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Well-being depends not only on what happens but also on when it happens. There are temporal aspects of well-being, and to a large extent those aspects are about relative timing—about being "in-tact." On the one hand, there is a perspectival aspect about being in-tact with one's past, present, and future or, in a less involved sense, with one's life as a whole. On the other hand, there is a synchronization aspect of being in-tact; and this aspect occurs on different levels: It might be about the alignment between different temporal domains—such as time as individually perceived and physical or intersubjective time. Or it might be about a single domain, especially the inner dynamics of individual time. The danger of not experiencing and acknowledging the relational character of these different timings likely leads to a substantial loss in the variety of human experience. Important aspects of subjective and intersubjective experience might fade away. The present paper discusses these aspects of well-being along the lines of distinctions and concepts prominently used in the metaphysics and the phenomenology of time. Thus, the paper also aims to complement the existing literature by bringing together important strands of current philosophical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of 'Too Many Minds', which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought specifically absurd to allow such a multiplication of conscious subjects, even if we could accept it for physical objects. I consider metaphysical, phenomenological, and moral arguments for this asymmetry, and show that they all fail: many overlapping conscious minds is no more problematic than many overlapping physical objects. Theories that imply such a multiplicity may or may not be true, but they cannot be rejected simply for implying it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show how Florentino H. Hornedo's intellectual life is a consistent articulation of a philosophy of man and human existence bolstered by interdisciplinarity. The approach of this study will be hermeneutic, as it will present a reading of the book The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom and selected essays in the anthologies Pagpapakatao, Christian Education: Becoming Person-for-Others and Pagmamahal at Pagmumura and Other Essays. These texts are read in the context of his story, which shall eventually give what he precisely means by phenomenology, thereby justifying the use of what he calls "organic thinking" as a method in doing philosophy of the human person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from (1) the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (2) the fact that conscious access appears to involve the selective routing/broadcasting of representational content to neural systems that integrate information in order to select cognitive/behavioral intentions in conjunction with goals. Based on these premises I illustrate how a disruption to the rationality of a representation’s influence on intention formation (when it becomes consciously accessible) would also remove any evidence that a person was conscious of the content of that representation. I therefore suggest that conscious content (and associated phenomenology) may be determined by the rational, content-appropriate influences an accessed representation has on intention formation (i.e., the influences associated with understanding). I conclude by offering replies to several potential objections to this thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach inPhenomenology of Perceptionhas been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, inPhenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Can Heidegger account for hallucination? I argue that while Heidegger does not develop an account of hallucination, he gives us all the resources we need to develop such an account. I first discuss a prominent argument against the very possibility of such an account. I argue that this argument is mistaken. I then discuss Heidegger's brief remarks on hallucination. In analysing a particular case study, Heidegger claims that the subject hallucinates for two reasons. First, he fails to realize the distinction between the different ways entities are present to him. For this reason, he cannot encounter a particular entityasit is present. Second, he is unable to do anything about the fact and manner of the presence of that entity. He is ‘unable to move in his world freely’, as Heidegger puts it. I show how these remarks, when taken in combination with Heidegger's broader ontology, allow us to explain the possibility of hallucination in a distinctively Heideggerian way. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Technology always provides a new perception of the world. However, it is not clear when technology produces 'mere' new informations and when it provides something more such as a production of new objects in our world which start to 'live' around us. The aim of this paper is to study how technology shapes our surrounding world. The questions which we are going to answer are: Is it really adding new objects to our world? If yes, does every technology have this potentiality? We are going to tackle the problem using a phenomenological and post-phenomenological approach focussing our attention on the perceptual level. Using Husserl's philosophy we will study how technology are deeply involved in our perception and, thanks to post-phenomenology and its concept of 'embodiment relations,' we will be able to determine which kind of technologies have the potentiality to change our surrounding world introducing and producing new objects in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it's like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one's perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use 'proposition' broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite several scholars referring to the relationships between the philosophy of Boltzmann and Wittgenstein, this topic is still to be explored. The aim of this paper is to analyse the similarities between their views on mathematical continuum and on the meaning of physical theories and phenomenological states of affairs. In several arguments, they both aim to achieve a similar task: by clarifying the meaning of theories in their concrete use, both authors persuade the reader to abandon an apparently intuitive way of thinking in order to overcome theoretical problems by dissolving them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides insight into the early history of the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (PPR), which was founded by Marvin Farber in conjunction with the International Society of Phenomenology, particularly as it concerns the editorial struggles to remain faithful to the work of Edmund Husserl. The PPR was intended as a continuation of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, which was the first philosophical platform for phenomenology. Many of Husserl's students who first published in the Jahrbuch formed the original editorial staff of Farber's journal and were dedicated to maintaining the spirit of phenomenology's founder in the journal. This commitment would be mitigated by the pragmatic temperament of American philosophy that Marvin Farber found in William James. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concerns the notion of aesthetic negativity, and related ideas regarding the autonomy of art. After giving some initial definitions and a brief historical sketch of these concepts, we will examine the definition proposed by arguably the greatest thinker of aesthetic negativity, Theodor Adorno, and its recent semiotic reconstruction in the work of Christoph Menke. This reconstruction configures aesthetic negativity and autonomy jointly as the capacity of artworks, and the experiences that they occasion; to processurally negate 'automatic' modes of understanding. This account is then critiqued, and contrasted with views on aesthetic experience that stress its nonconceptual and asemiotic aspects, and the close affinity of this modality of experience with perceptual presence and affective intensity, with a clear reference to the phenomenological tradition. Some recent ideas about how semiotic and phenomenological theories regarding art can interact are then cited, and an undertheorized aspect of their connection introduced, which is the main original import of the article. This connection, which is furnished by the concept of aisthetic trait, is derived from psychoanalytic metapsychology, and is an example of how the meaning and presence effects of art can act not just in a competing synchronic fashion, but can morph into each other over time. A trait is a signifier-like perceptual remnant of a prior subjective experience of high intensity that provides a kind of ratification of the experience that endures within the life history of an individual. This is then shown to have relevance to the previous topics of aesthetic negativity and autonomy in terms of the way that the trait mechanism may bring to light important diachronic aspects of aesthetic experience that are currently absent in other accounts in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent attempts to bridge Buddhist and Western philosophical accounts of perception and consciousness have been prompted in large measure by two sets of arguments: on the one hand those that set out to defend a conceptualist view of perception, and on the other those that take perception to have a self-intimating but non-conceptual aspect. This essay offers an innovative take on the conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate in the works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers by deriving insights from the phenomenology of perception. It argues that it is possible to conceive of the reflexivity of perceptual awareness (its self-intimating aspect) as intentionally structured without being at the same time transcendently constituted as a form of radical subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand the place of phenomenology within the Christian philosophical tradition. Contrary to common conceptions of phenomenology, and in spite of Husserl's own description of phenomenology as an "a-theistic" project, this paper will attempt to interpret the complex relationship of Husserl's understanding of phenomenology to the religious tradition ultimately as a function of that very tradition. In so doing, this paper will explore the philosophical concept of "vocation" in Husserl's usage, its application to the intended role of phenomenology as an agent of moral and religious "renewal," and the role played by the concept of tradition in Husserl's thought, which demands explicit reflection on Husserl's own relation to the tradition. This will allow the possibility of re-envisioning the overall sense of phenomenological discussion and its place within the tradition of philosophy, particularly in the relation of Husserlian phenomenology to the Anselmian project of "faith seeking understanding." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many have held the Acquisition of Concepts Thesis (ACT) that concept acquisition can change perceptual experience. This paper explains the close relation of ACT to ADT, the thesis that acquisition of dispositions to quickly and reliably recognize a kind of thing can change perceptual experience. It then states a highly developed argument given by Siegel (2010) which, if successful, would offer strong support for ADT and indirect support for ACT. Examination of this argument, however, reveals difficulties that undermine its promise. Distinctions made in this examination help to clarify an alternative view that denies ADT and ACT while accepting that long exposure to a class of materials may induce changes in phenomenology that lie outside perceptual experience itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How could we better understand the cosmic-positioning of human being/becoming in the territory of life we have access? Discussing some issues about the real and possible existence, on the ground of Tischner, Ingarden and Husserl's philosophical/phenomenological perspectives, I argue the significance of my own phenomenology of the ontopoiesis of life, focusing on the opportunities of grasping the imaginative/intellective forces in deciphering the logos of life's manifestations; finally, reaching to the comprehension of the indivualization within the cosmos, by life-transcendental architectonics of beingness/becoming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Abstract: It is widely accepted among philosophers that neuroscientists are conducting a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, or NCC. conceptualized this research program as the attempt to correlate the contents of conscious experience with the contents of representations in specific neural populations. A notable claim on behalf of this interpretation is that the neutral language of “correlates” frees us from philosophical disputes over the mind/body relation, allowing the science to move independently. But the experimental paradigms and explanatory canons of neuroscience are not neutral about the mechanical relation between consciousness and the brain. I argue that NCC research is best characterized as an attempt to locate a causally relevant neural mechanism and not as an effort to identify a discrete neural representation, the content of which correlates with some actual experience. It might be said that the first C in “NCC” should stand for “causes” rather than “correlates.” [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Filosofija, Sociologija is the property of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the philosophical works of Shaun Gallagher, an American philosopher and phenomenologist. It mentions several researches of Gallagher which include philosophy of mind, hermeneutics and intersubjectivity. It mentions his approach of understanding human cognition by combining philosophy, scientific knowledge and human experiences. It also reports his current work on "front loading phenomenology" which will aid in conducting scientific research over cognitive systems.

This paper outlines the basic traits of a responsive phenomenology by focusing on the issue of originary substitution. On the one hand, a phenomenology of alienness or otherness and an ethics of the other in the sense of Levinas will prove to be closely bound up with this sort of substitution. On the other side, this substitution can be concretised by transitional figures such as the advocate, the therapist, the translator, the witness, or the field researcher; they all intervene from the position of a Third without closing the fissure which opens between ourselves and the Other, between the own and the alien. Precisely by focussing on the issue of substitution, we have the opportunity to outline the basis traits of a responsive phenomenology and to discuss some of its institutional consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My study of how 'a phenomenology of phenomenology' can be conducted, guided by the deliberations into this essential inquiry by Robert Sokolowski and Klaus Held, offers a methodology long known, even as neglected by phenomenologists. The suggested methodology for this greater rigor is attention to not only how one judges, but one's grammatical account-the 'registering of phenomena'-- in judging. Husserl as early as the Logical Investigations and Sokolowski three-quarters of a century later knew that a reflective study of how phenomenological judgments were made must use a methodology that attended the semantics and syntax of phenomenological judgment because the perceptive judgment itself is carried and shaped by lexical aspects that are otherwise not adequately discerned in their noetic causal determinations. Only by attending the sentential flow of grammatical articulation can the phases of a phenomenological finding, as well as the constitutive profiles of those phases, be adequately discerned. Phenomenological judgment is an event in itself as attention, perception, and judgment are a temporal movement of mind. One's ordinary judgment or the phenomenological rigorous judgment is a "lived experience" in that it is formed and impelled by the inner temporality that attention generates as it registers the phases and constitutive profiles of a phenomenon. The paradox of the nunc stans, 'the now at a distance,' is the ego's journey forward in judgment while attempting to chart the mental geography of that journey. Only a stylistics can discern the actual topography traversed in judgment accurately due to the opaqueness of mere perceptual attentiveness. Moreover, stylistic inquiry reveals characteristic styles in the judger. I examine the significance of an aggregative orientation of mind and grammar in contrast to a quantum orientation of mind and grammar in registering the same phenomenon, a constituting difference in phenomenological judgment Immanuel Kant first discerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]