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Lurking behind every conception of intelligence—whether an implicit (folk) or explicit (expert-generated) conception—is an underlying theory of meaning that specifies the form the theory of intelligence does and, indeed, can take. These underlying theories of meaning become presuppositions for the conception's form. The theories of meaning have different origins—for example, psycholinguistic, philosophical, and anthropological. This essay reviews the different underlying theories of meaning and proposes a new historical causal-chain theory of conceptions of intelligence. The underlying theories of meaning affect the flexibility and modifiability of laypersons' (implicit) and experts' (explicit) conceptions of intelligence. As a result, these historical causal chains have profound but largely invisible effects on societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about what accounts for the perspectival character of perception. It offers details about the types of phenomena exemplifying the perspectival character of perception and the phenomenon called perspectival variance and perspectival similarity as well as other topics on the concept of a pluralist approach.

Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay seeks to situate a nai¨ve realist account of visual experience within the framework of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics covered include the argument that this view is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects, and the conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant.

I discuss the contribution by Davenport, Davison, Liou, & Love (2015) in which they relate reliability represented by coefficient α to formal definitions of internal consistency and unidimensionality, both proposed by Cronbach (1951). I argue that coefficient α is a lower bound to reliability and that concepts of internal consistency and unidimensionality, however defined, belong to the realm of validity, viz. the issue of what the test measures. Internal consistency and unidimensionality may play a role in the construction of tests when the theory of the attribute for which the test is constructed implies that the items be internally consistent or unidimensional. I also offer examples of attributes that do not imply internal consistency or unidimensionality, thus limiting these concepts' usefulness in practical applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The metaparadigm concept of person as a core emphasis for nursing theorizing has attracted considerable attention in western literature, but has received less attention in the context of eastern philosophical contexts. In this philosophical inquiry, we sought to clarify the concept of what it is to be a human being according to ideas deriving from Islamic tradition, drawing on concept analysis as general approach to advance an understanding of how nursing within an Islamic context might operationalize metaparadigm conceptualization. Specifically, we considered person as human being on the basis of its definition, attributes/characteristics and boundaries to explore the anatomy of the concept in this context. Our analysis revealed that Islamic thought is relevant to two distinct understandings of the holistic concept of human being. Reciprocal interaction worldview organizes the dimensions of being human (cognitive, emotion, social and spiritual) into a whole. Simultaneous action worldview emphasizes that the human is a coherent and unified creature in harmony with the universe. In Islamic thought, these two worldviews are integrated and operate concurrently. Nurse-patient interactions arising from an integrated perspective that aligns both of these worldviews will allow for informed applications of knowledge to practice and enhanced patient care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. ) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, but also by genuinely visual representations as well as beliefs. I conclude with some brief remarks on the role of object-directed bodily action in conferring a sense of unseen presence on an object's occluded features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research target was to find out whether there are some differences in the level of creative imagination among patients with eating disorders and a comparison (non-clinical) group. Another aim was to use the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS) as a measure for suggestibility/hypnotic susceptibility which were put in the context of cognitive style field dependence - independence. There are some hypotheses tested which concern differences in the field dependence between patients with eating disorders and the comparison group. Research was attended by 46 girls and women with eating disorder diagnoses at the age between 14 - 48 years and 46 girls and women from non-clinical population at the age between 16 - 33 years. We used CIS to examine the level of creative imagination and Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) to identify field dependence - independence. Eating Attitude Test (EAT-26) was presented to distinguish between patients with eating disorders and the comparison group and the body image issues have been recovered by Stunkard silhouette test. The results reflect that there are no demonstrable differences in the level of creative imagination between the group with eating disorders and the comparison (non-clinical) group. It was found that people with eating disorders are significantly more field dependent than the comparison group (p < 0,01) and it was also found that there is a greater field dependence of people with inadequate body image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls ‘the problem of perceptual presence,’ and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we approach the idea that, the ease or fluency of information processing being subjectively experienced as feeling of familiarity with a positive affective tone, interfere with evaluative processing. The close association of familiarity and positive affect is here addressed within a affective priming paradigm. Participants were asked to evaluate a set of target stimuli previously tested for their valence. These targets were immediately preceded either by a familiar or a unfamiliar stimuli. Congruently with the familiarity-positive affect association, familiar stimuli facilitated evaluations (generate faster responses) of affective consistent targets (positive targets). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I start from Phillips' discussion of Rhees's dissatisfaction with the idea of a language-game. Then, from a rereading of Moore, I go on to exemplify interconnected uses of the expressions “language-game,”“recurrent procedure,”“world-picture,”“formal procedure,”“agreement in judgment,”“genre picture” and “form of life.” The discussion is related to sense perception, our knowledge of time and space, and the picture-theory. These topics connect with Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of the will – which changed markedly later. The subtext (in footnotes) confronts (i) the sceptical methods of Descartes and Hume with the grammatical methods of Leibniz, Kant and Wittgenstein, and (ii) the realism of Leibniz and the Tractatus with the transcendental idealism of Kant. My conclusion is that, although the method of Wittgenstein's later work remains in a sense grammatical, (i) in its new form it can free us from the conviction that the intellect can and must resolve one way or the other the conflicts that arise in the course of the latter confrontation, and that (ii), although release from such a conviction is to be seen as the aim of philosophical discourse in general, it allows philosophy to retain its overriding significance. A positive element in that lies in the respect the method demands for that in a human life which is transcendental to the activity of scientific theorising: respect, therefore, for the unique perspective of the individual historical agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Magnetoencephalography (MEG) was recorded to detect the 40 Hz component in auditory steady-state responses (ASSRs) to Dau''s chirp sound regularly repeated 40 times/s. The phase coherence of the 40 Hz component increased with the chirp intensity until the latter reached about 30 dB above its absolute hearing threshold and then saturated. We constructed a differential-equation model for the phase dynamics which showed similar behavior to the experimental result in terms of the phase coherence. One of the two parameters in the model was seen to be influenced by the stimulus intensity while the other seemed unaffected. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as 'familiarity'. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Gibson's concept of perceptual system and Reed's concept of action system. After discussing several assumptions underlying these concepts, the ontological status of these systems is considered. It is argued that perceptual systems and action systems should be conceptualized neither as parts of an animal's body nor as softly (temporarily) assembled devices; rather, they are best understood as animals' abilities to achieve functional relationships, that is, as dispositional properties. This conceptualization entails that these systems are relatively permanent properties of the animal that are causally supported by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Further, it entails that it is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and action systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistant epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that [physical] objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We see or hear birds and bells but we also have visual and auditory ideas of birds and bells. This suggestion is explored through examination of what Locke says about perception in his Elements of Natural Philosophy and the accounts offered both by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and by some of Locke's successors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpreters of Locke's Essay are divided over whether to attribute to him a Representational Theory of Perception (RTP). Those who object to an RTP interpretation cite (among other things) Locke's Book IV account of sensitive knowledge, contending that the account is incompatible with RTP. The aim of this paper is to rebut this kind of objection – to defend an RTP reading of the relevant Book IV passages. Specifically, I address four influential assumptions (about sensitive knowledge) cited by opponents of an RTP interpretation and argue that in each case the assumption is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Yolton has argued that Locke held a direct realist position according to which sensory ideas are not perceived intermediaries, as on the representational realist position, but acts that take material substances as objects. This paper argues that were Locke to accept the position Yolton attributes to him he could not at once account for appearance-reality discrepancies and maintain one of his most important anti-nativist arguments. The paper goes on to offer an interpretation of Locke's distinction between ideas of substances and modes, a distinction that helps Locke to explain appearance-reality discrepancies, although not in a large enough range of cases to strengthen Yolton's interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attempt at defending a version of John Yolton's non-representationalist reading of Locke's account of perception against Vere Chappell's very threatening criticisms. Concerning this version, which takes ideas to be appearances, Chappell questioned their identity criteria, their relation to what they are appearances of, and their nature in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored Kocsis and Heller's findings concerning the relationship between one's belief and the perceived accuracy of a profile. The influence of types of information was also considered. A sample of 353 participants was used in the present experiment that gauged the perception of information contained in a profile. The results supported Kocsis and Heller's earlier findings with a positive relationship found between belief and perceived accuracy. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more likely he or she is to perceive a profile to be accurate. This relationship was most pronounced in participants' perceptions of information contained in a profile concerning an unknown offender's crime behavior and past history. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more information relating to these two factors is likely to be perceived. This relationship was not observed where information in the same profile involved physical features O f the offender [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the significance of Aristotle's account of induction to bridge the gap of empiricist outlook towards concept formation. Virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial; Point of Aristotle that philosophic wisdom is the excellence of the entirety of theoretical knowledge; Relevance of Aristotle's theory of perception to provide intuitions about sensory awareness.

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

El artículo habla de la esfera política y como intenta de fusionar lo político y lo social a través de la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri. Según el filósofo español, la realidad es parte del proceso de sentir, que tiene un lugar determinado. El campo social se consiste de tres partes: la acción social, la socialidad de las acciones, y la socialidad de la persona. Zubiri interpreta la filosofía entre la logificación de la inteligencia y de la realidad.

Two experiments investigated equivalence relations among auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli. In Experiment 1, three 6- and 7-year-old children learned conditional discriminations with auditory samples and tactile comparisons. In subsequent tests, they demonstrated that the conditional relations of the auditory and tactile stimuli were equivalence relations. Through cross-modal transfer, the classes also had extended to include novel visual stimuli that resembled the tactile stimuli in form and size. Experiment 2 reversed the role of the tactile and visual stimuli. After learning conditional discriminations with auditory samples and visual comparisons, the children demonstrated equivalence classes that included the training stimuli plus novel tactile stimuli that resembled the visual stimuli. One child in this experiment needed cross-modal training before the classes appeared. The experiments illustrate one way in which stimulus equivalence classes are extended and relate the paradigm of stimulus equivalence to studying perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A matching-to-sample procedure that engenders observation of two elements of a complex sample stimulus may establish equivalence relations among those elements. Studies that focus on complex stimulus control will help determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for equivalence class formation. Further studies in this area will benefit by blending the methods and concepts of stimulus equivalence research with those used in studies of conceptually related learning processes. The enterprise may also profit by reconsidering the role of compound stimulus control in the formation of equivalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A brinkmanship crisis with two-sided incomplete in formation is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve. The sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve, misperception, and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability. The description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading: the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis; a state may be less, not more, likely to prevail the greater its resolve; and a states' expected payoff may be less, not more, the greater its resolve. Moreover, reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis. Surprisingly, increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely. Finally, crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses issues concerning perceptual content. Possibilities of what a person can actually see when looking at a particular thing; Requirement of the myth of immaculate perception; Premise of seeing a particular thing as a unique uncategorizable something; Controversy between Monima Chadha and Mark Siderits on the issue of whether a realist needs perception of particulars without deployment of concepts.

This Symposium comprises five papers on Locke's theory of sense perception. The authors are John Rogers, Gideon Yaffe, Lex Newman, Tom Lennon, and Martha Bolton. There are also comments on the papers, both individually and as a group, by Vere Chappell. In addition to Locke's view of perception, the papers deal with the nature of Lockean ideas and with the question whether Locke is committed to skepticism regarding the external world. The authors (and the commentator) disagree in their readings of Locke on these issues, but most maintain – and some argue – that he holds a representative theory of perception, and that he is not an external-world skeptic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]