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I argue that one of the central concepts of the second part of Being and Time – resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) – represents a new way of doing philosophy and should therefore be understood as a philosophical method. Resoluteness is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things and is methodologically necessary to uncover these things as what they are. I draw on insights from the recently published On My Own Publications, in which Heidegger points to resoluteness as a crucial step towards his later methodological stance. In doing so, I illuminate important aspects of Being and Time and contribute to ongoing debates about Heidegger’s philosophical method. I demonstrate that it is Heidegger’s critique of transcendental philosophy and of the inquiry into possibility conditions that is meant to be overcome by developing the idea of resoluteness as a philosophical method., Argumentiram da je jedan od središnjih pojmova drugog dijela Bitka i vremena – odlučnost (Entschlossenheit) – predstavlja nov način filozofiranja i trebao bi se, stoga, razumjeti kao filozofijska metoda. Odlučnost je poseban način odnošenja prema stvarima i metodologijski je nužno za otkrivanje kakve jesu te stvari. Oslanjam se na uvide na recentno objavljeno djelo O mojim tiskovinama u kojem Heidegger ističe odlučnost kao ključan korak prema kasnijem metodologijskom stavu. Čineći to, rasvjetljujem važne aspekte Bitka i vremena i doprinosim trenutnoj raspravi o Heideggerovoj filozofijskoj metodi. Dokazujem da se idejom o odlučnosti kao filozofijskoj metodi nastoji nadići Heideggerova kritika transcendentalne metode i ispitivanja o uvjetima mogućnosti., Ich argumentiere, dass einer der zentralen Begriffe des zweiten Teils von Sein und Zeit – Entschlossenheit – eine neue Art des Philosophierens repräsentiert und demzufolge als philosophische Methode aufzufassen ist. Entschlossenheit ist eine spezifische Art, sich den Dingen gegenüber zu verhalten, und ist methodologisch unentbehrlich, um diese Dinge als das aufzudecken, was sie sind. Ich rekurriere auf Erkenntnisse aus dem neulich erschienenen Werk Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen, in dem Heidegger auf Entschlossenheit als einen einschneidenden Schritt in Richtung seiner späteren methodologischen Gesinnung verweist. Hierdurch beleuchte ich belangvolle Aspekte von Sein und Zeit und leiste einen Beitrag zu laufenden Debatten über Heideggers philosophische Methode. Ich beweise, dass es Heideggers Kritik an der Transzendentalphilosophie und an der Untersuchung von Möglichkeitsbedingungen diejenige ist, die es durch die Entfaltung der Idee der Entschlossenheit als philosophische Methode zu überwinden gilt., J’affirme que l’un des concepts centraux de la seconde partie d’Être et Temps – Résolution anticipante (Entschlossenheit) – représente une nouvelle manière de faire de la philosophie et devrait, par conséquent, être entendu comme une méthode philosophique. La résolution anticipante est une manière spécifique de se rapporter aux choses et, d’un point de vue méthodologique, est nécessaire pour découvrir les choses telles qu’elles sont. Je m’appuie sur les idées de l’œuvre récemment publiée Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen (De mes publications) dans laquelle Heidegger met en avant la résolution anticipante comme une étape cruciale pour sa position méthodologique tardive. De cette façon, je mets en lumière les aspects importants d’Être et Temps et contribue aux débats continus sur la méthode philosophique d’Heidegger. Je démontre que c’est la critique d’Heidegger de la philosophie transcendantale et le questionnement sur les conditions de possibilité qui tentent d’être dépassés.

When an agent “loses herself” in a project, or becomes completely absorbed in an activity, she has what Heidegger calls “reflected self-understanding”. This kind of reflected understanding allows the agent to find herself out in the world, “in things”, without ever holding any reflexive attitudes about herself. In my dissertation, I develop and defend Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding, which constitutes – for Heidegger – the most basic grip an agent has on who she is. I suggest that Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding is not only a significant contribution to the history of philosophy, but also the central kernel that structures Heidegger’s thought on the topics of understanding, interpretation, truth, and authenticity in Being and Time.

Sommes-nous libres ou sommes-nous déterminés ? La liberté est-elle simplement une illusion dans un cours des choses gouverné par la nécessité ? Il semble que la question sur la liberté ne saurait trouver de réponse certaine si elle reste ainsi posée dans ces termes qui sont ceux de la troisième antinomie kantienne. Notre étude tentera de montrer, à l’aide du corpus heideggérien, que poser la question de la liberté dans le cadre de la causalité, c’est d’emblée mécomprendre l’essence de l’être humain, de la liberté et du monde. Ce n’est qu’en redécouvrant une liberté plus originaire que l’on pourrait comprendre en quoi nous sommes essentiellement libres. La thèse de notre étude est que la « liberté herméneutique » chez Heidegger correspond à cette liberté originaire. Notre mémoire retracera, en trois parties, l’évolution du concept de liberté chez Heidegger de l’époque de Sein und Zeit jusqu’à sa pensée tardive. La première partie de notre étude s’intéresse au Dasein en tant qu’il est être-au monde : en reproblématisant la relation de l’être humain avec son monde, nous montrerons que l’être humain est essentiellement libre en tant qu’il se caractérise par son ouverture herméneutique au monde. La deuxième partie cherche à éclaircir le lien entre liberté et vérité : le Dasein, en tant qu’il est libre, est aussi dans la vérité entendue comme ouverture. Nous pourrons ainsi mettre en évidence dans la dernière partie de notre mémoire la continuité entre le concept de la liberté lors du « tournant » avec celui de l’époque d’Être et Temps et approfondir la notion de l’authenticité au-delà d’Être et Temps., Do we have free will or are determined? Is freedom only an illusion in a course of the world governed by necessity? It seems that the question of liberty cannot find a definitive answer if it remains thus posed in these terms which are those of the third Kantian antinomy. Our study will try to show, with the help of Heidegger’s work, that asking the question of liberty within the framework of causality is to misunderstand from the outset the essence of human being, of liberty and of the world. It is only by discovering a more radical liberty, freed from this framework, that one could understand how we are essentially free. The thesis of our study is that “hermeneutical freedom” in Heidegger corresponds to this radical freedom. Our thesis will retrace, in its three parts, the evolution of the concept of freedom in Heidegger from the time of Sein und Zeit until his later period. The first part of our study will look into Dasein as being-in-the-world: by problematizing the relationship between the human being and its world, we will show that freedom is essentially characterized as a hermeneutical openness to the world. The second part seeks to clarify the link between freedom and truth: Dasein, as it is free, is also truth understood as openness. We will thus be able to highlight in the last part of our study the continuity between the concept of freedom at the time of the "turn" with that at the time of “Being and Time” and be able to deepen the notion of authenticity beyond “Being and Time”.

U cilju omogućenja dijaloga između mišljenja Martina Heideggera i Rudolfa Steinera polazimo od teze Rainera Thurnhera da su Heideggerovi egzistencijali raspoloženje, razumijevanje i govor korelati tradicionalnih psihičkih fenomena u njihovoj trostrukoj klasifikaciji na mišljenje, htijenje i osjećanje (koju uvelike koristi i Steiner). Radi provjere te teze analiziramo vremensku konstituciju tih psihičkih fenomena, odnosno njihovih egzistencijalnih korelata iz vremenskih dimenzija budućnosti, sadašnjosti i prošlosti u Heideggerovu Bitku i vremenu i u određenim Steinerovim predavanjima., For the purpose of enabling a dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and Rudolf Steiner’s work, we start from Rainer Thurnher’s hypothesis that Heidegger’s “existentials”, Befindlichkeit, Verstehen and Rede, represent correlates of psychic phenomena in their traditional triple division into thinking, willing and feeling (often used by Steiner as well). To test this hypothesis, we analyze the temporal constitution of these psychic phenomena, that is, their existential correlates from the temporal dimensions of future, present, and past in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in some of Steiner’s lectures.

I am not concerned with whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a "secularisation" of primitive Christianity buried beneath the excrescence of a dead medieval Scholasticism and the "ontotheological constitution of its metaphysics". Nor I am concerned with seeking out the theological roots of Heidegger’s philosophy even though he and others may claim that his philosophy is rabidly a-theistic. To repeat, this paper is not interested in intellectual history and or a genealogical reconstruction of Heidegger’s true intentions and the contradictions that are displayed in his published works and what that could mean for the relation between theology and the philosophy of religion. We have to tread a path, making it new, as opposed to discovering a new path that has yet to be taken. Creation is harder than discovery; the former is active and intentional, albeit obscure, and the latter is passive, even accidental, albeit something that can be more readily followed.

Cette étude propose une lecture du chapitre V de la première partie d’Être et temps (1927) de Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) portant sur l’ouverture de l’être-au-monde et ses moments constitutifs — l’affectivité, le comprendre et le parler — en accordant une attention plus particulière à son dernier moment, soit celui du langage. À travers notre interprétation de ce chapitre, nous expliciterons ce qu’est un monde selon l’auteur et comment il se rapporte toujours aux trois modes d’être fondamentaux du Dasein que nous venons d’évoquer : c’est à travers l’affectivité, le comprendre et le parler qu’il peut y avoir quelque chose comme un monde pour Heidegger, et c’est à travers ces trois modes d’être du Dasein que ce dernier y séjourne quotidiennement. Seulement, dans l’existence quotidienne du Dasein, le monde apparaît au sein d’une affectivité, d’un comprendre et d’un parler quotidien, dans lesquels les choses du monde trouvent une expression banale et terne. Au sein du parler existent deux possibilités : l’entendre et le faire-silence. Si le faire-silence a la possibilité de « briser le bavardage », l’entendre a la possibilité de laisser les choses se dire au Dasein d’une nouvelle manière. En ces deux possibilités du parler se joue la possibilité d’une redéfinition du monde et d’un nouveau regard sur lui. La visée de cette étude est de voir comment la pensée de Heidegger en 1927 formule déjà la problématique du rapport intime du langage et du monde. En cela, Être et temps est déjà en chemin vers la pensée de la poésie et du langage, telle qu’elle s’élaborera dans les années 30., The present study puts forward an interpretation of the Chapter V of the first division of Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) Being and Time (1927), on the opening of Being-in-the-world and its constitutive moments – attunement, understanding and discourse – while highlighting its last moment, that is, language. Through our interpretation of this chapter, we want to clarify what is a world according to Heidegger and how it always relates to the three moments we just evoked: there can only be a world through attunement, understanding and discourse and it is through these three that Dasein exists daily. Only, in the daily existence of Dasein, the world appears within a daily attunement, understanding and discourse, in which things of the world are expressed in a humdrum and tedious way. Within discourse two possibilities stand out: hearing and keeping-silent. If keeping-silent has the possibility to “break the idle talk”, hearing has the possibility to let things say themselves in a new way. In hearing and keeping-silent, as possibilities of discourse, arise the possibility to redefine and see the world in a more accurate and new way. The aim of this study is to see how Heidegger’s thought in 1927 already articulates the problem of the relation between language and the world. We will argue that in doing so, Being and Time is already on the way towards the thought of poetry and language, as it will be elaborated in the 30s.

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

The task of this paper is to propose an answer to these related questions. It amounts to an attempt to work through conceptually step by step Heidegger’s so called “overcoming of metaphysics”. It is true of course that the locution, “the overcoming of metaphysics”, does not appear in Being and Time. The discourse of the overcoming of metaphysics is held by Heidegger’s commentators to belong to a period post-dating the early work, after the socalled Kehre. I shall stubbornly evade this knotty issue of Heidegger interpretation here. For my purposes it suffices merely if our understanding of Being and Time, its content, intent and consequence, can be deepened or expanded if it is read in the light of the task of overcoming metaphysics - or at least in the light of that task as it is to be conceived in the context I shall present here. What is to be understood by the phrase “the overcoming of metaphysics”? doi: 10.3860/krit.v4i1.1837 Kritike Vol.4(1) 2010 pp.94-107

Nous nous pencherons sur les travaux du jeune Heidegger afin de montrer que, s’il affirme dans Être et temps que les animaux ne sont ni chose, ni Dasein, mais participent d’un énigmatique mode d’être propre – le « simplement vivant », ce qui ne fait « rien de plus que vivre » – cela constitue un revirement dans la pensée heideggérienne. Dans les travaux qui préparent la rédaction de Sein und Zeit, l'animal avait toujours été considéré comme un être qui a un monde, comme un être auquel nous devons reconnaître le mode d'être du Dasein. En s’appuyant sur l’interprétation phénoménologique d’Aristote qu’il présente dans ses cours de 1919 à 1926, nous montrerons que les structures fondamentales de l'être-au-monde ont été élaborées sur le fond des capacités propres à la vie animale que sont l’affection (pathos), la perception (aisthēsis), la discrimination (krinein), la mobilité (kinesis kata topon) et le désir (orexis)., Our investigation of young Heidegger’s work aims at showing that, if Being and Time states that animals are neither mere things, neither Dasein, but have their own puzzling mode of being – “mere life”, which does not exist, but simply lives – this constitutes a reversal in Heidegger’s way of thinking. In the works that prepared the way towards Sein und Zeit, animal life was always presented as being-in-a-world, as a being to which we must ascribe Dasein’s way of being. With the help of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle presented between 1919 and 1926, we will show that the basic features of being-in-the-world that will become Being and Time's existential structures were developed on the basis of capacities belonging to animal life : affection (pathos), perception (aisthēsis), discrimination (krinein), mobility (kinesis kata topon) and desire (orexis).

Seventy-five years after the publication of SuZ, this work still not interpreted in the light of the question of being - few exceptions notwithstanding. To commemorate the seventy- fifth anniversary of the publication of SuZ, it is fitting to take up this question, and to attend to its structure and hermeneutic ramifications. Returning to this question we come upon and experience a phenomenon which Heidegger calls «retro- or forward relatedness of being» and which constitutes the foremost hermeneutic pre-condition for gaining access to his entire thought. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate that this relatedness sustains Heidegger's trascendental-horizonal as well as his being-historical thinking. Pasados setenta y cinco años de la publicación de Ser y tiempo, esta obra todavía no se ha interpretado desde la perspectiva de la cuestión del ser, al margen de algunas excepciones. Para conmemorar el setenta y cinco aniversario de la publicación de Ser y tiempo, abordaremos este tema y nos ocuparemos de su estructura y de sus ramificaciones hermenéuticas. Volviendo a la cuestión que centra nuestro interés, fijaremos la atención en la experiencia de un fenómeno que Heidegger denomina «retro-relación» o «proto-relación» del ser que constituye la pre-condición hermenéutica fundamental a la hora de acceder a la totalidad de su pensamiento. Este artículo se propone indicar que esta relación sustenta tanto el pensamiento horizontal-trascendental de Heidegger como su pensamiento acerca de la historia del ser.

This thesis attempts to render a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's concept of nothingness as it is argued for in Being and Time. This thesis has two main objectives: 1) to reinterpret Heidegger's concept of the anxiety in which Dasein experiences nothingness and to argue against the standard interpretation which states that Dasein experiences anxiety or nothingness when it acknowledges its mortality, and 2) to show that section 40 of Being and Time should be interpreted independently from later sections. The main emphasis of this thesis is to clarify what Heidegger means by nothingness and to criticize those who misinterpret Heidegger. I attempt to provide a more satisfactory account of nothingness and its relation to anxiety and death. In chapter I, merely give an account of Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity, which includes the following concepts: The "they", averageness, distantiality, levelling down, publicness, idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and falling and throwness. In chapter II, I discuss anxiety and nothingness. refer to Heidegger's essay entitled "What is Metaphysics?" in order to get a deeper understanding of Heidegger's concept of nothingness. I argue against the standard interpretation and show that nothingness can be experienced without the acknowledgement of one's mortality. In chapter III, I attempt to answer the following question: What does Heidegger mean by death? I outline the arguments of various interpreters of Heidegger's concept of death. They equate nothingness with one's acknowledgement of mortality, i.e., the possibility of one's own death. Those who argue for this position do not understand what Heidegger means by nothingness and its significance to death. I criticize these interpreters and reveal their oversights and misinterpretations, and then put forth my own interpretation of what Heidegger means by death. Master of Arts (MA)