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Objectives: Although patient safety continues to be a priority in the U.S. healthcare system, delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery still led to adverse events for patients. The purpose of this study was to review root cause analysis (RCA) reports in the Veterans Health Administration to identify the root causes and contributing factors of delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery in an effort to prevent avoidable delays in future care., Methods: The RCA reports from Veterans Health Administration hospitals from October 2016 through September 2019 were reviewed and the root causes and contributory factors were identified. These elements were coded by consensus and analyzed using descriptive statistics., Results: During the 3-year study period, 206 RCAs were identified and 163 were analyzed that were specific to delays in diagnosis, treatment, and surgery. The reports identified 24 delays in diagnosis, 117 delays in treatment, and 22 delays in surgery. Delays occurred most often in outpatient settings., Conclusions: Results supported the need for standardization of care processes and procedures, improved communication between and within department personnel, and improved policies and procedures that will be followed as intended. By reviewing adverse events, root causes, and contributing factors identified by local RCA teams, strategies can be developed to reduce delays in diagnosis and treatment of patients and lead to safer care., Competing Interests: The authors are employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and disclose no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2022 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.)

Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None reported.

Objectives: Developing a workforce skilled in improving the safety of medical care has often been cited as an important means to achieve safer care. Although some educational programs geared toward patient safety have been developed, few advanced training programs have been described in the literature. We describe the development of a patient safety fellowship program., Methods: We describe the development and curriculum of an Interprofessional Fellowship in Patient Safety. The 1-year in residence fellowship focuses on domains such as leadership, spreading innovations, medical improvement, patient safety culture, reliability science, and understanding errors., Results: Specific training in patient safety is available and has been delivered to 48 fellows from a wide range of backgrounds. Fellows have accomplished much in terms of improvement projects, educational innovations, and publications. After completing the fellowship program, fellows are obtaining positions within health-care quality and safety and are likely to make long-term contributions., Conclusions: We offer a curriculum and fellowship design for the topic of patient safety. Available evidence suggests that the fellowship results in the development of patient safety professionals.

Objective: The study goals were to examine wrong intraocular lens (IOL) implant adverse events in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), identify root causes and contributing factors, and describe system changes that have been implemented to address this challenge., Design: This study represents collaboration between the VHA's National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) and the National Surgery Office (NSO)., Participants: This report includes 45 wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events reported to established VHA NCPS and NSO databases between July 1, 2006, and June 31, 2014. There are approximately 50,000 eye implant procedures performed each year in the VHA., Methods: Wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events are reported by VHA facilities to the NCPS and the NSO. Two authors (A.C. and J.N.) coded the reports for event type (wrong lens or expired lens) and identified the primary contributing factor (coefficient κ = 0.837). A descriptive analysis was conducted, which included the reported yearly event rate., Main Outcome Measure: The main outcome measure was the reported wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events., Results: There were 45 reported wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events. Between 2011 and June 30, 2014, there was a significant downward trend (P = 0.02, R = 99.7%) at a pace of -0.08 (per 10,000 cases) every year. The most frequently coded primary contributing factor was incomplete preprocedure time-out (n = 12) followed by failure to perform double check of preprocedural calculations based upon original data and implant read-back at the time the surgical eye implant was performed (n = 10)., Conclusions: Preventing wrong IOL implant adverse events requires diligence beyond performance of the preprocedural time-out. In 2013, the VHA has modified policy to ensure double check of preprocedural calculations and implant read-back with positive impact. Continued analysis of contributing human factors and improved surgical team communication are warranted.

Objective: While the study of suicide on mental health units has a long history, the study of patient safety more generally is relatively new. Our objective was to determine the type and relative frequency of adverse events occurring on Veterans Health Administration (VHA) mental health units; the primary root causes for these events; and make recommendations for abating or mitigating these events., Methods: We searched our national database for any reported adverse event that occurred on an inpatient mental health unit between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016. We found 87 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) reports and 9780 safety reports. The safety reports were coded for type of event and the RCAs were further coded for underlying causes and severity., Results: Of the 87 RCA reports, there were 31suicide attempts, 16 elopements, 10 assaults, 8 events involving hazardous items on the unit, 7 falls, 6 unexpected deaths, 3 overdoses and 6 cases coded as "other". For the 9780 safety reports falls were the most common event, followed by medication events, verbal assaults, physical assaults, medical problems and hazardous items on the unit., Conclusions: As with medical units, patients on mental health units are at risk for many types of adverse events. The same focus on patient safety is just as important for our mental health patients as for our medical patients. Mental health unit staff should undertake a structured assessment of all risk on their units. This broad approach may be more successful than focusing on a particular event type., (Published by Elsevier Inc.)

The objective was to analyze reported flash burns experienced by patients on home oxygen therapy (HOT) in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) using a qualitative, retrospective review of VHA root cause analysis reports between January 2009 and November 2015. Of 123 cases of reported adverse events related to flash burns, 100 cases (81%) resulted in injury, and 23 (19%) resulted in death. Although 89% of veterans claimed to have quit smoking (n = 109), 92% (n = 113) of burns occurred as a result of smoking. The most common root cause was risk identification issues. Recommended actions were standardized risk assessment policies, patient education, and the adoption of fire stop valves. Patients with a history of smoking who are on HOT should be considered for fire stop valves and offered consistent counseling and follow-up using a combination of harm reduction and shared decision-making techniques. Standardization of risk identification and documentation is recommended.

Rationale, Aims and Objectives: Patient safety culture may have a significant influence on safety processes and outcomes. Therefore, it is important to have valid tools to measure patient safety culture in order to identify potential levers for cultural change that could improve patient safety. The 65-item Department of Veterans Affairs Patient Safety Culture Survey (VA PSCS) consists of 14 dimensions and is administered biannually to VA employees. Test-retest reliability of the VA PSCS has not been established., Methods: We conducted repeated administrations of the VA PSCS among 28 VA employees. We measured intraclass correlation coefficients for each item and dimension., Results: Test-retest intraclass correlation coefficient values were 0.7 or greater for 13 out of 14 dimensions of the VA PSCS. Employees had difficulty reliably reporting how others feel about patient safety., Conclusions: In general, the VA PSCS survey showed adequate test-retest reliability. Items asking what others think or feel showed lower reliability. Further work is needed to better understand the relationship between safety culture, safety processes and safety outcomes., (Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.)

Background: Preventable adverse events are more likely to occur among older patients because of the clinical complexity of their care. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) stores data about serious adverse events when a root cause analysis (RCA) has been performed. A primary objective of this study was to describe the types of adverse events occurring among older patients (age > or = 65 years) in Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. Secondary objectives were to determine the underlying reasons for the occurrence of these events and report on effective action plans that have been implemented in VA hospitals., Methods: In a retrospective, cross-sectional review, RCA reports were reviewed and outcomes reported using descriptive statistics for all VA hospitals that conducted an RCA for a serious geriatric adverse event from January 2010 to January 2011 that resulted in sustained injury or death., Results: The search produced 325 RCA reports on VA patients (age > or = 65 years). Falls (34.8%), delays in diagnosis and/or treatment (11.7%), unexpected death (9.9%), and medication errors (9.0%) were the most commonly reported adverse events among older VA patients. Communication was the most common underlying reason for these events, representing 43.9% of reported root causes. Approximately 40% of implemented action plans were judged by local staff to be effective., Conclusion: The RCA process identified falls and communication as important themes in serious adverse events. Concrete actions, such as process standardization and changes to communication, were reported by teams to yield some improvement. However, fewer than half of the action plans were reported to be effective. Further research is needed to guide development and implementation of effective action plans.

The purpose of this report is to discuss surgical adverse event lessons learned and to recommend action. Examples of incorrect surgical adverse events managed in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) patient safety system and results of a survey regarding the impact of the surgery lessons learned process are provided. The VHA implemented a process for sharing deidentified stories of surgical lessons learned. The cases are in-operating room selected examples from lessons learned from October 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Examples selected illustrate helpful human factors principles. To learn more about the awareness and impact of the lessons learned, we conducted a survey with Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA. The types of examples of adverse events include wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These are accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimizing handoffs, and standardizing how information is communicated. The survey response rate was 76 per cent (88 of 132). Of those who had seen the surgical lessons learned (76% [67 of 88]), the majority (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviors in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice.

Using cultural analysis, the authors present a rationale for a nursing-focused crew resource management (CRM) program in the Veterans Health Administration. Although the value of CRM in aviation is well documented and CRM has been successfully applied in healthcare settings to improve communication and teamwork, there is little evidence outlining the implementation of CRM on nursing units with nursing as the primary focus. This article describes the preproject data supporting a nursing-focused CRM program called nursing CRM. This is the first in a series of 2 articles highlighting this program.