possible application of the phenomenological approach and method through our contemporary experience of corporeal distance.

In analogy to Kant, Husserl argues that existence is not a real predicate, that is to say that the existence of an object consists in not its reference to objective reality but rather in the specific manner of givenness in consciousness. As a consequence, the concept of existence is understood with regard to the different ways of presentation (Gegenwärtigung) of reality, and it can only be clarified in a pure phenomenological description of intuitive modes of its givenness. The aim of phenomenological investigation is to clarify the sense of real existence of transcendent things, in particular, the legitimacy of the general thesis of the natural attitude as universal belief in which is realized the existence of the world. This clarification presupposes the constituting consciousness as an original place of the demonstration of the sense of the existence so that the existence of the transcendent things always refers to the actually experiencing consciousness in which such things are given. Thus, the existence of the real world is relative to the existence of world-constituting consciousness that is understood as a sphere of absolute self-givenness because it does not refer in its existence to a higher consciousness in which it would be given. This implies that the existence of the real world has presumptive character, as it is a correlate of the general thesis of the natural attitude, which requires the confirmation in the further course of the experience, whereas the actually experiencing consciousness is an absolute sphere of being that is given in apodictic evidence and it posits itself through itself in existence.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar as peculiaridades das sínteses de preenchimento intuitivo dos atos intencionais na percepção e na imaginação, apoiando-se nas Investigações Lógicas (1901) de Husserl. Se na percepção a coisa é apreendida diretamente “ela própria” (ainda que em diferentes momentos), na imaginação, a coisa visada originariamente é substituída por um “analogon” que lhe é mais ou menos semelhante (trata-se do fenômeno da reprodução na imaginação por “semelhança”). Ao final, o artigo compara a consciência perceptiva à consciência imaginante, opondo-as aos atos intencionais meramente significativos (nos quais encontramos apenas uma consciência de sinal, sem qualquer preenchimento intuitivo).

In this study, we wanted to show that plunging into the depths of modern (including altered and generic) consciousness (according to the phenomenological recipe of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Alen Badiou and others and Albert Einstein’s cosmological recipe) allows us to discover a new fundamental measurement of consciousness associated with compaction of time. More precisely, we seek to identify the possibility of compaction of time in the consciousness under certain (high-energy) conditions, by analogy with how time is fundamentally transformed in space (in the black hole zone). We are trying to understand how, through modern existential and phenomenological as well as natural science methods, primarily on the way of interpreting Heidegger’s destruction, one can rethink the essence of the fundamental dimension of consciousness related to institutionalization of time. In other words, the analysis results offer an opportunity to state that the new dimension reveals another fundamental property of consciousness. In this dimension, not only time is split (into the past, present and future; retention, now-point and protention, in Husserlian terminology), which had an objective effect on the classic understanding of the world view. The intention of time is also split, which manifests itself in transretention (destruction, in Heidegger’s existential coordinates), transcendention and transprotention (in our understanding).

This paper provides an account of the experience of empathizing with the fictional characters of literary works, through the lens of Husserl's theory of presentification. Via a critical analysis of Husserl and other phenomenologists, I argue that fictional characters, though lacking embodied presence, can be presentified to the reader in the mode of "as if." Moreover, I claim that imaginative empathy is a guided creative reproduction of sedimented past bodily experiences. This explains why, motivated by imaginative empathetic presentification, not only aesthetic feelings, but also "as if" existential feelings come to the fore. Finally, it shows to what extent presentation and the different modes of presentification are interwoven and function together.

Why Alfred Schutz's legacy influenced so much social theory, remaining much less known in the world of philosophy, and phenomenology in particular? The paper tries to show its importance for the phenomenological tradition, pointing to its relevance for such philosopical problems as understanding of the phenomenological reduction, self-evidence, the reproach of psychologism, constitution of meanings and realism vs. idealism in phenomenology. Highlighting Husserl's high esteem for Schutz, it departs from the historical background of Schutz's reflection (the Austrian school of law and economy, neo-kantianism of the Marburg and the Baden school and its influence on Max Weber, Husserl's dispute with psychologism) in order to show, on the example of "The Phenomenology of the Social World", how Schutz finds his way from the solipsistic trap, finding a solution of the self-evidence problem by means of providing a description of the pre-reflexive and of the reflexive side of the time structure, inherent in the process of the social constitution of meaning. The text proceeds by delineating historical background of Schutz’s reflection: first of the inspiration of his philosophy by legal and economic theories, then of his engagement in the discussion on grounding the humanities, of Max Weber’s position in this discussion, constituting a point of departure for Schutz, and, finally, of Schutz’s relation to the basic issues of phenomenology, comprised in the question of psychologism. After this introduction Schutz’s project turns out to be a reconstruction of processual self-evidence, realized in co-existence of various streams of consciousness, in a way congenial to Heidegger’s “Time and Being”.

Work in what has been known as the theological turn in French phenomenology describes the way in which human beings are always, already open to a religious encounter. This paper will focus on Levinas as a proper transcendental phenomenologist as would be characterized by parts of Husserl and Husserl’s last assistant Eugen Fink. What Levinas does in his phenomenology of the face/other (which gets tied up in religious language) is to describe an absolute origin out of which the subject arises. This point of origin structures the self in such a way as to always, already be open to that which overflows experience and, thus, makes possible the very experience of an encounter with the numinous. Such an approach to religious experience for which I am arguing simply takes Levinas at his word when he declares “The idea of God is an idea that cannot clarify a human situation. It is the inverse that is true.” (“Transcendence and Height”) Understanding the structure of the subject as open to that which cannot be reduced/totalized/ encapsulated is to recognize that the human situation is ready for the possibility of religious experience.

Este artículo aclara la relación entre Al-Ghazali y René Descartes, para articular similitudes y diferencias en sus respectivos periplos desde la duda a la certidumbre. Algunos investigadores concuerdan en que los argumentos de la duda que emplean Descartes y AlGhazali son similares, pero identifi can sus caminos desde la duda como radicalmente diferentes: mientras Descartes encontró la superación de la duda mediante el cogito o la razón, Al-Ghazali fi nalizó su Aventura fi losófi ca como un Sufi , abrumado por su experiencia místico-religiosa. Este artículo demuestra lo contrario. Bajo un cuidadoso escrutinio textual y aprovechando algunos conceptos fenomenológicos básicos de Husserl, planteo que la posición de AlGhazali fue malinterpretada, y así revelo su verdadera naturaleza filosófica. This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and René Descartes, to articulate similarities and differences in their journeys from doubt to certainty. Some scholars agree that the doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito or reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi , overwhelmed by his religious-mystical experience. This paper proves the opposite. Under close textual scrutiny and using of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali’s position was misunderstood, and thus disclose his true philosophic nature.