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Oil and gas (O&G) companies, as key players in the contemporary global energy landscape, have evolved within the context of a dynamic interaction between states and markets. However, their role is being transformed radically by two successive "global shifts": economic globalization—driving energy demand growth patterns—and climate change—driving energy system transformation and decarbonization, both of which require them to reconsider their business strategies. Using an interdisciplinary lens that draws on human geography, strategy and international business, and international political economy, we propose an integrated conceptual framework for two periods—the 1990s–early 2010s and the post‐Paris Agreement era—to explore the nature of strategic responses by O&G companies to these global economic and environmental shifts. We illustrate the linkage of O&G companies' two strategies of (re‐)globalization and decarbonization by the aspects of production, finance, and knowledge as internal structures. Energy security is one of the priorities in the macro external environment. It is becoming increasingly difficult for O&G companies to deal with current dilemmas: climate goals require a significant reduction in fossil fuel production and consumption, and pressures from governments, nongovernmental organizations, and investors threaten the long‐term survival of O&G companies, while fossil fuel demand will remain high in the short to medium term. At the same time, the post‐pandemic recovery and Russia's war in Ukraine are resulting in a re‐assessment of the benefits of unfettered globalization. Therefore, global O&G companies face dual challenges in the new era of (re‐)globalization and decarbonization and need to make changes to ensure their future viability. This article is categorized under:The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Decarbonizing Energy and/or Reducing Demand [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has already disrupted large swathes of the global economy, threatening the growth models of major oil and gas producer countries like Russia. A collapse in oil prices, triggered by the pandemic, once again exposed Russia's enduring susceptibility to sharp falls in oil and gas prices. We argue that this decline in oil prices came at a time when tectonic shifts in global energy markets had already threatened to reduce the value of future oil and gas revenues. These structural changes were accelerated by the collapse in demand caused by the pandemic. Because the Russian leadership had done little to address the threat posed by the emergence of a new energy order, the economy remained highly dependent on oil and gas sales as the primary source of growth. While measures undertaken since 2014 to reduce the government's fiscal dependence on high oil prices will help Russia avoid a worst-case outcome of a fiscal or financial crisis, the dependence of other branches of the economy on the energy sector remains high. This has left Russia set once again to experience a deeper recession than that forecast for other energy exporting economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the oil industry is unlikely to return to the pre-2014 status quo as two profound shifts in technology and markets are dramatically changing the longer-term outlook for the oil industry. In the short term, traditional producers will feel persistent pressure from the shale revolution, a disruptive technology that has altered the cost curve and elasticity of oil supply. In the medium term, the industry must confront a structural slowdown and eventual peak in demand owing to innovation and evolving consumer preferences, related in part to concerns over climate change. Together, these shifts reflect a new energy order in which oil is no longer an exhaustible resource, new trading patterns emerge and oil prices exhibit greater short-term volatility amid a long-term declining trend. These new rules of the game force us to reconsider some of the theories and concepts of the international political economy of oil. We flag three key political effects from these market shifts: first, key oil-producing states face economic and political turmoil; second, OPEC cannot influence the price of oil in the long term by cutting output; and third, power is redistributed in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the complexities surrounding the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in Russia and considers the wider lessons that can be learnt. According to a group of environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Sakhalin-2 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) is particularly disadvantageous to the Russian party. Several NGOs focused on specific issues such as the impact of the project on Sakhalin's salmon fishery and the status of the endangered Western Gray Whale. Efforts to address the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) concerns led to the doubling of the cost of the project. In addition, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources accused the project of non-compliance with its own national legislation in early summer 2006.

The article examines the economic geography and resource abundance of Russia. It discusses the spatial redistribution of resource rents generated by extraction, primary processing and fabrication. The author determines the country's resource regions and considers the different dimensions of resource rent concentrating on the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, the article discusses the effects of rent distribution for interregional income flows as well as territorial cohesion of Russia.

The article presents comments on problematic potential of Russian oil. the author of this article, discusses a paper by an economic geographer Leslile Dienes titled "Observations on the Problematic Potential of Russian Oil and the Complexities of Siberia," which tackles a controversial subject involving an abundant energy resource and an increasingly prominent extractive industry, both of global significance and increasing economic and political influence. Russian oil, frequently discussed and even headlined in the Western media, is critical if for no other reason than its prospects are central to the country's future economic prosperity.

The spring of 2003 saw a number of key announcements relating to the Sakhalin oil and gas projects. After considerable speculation, the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company announced that it was to go ahead with a $10 billion investment to construct Russia's first liquefied natural gas plant to export gas to Northeast Asia. This article examines the wider context of Russia's potential as an oil and gas supplier to Northeast Asia. It considers the prospects for the numerous gas pipeline projects that are being proposed. It then focuses in detail on the prospects for oil and gas development offshore of Sakhalin. The background to the current projects is presented and the composition and current status of the major projects reviewed. The article then examines the processes that are helping to shape the projects and places Sakhalin with the wider debate of the impact of globalisation upon Russia's economic transformation. The paper concludes by assessing the prospects for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that there is no alternative to a continuation of self-reliance and autonomous power generation in the development of Sakhalin oil and gas in Russia. Examination of the fuel and energy complex of the Russian Far East; Lack of proper institutional restructuring of natural monopolists; Consequences of populist price controls for coal, fuel and energy.