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The US president's unfettered authority to order the use of nuclear weapons and an unstable US nuclear posture create a compound existential risk. Reducing the risk requires eliminating the dangerously unstable warfighting contingencies of first use of nuclear weapons and launch on warning of nuclear attack from the repertoire of presidential options; re-configuring the nuclear chain of command; and building a robust and enduring nuclear command system to stabilize the contingency of second-strike retaliation on which true deterrence depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The FAS Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a research associate with the project. This Nuclear Notebook reviews the status of France's nuclear arsenal and finds that the stockpile of approximately 300 warheads has remained stable in recent years, but that significant modernizations are underway with regard to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, aircraft, and the nuclear industrial complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the United States need to do - and what could it reasonably not do - in terms of ensuring the reliability of its nuclear arsenal and reducing the huge cost currently foreseen for maintaining that reliability? Clearly, in our view, the United States could invest less in what is broadly called "nuclear modernization" and still maintain a reliable nuclear arsenal. Reducing such investments, however, would require hard decisions about the overall shape of the US arsenal and the need to continue to support some legs of the current triad of nuclear-capable airplanes and land- and sea-based missiles. The United States could for example reduce costs without compromising security by phasing out the most vulnerable leg of the triad, ground-based nuclear missiles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the Russian nuclear forces for 2006. The country continues to reduce its total nuclear forces in 2005, however, it plans for a new weapon systems and upgrades of existing one. Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to reassert the country's nuclear strength and reinstate large-scale military exercises. Statistical data on the operational Russian strategic offensive weapons, nonstrategic and defensive weapons and projected strategic warheads from 2006 to 2015 are presented.

Focuses on the legislative deliberations for the Omnibus Defense Authorization Bill for 1985. Amendment limits to the total number of nuclear warheads to be produced and deployed; Appeal for the termination of research and development on nuclear warheads; Arguments for an increase in conventional forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. government.

The article describes the dispersion of United States' tactical and strategic nuclear weapons at home, at sea, in Europe and in Asia. There is an estimated 14,800 nuclear weapons that are kept in the U.S. and about 7,000 weapons are dispersed at sea. In Europe, these weapons include different kinds of surface-to-surface missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear capable fighter-bombers. In Asia, an estimated 1,700 tactical nuclear weapons are maintained on land, reportedly in Korea and the Philippines. INSET: 'Broken Arrows'.

The article reports on disarmament control policies regarding atomic energy. According to the author, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's proposal discusses disarmament and cooperation in the development of useful applications of atomic energy. He also discusses "Operation Candor" that focuses on the realities of atomic threat and cooperation with trusted allies wherein it was considered in facing the problem with the development of Soviet Union's hydrogen bomb. Moreover, the disarmament agreement include the maintenance of low level of atomic and other weapons as a preventive measure for possible atomic attacks.

The article focuses on the psychological effect of atomic weapons on the American people. According to the government, American people will not panic during atomic attacks for the military were trained to be ready during an attack. However, the author opposed the government's statement and concluded that these people would panic. Moreover, he suggested two factors regarding his conclusion that include the public has exhibited various symptoms including hysteria and the psychological effects of atomic attack is more damaging than physical effects.

The article discusses the implications of the atomic arms race and cites possible solutions to avert its catastrophic outcome. The strategic use of atomic bombs in warfare invites proliferation of its development in which case a need for an atomic armament control plan is deemed necessary. Several frameworks upon which disarmament control policies should be based is presented one of which is an international agreement which will set limitation on arms production including atomic armaments. The control scheme, however, requires a knowledge in the dynamics of developing an atomic bomb such as plutonium and uranium content or the amount of fissionable material.

The article comments on the views of Mr. Marseille related to the possession of nuclear weapons. The author emphasized that Marseille attacks the Russell-Einstein appeal which was signed by ten eminent scientists. The author pointed out that the whole doctrine of liberty of opinion contended that there should be free competition among ideas and that the competition should be conducted by argument not by force. The author believed that the changed circumstances have compelled a change of policy, but the new policy has precisely the same sincerity as the old one and has the same main purpose which is to preserve the human race.

The article presents a detailed discussion about the distribution, stockpiling, and production of nuclear fuels. It explains that the advantage to be acquired by a nation through seizure of production facilities or of stockpiles must be minimized because of the ease of producing weapons from such material. However, the seizure would be a serious violation to the treaty because it tells that the country is inclining on atomic warfare. It mentions that there is no certainty whether or not enough additional fuel can be made in a power reactor to regenerate the original supply.

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they 'work' by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the martyr state view of Iran in relation to its nuclear weapons program. Israel's ambassador to the U.S. Michael B. Oren says some Israeli experts believe sacrificing 50% of Iranians may be allowed by leaders to eradicate Israel. The article points out the threat posed by Iran if it is as casualty-tolerant or messianic as the view implies. Radical cleric Ayatollah Khamanei is seen as having the final authority on foreign policy based on Iranian constitution. Also noted is the support of both political factions for the nuclear program.

Nuclear weapons' effects on an actor's success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve their allotment of a good or convince an opponent to back down and have shorter crises if their opponents have greater expected costs of crisis. Noting that nuclear weapons increase the costs of full-escalation scenarios but decrease their probability, it is uncertain what impact nuclear weapons should have on expected costs of conflict. The authors assess crisis outcomes from 1945 to 2000 using the International Crisis Behavior data set. The evidence confirms that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state. The expected duration of crisis in such asymmetric directed dyads is substantially smaller than the duration of crisis for actors in nonnuclear dyads. Nuclear actors in asymmetric dyads are also more likely to prevail than states in symmetric nuclear dyads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? This article quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates whether the length of time states have nuclear weapons influences their behavior and the behavior of opponents in militarized disputes. Using multiple statistical models and illustrative cases, the article shows that, while acquiring nuclear weapons makes states significantly more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated, over time, the effect reverses. In contrast to a static understanding of nuclear weapons, this variation in outcomes over time highlights the difficulties presented by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain has possessed its own nuclear weapons for just over fifty years and is laying plans to keep them going for the next half-century. Hugh Beach argues that there are better things to spend government money on and the Trident replacement programme should be cancelled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article underscores the continuing U. S. and multilateral efforts to control the nuclear program of Iran. It states that efforts by the United States and other countries to terminate Iran's nuclear program appear not to have lessened Iran's determination to go ahead with this program. It also forwards that Iran antecedently had a nuclear weapons program but terminated it in 2003 because of international pressure and scrutiny. Moreover, some International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Israeli officials questioned this arms program of Iran.

The article focuses on the motives for Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons. Egypt perceived Israel as its enemy and the two countries engaged in major military confrontations in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. The two countries are also involved in other military confrontations and broad economic wars. Another motive for Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons is its leadership role in the Arab world.

The European Union has been the main international actor trying to contain the Iranian nuclear programme. In 2003, for the first time ever, the EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran. The current article begins with an analysis of the concept of coercive diplomacy before applying it to the Iranian case. In so doing, the article aims to make an interim assessment of the European (EU-3) effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common perception of the Manhattan Project is that of an American success story of the development of atomic weapons. Although research at Los Alamos was carried out by an international community of researchers, non-American contributions to the development appear to have been neglected and the post-war nuclear monopoly was an American one. The article investigates the interplay between an international scientific community pushing the boundaries of science and political decision makers with their national security priorities. Furthermore, it discusses the validity of claims of Britain having ‘invented’ the atom bomb against other assessments of the British contribution being insignificant for the overall success of nuclear research on the Hill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traces the background of the nuclear program of Iran. Review of Iran's dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council; Overview of Iran's presumed motives for seeking nuclear weapons; Objections of the international community to a nuclear-powered Iran.

Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce—which could include deterrence, damage limitation, and the continued ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives—are relatively small, because the United States possesses large nuclear forces and highly effective conventional forces. Finally, nuclear counterforce would bring a variety of costs, including an increased probability of accidental war and unnecessary preemptive attacks in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the case for nuclear counterforce is stronger than during the Cold War, when the enormous size and redundancy of U.S. and Soviet forces rendered counterforce useless. When facing a small nuclear force, the United States may decide to use counterforce to limit damage. Although complex trade-offs are involved, if there are critical targets that can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons, then under a narrow set of conditions the benefits of planning for damage limitation might exceed the dangers. The United States must not, however, rely on nuclear counterforce to support a more assertive foreign policy; doing so would unjustifiably increase the probability of nuclear war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Israel began developing its nuclear option in the early 1950s because of its fear of the Arab world's hostile intentions. The country's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, believed that the Arab world, despite its internal rifts, was united on one subject: the destruction of Israel as an independent Jewish state. Notwithstanding Israel's impressive victory in the 1948 war, Ben-Gurion was convinced that the Arabs were capable of realizing this goal. He regarded the nuclear option as the only means that could deter them from endangering Israel's survival. At a certain stage in the mid-1960s, Israel's nuclear option became a factor with far-reaching strategic implications, and Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity in this regard. Despite the dramatic changes in the balance of power between Israel and the Arab world and Israel's relations with the Great Powers, this policy still seems relevant and best suited to Israel's national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

*This article is based on a talk Desaix Anderson gave at the Task Force on North Korea at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, on Tuesday, March 8, 2005. The Board of Trustees and members of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy mourn the death of Saul Bellow, the acclaimed, Nobel prize-winning American writer who served on our Board of Advisers for many years. We extend our deepest sympathy to his family. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes Russia's policy towards Iran, particularly on the latter's nuclear weapons program. Contributions of Russia to Iran's nuclear programs; Reasons behind the historical willingness of Russia to help Iran; Economic benefits gained by Russia from its nuclear weapons involvement with Iran; Factors that contributed to the change in Russia's perception about Iran's nuclear intentions; Impact of Russia's connection with Iran on Russia-Europe-U.S. relations.

Anti-American, pro-Chinese sentiment is spreading widely in South Korea. This phenomenon is caused by extreme US-ROK policy dissension over matters related to North Korea, especially the nuclear questions, and South Korea's emotional attachment for China based on historical and geopolitical factors. In order to prevent this irrational situation from damaging the mutual interests of both Washington and Seoul, the two capitals should come up with mutually acceptable options for nuclear issues--placing more gravity and priority on dialogue over sanctions as a matter of strategy. Coercive measures can be employed only as a last resort. In order to maintain peace, to fulfill the political responsibility as a great power in East Asia, and to reciprocate to South Korea's positive expectation, Beijing should play a more constructive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issues and in inducing Pyongyang to open up and reform more aggressively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses India's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the light of debate of why states built nuclear arsenals. Consideration of national security and prestige; Formation of a nuclear security dilemma precipitated by the first Chinese nuclear test; Emphasis of the government in building a wide-ranging nuclear infrastructure; Motives of political leaders in forming nuclear programs.

Discussion of North Korea's nuclear programme and what to do about it has become ideological and emotionally charged. Convinced that good policy serving American and allied interests is unlikely to emerge from such a debate, Korea experts Victor Cha and David Kang decided to step back from the histrionics and engage in a reasoned, rational and logical exchange on the nature of the North Korean regime and the policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Their debate was published in book form as Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Survival invited Cha and Kang to continue their debate in these pages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a conceptual scheme designed to analyze transnational social movements as process originating in national settings and becoming transnational through a series of strategically-driven actions in the context of Swedish anti-bomb movement. It is opined that transnational social movements (TSMs) are as old as movements themselves. It is observed that many TSMs originate specifically in a national context, suggesting that they become transnational through a step-like process in response to variations in political opportunity. In this process, the movement becomes transnational in certain of its aspects before it does so in others. This implies that movements are complex multidimensional entities and, that their, constituent aspects have some degree of autonomy in their manifestations. In this context, it is noted that the Swedish anti-bomb movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s challenged the intention of a collectively powerful array of actors within the Swedish security elite to arm the military with an arsenal of tactical atomic weapons.

Comments on the U.S. government spending for nuclear weapons-related activities under President George W. Bush's administration. Amount of the nuclear weapons spending for the year 2004; Amount proposed for the development of a robust nuclear earth penetrating warhead; Amount that will be spent for the completion of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility in 2007.

Offers a critique of proposals to de-alert nuclear-weapon delivery systems in the United States. Why nuclear weapons are on alert; Questions that should be addressed to evaluate the claims that alert status is dangerous; Adequacy of early warning; Controls to prevent accidental or unauthorized use; Unilateral reductions, deactivation and de-alerting; Dangers of de-alerting.