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The article focuses on the issues related to development of Hydrogen bomb in the United States. Most people in the United States are under the impression that when the U.S. President Harry S. Truman gave his go-ahead order for the development work on it, he actually meant for switches to be thrown to start the machinery of production in some secret factory. Such a bomb, if it should be built, would be fantastically destructive. In the atmosphere of a cold war such development work can be the source of civil repressions on a scale not yet experienced. It becomes elevated to the status of the secret, and defense of the secret will be used to justify anything.

The article argues that the United States should maintain a strong military policy and provide adequate funding for its armed forces. The fourth postwar phase of American military policy has tactical, strategic, and economic problems. In the era of atomic weapons, Russia's military advantage on land, and unrest due to changes in Russian policy, the U.S. is at risk and vulnerable to attack. Military readiness should be based on seven principles that include good morale and offensive capability. Five requirements for U.S. military policy include overseas bases with allies and informed public opinion. Topics are the NATO coalition in Europe, Communism in the Pacific Ocean area, and the strength of U.S. air and naval forces.

The author reflects on the shortage supply of engineers and scientists to produce the necessary electronic devices and weapons for the "push-button war" in the U.S. The author made a comparison between the country and the Soviet Union which has increased its production of engineers since the 1917 revolution and the number of its students in the institutions of higher education. However, in the U.S., technical and scientific works are done only by high school trained specialists.

Discusses the debate between the U.S. and its European allies regarding the plans of the U.S. to use atomic bombs against the Soviet Union as of December 1957.

The article discusses the use of nuclear weapons for the peaceful industrial use in the U.S. The industry's enthusiasm is short-lived as the developing atom bombs for industrial use have fallen victim to the cold war and the international discussion over the banning of the nuclear tests. The process and the conduct of the Rainier nuclear test alongwith the implications of the development are discussed.

The article discusses the missile race between the U.S. and Russia as of February 1959. It expresses concern over the missile gap as significantly large that there may come a point when the ratio will render the retaliatory power of the U.S. ineffective. It discusses how the concept of preventive war may not apply to the situation and how there may be no time to retaliate in the event of an attack. It proposes arming to parley while doing everything to call the whole thing off.

Focuses on the ongoing debate in the U.S. Congress over the question of nuclear weapons. View that the Soviet's nuclear capability should not be underrated; Information on the destructive capability of nuclear power; Discussion on the Soviet missiles and rockets that can be threats to the U.S.; View that the Soviet is unwilling to end the cold war; Need for establishing an education system in the U.S. capable of producing minds that can help develop technological discoveries.

Presents the author's views on the impending threat to the U.S. from Nikita S. Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union. Apprehension, that owing to his risk taking proclivities, Khrushchev could cause great damage to the U.S.; Penchant of Khrushchev for missiles; Efforts of Khrushchev to counter the atomic power of the U.S. by developing his own atomic artillery.

Focuses on the cold war between Geneva, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. Assumption that Soviet Union's aggressiveness is derived from genuine fears for her security; Reports that Soviet policy after Geneva became an enigma to Western statesmen; Discussion on the policy of disarmament and abolition of atomic weapons, flanked by East-West non-aggression pacts.

The article reports on the cold war between Russia and China. It mentions that the nature and size of the break up can shape the course of the cold war and the strategists from the West have studied the evidence to help function its dimensions. It notes that despite the deepness and reality of the split, both countries are Communist and are dedicated to the same determined end winning of the world to Marxism.

Industrial fallout shelters are important not only for their value in discouraging any would-be aggressor, but also for survival in case our nation is attacked. According to informed sources, a sound shelter program carried out by industry and local government could save up to 70,000,000 lives in case of a heavy thermonuclear attack (depending, of course, on the areas bombed, weather conditions, etc.). Business leaders will find here the data they need to: (1) understand the nature of the fallout threat; (2) direct construction of a sound, economical shelter; (3) plan for the management problems of running an occupied shelter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explains the inhibition to war of nations in the Cold War era. Assertion that the presence of nuclear weapons has contributed to the maintenance of peace; Explanation of the principle stating that the possession of absolute weapons limit conflicts; Analogy of the power play between countries in conflict and fighting between male rattlesnakes; Reasons behind the inhibition of a great power to use force against another power or a weak state; Contention that inhibition to war depends on popular opinion; Events that might end the Cold War.

It is said that the cold war came to an end on a certain date, signaled by the recorded specific act of a certain person; and, that professional commentators then, and for years afterwards, failed to notice it. The date was September 30, 1961, the specific act was a statement in London, England, by Senator J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate, in which he declared that the West was partly to blame for the Berlin, Germany, stupidity and that the Russians had a legitimate concern about atomic weapons being given to Germany. They should not be given if there was any reasonable prospect of reaching some acceptable agreement with the Russians.

The article presents the views of Karl Barth, professor at the University of Basel, on man's relationship with God. In his epochal commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Barth said that the biblical God was wholly different, powerful, and mysterious; and man's task was to reshape himself to God's design. Barth was not only Protestantism's dominant theologian, but also a public figure. Publicly, he kept criticizing the West for its nuclear weapon buildup and its cold war mentality.

Discusses a strategy called launch under attack. Idea that nuclear weapons will be launched after a warning that attacking weapons, notably from the U.S.S.R., are on their way; Lobbying for the adoption of this strategy in the United States; The Reagan Administration's decision to put 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos; The increasing instability in the nuclear arms balance; The problem of ICBM vulnerability; Scenario of events after a preemptive nuclear attack; The electromagnetic pulse generated by an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion; The command system of a Minuteman II squadron; The author's view on the outlook for nuclear war.

Presents letters to the editor concerning articles about threats of nuclear attack on U.S. during the cold war period. Measures of precaution to counter the nuclear attack on the U.S. by Soviet Union; Effects of unilateral disarmament on the U.S.; Issues related to balance of power between the Soviet Union and U.S.; Soviet Union's refusal to symmetrical arms control proposals while continuing aggressive build-up of nuclear power since the 1960s.

Points out that the United States should maintain its nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Observation that the U.S. has enjoyed a technological lead over the Soviets since the invention of the atom bomb; View that if the U.S. slows down, the Soviets will catch up; Advantage of the Soviet Union over the U.S. in that it is bigger in size, that it could deliver a fatal blow to the U.S. if it is able to catch up.

Criticizes the U.S. Energy Department's $81 billion request for 'modernization and environmental restoration' at nuclear-weapons production complex. Absence of rationale with the winding down of the Cold War; Secrecy of the country's nuclear-weapons program; Shielding of blunders committed by the bureaucrats who ran the program.

Focuses on the current scenario of Cold War. Announcement made by Germany to negotiate away the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations's (NATO) nuclear missiles and its impact on the U.S. foreign policy; Information on the 40th anniversary NATO summit in Brussels; Negotiations to eliminate the Warsaw Pact's conventional weapons advantage, maintenance of a modern nuclear deterrent and eventual nuclear reductions as warranted by progress in conventional weapons talk; Enthusiasm of Germans over short-range nuclear missiles.

Presents a brief history of the Cold War. Year that started the struggle for Europe; Discussion of the contest over Europe and Germany as the main point of the Cold War; Other countries involved in the Cold War; Role of nuclear weapons; Agreement of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to allow Germany to stay in the North American Treaty Organization and pull Soviet troops out of East Germany.

This article examines that threat posed by nuclear weapons to international security after the Cold War. The world stockpile of nuclear weapons comprises some 52,000 nuclear warheads, 97 percent of them in the hands of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Beyond the three other states acknowledging the possession of nuclear weapons, China, France and Great Britain, there are 4 or 5 states that either have some current nuclear capability or are on the threshold of achieving it. The most striking fact about nuclear weapons is that since their development and the demonstration of their feasibility in July 1945, only two have ever been used in war. There are more pragmatic reasons for seeking to continue the process of nuclear disarmament. First is the simple calculation that reducing the number and variety of weapons and the geographic breadth of their deployment reduces the probability of their accidental or unauthorized use. At any level of effort devoted to ensuring the central control and security of deployed weapons, the fewer there are, the less the probability of failure. Second is the influence of the size and growth of the weapons stockpiles of the nuclear weapons states on the acceptance by the others of their non-nuclear status.

This article offers views on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and on whether the destruction of all nuclear weapons is a desirable or realistic goal. According to the author, START is probably good news. Defense against nuclear attack carried by thousands of missiles will continue to look like an insoluble problem. But the author believes that a slow reduction in the number of long-range nuclear missiles may make solving the problem somewhat more practical. On the other hand, completely eliminating nuclear arsenals would leave the world vulnerable to the Saddam Husseins who, with dictatorial regimes, manage to violate international agreements on weapons on mass destruction. Therefore, in the author's view, the destruction of all nuclear weapons is not a desirable or realistic goal. In the long run, according to him, a true end to the Cold War should carry with it universal opposition to aggression and international cooperation in developing defensive systems. The author believes that the success in developing strategic defensive systems requires a plan ambitious enough to be significant, but limited to the extent that it should be feasible. In his opinion, the most essential ingredient is a general policy of openness.

This article comments on the end of the Cold War. Foremost are the developments in East-West relations. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was revived and promptly signed. On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George Bush announced the withdrawal of tactical weapons. Many strategic missiles were taken off hair-trigger alert, as was the B-52 bomber fleet. On October 5, 1991, Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev announced similar initiatives and upped the ante by indicating that the Soviet Union would suspend nuclear testing. The Cold War is over. The East-West nuclear arms race has ended. But the world is still a dangerous place. The START agreement, which mandates reductions in the number of strategic nuclear weapons, does not initiate a process for retiring the warheads and converting the highly enriched uranium and plutonium into a form not usable in weapons. While the failed coup and subsequent extraordinary changes in the former Soviet Union are major reasons for optimism, the whole world is properly concerned with the risks of national disintegration and the security of the 27,000 nuclear weapons during the critical period when the republics and the central government strive to create a new and reliable relationship despite great difficulties. It is recognized that nuclear weapons remain; even the modest agreed-upon reductions in their numbers will not be achieved overnight. Far deeper reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles must follow. It is encouraged by the East-West agreements to conduct on-site inspections, and by the improvement of technologies for verification. The experience of the Gulf War offers many lessons, one of the most significant being the increasing role for the United Nations in resolving conflict and blocking aggression.

This article outlines the history of the Cold War from 1947 until 1991 as indicated in the Bulletin Clock, which is featured in the journal The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as a countdown to nuclear danger. In 1947 the clock first appeared on the Bulletin cover as a symbol of nuclear danger. Then, in 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. The U.S. successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in late 1952. In 1960, the clock moved in response to the growing public understanding that nuclear weapons made war between major technical nations irrational. In 1963 the U.S. and Soviet signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty provided the first tangible confirmation of what has been the Bulletin's conviction that a new cohesive force has entered the interplay of forces shaping the fate of mankind. In 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In 1974, SALT talks reached an impasse and India developed a nuclear weapon. In 1980, the deadlock in U.S.-Soviet arms talks continued; nationalistic wars and terrorist actions increased and the rift between rich and poor nations widened. In 1981 both superpowers developed more weapons for fighting a nuclear war. In 1990 Democratic movements in Eastern Europe shattered the myth of monolithic communism and the Cold War ended. In 1991 the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and announced further unilateral cuts in tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.