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Islam is the key character of Pakistan's national identity, but ironically, it has also become a tool used by different sectarian/jihadi outfits to perpetrate violence against different religious minorities in Pakistan. The targeted persecution of the Hazara Shia community in Balochistan certainly stands among such cases. Since 2003, a Sunni militant group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), has been perpetrating targeted violence against the Hazara Shias in Balochistan. This paper explores why LeJ has been waging targeted violence against the Hazara community. Is it motivated solely by anti-Shia hatred or are other factors, such as local-level socio-political and economic grievances and the changing regional security environment, also playing a part in exacerbating the violence? The analysis reveals that although Sunni-Shia sectarian dimensions and regional geopolitical factors are still relevant in explaining the targeted persecution of Hazaras, they are no longer the sole instrumental causes behind the violence. It demonstrates that local level disputes over socio-economic resources and access to political power have now become more significant, to the extent that they are transforming the relationship between Sunni sectarian outfits and local ethnic communities in Balochistan, thus creating incentives for militant groups to promote religious hatred and sectarian intolerance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent months there has been an effort to reignite debate about the suitability of a federal parliamentary system and argue that it needs to be replaced by a centralized presidential form of government. This has led to sharp reactions from those who favour a continuation of parliamentary government in Pakistan especially with regard to the strong federal provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment (2010) to the Pakistani Constitution, which granted greater autonomy to the provinces and undid many of the changes imposed by military rulers. This paper examines the original version of this debate from Pakistan's experience in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of identifying and discussing the rationales of those in favor of a presidential Pakistan and the price that the country paid for undermining parliamentary government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan claims to maintain neutrality in the Iran–Saudi rift. Sustaining this approach, however, has been problematic against a backdrop of intensifying Iran–Saudi rivalry. Pakistan's choices suggest a tilt towards Saudi Arabia. Based on extensive fieldwork in Islamabad, this paper focuses on the meanings and uses of neutrality in Pakistan's foreign policy. The paper argues that Pakistan cannot be neutral due to its stronger cultural, economic and defence ties with Saudi Arabia but it promotes this rhetoric due to a combination of demographic, geographic and geopolitical factors. Islamabad's claim of neutrality serves the dual purpose of the national interests in relation to domestic and foreign affairs. Based on its economic, sectarian and geopolitical realities, Pakistan desires a neutrality in the Iranian-Saudi rivalry but it is very difficult because it has strong and multifaceted relations with Saudi Arabia. Based on the assessment of Pakistan's foreign policy choices, we argue that Pakistan continues to lean away from Iran towards Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recognizing constraints Pakistani women legislators face despite their entry into politics on a 17 per cent quota in national and provincial assemblies, it is time to rethink how quotas can lead to their political mainstreaming. This article explores quota legislators' views on their own accountability and empowerment based on the first online survey in Pakistan with 200 women in the assemblies (2013-18). Findings show quota legislators resist classification as male proxies and view themselves as accountable to notional voters, although they are indirectly elected. Many report silencing and harassment by male colleagues. Cross-party women's caucuses in each assembly have a mixed track record of facilitating substantive representation, undermined by religious parties and class differences. Respondents favoured further affirmative action mechanisms to increase their political voice, e.g. additional quota requirements within parties, more tickets for general seats and participation in key decision-making bodies of parties. A trajectory for women in politics to move from quota seats (in local bodies and assemblies) to general seats is not yet in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious authorities in many Muslim-majority countries have argued that the suspension of communal prayers during an epidemic does not contravene Islamic law. In Pakistan, such measures have proven difficult to enforce, in part because many religious leaders in the country have opposed the closure of places of worship and the limits placed on public religious gatherings. The question is why? This paper suggests that the distrust of the state in matters of religion in Pakistan can be traced back to the colonial era, and that the political developments following independence have amplified frustration and mistrust between political and religious authorities in the country. Significant sources of contention in matters of religion and state remain unresolved under the prime ministership of Imran Khan. At the same time, the pandemic has thrust earlier conflicts into the spotlight and exposed contests over opinion, expertise, and authority in matters of religion and public health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan's progress toward full democracy is dependent upon many variables. One major obstacle to establishment of a mature democracy is widespread corruption, which penetrates deep into the institutions of governance and accountability. Three civilian governments (1958–1971, 1977–1988, 1999–2008) have been overthrown by the military, and three (1988–1990, 1991–1993, 1994–1996) removed by elected presidents on charges of 'public corruption.' The extensive literature on causes of corruption in Pakistan has focused on the most apparent reasons, which include politicized bureaucracy, weak institutions, and incompetent political classes. No attention has been paid to the role of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), a legal framework under which the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has been operating since November 1999. This study is the first to highlight the NAO's role in spreading corruption. Rational choice theory and the economics of crime are applied to evaluate Pakistan's anti-corruption law, particularly the settlement system. The study concludes that flaws in the law in an environment where the NAB lacks institutional autonomy result in the benefits of a crime outweighing the costs for an offender. In other words, awareness of gaps in the law increases corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In authoritarian states, emerging democracies, and well-established democracies alike, alternative accounts that contest official state narratives are common. Why do people believe such accounts even in the absence of supporting evidence? While this question has been explored in the United States, relatively little research has assessed it in other contexts. Through a survey experiment carried out in Pakistan, this article tests the impact of cues by political parties on belief in such conspiracy theories. The results provide evidence in favor of partisan cueing: When alternative narratives are endorsed by political parties viewed favorably by the respondent, they are more likely to be believed. I suggest that political parties are able to capitalize on misinformation and a lack of trust in official institutions for tactical advantage. Results differ by subgroup: Higher income and urban respondents are swayed more by their own party source than are lower income and rural individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Indian and Pakistani Punjab, this paper focuses on how, despite membership in or conversion to majority religious communities, former untouchables in both countries continue to experience caste-based discrimination. In India, a rights-based idiom for caste politics is limited by fragmentation within the Dalit community and the compromises required by electoral politics, while the imposition of a totalising Islamic identity by the state has resulted in the erasure of caste from the political discourse in Pakistan. This paper suggests that class-based mobilisation may be a better route to Dalit empowerment on both sides of the border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines some turns in the Pakistani political career of the Dalit leader Jogendranath Mandal between 1947 and 1950 when he resigned as a government minister and left the country. The imperatives of Dalit emancipation interacted with concerns about the position of minorities, thereby revealing the conditions by which difference became legible in the new state. In the creation of Pakistan, Mandal had seen a promise of furthering Dalit emancipation, but this vision could not withstand the state's view of an undifferentiated Hindu minority population. By tracing Mandal's trajectory, this essay follows both the promises offered by Pakistan and the slow closure of such alternative possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We investigate the cross scalar linkages between every day violence and global war on terror in the context of urban Pakistan. We draw upon intensive research undertaken in the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi to highlight how marginalized Pashtun and Bengali Rohingya communities experience state and everyday violence in the context of the global war on terror. Focusing on the gendered aspects of infrastructural and spectacular violence, we argue that every day violence too, is deeply politicised and inflected by national and global level geopolitics. Following Hannah Arendt, we conceptualize violence as a manifestation of a loss of power. Accordingly, drawing upon ethnographic evidence we demonstrate how even domestic violence takes on a public and a political valence. We argue that performances of masculinities and femininities are, in fact, imbricated with geographies of exclusion, marginalization and state policies. The routinization of violence in everyday spaces draws attention to the DNA like relationality of the local with the geopolitical at the global and national scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local government reform in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province between 2001 and 2009 is examined through the lens of multi-level governance. The reforms were initiated by the military-led government of Pervez Musharraf and entrenched the power of the federal government. The reforms of 2001–09 were similar to the reforms implemented by the governments of Ayub Khan in the 1960s and Zia-ul-Haque in 1979. The article argues that three different military governments pursued similar programmes of constitutional reform to secure themselves in power. We conclude that devolution may not always enhance democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is significantly weakened and dislodged from former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) yet, it has relocated to bordering areas in Afghanistan under ideological umbrella of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and gets operational and logistics support through Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies. ISIS, having been greatly marginalized in the Middle East is struggling to gain foothold in Afghanistan with TTP as its proxy to execute the deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan not only poses threat to Afghanistan but its collusion with TTP threatens Pakistan's internal security as well. Pakistan's sacrifices go in vain if cooperation from Afghanistan and the US forces is not forthcoming in defeating ISIS and TTP operating from Afghanistan. The article argues while domestic reforms and effective implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) by Pakistan is important to quell extremism and terrorism from urban centres, the cooperation from regional countries, harbouring TTP is vital for the elimination of scourge of terrorism from the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In federal systems, upper chamber of the legislature is considered as a representative institution of the smaller units but the evidences suggest that the parliamentary features of federations limit the territorial role of the upper/federal chamber. This is because the relative party discipline in parliamentary democracies and the supremacy of popular house on the second chamber in such federations. Building on this proposition, the paper attempts to determine the territorial character of Pakistani Senate through evaluating its role for pro-autonomy legislation during the debates over 18th constitutional amendment in Pakistan. The evidence demonstrates congruence of opinion between the Senators and the members of National Assembly over certain autonomy issues. Hence, it seems to suggest that the parliamentary nature of the institutions limits the territorial of the Senate of Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the interplay between corruption and governance in post 9/11 Pakistan. Post 9/11 Pakistan is characterized by a protracted conflict that has affected daily lives of people as well as governance trends. Primary data in the form of Key Informant Interviews with government officials, journalists and public representatives is used for this paper. Secondary data sources included research papers, newspaper articles and data pertaining to corruption, governance and conflict have been utilized. Evidence from post 9/11 Pakistan indicates that weak governance is related with corruption and is dependent on the state of the institutions and conflict induced instabilities. The paper outlines how different Governments in the post 9/11 period, instead of improving social services delivery for the populace, indulged in mismatched priorities, leading to a lack of accountability and transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women's political participation is sine qua non of women's empowerment movement. Pakistan is a developing democracy where citizens are given equal political rights without any gender discrimination. The Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa elected a female as Deputy Speaker for the first time. Report of various organizations on 2013 general elections declared that women's participation in politics have strengthened its roots in Pakistan. Mardan is the 19th largest city of Pakistan and 2nd most populous district of KP Province. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the most affected province of Pakistan in the war against global terrorism nevertheless in the 2013 general elections, the province generally and district Mardan especially witnessed increase in women's political participation. An encouraging number of women casted their votes, contested election, and launched elections campaigns. The research is qualitative and is based on primary and secondary sources. The study explores the changing trends of women's politics in Mardan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study attempts to look into the temporal and spatial variations in human development across the districts of Punjab. The spatial variations in human development have been shown by calculating a district level Human Development Index (HDI) in Punjab for the year 2014. The temporal variation in human development for the districts of Punjab has been shown by comparing the HDI calculated in this paper with the HDI calculated for the same districts by Jamal and Khan (2007). However, the present work tries to correct some of the methodological issues in the work done by UNDP (2003) and Jamal and Khan (2007). Due to data constraints at the district level, UNDP (2003) and Jamal and Khan (2007) used health outcomes at the provincial level to calculate district health index in Pakistan. Similarly, they constructed income and education index by using some weak proxies. Income index was calculated by assuming equal share of services in gross domestic product (GDP) for all districts. For education index they considered adult literacy rate. Present study has used district level child survival rate for health index. Per capita income and mean years of schooling have been used for calculating for income and education index. The availability of data on child survival rate, income and mean years of schooling has been made possible by the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS, 2014) conducted by the Punjab Bureau of Statistics with the collaboration of UNDP and UNICEF. The results confirm the common perception of regional disparities in Punjab. Moreover, the temporal comparison of HDI points towards the widening of development gap between the regions of Punjab. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expectations in Pakistan rose, when for the first time, in its history a political government in 2013 completed its full term of office and was replaced not by the military but by another political government after being defeated at the ballot box. It raises questions about what kind of democratic space is developing and what type of hybrid regime is emergent. The paper reflects upon the concept of hybrid regime and draws out key variables: turnover, tutelage and neo-patrimonialism and then considers how to categorise development in Pakistan. It concludes that Pakistan is in a ‘gray zone’ and that during the period there was evidence of it moving towards becoming an illiberal hybrid regime but the military went on the offensive and the democratic space contracted returning to being an illiberal tutelary hybrid regime. Unless tutelage and neo-patrimonialism are not challenged Pakistan will not progress in the democratic transition and remain a hybrid regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the recent shifts in the ideological messaging of Karachi's MuttahidaQaumi Movement. Faced with external challenges, theMQMhas adapted by using the rhetoric of the "global war on terror" to gain advantage over its political opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that constitutions can play an important role in fostering a degree of political co-operation if they are useful to the political strategies of both rulers and ruled. Viewing Pakistan's constitutional documents as 'strategic constitutions' helps to explain the timing and content of constitutional reform, but also the seemingly contradictory provisions relating to the Constitutions' commitment to Islam. A strategic constitution functions to settle political exigencies rather than committing itself to the task of putting fundamental issues of state to rest. Often, the constitutional domain substitutes for other conventional channels of politics which may be inaccessible, or deliberately sidestepped, in order to achieve particular political goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2013 election in Pakistan was a significant point in a presumed transition from autocracy towards democracy, since for the first time an elected government completed a full term and was replaced by another freely elected government. Pakistan’s hybrid regime, however, continues to be threatened by a significant ‘disloyal opposition’, in the form of secessionists in Balochistan andjihadiIslamists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (the so-called Pakistan Taliban). Drawing on the literature on hybrid regimes, and using Juan Linz’s framework that focused on both ‘disloyal’ and ‘semi-loyal’ oppositions to democratic rule, this article examines the threat to a continuing movement towards democracy posed by secessionists, Islamists, and the military. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Tensions with India and a fraught civil-military imbalance were the dominant storylines in Pakistan in 2016. These crises overshadowed promising developments in the areas of counterterrorism, the economy, and the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the modern times national flag is one of the basic requirements for a nation state. It symbolizes the state and is consider as a matter of honor, respect and pride for the entire nation. Pakistan's national flag, comprised of green and white with a crescent and star, was designed by AmiruddinKidwai, approved by the Muslim League leadership and finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly of the country. Jinnah showed personal interest in making of the flag. He wanted to make it reflect the feelings of the people of Pakistan and thus annoyed Mountbatten by not accepting his design. There are some controversies regarding the flag including the debate that whether the crescent is in right direction or not, but ever since the birth of Pakistan, there is a national consensus about this flag and not even a slight modification has been made in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the views of Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on a range of issues including sovereignty, civil-military relations, the civil service, industrialization, religion and the state, and national integration. Relying on Jinnah's own views, it reveals that selective engagement with what Jinnah thought has done no favours to Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan has for all practical purposes, rejected nearly every policy prescription that its founder believed in and effectively repudiated what Jinnah stood for. While much attention has been paid to Jinnah's role in the partition of India or in the politics of the Indian Freedom Movement and the Pakistan Movement, comparatively little has been written about Jinnah's views on governance. This paper tries to initiate the process of filling this gap in the hope of generating a more holistic debate about what Pakistan's founder stood for as a statesman and state builder. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study investigates the prevalence, sources and distribution of household vulnerability to food-insecurity in the Punjab, Pakistan. Applying a multilevel model on a large dataset of about 90,000 households, we find that the share of households at risk of becoming food-insecure (vulnerability) is higher than the share that is current food-insecure. Households in rural areas are least vulnerable. In contrast, residents of cities and urban areas experience high level of vulnerability that exceeds the average in the Punjab. The risk-induced vulnerability is higher than the structural-induced vulnerability and vulnerability to idiosyncratic shock is higher than vulnerability to covariate shocks. Findings imply that households in the Punjab are vulnerable not as a result of poor resource endowments but because of risk. The Pakistani government should go beyond mere observed food-insecurity to address the needs of the relatively larger population that is at risk of being food-insecure in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper looks at the concept of political ‘hybridity’ within the broader framework of Pakistan’s domestic politics. Whilst analysing Pakistan’s domestic politics, most analysts tend to view the country’s political system as authoritarian and label it as a military dictatorship. Whilst this has been true for most of Pakistan’s history since it came into existence in 1947, it is also equally important to look at the role played by the more democratic elements of Pakistani society in politics, and the interactions that have taken place between the more democratic forces on the one hand, and the more authoritarian elements on the other. This paper moves away from traditional ways of viewing Pakistan’s domestic politics and focuses more on the grey areas, instead of viewing the country in black or white terms. In doing so, the paper has a strong focus on Ayub Khan’s concept of Basic Democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistani politics are characterised by strong corporate social links through kinship and caste that impose reciprocal obligations and rights. Marital maps enable allow for accurate prediction of allegiances and decision making and contribute to a transparent assessment of political processes in the country. While much of the focus on reciprocal relations has understandably been on descent relations (dynasties), the complex network of marital alliances that cut across lineage and sectarian divides helps explain notable levels of stability despite the fragility of the state and other public institutions. Using the example of one of the most successful political dynasties in post independence Pakistan, we show the extent of cross lineage, region and even party alliances that shape this political kinship network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government of Pakistan established several 'publicly funded, privately managed' companies based on the principles of Public Private Partnership. This paper analyses whether this unique PPP model protects the interests of both the public and private stakeholders, or is this just a means to public subsidizing of private interests? By drawing on evidence from primary and secondary sources, this paper finds that though some elements of PPP are present in these companies, they, as a whole, are not truly public private partnerships. They do, however, represent an innovative relationship between the public and private sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The arbitrary, discriminatory and oppressive application of blasphemy laws in Pakistan has been the cause of much discord and violence in recent years, affecting the non-Muslim population particularly harshly. This article traces the history of such laws and argues that the courts have done little to mitigate the adverse effects of their use by successive governments. The article calls for urgent and concerted international pressure to ensure that the Pakistani authorities respect their obligations under relevant legal instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why do developmental state institutions persist? We address this conceptual question through an empirical puzzle: even though Pakistan and Turkey, like South Korea and Taiwan, constructed postwar developmental state institutions, the Pakistani and Turkish economies have been unable to upgrade to higher value-added production following the Korean and Taiwanese experience. If, as many scholars argue, the creation of developmental state institutions is necessary and sufficient for high growth outcomes, how can we understand the divergence between these two sets of cases? We argue that that the persistence of developmental state institutions is contingent on the absence of articulated opposition from agrarian actors and provincial capitalists against regimes of industrial promotion. While Korea and Taiwan suppressed or co-opted potential challengers from the countryside, such actors in Pakistan and Turkey effectively challenged the developmental state in the mid-1970s. We suggest that the politics of developmental state persistence are analytically distinct from the origins of developmental states, thus enabling a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between the politics of developmental state institutions and late industrialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - Jinnah was, to some extent, a successful leader in obtaining his goals of becoming the only spokesperson for Muslims in India and gaining a piece of land for Pakistan but the main question is whether these achievements can be attributed to transactional or transformational strategies. Has he managed transactional or transformational change in terms of political culture? This point will be discussed in the paper. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach - A documentary analysis of behaviors, statements and incidents of Jinnah and other relevant personages. Findings - The research shows that Jinnah was neither a transformational nor a charismatic leader. Therefore, his success cannot be attributed to his transformational ideology or charismatic personality. The political maneuvers that he adopted by frequently changing his espoused values and theories-in-use are the sources of his transactional success. Moreover, it is the international events and the vested political interests of the British are among the significant reasons that brought him success. Research limitations/implications - In this work, a detailed comparison has not been made between voluminous theories of leadership because it is beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, it is not the intention of the paper to compare his leadership with that of other leaders; however, the future research in this direction might be useful. Indeed, the relevant leadership examples have been selected from the All India Congress with the major point of reference being the All India Muslim League - the party that brought him real recognition and fame. Practical implications - It is stressed in the research that overt success is not a sufficient criterion to categorize a leader in a specific category without analyzing espoused theory and theories-in-use. The study will help those researchers who are interested in understanding the current political culture of Pakistan. The research will be helpful in enhancing the debate within the theme of leadership, especially transformational, transactional and charismatic. Moreover, the paper will encourage other researchers to compare Jinnah's leadership with that of other political leaders of the world. Originality/value - The research is original as Jinnah's leadership from the perspectives of transformational and transactional leadership styles and the espoused theory and theories-in-use has, so far, not been discussed. It presents significant new arguments and information, which will be in the interest of researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A year after assuming power, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government faced a political crisis fomented by the pro-military opposition leader Imran Khan, who mobilized his supporters to protest alleged electoral rigging in the 2013 poll. Khan had to call off the protests after the Pakistani Taliban's grisly terrorist attack on an army-run school in retaliation for the army's offensive against them in North Waziristan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How might we understand the maintenance of political order in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas from Pakistani Independence until the mid-2000s, when all the factors used to explain the current insurgency have been present for decades? This article argues that particularistic institutional arrangements between the state and tribal structures-what I call 'hybrid governance'-established and maintained political order in the region. It develops a conceptual framework for the creation and maintenance of hybrid governance-where the state explicitly shares coercion with societal elites-as a specific kind of indirect rule. Through archival, documentary, and interview-based research, the article then demonstrates the utility of hybrid governance concept in explaining the establishment and operation of political order, and how the marginalization of the agents of hybrid governance is a major causal factor in the onset of the insurgency. The article concludes with some comparative reflections on the sources of political order outside the state's monopoly of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that in the wake of 9/11, Pakistan engaged in two policy moves that were highly problematic and controversial from a domestic perspective: the alliance with the United States, and the simultaneous disengagement with the Taliban regime. While realist accounts largely posit these moves as a consequence of US diktat, this article is more interested in exploring how the actions were enabled by a domestic political narrative. Scholarly accounts in the post 9/11 era tend to marginalise the role of indigenous agency and ‘voice’, and overwhelmingly work within frameworks that emphasise the consequential effects of US hegemony. Conversely, in examining official Pakistani political discourses, the article argues that a number of identifiable rhetorical strategies played a performative role in enabling specific Pakistani policy outcomes in the wake of 9/11. In important ways, the analysis moves away from unproblematically assuming Pakistan as simply a passive recipient of American ‘empire’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some militaries retain high authoritarian prerogatives during transitions from militarized authoritarian rule? The Pakistan military's 2007 extrication shows that an important part of the answer lies in the level of structural differentiation between the “military government” and the “military institution”. Despite sustained contentious opposition to military rule, the high level of separation between these two military dimensions of the state allowed the institutional military to delink itself from the discredited dictatorship and exit on its own terms. In the post-authoritarian context, the military has preserved its expansive prerogatives by using a variety of adaptive contestation mechanisms – including the mobilization of the media and the judiciary – that act as a continuing source of political instability and uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There are several theoretical frameworks proposed by a wide range of scholars to explicate and understand civil and military relations. Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory is one of the recent models in this theoretical tradition. She argues that the theory of separation of civil and military relations given by Huntington not only fails to give an adequate account of domestic military interventions in Pakistan but also attempts to impose the American model of civil and military relations on it. Given the problems and flaws of the separation model, she proposes the concordance theory in place of the separation model. Schiff claims that the concordance theory provides an appropriate model to explain and to avoid military intervention in Pakistan. She purports to demonstrate that a military coup takes place due to discordance among three partners on four indicators. This article will show through the case study of Pakistan that concordance theory fails on four accounts. First, Pakistan's military coup is not the consequence of discordance but concordance. Second, there are not three partners but two. Third, the notion of four indicators runs the risk of oversimplification. Fourth, concordance theory makes somewhat the same mistake committed by the separation model attempting to superimpose the American civil and military framework upon Pakistan. This article will demonstrate that concordance theory draws the civil and military relations upon two rival approaches: abstract theoretical and multicultural approach. By consequence it goes through the internal contradiction because of which it is fated to fail. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the colonial legacies in the development of the Indian and Pakistani navies following Independence. As both navies struggled with problems of indigenising their forces, Britain endeavoured to maintain its regional hegemony by extending the professional dependency of both. The influence of imperial ideologies and racial discourses of power on these relationships and on Indian naval identity caused India's and Pakistan's navies to evolve in different directions, as did Cold War geopolitics and civil–military relations. By analysing the challenges faced by India in achieving strategic independence, this article widens existing debates surrounding the neo-colonialism of Indian governance and education during the Nehruvian period, the reinvigoration of Empire and the limits of British imperial power after World War II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's non-traditional security (NTS) relations with its neighbouring states through the lens of state weakness. Building on existing Chinese language literature on the NTS situation in China, the article demonstrates how weak institutions, political illegitimacy and poor state-society relations in six of China's periphery states--Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, and Mongolia--negatively impact China's domestic NTS environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: I consider structural reforms to democracy in Pakistan using ideas from the analysis of oligopolistic competition and game theory. Successful democracy requires strong, flexible political parties and high-quality, responsible leaders. Parliamentary responsibility for government helps develop strong parties. National parties should be able to nominate candidates in all elections at all levels. For flexibility, members of the National Assembly should be free to form new parties. With federalism, provincial and local democracy also reduce political entry barriers. Approval-voting open-list proportional representation can strengthen democratic leadership in all communities. Runoff elections would allow more flexible party competition in single-seat districts. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Historically speaking Pakistan and Israel are not directly engaged in any hostility or clash with each other. Pakistan did not recognise Israel since its inception because of her consistent support to Palestine issue and its apprehension that India Israel connections are against her security, ultimately shattering sub-continental balance of power. During General Musharraf regime, the debate to recognise Israel was on high side. It had been debated at academic, official as well as public levels. It was believed at that time that if Pakistan accord recognition to sate of Israel, the sensitivities associated with the issue might change. The cost and advantage quotient of recognition were kept in mind and discussed openly. During Musharraf regime and onwards, the moot point in Pakistan has been the cost benefit analysis of recognition. The existing world scenario has changed the ground realities and placed Pakistan in a difficult situation that how it can move closer to Israel without abandoning historical stand on Palestinian cause. It is also believed that if the transformation and change in Pakistan's policy is not hasty, only then it might be more productive and successful. The eventuality of recognising Israel might spur the sentiments of public and it may take some time to have popular placement in our society By analysing different and conflicting view points, this paper will investigate primarily the debate held during Musharraf era in the light of historical background and shall see what course Pakistan should take on in this regard after assessing pros and cons of recognition. After going through different approaches on the subject, this will also contribute whether Pakistan should shift her stance about Israel or otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India and Pakistan are two countries that, having tussles since the day they emerged on the globe as independent countries in 1947. The dispute between the two countries has a number of constraints in terms of historical, political and strategic terms. However, the most important amongst them is Kashmir, over which a number of wars have been fought. In May 1998, the relations between India and Pakistan took a new turn when India conducted its nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, followed by Pakistan conducting its own series of nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. Thus began a complicated nuclear race between the two that concerned the international community at large because any conflict between the two having a nuclear angle would have global ramifications. This research is focused on the domestic constraints of Pakistan related to the nuclear issue of 1998 and provides a better perspective, from a Pakistani viewpoint. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan did not lead to instability in the region, both have adopted a policy of deterrence, the leadership of both sides is thinking rationally and stable relations in the form of deadlock are current. Both in India and Pakistan there exists a common belief that their nuclear programs are the guarantors of national security and national power. Due to these explosions, nuclear weapons have been put to political use by both countries. And both states are now targets for the nuclear missiles of all the other nuclear weapon states, as well as each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the role played by the Communist Party in Pakistani politics before it was banned in 1954, a time when it was the centre of a motley variety of progressive movements that expressed regionally variant, alternative visions of politics. It is an attempt to draw out the relationship between the state, and groups who referred to themselves varyingly as ‘communists’, ‘leftists’ and ‘progressives’ within the city of Lahore. This localized analysis of these different yet overlapping groups illustrates how they were all linked within official state narratives to the Communist Party, which was, in turn, constructed as the centre for godless, anti-national sentiment, thereby justifying the repression of all those who were seen to be associated with it. This allowed for the construction of a historical narrative where the role of the Communist Party as political opposition, presenting an alternative in its own right, became subsumed within the wider narrative of the nation state and its friends and foes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing with the 37 year checkered constitutional history (1973-2010), the first decade of 21st Century, brought some hope for Pakistan. That was adoption of 18th Constitutional Amendment. It was a damage-control exercise which was proposed by an All Party Parliamentary Committee (APPC). To what extent, the 18th Constitutional Amendment restored the original constitution and what are its salient features, is the subject of this paper. Defects found in the 18th Amendment created a head on collision between Parliament and judiciary. However, these were subsequently rectified through the 19th Amendment passed after few months of the previous bill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bureaucracy forms life blood of any government and it serves as a black box where the public demands and supports are transformed into actions and policies. This paper analyzes the role of Pakistan's bureaucracy in policy issues and the various elements that have shaped its character in the country's governance. Dynamics of policy making have been discussed, followed by the configuration and nature of Pakistan's bureaucracy under different regimes. Through historical study, evidential examination and observation; current role of bureaucracy in policy matters has been argued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enduring role of Pakistan's army in both foreign and domestic affairs has long drawn the attention of political scientists. Since its emergence from the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, Pakistan has suffered four military coups (in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999), long periods of political instability and a persistent inability to consolidate democratic institutions. At first glance, Pakistan's inability to sustain a transition to democracy is especially puzzling given that India, which also emerged from the collapse of British rule in South Asia, has experienced only a brief bout of authoritarian rule (1975–77) and has managed to consolidate democracy – even though the quality of its democratic institutions and their performance leaves much to be desired. Many scholars have proffered explanations for Pakistan's failure to make a successful transition to democracy. This essay will argue that all the extant accounts are partial and incomplete. It will contend that the roots of Pakistan's propensity towards authoritarianism must be sought in the ideology, organisation and mobilisation strategy of the movement for the creation of Pakistan. Whereas other recent writing on authoritarianism in Pakistan dwells upon the aggregation of power by the military, this essay focuses upon the failure of civilian democratic institutions to fully abandon authoritarianism even when the military is not in power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Balochistan is in the grip of two distinct and mutually exclusive ethnonational and religious movements that straddle important swathes of its rugged and mountainous territory. From Quetta up in the north to the coast of Makran in the south, Balochistan is being shaped by the twin forces of local nationalism and jihadist organizations. Domestically, the issue of Balochistan has remained an Achilles heel for Pakistan's policy makers culminating in five separate insurgencies in the post-colonial era. All such insurgencies had to do with the imperative of a centralizing elite and the recalcitrance of a local elite resisting assimilationist pressures. On the religious front, since 2009 Balochistan has come under increased scrutiny, with the Americans alleging that Quetta and its environs are a safe haven for the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar. Coincidentally, Quetta has also seen rising sectarian conflict, and the Shia-Sunni divide in the city continues to assume importance in the War on Terror. In light of the rising tide of Baloch nationalism and jihadist activism, including sectarian killings, the paper puts forth a critically oriented analysis of the twin dynamics of religious activism and ethnic conflict in Balochistan and its attendant ramifications for domestic, regional, and global security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the rising Pakistani Nationalism and suggests how to use it as a tool of public administration for good governance. Pakistani nationalism is on the rise, Pakistan is moving towards greater integration and most of the Pakistanis take pride in their nationality and say, "our life starts from Pakistan and ends at Pakistan". Today there is not a single separatist movement in the country. The character of political parties is changing from regionalism to nationalism. The trend will further develop and Pakistanis will very soon emerge as a closely integrated nation in the world. This trend can be very effectively used as tool of public administration. The administrators will discharge their duties with more vigour and those administered, will follow the order with more loyalty if motivated by nationalism. It will enable us to control corruption, nepotism; (by the administrators) dishonesty and inefficiency etc (by those administered) and improve overall governance in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the judicialization of politics in Pakistan under the Supreme Court Chief Justice Choudhry (2009–). Confrontation between the executive and judiciary under him led to speculation about the imminent collapse of the democratic system, given the history of military take-over in the country. The use of judicial review, whereby the Court exercised the power of interpreting the Constitution with impunity, was widely criticized as an attempt to encroach on the territory of the legislature through case law. At the institutional level, the Court sought to exercise veto power over the appointment of judges and to deny the right of oversight to any government agency. The Court's pursuit of public interest litigation through frequent suo motu actions taken in a populist mode led to brinkmanship on the part of the executive and judiciary. Despite this power play, the Court's operations fell into the category of modus operandi, instead of being a fight to the finish. However, the Court's pursuit of judicial reform relating to cheap and speedy justice and accountability of the higher judiciary remained far from satisfactory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Navy SEAL raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Islamabad's subsequent turn toward China have highlighted one of the most remarkable legacies of the Cold War: the persistence of a strategic triangle composed of China, Pakistan, and the United States. Throughout much of the Cold War, China and the United States competed to keep Pakistan within their particular sphere of influence, while Pakistan deftly took advantage of the subtle power struggle to improve its security profile vis-à-vis India. Despite persistent competition, the nations of the strategic triangle enjoyed three major convergence points: (1) the 1969–71 period, when Pakistan acted as a conduit for secret talks between Beijing and Washington, which subsequently led to mutual coordination during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war; (2) the decade following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; and (3) the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, when global focus turned to Afghanistan and terrorism. This third convergence around terrorism is particularly salient, as Pakistan is increasingly viewed globally as both a source of terrorist activity and a victim of terrorist violence. In the long term, the strategic triangle may act as a modulating force that may prevent instability within nuclear-capable Pakistan, as well as constrain activities by certain Pakistani state organs that may be linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and clandestine support for militant organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Underlying Pakistan’s three experiments with a federal arrangement in the form of the 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions, there has been a persistent concern about constraining the numerical majority of the largest province, first East Bengal and later Punjab. The first two constitutions had virtually eliminated the federal principle in West Pakistan by merging the four provinces and various princely states into one megaprovince called One-Unit in order to establish parity between the two wings of the state. In post-Bangladesh Pakistan, while the 1973 Constitution provided a strong centre with scant provincial autonomy, it tacitly acknowledged the linguistic majorities of the four provinces as legitimate representatives of their respective federating units. Together, these developments brought the issue of provincial autonomy to the centre of the stage in Punjab-dominated national politics championed by the three smaller provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. 37 years after the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, the 18th Amendment finally addressed this issue with full strength. Pakistan in the following half decade is expected to experience what by all means is going to be a tempestuous process of shifting several ministries and divisions from the federal to provincial capitals. There can be resistance from the army and the centralist bureaucracy against the perceived dilution of state authority on the one hand and ‘minorities’ from the three smaller provinces against their perceived persecution at the hands of the majority communities of these provinces on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While Pakistani politics regularly employs the rhetoric of provincial autonomy, there are powerful structural and empirical tendencies that have contributed to the centralisation of power. This paper examines the relationship between this concentration of power and the quality of the provincial administration. It argues that unless the provincial administration is rehabilitated and a real measure of fiscal autonomy is granted to the provincial units, Pakistan will continue to suffer a state apparatus and political process that is centralised, arbitrary and ineffective. The effectiveness of the Pakistani state apparatus has become a matter of international concern due to the US-led war on terror and the spill-over of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda insurgency into Pakistan. It is contended that fixing the problems inherent in Pakistan's administration require not only material inputs, but a change in attitude and orientation towards the provincial administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]