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We develop a macroeconomic theory of the division of household tasks between servants and own work and how it is affected by automation in households and firms. We calibrate the model for the U.S. and apply it to explain the historical development of household time use and the distribution of household tasks from 1900 to 2020. The economy is populated by high-skilled and low-skilled households and household tasks are performed by own work, machines, or servants. For the period 1900-1960, innovations in household automation motivate the decline of the servant economy and the creation of new household tasks motivates an almost constant division of household time between wage work and domestic work. For the period 1960-2020, innovations in firm automation and the implied increase of the skill premium explain the return of the servant economy. We show the robustness of results to the introduction of time trends in skilled-labor supply and the consideration of endogenous demand for leisure. With counterfactual experiments we address the effects of task-dependent disutility of work and of innovations in servant efficiency (the Gig economy). We provide supporting evidence for inequality as a driver of the return of the servant economy in a regional panel of U.S. metropolitan statistical areas for the period 2005-2020.

In this paper we set up an overlapping generations model of gerontological founded human aging that takes the interaction between R&D-driven medical progress and access to health care into account. We use the model to explore potential futures of human health and longevity. For the baseline policy scenario of health care access, the calibrated model predicts substantial future increases in health and life expectancy, associated with rising shares of health expenditure in GDP. Freezing the expenditure share at the 2020 level by rationing access to health care severely reduces potential gains in health, longevity and welfare. These losses are greatest in the long run due to reduced incentives for medical R&D. For example, rationing is predicted to reduce potential gains of life-expectancy at age 65 by about 4 years in the year 2050. Generally, and perhaps surprisingly, young individuals (i.e. those who save the most health care contributions through rationing) are predicted to suffer the greatest losses in terms of life expectancy and welfare.

It is a well known fact that economic development and distance to the equator are positively correlated variables in the world today. It is perhaps less well known that as recently as 1500 C.E. it was the other way around. The present paper provides a theory of why the “latitude gradient” seemingly changed sign in the course of the last half millennium. In particular, we develop a dynamic model of economic and physiological development in which households decide upon the number and nutrition of their offspring. In this setting we demonstrate that relatively high metabolic costs of fertility, which may have emerged due to positive selection towards greater cold tolerance in locations away from the equator, would work to stifle economic development during pre-industrial times, yet allow for an early onset of sustained growth. As a result, the theory suggests a reversal of fortune whereby economic activity gradually shifts away from the equator in the process of long-term economic development.

In this paper, we show, using a panel of developed countries, that there is a long-run negative association between church attendance and total factor productivity (TFP) with predictive causality running from declining church attendance to increasing factor productivity. According to our preferred estimate, about 18% of the increase in TFP from 1950 to 1990 is caused by declining religiosity. In order to explain this phenomenon, we integrate into standard R&D-based growth theory a micro-foundation of individual cognitive style, which is either intuitive-believing or reflective-analytical. Under the assumption that R&D productivity is positively influenced by a reflectiveanalytical cognitive style, we find that secularization leads to an increasing labor share in R&D and gradually increasing productivity growth. We use these insights to reflect on trends in religiosity and R&D-based growth in the very long run, from Enlightenment to the present day.

We set up a unified growth model with gender-specific differences in tastes for consumption, fertility, education of daughters and sons, and consider the intra-household bargaining power of spouses. In line with the empirical regularity for less developed countries, we assume that mothers desire to have no more children than fathers and to invest no less in education per child. We then show that female empowerment has the potential to promote the transition from a state of high fertility, low education, and sluggish economic growth towards a state of low fertility, high education, and fast economic growth if the child quantity-quality preferences of spouses differ substantially. In this case targeted policies to empower women have the potential to constitute a successful development strategy. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding with respect to endogenously evolving bargaining power and division of child-rearing time within the household.

Unified growth theory predicts that the timing of the fertility transition is a key determinant of contemporary comparative development, as it marks the onset of the take-off to sustained growth. Neoclassical growth theory presupposes a take-off, and explains comparative development by variations in (subsequent) investment rates. The present analysis integrates these two perspectives empirically, and shows that they together constitute a powerful predictive tool vis-a-vis contemporary income differences.

In this paper we examine the long-run relationship between religiosity and income using retrospective data on church attendance rates for a panel of countries from 1925 to 1990. We employ panel cointegration and causality techniques to control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias and test for the direction of causality. We show that there exists a negative long-run relationship between the level of religiosity, measured by church attendance, and the level of income, measured by the log of GDP per capita. The result is robust to alternative estimation methods, potential outliers, sample selection, different measures of church attendance, and alternative specifications of the income variable. Long-run causality runs in both directions, higher income leads to declining religiosity and declining religiosity leads to higher income.

We hypothesize that the timing of the fertility transition is an important determinant of comparative physiological development. In support, we provide a model of long-run growth, which elucidates the links between population size, average body size and income during development. Industrialization is shown to be accompanied by a reduction in family size and an intensi cation of nutrition per child. Early transition countries are therefore expected to be more developed today, economically and physiologically. Empirically, the timing of the fertility transition is strongly correlated with average body size across countries.

This article investigates economic performance when enforceable property rights are missing and basic needs matter for consumption. It suggests a new view of the so-called voracity effect according to which windfall gains in productivity induce behavior that leads to lower economic growth. Taking into account that the rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption depends on the level of consumption, it is shown that 'voracious behavior' is situation-specific. It occurs when an economy is in decline and suffciently close to stagnation.

This study provides a uni ed growth theory to correctly predict the initially negative and subsequently positive relationship between child mortality and net reproduction observed in industrialized countries over the course of their demographic transitions. The model captures the intricate interplay between technological progress, mortality, fertility and economic growth in the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. Not only does it provide an explanation for the demographic observation that fertility rates response with a delay to lower child mortality. It also identi es a number of turning points over the course of development, suggesting a high degree of complexity regarding the relationships between various economic and demographic variables.

This paper introduces wealth-dependent time preference into a simple model of endogenous growth. The model generates adjustment dynamics in line with the historical facts on savings and economic growth in Europe from the High Middle Ages to today. Along a virtuous cycle of development more wealth leads to more patience, which leads to more savings and even higher wealth. Savings rates and income growth rates are thus jointly increasing during the process of development until they converge towards constants along a balanced growth path. During the transition to modern growth an economy in which the association of wealth and patience is stronger overtakes an otherwise identical economy and generates temporarily diverging growth rates. It is shown how wealth-dependent time preference can explain the existence of a locally stable poverty trap as well as the phenomenon of simultaneously falling interest rates and rising growth rates.

This study constructs a simple, two-sector Malthusian model with agriculture and industry, and use it to identify the determinants of subsistence income. We make standard assumptions about preferences and production technology, but by contrast to existing studies we assume that children and other consumption goods are gross substitutes. Consistent with the traditional Malthusian model, we find that productivity growth in agriculture has no effect on subsistence income. More importantly, we also find that subsistence income increases, not just with the death rate as has recently been demonstrated in the literature, but also with productivity in manufacturing.

This article investigates economic performance when enforceable property rights are missing and subsistence needs matter. It shows that if per capita income is sufficiently high, a windfall gain in productivity triggers behavior that leads to higher growth (the normal reaction). The same shock can produce voracious behavior and lower growth when faced by poor economic agents, in particular when their productivity is low and their society is largely fractionalized. This leads to a re-assessment of the voracity effect. Economic and social performance depends no longer on character traits (the assumed curvature of the utility function) as assumed in the earlier literature. Instead, the initial degree of development, the state of technology, and the make up of society are decisive. An extension towards a two-sector economy shows that conditions for an active informal sector of low productivity are much less restrictive than originally thought.

Successful economic development is usually characterized by two salient phenomena: industrialization and demographic transition. Chronologically both events happen so closely to each other that historians and economists alike suspect that they are interrelated. This paper develops a theory for their interaction with a special emphasis on the different pattern and pace of transition in cross-country comparison. For that purpose it rationalizes why a population grows at high rates at geographic locations of high extrinsic mortality. This mechanism is then used to explain why both demographic transition and structural change proceed at slower speed in countries of low absolute latitudes. It is also shown that at tropical locations the pace of transition can be so slow that it sometimes looks like as if societies got stuck in the midst of the process.

This study provides a unified growth theory to correctly predict the initially negative and subsequently positive relationship between child mortality and net reproduction observed in industrialized countries over the course of their demographic transitions. The model captures the intricate interplay between technological progress, mortality, fertility and economic growth in the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. It identifies a number of structural breaks over the course of development, suggesting a high degree of complexity regarding the relationships between various economic and demographic variables.

It is well known that the performance of simple models of economic growth improves substantially through the introduction of subsistence consumption. How to compute subsistence needs, however, is a difficult and controversially discussed issue. Here, I reconsider the linear (Ak) growth model with subsistence consumption and show that the evolution of savings rates and economic growth rates over time is independent from the size of subsistence needs. The model is thus more general and less subject to arbitrariness than it might have been thought initially. Quantitatively, it is shown that, although there is no degree of freedom to manipulate transitional dynamics, the model approximates the historical evolution of savings rates and growth rates reasonably well.

Drawing on recent research on allometric scaling and energy consumption, the present paper develops a nutrition-based efficiency wage model from first principles. The biologically micro-founded model allows us to address empirical criticism of the original nutrition-based efficiency wage model. By extending the model with respect to heterogeneity in worker body size and a physiologically founded impact of body size on productivity, we demonstrate that the nutrition-based efficiency wage model is compatible with the empirical regularity that taller workers simultaneously earn higher wages and are less likely to be unemployed in less developed economies. The theory also provides an answer to the question of why such regularity may disappear in the process of development.

This paper develops a bioeconomic Malthusian growth model. By integrating recent research on allometric scaling, energy consumption and ontogenetic growth, we provide a model where subsistence consumption is endogenously linked to body size and fertility. The theory admits a unique Malthusian equilibrium in a two-dimensional state space characterized by population density and body size (metabolic rate) of the representative adult. As a result, the analysis allows us to examine the link between human biology, economic productivity, body size, and population size. Off the steady-state we investigate the possibility of cyclical behavior of the size of a population and the size of its representative member over the very long-run. We also demonstrate that a take-o? into sustained growth should be associated with increasing income, population size and body size. The increase in the latter is, however, bounded and can be viewed as convergence to a biologically determined upper limit.

This paper investigates the impact of subsistence consumption and extrinsic and intrinsic causes of child mortality on fertility and child expenditure. It offers a theory for why mankind multiplies at higher rates at geographically unfavorable, tropical locations. Placed into a macroeconomic framework this behavior creates an indirect channel through which geography shapes economic performance. It is explained why it are countries of low absolute latitude where we observe exceedingly slow (if not stalled) economic development and demographic transition.

This paper provides a uni?ed growth theory, i.e. a model that explains the very long-run economic and demographic development path of industrialized economies, stretching from the pre-industrial era to present-day and beyond. Making strict use of Malthus’ (1798) so-called preventive check hypothesis that fertility rates vary inversely with the price of food the current study o?ers a new and straightforward explanation for the demographic transition and the break with the Malthusian era. The current framework lends support to existing uni?ed growth theories and is well in tune with historical evidence about structural transformation.

This article shows within a simple growth model how the make up of society affects economic performance when property rights are unenforceable. It investigates behavior of non-cooperative social groups that consume, produce, and appropriate resources either peacefully or through contest. For the case of symmetric groups it is shown that economic growth is generated only in peaceful societies. For the case of asymmetric groups rebel-equilibria are investigated in which a large majority behaves peacefully although challenged by an aggressive minority. In each case it is shown how the possibility of conflict and its intensity and the rate of economic growth depend on social fractionalizaton, general productivity of the economy, and the ease at which resources are appropriated. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites.