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In this article, I imagine a scene in Plato’s cave where Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari encounter Pinocchio, the most famous puppet. I want to examine the forms of resistance created by the expressions of the Body Without Organs during the process of Pinocchio’s formation and bring together the elements that undermine the pedagogical causality established between telling a lie and the elongation of the nose to show that a different reading of The Adventures of Pinocchio is possible. I hope to achieve this reading by demonstrating the constant conflict of the two logics in The Adventures of Pinocchio: the logic of punishment and the logic of symptoms. This research can also be read as preparing a possible strategic escape plan for Pinocchio, Deleuze and Guattari for a permanent escape from Plato’s cave., U ovom članku zamišljam scenu u Platonovoj spilji gdje Gilles Deleuze i Félix Guattari susretnu Pinocchija, najpoznatijeg lutka. Želim istražiti oblike otpora stvorene izričajima Tijela bez organa tijekom postupka Pinocchijeva oblikovanja te objediniti elemente koji potkopavaju pedagogijsku uzročnost uspostavljenu između govorenja laži i izduljenja nosa, da bih pokazao da je moguće drugačije tumačenje Pinocchijevih pustolovina. Nadam se takvo čitanje postići demonstracijom stalnog sukoba dvije logike Pinocchijevih pustolovina: logiku kazne i logiku simptoma. Ovo se istraživanje također može čitati kao pripremanje mogućeg strateškog plana bijega iz Platonove spilje za Pinnochija, Deleuzea i Guattarija., In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich mir eine Szene in Platons Höhle vor, in der Gilles Deleuze und Félix Guattari auf Pinocchio, die berühmteste Marionette, treffen. Ich möchte die Formen des Widerstands untersuchen, die durch die Äußerungen des organlosen Körpers während des Entstehungsprozesses von Pinocchio geschaffen wurden, und die Elemente zusammenbringen, welche die pädagogische Kausalität untergraben, die zwischen dem Lügen und der Nasenverlängerung hergestellt wurde, um zu zeigen, dass eine differente Lesart von Die Abenteuer des Pinocchio denkbar ist. Ich hoffe, zu dieser Lesart zu gelangen, indem ich den ständigen Konflikt der beiden Logiken in Die Abenteuer des Pinocchio demonstriere: der Logik der Bestrafung und der Logik der Symptome. Diese Studie kann auch als Vorbereitung eines möglichen strategischen Fluchtplans für Pinocchio, Deleuze und Guattari für eine dauerhafte Flucht aus Platons Höhle ausgelegt werden., Dans cet article, j’imagine une scène où Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari rencontrent Pinocchio, la plus célèbre des poupées, dans la caverne de Platon. Je m’applique à rechercher les formes de résistance créées par les expressions du corps sans organes au cours du processus de transformation de Pinocchio et unifier les éléments qui sapent la causalité pédagogique instaurée entre la parole du mensonge et l’allongement du nez, en vue de montrer qu’une autre interprétation de Les Aventures de Pinocchio est possible. J’espère atteindre une telle lecture par la démonstration de la constante lutte entre les deux logiques de Les Aventures de Pinocchio : la logique de la punition et la logique du symptôme. Cette recherche peut également se lire comme une préparation au plan stratégique de fuite de la caverne de Platon pour Pinocchio, Deleuze et Guattari.

RESUMEN Aristóteles afirma en Phys. II 7, 198a 25 que de las cuatro causas principales del devenir, tres de ellas se reducen a una, la forma. De este modo, el Estagirita parece establecer que la forma es el fundamento de la causalidad. A partir de esta consideración, en este escrito serán planteadas dos cuestiones principales desde un común denominador: una será cómo interpretar la primacía causal de la forma, y la otra, cuál es la relación entre esta primacía y el Primer Motor Inmóvil, como causa primera del movimiento, ambas cuestiones a la luz de la teoría de acto-potencia. ABSTRACT Aristotle affirms in Phys. II 7, 198a 25 that of the four main causes of becoming, three of them are reduced to one: the form. In this way, the Stagirite seems to establish that the form is the foundation of causality. From this decision, in this writing two main questions will be raised from a common denominator: one will be how to interpret the causal primacy of the form, and the other will be the relationship between this primacy and the First motor engine as the first cause of movement, both questions seen from the act-power theory.

This paper deals with aspects of Derridean hauntology in the poetry of May Angelou and Lucille Clifton , two prominent , albeit understudied, African American women poets. Starting with an overview of Jacque Derrida’s postulations disclosed in his book Specters of Marx, the study is then to situate his theory in selected poetry by the two poets afore-mentioned with the attempt of showing how it helps delve deeper into the nuances of African American consciousness. The paper argues that given the intensive studies on specters, legacies and memories, what distinguishes Derrida’s theory is its tripartite link to temporality, existentialist being and hegemony. With Derrida asserting that specters control the present and the future and determine being and becoming besides governing the quest for hegemony, Derridean hauntology not only unsettles the taken-for-granted notions of temporality but also disrupts the conventional concepts of existentialist being and power. Bringing the three-aspected hauntology to Angelou and Clifton’s poetry helps shed light on the role of textuality and the author in the struggle over hegemony and in the attempt to reconcile the conflicting poles of being in the case of black American subjects. To achieve its objectives, the study is to follow an expository analytic approach wedding theory to practice and foregrounding the poetic devices that help hammer forth the Derridean perspective.

Being-at-home in a particular, determined, world is dangerous for thinking. For thinking to be thinking/becoming, one should not get too comfortable. For thinking is to not arrive back home, in the same place one begins. But how to escape the world that has created who you are, gave you purpose and a past? How to make sure the future is not a repetition of the Same? How to break away from something that you need? In this article, my aim is not to give one more solution to this fundamental problem that is in essence an ethical problem. For providing a refuge, a new theory, a new methodology, would be providing a new island for those who realise that a flood is endangering their own island. My aim is to exercise the craft of exilic thinking as a way to deal with the contradiction already pointed out by Heraclitus and Parmenides – “We both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not.” Exilic thinking as a craft of fragilising the self establishes a matrixial borderspace through which the impossible becomes possible.

John Banville’s long career can of course conventionally be viewed as a linearity, but it would be better seen as a form of spiral. This spiral is the hermeneutic process and concomitantly the movements of eternal recurrence in the oeuvre. In accordance with Nietzsche’s concept, these recurrences are not to be construed as returns of the identical. Rather, this ethic and aesthetic dimension in Banville is explicated as an attunement to the overall force of becoming. In agreement with Wallace Stevens’ poetics, Banville’s aesthetic is seen primarily as process. Through the immediate access to metacognition and reflection in the intentional act, Banville, through his protagonists, maintains a sense of wonder as hope in a fictional world often permeated by loss, melancholy and despair. This fictional trait is argued to have been there since the debut up to Banville’s more recent creative work. Resumo: A longa carreira de John Banville pode, evidentemente, ser vista convencionalmente de modo linear, contudo seria melhor se fosse vista como uma forma de espiral. Essa espiral representa o processo hermeneutico e, concomitantemente, os movimentos de recorrencia eterna na obra. De acordo com o conceito de Nietzsche, essas recorrencias nao devem ser interpretadas como retornos do identico. Em vez disso, essa dimensao etica e estetica em Banville e explicada como uma sintonizacao com a forca geral do devir. De acordo com a poetica de Wallace Stevens, a estetica de Banville e vista principalmente como processo. Por meio do acesso imediato a metacognicao e reflexao no ato intencional, Banville, atraves de seus protagonistas, mantem um sentimento de admiracao como esperanca em um mundo ficticio, muitas vezes permeado por perda, melancolia e desespero. Argumenta-se que esse traco ficcional esta presente desde a sua estreia ate a escrita mais recente de Banville.

Schelling’s Naturphilosophie was, from the outset, more concerned with ontogeny than ontology, i.e. not on what nature is but on what it does: ubiquitous creation. Therefore, the processes articulated in the Philosophy of Mythology remain instances of a philosophy driven by what might be called a post-naturalist naturalism. The two aims of this paper are, firstly, to demonstrate this nature-philosophical continuity throughout Schelling’s so-called Protean philosophical projects in order, secondly, to re-prepare Schellingian themes for current debates concerning ontology. To this end, I draw on the worldmaking and abundance postulates of Goodman and Feyerabend, respectively, to demonstrate the persistence of Schellingian ontogenetic pathways for remodelling process metaphysics for contemporary philosophy. Finally, the paper argues that the logical form of the hypothesis (antecedent and consequent) is itself consequent upon the ontogeny it hypothesises.

RESUMO Neste artigo, discuto o que considero serem os pressupostos ontológicos da crítica de Nietzsche à metafísica no primeiro livro de Humano, demasiado humano e a natureza da relação estabelecida por ele entre filosofia e ciência. Busco definir sua posição como um realismo científico moderado, que considera que as ciências caminham progressivamente em direção a uma concepção puramente dinâmica do real. ABSTRACT In this paper I discuss what I consider to be the ontological assumptions of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics in the first book of Human, all too human and the nature of the relation he establishes between philosophy and science. I try to define his position as a moderate scientific realism, as he claims that science progressively moves towards a purely dynamic conception of reality.

Resumo Ainda que de modo introdutório, dizemos que existe um sujeito, o perverso, no interior da filosofia de Deleuze. Mais, que é tornando-se esse sujeito, fazendo do perverso um filósofo, que Deleuze dá início à sua filosofia, em Diferença e repetição e na Lógica do sentido. Ou seja, que existindo um devir-perverso do próprio Deleuze, esse devir condiciona uma abordagem à relação do seu pensamento com o tema da perversão, e isto por ser justamente a criação desse heterónimo, o perverso, que está na origem da sua filosofia. Abstract Even if only schematically, we say there is a subject, the pervert, in Deleuze’s philosophy. More, that it is by becoming this subject, making the pervert a philosopher, that Deleuze brings about the beginning of his own philosophy in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. In other words, that there is such a thing as Deleuze’s very own becoming-pervert, being this becoming which conditions an understanding of the relation of his thinking with the question of perversion precisely because it is this heteronym, the pervert, who stands at the origin of his philosophy.

RESUMO: O presente artigo tem como objetivo indagar e talvez responder – com auxílio dos comentadores – dois pontos relevantes na lógica de Hegel. O primeiro, diz respeito à concepção de fundamentação de um sistema filosófico sem um começo: a ideia de um pressuposto incondicionado. O segundo, concerne à condiçõe das modalidades de necessidade e contingência numa lógica que se propõe absoluta. Como método absoluto, a ciência da lógica expõe o devir como condição do puro pensamento e Aufhebung [suprassunção] aparece como um conceito central, pois é o motor que impulsiona a dialética. Isso pode ser observado tanto na Ciência da Lógica (2016) – com as determinações do pensamento – como na Fenomenologia do Espiríto (2018) – com as figuras da consciência –. Observa-se que há uma relação entre os conceitos de Aufhebung, necessidade e início absoluto. Por tanto, a partir dessa relação, objetiva-se expor a condição das modalidades de necessidade e contingência num sistema absolouto.

Grunbaum's three chief fields of research were space-time philosophy, the methodological credentials of psychoanalysis, and reasons given in favor of the existence of God. Grunbaum defended the so-called conventionality thesis of physical geometry. He partially followed Hans Reichenbach in this respect but developed a new ontological argument for the conventionality claim in addition. In addressing the physical basis of the direction of time, Grunbaum advocated that there is a physical basis for the distinction between the past and the future (or the anisotropy of time), but no such basis for the idea of a ‘present’ moving through time. His main claim in scrutinizing Freud’s theory methodologically was that supporting the causal claims Freud made would have required data that go beyond the clinical setting. Finally, Grunbaum worked on the philosophy of religion and set out to undermine arguments for the existence of God.

Der Artikel legt dar, was "Anfang" im kreisförmigen System Hegels bedeutet, und untersucht kritisch die ersten Schritte seiner Logik: Sein, Nichts, Werden, Dasein. Die These lautet: das Sein als Sein wird hier in seinem ontologischen Sinne nicht gedacht und ein dialektischer Übergang zwischen Sein und Dasein ist nicht möglich. The article exposes what "beginning" means in the circular system of Hegel, and critically studies the first steps of his logic: being, nothing, becoming, existence. The thesis is that being as being is not there thought in its ontological sense, and that a dialectical transition between being and existence is not possible.

This paper plateau describes children’s interspecies relation with a classroom canine, utilising posthumanism, post-structuralism and new materialism as its research paradigm and methodology. Once feelings are cognitised or articulated, their true essence can be lost. Therefore, elucidating moment-to-moment child–dog interactions through the lens of affect theory attempts to materialise the invisible, embodied, ‘unthought’ and non-conscious experience. Through consideration of Deleuzian concepts such as the ‘rhizome’ and ‘Body-without-Organs’ being enacted it illuminates new, ‘situated knowledge’. This is explicated and revealed using visual methods with ‘data’ produced by both, the children and their classroom dog such as photographs and video footage mounted on the dogs harness, from a GoPro micro camera. In addition, individual drawings, artefacts and paintings completed by the children are profound points in the research process, which are referred to as ‘plateaus’. These then become emergent as a children’s comic book where their relationship with ‘Dave’, their classroom dog is materialised. Through their interspecies relationship both child and dog exercise agency, co-constitute and transform one another and occupy a space of shared relations and multiple subjectivities. The affectual capacities of both child and dog also co-create an affective atmosphere and emotional spaces. Through ethnographic, participant observation and the ‘researcher’s body’ as a tool, they visually create illustrations through the sketching of ‘etudes’ (drawing exercises) to draw forth this embodied experience to reveal multiple lines and entanglements, mapping a landscape of interconnections and relations.

Presentism faces the following well-known dilemma: either the truth-value of past-tense claims depends on the non-existing past and cannot be said to supevene on being, or it supervenes on present reality and breaks our intuition which says that the true past-tense claims should not depend on any present aspect of reality. The paper shows that the solution to the dilemma offered by Kierland and Monton’s brute past presentism, the version of presentism according to which the past is supposed to be both a fundamental and present aspect of reality, is implausible and proposes how to cure presentism: the dillema can be avoided by taking a third road consisting of introducing dynamics into presentism in the form of the real passage of time. Dynamic presentism, which is constructed in such a way, can overcome the dilemma by providing an ontological basis for the past-tense propositions in the form of the real past. Dynamic presentism also offers a rationale for treating the future as being open.

El trabajo se propone explorar la representación del concepto de devenir en De rerum natura de Lucrecio. Los supuestos de la física epicúrea llevan a concebir la naturaleza como una totalidad compuesta y fluctuante de elementos en conflicto. Este aspecto de la filosofía del Jardín es tratado por Lucrecio a través de un conjunto de imágenes en torno a diversas facetas del tema de la navegación y de la guerra. Demostraremos que estas imágenes se articulan en motivos cuyo poder expresivo y de síntesis permite al autor sortear los problemas de indeterminación que supone la representación de la naturaleza de las cosas., The paper aims to explore the representation of the concept of becoming in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. The axioms of Epicurean physics lead to conceive nature as an integrated and fluctuating totality of conflicting elements. This philosophical aspect is treated by Lucretius through a set of images involving various aspects of the themes of navigation and war. It will argue that these images are organized in motifs whose capacity for expression and synthesis allows the author to overcome the problems of indetermination underlying the representation of the nature of things., Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

On Being and Becoming offers a new approach to existentialist philosophy and literature, as responding to competing demands for universal truth and the defense of the irreducible singularity of the individual. On Being and Becoming traces the heterogeneity of existentialist thinking beyond the popular wartime philosophers of the Parisian Left Bank, demonstrating their critical dependence on sources from the nineteenth century and their complements in modernist works across the European continent and beyond. While quintessentially modern, existentialism inherits ideas of the past and anticipates challenges of the present. Despite its individualism, existentialist attention to the human self is related to conceptions of world, others, the earth, and the more encompassing concept of being. The predominance of ideas of authenticity, individuality, and self-determination makes any existentialist manifesto self-contradictory, while existentialist thinkers above all wanted to make their philosophy relevant to concrete human existence as it is lived. Prevailing models of existential authenticity life tend to overlook the rich diversity of its prospects, which, as this volume shows, involve not only anxiety, absurdity, awareness of death and of the loss of religious reassurances, but also hope, the striving for happiness, and a sense of the transcendent—all of these grounded our human capacity to create meaning. In spite of the diversity of existentialism, all of its thinkers recognize the self as becoming, and recognize the courage and creativity human individuality demands. On Being and Becoming elaborates pragmatic and philosophical relevance of existentialism for being human in the contemporary world.

RESUMEN Este trabajo propone aproximarse al concepto de discapacidad extendiendo el campo del análisis a los efectos que dejan sobre los cuerpos el transhumanismo, la sociedad del rendimiento y los accidentes o catástrofes -sociales, económicas, políticas, tecnológicas-, efectos que abren el espacio para pensar otras modalidades subjetivas, asociadas con la vulnerabilidad. El texto sostiene que el devenir discapacitado se nos presenta, entonces, como el nuevo horizonte desde el cual pensar las formas de resistencia ética, social y política en el presente. RESUMO Este trabalho propõe se aproximar ao conceito de deficiência estendendo o campo da análise aos afeitos que deixam sobre os corpos o transumanismo, a sociedade do rendimento e os acidentes ou catástrofes -sociais, econômicas, políticas, tecnológicas- efeitos que abrem o espaço para pensar outras modalidades subjetivas, associadas com a vulnerabilidade. O texto argumenta que o devir deficiente se nos apresenta, então, como o novo horizonte desde o qual pensar as formas de resistência ética, social e política no presente. ABSTRACT This article posits an approach to the concept of disability by expanding the field of analysis to the effects that transhumanism, the society of efficiency, and accidents or catastrophes -social, economic, political, technological- leave on bodies, which open the space to think other modes of subjectivity associated with vulnerability. It argues that becoming disabled is presented to us, then, as the new horizon from which to think the ethical, social, and political forms of resistance in the present.

Reflective practice constitutes an important aspect of social work enactment, with a range of theory available to the practitioner. This paper continues this heritage with a theory of reflection informed via continental philosophy. The theory advocated here considers the life career of the practitioner via the duality of being and becoming, providing a critical lens upon retrospective enactment illuminating paradoxical moments. Such moments provide diachronic and nuanced insights into enactment across a range of interconnected strands of the life career, allowing the practitioner to consider important emergent themes across career articulation and thus action within and outside the vista of paid employment. This paper provides a case illustration to demonstrate the penetrative nature of such a lens, advocating future research endeavours to inform social work pedagogy and practice.

espanolEl objetivo es mostrar la interpretacion del concepto de tiempo de Hegel y Schelling en los seminarios de 1927-1928 de Martin Heidegger. Primero se explica la confrontacion que Heidegger realiza de Hegel antes y despues de Ser y tiempo. Despues, se analiza la primera confrontacion con Schelling en 1927-1928. Y al final se concluye con los elementos centrales que el joven Heidegger retoma del concepto de tiempo de Hegel y Schelling. EnglishThe aim is to show the process of Hegel and Schelling s interpretation of concept of time on Martin Heidegger s seminars of 1927-1928. First, I explain the Heidegger s confrontation of Hegel before and after of Being and Time. Then, is analyzed the first Heidegger s confrontation with Schelling in 1927-1928. At the end, is concludes with the basics elements that the young Heidegger takes up from Hegel-Schelling s concept of time.

This paper explores the Neoplatonic interpretations of the distinction that Plato draws at the beginning of Timaeus (27d6 - 28a1) between "that which always is and has no becoming" and "that which is always becoming but never is". Philoponus tries to show that Plato understands "generated" in the sense of "generated in time", rejecting Aristotle's incompatible thesis. According to the Neoplatonic reading that Plotinus inaugurates, and Porphyry subsequently develops, "generated" (γϵνητóν) has two meanings: to depend on a cause and to exist by virtue of a composition. The first meaning is assigned to the incorporeal - the Intelligence and the Soul; the two meanings, on the other hand, are assigned to bodies. The Intelligence depends on a cause, the One-Good; and, in turn, the Soul depends on a cause, the Intelligence. These realities are not in the range of "that which is always generated and never is", but of "that which always is and is not generated", i.e. of "that which is without ceasing to be"., This paper benefited from the support of two Spanish R&D projects: HAR2017-83613-C2-2-P and H2019/HUM-5714, and is part of the activities of the UAM Research Group: Influences of Greek Ethics on Contemporary Philosophy (Ref. F-055)

[Resumen] En este trabajo se analizarán las posiciones ontológicas tanto de Deleuze como de Žižek, Deleuze argumenta que la falta, o el ser de negación, es un error de comprensión representativa, mientras que Žižek concibe su filosofía como impulsada por la falta absoluta. Hegel un precursor de Žižek es un oponente absoluto del pensamiento de Deleuze. No obstante, Žižek refleja los conceptos de Deleuze en su lectura lacaniana de Hegel, mientras que dichos conceptos conservan términos idénticos. Por ejemplo, Žižek llama a " l’objet petit a" una "diferencia", mientras que su término para negación absoluta es "repetición" y, finalmente, se refiere a su sistema filosófico como No-todo. Estos conceptos singulares en el pensamiento de Žižek comparten un lenguaje idéntico al de Deleuze. La filosofía de Deleuze es una de "diferencia", mientras que su modo de proliferación es la "repetición" y, finalmente, a menudo se refiere a su filosofía como el "Uno-Todo". [Abstract] In this research work the ontological positions of both Deleuze and Žižek will be analyzed, Deleuze argues that the lack, or the being of negation, is an error of representative understanding, while Žižek conceives his philosophy as driven by the absolute lack. An absolute opponent of Žižek's predecessor, Hegel, Deleuze rejects opposition as a constitutive feature of reality. However, Žižek reflects the concepts of Deleuze in his Lacanian reading of Hegel, while these concepts retain identical terms. For example, Žižek calls "l'objet petit a" to the concept of "difference", while his term for absolute negation is "repetition" and, finally, refers to his philosophical system as No-all. These unique concepts in Žižek's thought share a language identical to that of Deleuze. Deleuze's philosophy is one of "difference", while his mode of proliferation is "repetition" and, finally, he often refers to his philosophy as "One-All

This paper examines relationships between learning and technological change and argues that we urgently need new ways to approach what it means to learn in the context of a global Fourth Industrial Revolution. It briefly introduces the postdigital perspective, which considers the digital ‘revolution’ as something that has already happened and focuses to its reconfiguration. It claims that what we access, how we access it, what we do with it, and who then accesses what we have done, are important elements of a postdigital world worthy of closer examination. Focusing to recent debates about postdigital collective intelligence, we develop the concept of postdigital we-learn by showing that it might help us, amongst other things, to counter the idea of a lone human accessing education primarily for future individual, economic profit, as prescribed by the neoliberal learning economy. Building on new schools of thought emerging in response to the expansion of non-human (algorithmic) agency, we refine the concept of postdigital we-learn as a gathering between humans and machines. The consequences of this gathering are uncomfortable, as they imply unlearning elements of both capitalism and critical pedagogy. However, such unlearning is inherent to ‘a critical pedagogy of becoming’ and positions postdigital we-learn as a suitable framework for understanding and development of emancipatory, critical learning in our postdigital reality.

espanolEste articulo propone una aproximacion linguistica a la ontologia clasica y sugiere que el concepto griego de ‘ser’ fue determinado por las propiedades del verbo eἰμί. Por un lado, caracteriza esta palabra como un verbo estativo de soporte, lexicamente neutro y con aspecto imperfectivo. Por otro lado, relaciona semejante caracterizacion con la oposicion filosofica entre la permanencia del ser y la transitoriedad del devenir, asi como tambien con la expresion polisemica de lo ente. EnglishThis article puts forward a linguistic approach to classical ontology and suggests that the Greek concept of ‘being’ was determined by the properties of the verb eἰμί. On the one hand, it characterizes this word as a lexically neutral, supportive and stative verb with imperfective aspect. On the other hand, it relates such a characterization with the philosophical opposition between the permanence of being and the transience of becoming as well as with the polysemic expression of that which is.