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This article discusses the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa and its impact on the Apartheid Government's nuclear weapons program. The program was developed as a strategic deterrent against perceived communist threats in the region. However, with the changing political landscape, including the end of hostilities in Angola and the rise of progressive leaders like FW de Klerk, the program was deemed unnecessary and a burden. In 1989, de Klerk ordered the termination of the program and the dismantling of the nuclear arsenal. This decision, along with South Africa's subsequent commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, played a significant role in the country's transition to democracy and its emergence as a leader in promoting disarmament. [Extracted from the article]

In 1985, British psychoanalyst Hanna Segal delivered the paper 'Silence is the Real Crime' to the first meeting of the group International Psychoanalysts Against Nuclear Weapons in Hamburg, appealing to her fellow analysts to counteract the denial of the geopolitical realities that characterized the late Cold War by intervening in public debates regarding the threat of nuclear war. A year later she gave a paper in London discussing clinical cases of patients who brought their nuclear anxieties to the couch. This article considers Segal's political and clinical writings on the psychological consequences of the atomic age, situating them in the context in which she was living, writing and practising as an analyst: 1980s Britain in a moment of 'nuclear anxiety'. I argue that Segal's anti-nuclear writings shed light on what she called the 'very very tricky' relationship between psychoanalysis and politics. Segal confronted the tension between maintaining clinical neutrality in the consulting room while publicly expressing her political commitments, wrestling with the complex relationships between individuals and the societies in which they live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) protested nuclear weapons testing, called for nuclear and conventional disarmament, and simultaneously embraced the promises of atomic energy. The ICFTU also, particularly through its atomic energy committee, pressed the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for stronger worker protections and union input at atomic energy sites. Such efforts revealed how a non-governmental organization (NGO) attempted to shape international narratives and standards regarding nuclear weapons and atomic energy, revealing a complex approach to the use of the atom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through comparative historical analysis, we find that Russia's strategic communications regarding nuclear weapons use in Ukraine broadly reflect Soviet strategy during the Cold War. The Soviet Union employed a combination of aggressive and defensive propaganda narratives regarding nuclear weapons; the former aimed to coerce the West away from interfering in Soviet military interventions abroad, while the latter sought to convince international audiences that the West was primarily to blame for escalations in tensions. Russia continues to employ this same strategy to provide protective cover for its ongoing war on Ukraine. In both cases, actual Soviet and Russian nuclear posture remained significantly less bellicose than its propaganda narratives imply. Our analysis suggests that Russia's aggressive rhetoric about nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine has thus far been primarily intended to shape Western decision-making, rather than a genuine expression of intent to use such weapons. In Ukraine, nuclear 'red lines' advanced by Russian propaganda have consistently been eroded without response, including significant strikes on Crimea, advanced weapons supplied to Ukraine, and the re-taking of illegally annexed territory. Nevertheless, Russia's nuclear propaganda has been one of its most successful cognitive warfare efforts in limiting or delaying critical Western military support to Ukraine, on the grounds of avoiding potential escalation. While Russia's nuclear arsenal remains a significant threat to Ukraine and the West, an overly cautious response to Russian rhetoric also risks potentially significant geopolitical consequences by tacitly rewarding nuclear threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Louis St Laurent and Dwight Eisenhower came to power during one of the most intense periods of the Cold War. The Soviets had recently developed a nuclear bomb, touching off an arms race, while both the Canadian and American governments ran desperate investigations to purge their ranks of suspected communist sympathisers. St Laurent's victories in 1949, and again in 1953, as well as Eisenhower's in 1952, are often seen as inevitable. This interpretation is rooted in the fact that both men managed to stir overwhelming support from the hearts of their citizens. However, this viewpoint often fails to examine how their campaigns did this – through the projection of a reassuring, paternalistic image that spoke to hegemonic masculine norms in the era. Elaine Tyler May argues that the nuclear family, with the father at the helm, was seen as a form of 'domestic containment' against external ills. This article extends that theory upwards and explores how voters responded positively to the projection of a fatherly image from St Laurent and Eisenhower. At the same time, it examines how their campaigns actively deployed masculine image‐making to discredit opponents and depict them as outside the hegemonic masculine ideal. By voting instead for St Laurent and Eisenhower, citizens could be reassured that their families would come under the protection of a calm father figure, who would guide the nation through the current period of intense instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the heightened risks of a nuclear catastrophe are being seriously felt around the world. Over the past decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - the central instrument of the global non-proliferation regime - has been rife with divisions among its members and has been undermined by the failure of two consecutive Review Conferences (RevCons) to adopt a consensus outcome document. The basic assertion underlying this Special Issue is that there is growing criticism or contestation from countries in the Global South about the role and future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the obligations imposed by the NPT and the lack of a reciprocal benefit for these countries. This contestation could hinder the optimal functioning of the NPT, for instance through reduced cooperation in the implementation of its provisions. As such, a serious examination of the Global South's criticism of the NPT and what this means for the future of the non-proliferation regime is both timely and necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the Soviet Union's successful efforts to employ more women specialists in nuclear science and technology, from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the Soviet atomic bomb project to the Cold War and the present. Despite their contributions to building a Cold War military machine, women rarely reached the pinnacle of the scientific enterprise due to persistent views about their lesser capabilities as specialists. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a vastly changed social, political, and cultural climate, the claimed socialist equality of women gave way to more traditional views of their status in Russian society. For the nuclear enterprise, this change emerged in activities that had disappeared under communism such as the annual "Miss Atom" beauty pageant, a striking departure from Soviet attempts to involve women equally in science and technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapon state, having undertaken six tests between 2006 and 2017. Throughout a series of nuclear crises, since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has not only emphasised its sovereign right to explore nuclear options as an inevitable response to a hostile United States, but has at the same time consistently embraced an anti-nuclear stance, maintaining a commitment to the 'denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula'. This nuclear posture – 'arm, to disarm' – stressing the inevitability of nuclear-arming while at the same time pledging a normative anti-nuclear commitment to denuclearisation, contains seemingly irreconcilable elements. This challenges rationalist IR theories, which are unable adequately to explain the DPRK's position, characterising it as either a tactical diversion to disguise realist motivations or a negotiation leverage to induce economic and strategic concessions. This article offers an alternative analysis, seeking to decode the DPRK's seemingly contradictory nuclear posture by arguing that its anti-nuclear posture has deep Cold War roots aimed at hedging its security inferiority vis-à-vis nuclear-armed enemies. It focuses on the Cold War security nexus in East Asia and examines how Pyongyang's engagement in the anti-nuclear movement evolved to shape its seemingly irreconcilable 'arm, to disarm' nuclearism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the threat of Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine remains, it becomes ever more important to address the long history of confusion among Western analysts in trying to understand the Kremlin's thinking. Anzhelika Solovyeva contends that while the Soviets were more serious and systematic in terms of deterrence than has often been assumed, layered deterrence and theatre-level war-fighting constitute two complementary but different paradigms of Russia's current nuclear strategy.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When new threats arise, how do weaker partners allied with great powers choose among loyalty (remaining allied to their great power patrons), hedging (improving political relations with the challenger, or – in the nuclear age – pursuing nuclear weapons), and exit (leaving the alliance by declaring neutrality or defecting to the rising challenger)? We argue that, in general, as protégés come to doubt the ability or willingness of patrons to defend them, they are likely to shift away from loyalty and towards exit. Where they end up on this alliance spectrum, however, depends on additional factors that we identify, including signals of commitment from patrons and the territorial claims of challengers against protégés. We illustrate our argument and these conditions in three cases from interwar and early Cold War Europe and draw implications for U.S. alliances today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Was Kim Il-sung's desire to have nuclear weapons the sole reason for North Korea's quest for nuclear power? The answer, I argue, is highly unlikely given that extensive economic considerations played the most fundamental role in North Korea's pursuit of atomic energy from 1945 to 1965. With original, creative research on previously unexamined North Korean publications and Soviet archival materials, I demonstrate how the 'peaceful' impetus steered North Korea's early nuclear enterprises in the Cold War period. While previous studies draw only upon circumstantial evidence to argue that North Korea's going nuclear was predestined due to its security concerns, this article revises this teleological assumption by reconstructing historical contexts wherein the two driving factors that formed early North Korea's nuclear programme were mostly emulating how the Soviets harnessed nuclear power for economic gain, and aversion to the Americans' use of nuclear power for atomic weapons to a lesser degree. That is, North Korea, like other countries in what later would be termed the Global South, sought to master nuclear technology for industrial ends in the first place, which turned out to be economically burdensome to continue, long before September 1965 when its first research reactor went online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The five books under review address nuclear weapons and the risk of war during the Cold War. Four of the five contend this risk was higher than understood by policymakers at the time or many scholars in its aftermath. They attribute this risk to strategic alerts, close encounters of opposing forces in crisis, and lack of access to critical intelligence. They consider the superpowers to have emerged unscathed from the Cuban missile crisis as much due to luck as leader commitments to avoid war. I interrogate the concept of "luck" and use my analysis to evaluate these arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Strategic & Social Research is the property of Mehmet Akif Ersoy University, Social Science Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The post-Cold War international strategic environment transformed into one characterized by high level of certainty and complexity. This challenged the concept and practice of deterrence, which had remained the mainstay of the Cold War strategic environment. This research employs securitization theory to evaluate the actions that nuclear-armed states (particularly the US, Russia, China, UK, and France) took in response to this shift. The research finds out that the nuclear-armed states responded with de-securitization, re-securitization and wider securitization of deterrence. By doing so, as a concept and practice, deterrence has entered into a high and extraordinary phase of politics, resulting in the construction of a response (deterrent posture) that pervades across different sectors of society/national power, including politics, society and industry. However, the research notes that this posture is based on a high risk of escalation and competitive impulse driving states into a relentless arms race. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this posture depends on how consistent nucleararmed states are and will be in maintaining such a posture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India is rapidly building up its space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Although Indian military assets in space are in contention with the Chinese space program, they also make Pakistan apprehensive about the future of its nuclear deterrence. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to deter its much larger and stronger arch-nemesis, India, from violating its territorial integrity. Pakistan's nuclear deterrence and strategy are aligned with the Perfect Deterrence Theory, a diversion from the Classical Deterrence Theory used to understand the deterrence relationship between the USA and USSR during the Cold War. The study addresses the impact of India's space-based ISR capabilities on Pakistan's nuclear deterrence and posture. The growth of the Indian military space program, along with its great interest and investment in supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missile defence program, indicates that India is building up its First Strike potential against Pakistan's strategic assets and installations. The developments will tremendously impact deterrence stability in South Asia as they will increase the likelihood of a nuclear escalation in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear weapons have delivered more near-extinction encounters than any other anthropogenic threat, but for the three decades after the Cold War discussion of this threat was relatively sidelined. This paper points to some of the historical connections between ‘war-ending’ weapons, deterrence logic and its breakdown, and the binding between the sublimation of politics into commerce and an extinction logic held within it. It firstly gestures towards roots in the ideal of market mediation as civilisation rising in the eighteenth century; secondly it looks at some writing on the conception of nuclear weapons and the surprisingly long history of awareness of anthropogenic extinction risk this brings; thirdly it suggests that a post-Cold War revival of the binding of market realism to progress that had led to the ‘weapon to end war’, and the condition of deterrence, helps explain the fall in discussions of nuclear extinction; and fourthly it notes that current proliferation and destabilisation question this deep and largely unspoken conventional wisdom over nuclear ‘non-violence’. It points to various moments in the imagination and realisation of viable nuclear weapons and their embedding in democratic regimes in Atlantic powers in particular, and to points of serious scientific consideration of extinction during the Cold War, and suggests that the long naturalisation of nuclear weapons has taught us to ‘live extinction’ in a way that speaks to other anthropogenic risks. Climate and nuclear crises indeed can be read as nodes on a trajectory of extraction and exchange defining a narrow conception of progress that has extinction as its telos. Ideas of ‘total’ deterrence become widespread during the imperial rivalries following this extractive-productive ethics, and take nuclear form as early as the first decades of the twentieth century. After ‘stable’ deterrence, though, as nuclear arsenals remained to back the Anglo-American ‘victory’ in the Cold War, these arsenals reached the apotheosis of their long depoliticising, dehumanising mission, standing as a silent horizon absorbing conflict and helping to explain a lack of political ‘newness’ often felt during late neoliberalism. With the more recent complex and largely obscured re-arming, nuclear weapons are being rediscovered as both an existential threat and an imperative to rethink the scope of political action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tunisia's postcolonial leadership intervened in North African decolonisation and the Cold War arms race by monitoring fallout from French nuclear explosions in the Algerian Sahara. This article examines the international negotiations that facilitated Tunisian access to monitoring technology and Tunisian participation in nuclear weapons governance. When the International Atomic Energy Agency denied Tunisia's request for technical assistance, Tunisian officials struck a deal with US diplomats, who cleared this arrangement with French counterparts. Radiation detection demonstrated the stakes of Tunisia's intergovernmental relationships, enhanced Tunisia's leverage in nuclear-armed capitals, and revealed nuclear weapons' relevance to Tunisia's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine is the first violent crisis of the new cold war. In the short and medium term, the biggest challenge is how to stop the confrontation and on what terms to negotiate between NATO, kyiv and Russia. But until you get there, the positions are divergent about the delivery of weapons to Ukraine, the conceptions of "victory" and "defeat", and the strategic objectives of Moscow and NATO. All against the backdrop of the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. Europe's progress and peace will not be possible without Russia and even less so against Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does partisan ideology influence whether Europeans are willing to use nuclear weapons, and if so, how? The US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe have been at the core of European security since the Cold War, but we have still yet to learn what would make Europeans be willing to support their use. In this paper, we present the results of a survey, in which we asked citizens in Germany and the Netherlands about their views on the use of the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory in four distinct scenarios. Our results indicate that voters of right-wing parties are more likely to approve of the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. There are, however, important differences between the two countries in terms of the degree to which the participants oppose the use of nuclear weapons. These results have implications for NATO's nuclear deterrence posture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few realise that amid rising international tensions, inter alia over Ukraine, Taiwan of China, Iran and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States), nuclear arms control is today almost entirely dismantled and a manifestly declining and desperate US has launched a new nuclear arms, now also targeting China, making war and even nuclear war seem increasingly possible. The political and geopolitical economy of nuclear proliferation and control here highlights the singular role of the US in driving the arms race, arguing that the US desire to dominate the world economy, not the Cold War, caused the nuclear arms race; that the only surviving arms control treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has become more a channel for proliferation than a dam against it; and that the US used the NPT to justify its post–Cold War international aggression against some countries while violating it to aid allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the activist group Women for Life on Earth (WFLOE) attempted to persuade the USSR to ditch their nuclear weapons. The article finds that WFLOE began a women-led campaign and engaged with unofficial activists and ordinary people in the USSR to lobby the Soviet government to disarm. WFLOE's fame as 'Greenham Women' helped them to publicise their overseas activism and they attempted to challenge predominant representations of peace campaigners in the UK by campaigning against Soviet nuclear weapons. However, this success was limited with the Cold War maintaining primacy for the British press and WFLOE only gaining positive coverage when they caused embarrassment to the Soviets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the historiography of nuclear arms in the Cold War the political and military strategic levels are dominant; little attention has been paid to the sub-strategic levels. This is understandable, because most archival material has been destroyed or is still classified. However, it is also remarkable because tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were a crucial element in NATO strategies and because all NATO forces had to prepare, down to the lowest levels, to fight a war by nuclear means. Based on previously unused archives, this article analyses how the Dutch army, as an army of a small NATO-member state, adapted step by step to the nuclearisation of land warfare in the period 1953 to 1968. Which role were the TNW s assigned in the war plans? But also, how realistic would these plans have been, given the influence of (inter)national political developments, moral and psychological aspects, and military-technical and military-tactical issues? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, there were two nuclear superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, who had their own allies. They divided the whole world into spheres of influence, and there was an indirect struggle for supremacy between them. Therefore, they started a nuclear race for supremacy. As a result of these policies, both superpowers have built up enormous stockpiles and capabilities of nuclear weapons. All this could destroy the earth several times. Like the nuclear weapons in their arsenal today. After the Cold War, a new geopolitical order was created in the world, dominated by the USA. However, this dominance did not last long, as new geopolitical players became active in the world in the form of Russia and China. They have their own geopolitical interests and a unique vision of the world. After the creation of nuclear weapons, nine nuclear states emerged in the world. As well as a number of states that want to possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is important to pursue a policy of nuclear deterrence to make the world safer. The presented article discusses the policy of nuclear deterrence and the existing difficulties in the post-Cold War period. The aim of the work is to discuss the nuclear deterrence policy and analyze the existing threats in the process of establishing a new world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper illustrates how Anglophone science fiction literature of the second part of the Twentieth century contributed to influence the public debate regarding the absolute risk of an upcoming atomic apocalypse and the need to prevent it at all costs. In this way, it often came into conflict with the rhetorical strategies of US administrations, committed to normalize the presence of nuclear weapons and reducing their potential risks. The article provides some particularly significant examples of this conflict, reflecting on their outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Auf dem NATO Gipfel von Madrid wurde nicht nur ein neues strategisches Konzept der NATO beschlossen, auch wurden Maßnahmen eingeleitet, die Abschreckung und Verteidigung stärken sollen. Das Konzept setzt den Erwartungshorizont sehr hoch an und die NATO hat eine Vielzahl von Aufgaben zu erfüllen, um den selbst gesetzten Erwartungen gerecht zu werden. Die NATO sollte die grundlegenden Lehren ihres früheren strategischen Konzeptes revitalisieren und modernisieren, mit dem sie seinerzeit erfolgreich von sowjetischen Angriffen abgeschreckt hat: das Zusammenspiel von „Schwert", „Schild" und „Igel." Das bedeutet, dass die nukleare Abschreckungsmacht der NATO gestärkt werden muss, das in eine konventionelle Vorneverteidigung zu investieren ist und dass die Fähigkeiten der östlichen Alliierten zur Abwehr und Abschreckung gegen alle Formen russischer Aggression zu verbessern sind. In Madrid, NATO revealed its new strategic concept and made significant force posture changes to bolster deterrence and defense. The concept sets out a high level of ambition and NATO still has plenty of work to do to meet it. NATO should revitalize — and modernize — the basic tenets of the "sword and shield" strategy and the "hedgehog defense" that contained Soviet aggression. NATO allies should follow up the concept over the coming months with three initiatives inspired by its Cold War strategy: sharpen the sword, strengthen the shield, and bring back the hedgehog. This means making NATO's nuclear posture more credible, investing in forward defense with conventional forces, and boosting the resilience of Eastern allies to deter and resist all forms of Russian aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Furthermore, since all attempts to change the secrecy regime were themselves classified activities, reformers could not seek the support of those outside the establishment or provide explanation when they appeared to promote the regime. That apparently clear line was broken when people Wellerstein calls "anti-secrecy activists" showed that they could use public sources to describe radiation implosion so accurately that US authorities were forced to suppress unclassified information. The third incarnation of the US nuclear secrecy establishment is what Wellerstein calls the Cold War regime. [Extracted from the article]

One of the lingering legacies of the Cold War was the enormous nuclear arsenals amassed by the two superpowers. When one of them, the Soviet Union, disintegrated in 1991, its nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons were located on the territory of not one but four newly sovereign states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Although command-and-control of Soviet strategic missiles was centralized in Moscow, the specter of the single largest wave of horizontal nuclear proliferation loomed after 1991. By 1994, however, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had decided to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to give up the missiles on their soil. Drawing on previously untapped archival records, this article reconstructs the divergent paths of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine toward relinquishing their armaments. A combination of domestic and international political factors contributed to the resolution of the problem. Among the various contributing factors, the NPT stands out as a salient force that provided normative framing and guided deliberations on post-Soviet nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Separating Isotope Facts from Fallacies compares how intelligence agencies have performed in assessing the nuclear proliferation intentions of other countries. Using original archival and declassified documents from the Cold War era, the study appraises the accuracy of American, British, and West German intelligence proliferation assessments of India and Argentina. Contrary to pervasive scepticism, the available historical documentation shows that intelligence agencies did not habitually inflate their assessments of proliferation risks unless they anticipated arms race dynamics. Second, target state attitudes toward the nonproliferation regime provide essential clues to their nuclear intent. Third, more information about intentions did not inherently improve accuracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do unbalanced nuclear alliances provide extended nuclear deterrence (END) to their members? Why have nuclear alliances chosen certain types of END strategy and not others? Existing accounts regard END as a function of the inter-alliance balance of power, regime type, or institutional design. END strategies inspired by theories focused on regime type and institutional design have not yet materialised, while the inter-alliance balance of power does not suffice to explain the choice of END strategy. To elucidate variations in END strategy, this article puts forward an argument centred on the intra-alliance balance of power. Drawing on the history of the US-led and the Soviet-led alliances during the Cold War, namely North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, it shows how the two superpowers changed their approach to defending their allies with nuclear weapons according to quantitative and qualitative shifts in the distribution of power within the alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, Russia has considerably ramped up its military presence in the Arctic. This is something that attracted much attention from Western countries, especially against the backdrop of deteriorated relations and general mistrust following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Current developments are to some extent familiar, as they echo the militarisation of the Arctic during the Cold War and the attendant US-Soviet tensions. Although comparisons with the Soviet Union's Arctic military posture lie close at hand, we need to analyse Russia's current military build-up in the Arctic with fresh eyes. Two of the most indicative developments were studied. Firstly, the formation of a single Arctic military command, with its implications for a reassessment of the Arctic strategic direction; secondly, the physical expansion of its Arctic military footprint, which includes both the construction of modern facilities and the increased activity of its armed forces there. In both these developments, the Northern Fleet is taking on a leading role, but the overall military posture relies on other military and civilian actors as well, and is closely related to security concerns of the developing latitudinal axis of the Northern Sea Route, rather than the Cold War longitudinal axis of a massive nuclear weapons exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of TECHNO Review is the property of Eurasia Academic Publishing Group and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada's efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada's struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]