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More often than not, violence between states in the field of international relations is understood in instrumental terms. States are thought to act purposively in the pursuit of some tangible object, treating those in their way as objects; the targets of that violence respond to such treatment phlegmatically, without any sense of outrage. Drawing on psychological research in 'virtuous violence', which argues that intergroup violence is primarily moralistic in character, we present results from three survey experiments in the United States and Russia and a re-analysis of a recent study, which demonstrate that moral condemnation of adversaries is extremely easy to invoke, hard to avoid, common across different cultural contexts, and a central feature of 'binding' morality, one of the most fundamental moral foundations. Our first survey experiment presents American respondents with a fictional state developing nuclear weapons. Strategic features of the situation – offensive capability, past history, and interest divergence – generate not only threat perception but, crucially, negative moral attributions that mediate between the two. In the next two survey experiments, we show that American and Russian respondents judge aggressive action against a third country, regardless of whether the aggressor pursues water necessary for its population or oil useful for its economy. Finally, our re-analysis of Rathbun & Stein 1 shows that moral condemnation strongly mediates the effect of binding morality on support for nuclear weapons use against terrorists. Our results suggest a future agenda on morality's role in international relations that highlights ethical dynamics beyond the taming influence of humanitarianism and cosmopolitan individualism. Morality can drive conflict, not just restrain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world is entering an era of nuclear disorder. Therefore, this article aims to examine the European engagement with nuclear weapon questions at the beginning of this disorder. The research questions are: in what ways does Europe engage with nuclear issues? And how to make sense of the divergence and ambivalent stances among European states on nuclear weapons? The review identified engagement regarding non-proliferation and divergence on disarmament at the EU level, but mostly disengagement with nuclear deterrence questions outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), apart from short-lived discussions on the so-called 'Eurodeterrent'. Regarding the former observation, it becomes increasingly hard to forge common positions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament within an EU context. The latter observation is exemplified by recurring but ephemeral debates on a European nuclear deterrent. To understand the divergence and ambivalent stances, several factors are of importance, varying from the primacy of national interest to geography. Consequently, while the world is entering an era of nuclear disorder, Europeans should start a strategic dialogue on the necessity of nuclear weapons without undermining transatlantic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main prerequisites for signing the Budapest Memorandum by Ukraine are defined. An overview of the main miscalculations that led to the conclusion of the Memorandum is provided. The very form of the international document "memorandum" and its legal force have been analyzed. Statements are made regarding the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the norms of the Budapest Memorandum and ways of improving security agreements are proposed. It is investigated that when signing the Memorandum, Ukraine and its political leadership interpreted it as a security guarantee for Ukraine, but the actual war since 2014 and the full-scale invasion by the terrorist neighbor in the east have raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of such a document and even more questions about how in the future, mechanisms must be laid out, fixed and foreseen for implementation, which should guarantee real security, and not only bear the declarative nature of norms, for the violation of which the aggressor will not suffer a fair punishment. The article analyzes that Ukraine's signing of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, had a number of preconditions that were not only objective in nature, but this document contains neither guarantees nor security for the provision that was called from the point view of its presentation. The article also provides arguments about the fact that the main mistake that led Ukraine to the consequences that Ukrainian society is currently experiencing is the latter's weak legal consciousness, which was nurtured by puppet politicians and purposefully advanced. The planned weakening of the army of our country, the destruction of the military-industrial complex and the subsequent aggressive expropriation of Ukrainian culture and self-identification were clearly planned by the aggressor, in order to realize his terrorist and invasive intentions. This article is intended to initiate a scientific study of security agreements as a form of international guarantee of protection to all parties to such agreements, regardless of their importance in the political arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the characteristics of key international instruments in the field of control over the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies and the specifics of their influence on the formation and development of the export control mechanism of Ukraine. Even though the foundations of international legal cooperation in the relevant field were laid by treaties in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Convention on Biological Weapons, Convention on Chemical Weapons), its regulatory core consists of acts adopted within the framework of multilateral regimes (groups) of export control (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Agreement), which, however, are not legally binding. The simplified procedure for the adoption of regulatory instruments, which define the basic principles and establish requirements for the procedure for control over the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies, as well as determine their lists, within the limits of multilateral export groups, allows for a prompt response to the challenges faced by the international community, taking into account the dynamics of scientific and technical development and hence the emergence, among other things, of new materials, equipment, software, which can potentially be used to develop the latest types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the lack of appropriate regulatory flexibility lies in the fact that the effectiveness of international cooperation in the relevant field directly depends on the conscientious observance by states of the guidelines of “soft” law acts. Currently, Ukraine is a party to all treaties in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a member of key multilateral export control groups, which directly affected the specifics of the national system of control over the international transfer of dual-use goods and technologies. The national institutional and legal mechanism generally reproduces the key principles of control over the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies reflected in relevant international treaties and acts of multilateral export control groups. At the same time, the Single List of Dual-Use Goods needs to be updated in accordance with the changes in the lists of controlled goods reflected in the guidelines of multilateral export regimes [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A rich literature has identified a number of important drivers of nuclear proliferation. Most of this work, however, treats the determinants of proliferation as constant over the entire nuclear age—the factors leading to proliferation are assumed to be the same in 2010 as they were in 1945. But there are reasons to suspect that the drivers of proliferation have changed over this time: nuclear technology is easier to come by, the global strategic environment has shifted, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime has come into being. To examine changes in the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, I adapt a cross-validation technique frequently used in the machine learning literature. I create a rolling window of training data with which statistical models of proliferation are built, and I then test the predictive power of these models against data from other time periods. The result of this analysis is a temporal map of how the determinants of proliferation have changed over time. My findings suggest that the underlying dynamics of nuclear proliferation have indeed shifted, with important implications both for the literature on nuclear proliferation and for policymakers interested in limiting the future spread of nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NPT recognised Nuclear Weapons States have made no serious attempt to disarm and only do lip service to nuclear disarmament ever since they agreed to do the same in good faith. They have not only retained their nuclear weapons but also kept increasing their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, their nuclear capability is often used as a tool in pursuing their geostrategic objectives. The paper argues that states viewed as strategic allies are supported in their nuclear ambitions whereas other states, despite their genuine security concerns, are actively and collectively discouraged from developing a deterrent. India is a prime example in point which has been given a special status outside NPT. The paper aims to critically examine the evolution of nuclear nonproliferation regime and how geostrategic interests and great power rivalry overshadow this regime. Using Indo-US nuclear cooperation driven by Sino-American competition as a case study, this paper examines the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime using Krasner's organised hypocrisy model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How do the costs of proliferation shape the public support for building nuclear weapons? Public opinion matters, especially in a democracy, because the masses can affect the nuclear policy choices that political elites make. Yet the existing literature on nuclear proliferation has not incorporated the public's cost sensitivity in the analysis. We therefore do not fully understand the sources of public attitudes toward nuclearization. By fielding a novel survey experiment in South Korea, I found that the economic and human costs of economic sanctions and preventive strikes dampen South Koreans' preferences for nuclear armament. Relative to the no-cost condition, economic and human costs reduce the support levels by 25.1% points and 19.4% points, respectively and in the case of combined costs the support decreases by 29.6% points. However, South Koreans still have relatively high levels of support for a nuclear arsenal even after the exposure to the costs of nuclearization. This implies that the rally effect resulting from hostile international responses may mitigate the negative cost effects to some degree. This study can contribute to the growing literature by providing new theoretical foundations and empirical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue contributes to the global dialogue on a nuclear weapons ban by evaluating how regional politics enable or hinder a global ban on nuclear weapons. The insights of 17 contributions offer a nuanced and diverse account of the landscape of nuclear disarmament, arguing that understanding the diversity of regional perspectives, lenses, and approaches is crucial for advancing toward a global nuclear weapons ban. This introduction sets the stage for a detailed exploration of common themes, aiming to shed light on the structural elements that characterize regional and global nuclear politics. For that, we employ a Comparative Area Studies Approach to explore venues and patterns across different regions, offering a comprehensive analysis that underscores the importance of considering local, regional, and global dimensions in tandem. We delineate three key elements that either facilitate or impede the implementation of a nuclear weapons ban: (1) Inclusivity: How key actors participate and are included in the policy-making process at the global, regional, and local levels; (2) Inequalities: how power inequalities shape social processes that enable or hinder the continuity of nuclear weapons; (3) Institutions: how networks and institutions are organized and structured between each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of nuclear order in the newly emergent geostrategic space of the Indo-Pacific. With the onset of increasingly sharp access/denial competition between the United States of America and China, the otherwise bilateral and dyadic rivalries are getting meshed together into the newly emergent geostrategic arena of the Indo-Pacific. This poses proliferation risks and miscalculations among the rival nuclear-armed dyads which populate the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the essay draws out the contours of the nuclear order and the attendant strategic necessities which mold the challenges posed to nonproliferation by the competition between nuclear armed states in the Indo-Pacific. It is argued that an action-reaction dynamic abounds in the region and as such given increasing competition between the United States & China and simultaneous Sino-India competition, the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation look bleak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1994, India enthusiastically supported the United Nations process for negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It expected the treaty would ban all types of nuclear testing and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. The final treaty negotiated in 1996 did not commit itself to this goal of disarmament and India ultimately rejected it. However, behind this rejection also lies the story of India's deteriorating national security outlook and decision-makers' keen desire to avoid their country being subjected to a discriminatory nonproliferation regime enacted by the nuclear weapon states. The key questions guiding the query on (CTBT) are: What were the reasons behind India's initial support of the CTBT in 1993? And what transpired between 1994 and 1996 that led India to change its stand? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been one of the primary international arenas for discussing pathways to establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ). This contentious issue was considered the make-or-break factor that determined whether some past Review Conferences could adopt a final document. With the commencement of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2019, mandated by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), questions have been raised about whether this new track replaces the NPT in addressing the Zone issue and, if not, in what format both tracks should interact. This essay sets the context for these questions by discussing evolving nuclear risks in the Middle East, the linkages between the NPT and the Zone, and the potential risks of decoupling the Zone issue from the NPT review process. The essay then argues for a balanced approach in which the NPT and the UNGA-mandated tracks function in conjunction with, and complement, each other. This approach would preserve the integrity and efficacy of each process and maintain the region's commitments to the Zone, to abolishing nuclear weapons and to preventing further proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the developments and interconnections between regional and global-level negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons. Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who has been one of the leading negotiators on nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation since the 1960s and is the current president of the Pugwash movement, traces the history of Latin American and Caribbean efforts to forge stronger ties and foster regional cooperation. He goes back to the first quarter of the nineteenth century to show how those ties laid the ground for the conception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in a populated area, and facilitated the region's active role in nuclear affairs. He also dives into other successful arrangements, such as the creation of a binational agency (ABACC) that ensures control of nuclear materials in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to build confidence and increase cooperation in the nuclear field, and he describes the region's key role in enabling the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction/purpose: The paper provides an overview of international regimes and agreements that aimed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. For each regime, its impact on nuclear weapons proliferation is presented, as well as its significance in stopping nuclear tests that posed a threat of a global ecological catastrophe. Many of these regimes are no longer in effect today, but throughout history, they played their role in fulfilling specific needs to halt the global spread of nuclear weapons or characteristic nuclear weapons of a certain range. Methods: The paper analyses the international agreements in this field, as well as the papers in the field of nuclear safety from journals of international importance. Results: The analysis of nuclear security regimes gave results that speak of their strengths and weaknesses. The importance and weaknesses of the regimes are given through the analysis and several diagrams that show the trend of increasing the amount of nuclear weapons over time. Conclusions: The work points to the historical importance of nuclear security regimes, but also to their weaknesses, both in earlier times and today. It is clear that these regimes halted nuclear weapons, but this halt did not lead to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, which is the ultimate goal of the agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine's decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia's use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces ROK–US negotiations for the termination of the ROK's nuclear weapons program. It was not solely an issue of ROK–US relations; France and Canada, other allies of the United States, were also involved in the ROK's nuclear weapons development. When an ally (ROK) attempted to develop nuclear weapons and another ally (France) pursued commercial interests by exporting nuclear technology, the US-led non-proliferation regime was put at risk. Therefore, the US had to coordinate the interests of its allies. In particular, it attempted to dissuade France from exporting nuclear technology with the support of another ally (Canada). By examining how the US endeavored to coordinate diverse interests, this study ultimately demonstrates that one of the prerequisites for establishing a successful non-proliferation regime led by the US was how to dissuade its ally from seeking financial gain through the export of nuclear technology and instead persuade them to support US-led non-proliferation regime building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do childhood experiences of wartime violence affect individuals' preferences for nuclear proliferation? This paper argues that individuals who experienced severe war violence during childhood are more likely to value the security-enhancing aspects of nuclear weapons. These individuals are more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence, so they view nuclear weapons as a deterrent against large-scale invasions. By utilizing the geographic variation of violence intensity during the Korean War, this paper compares the pre-war and post-war cohorts who resided in severely damaged regions and relatively safe areas. Within the pre-war cohort, I find that individuals who resided in war-torn areas are more supportive of nuclear proliferation than those who were exposed to less violence. This regional difference, however, is not substantial in the post-war generation. The results suggest that direct exposure to wartime violence during childhood increases public demand for nuclear weapons when confronted with security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do South Koreans shape their nuclear proliferation beliefs? Despite growing scholarly research on public attitudes toward nuclearization, we do not fully understand the underlying factors that influence mass opinion on nuclear weapon acquisition. This study tests the effects of structural- and individual-level factors on South Korean public support for nuclear weapon acquisition by creating a novel time-series dataset. Contrary to conventional wisdom, structural variables did not immediately shift South Koreans' proliferation beliefs. Instead, the effects accumulated over time. North Korea's ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests gradually increased South Koreans' support for proliferation. Also, within a short time period, South Korea–U.S. summits had null effects but progressively dampened the armament preferences. Interestingly, North Korea's denuclearization summits instantly reduced the proliferation beliefs, but, the support for nuclearization surged over time. Regarding individual-level factors, South Koreans' fear of nuclear imbalance, desire to decide on their own nuclear war, and conservative party identification were positively associated with the support for proliferation. This study enriches existing literature by offering new empirical evidence and contributes to the scholarly debate on the impact of U.S. security assurances on South Koreans' nuclear proliferation attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Economics & Administrative Sciences / Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Afyon Kocatepe University, Faculty of Business Administration and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main goal of this article is to analyze the conditions under which South Korea would decide to go nuclear. It seeks to examine the key factors that would trigger Seoul's decision for nuclear‐arming. The article contends that South Korea is likely to go nuclear under the following conditions: where South Koreans' demands for nuclear weapons continue to rise despite US security assurances; where Pyongyang's threats of its nuclear weapons attacks are increasingly directed towards Seoul as opposed to Washington; where US security assurances for South Korea become highly questionable; and where potential nearby proliferators (Japan and Taiwan, in particular) go nuclear. Any single one of these conditions might not be enough for Seoul's decision to nuclearize, but when at least any two of them are fulfilled at the same time, South Korea is highly likely to go nuclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the heightened risks of a nuclear catastrophe are being seriously felt around the world. Over the past decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - the central instrument of the global non-proliferation regime - has been rife with divisions among its members and has been undermined by the failure of two consecutive Review Conferences (RevCons) to adopt a consensus outcome document. The basic assertion underlying this Special Issue is that there is growing criticism or contestation from countries in the Global South about the role and future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the obligations imposed by the NPT and the lack of a reciprocal benefit for these countries. This contestation could hinder the optimal functioning of the NPT, for instance through reduced cooperation in the implementation of its provisions. As such, a serious examination of the Global South's criticism of the NPT and what this means for the future of the non-proliferation regime is both timely and necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

First put forth by Hedley Bull in the 1970s, the notion of 'accommodation' is an often-neglected approach to understanding the role, rights and responsibilities of emerging nuclear powers from the Global South in the nuclear order. The existing literature looks at the avenues and conditions through which the institutions of the nuclear order grant accommodation. However, analysis of the demands raised by rising powers at various stages of the nuclear order's development is severely lacking. The cases of India and Brazil, two rising powers with advanced nuclear capabilities, highlight some of the demands of accommodation raised by these states during the early development of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) - a cornerstone agreement in the global nuclear architecture. Two important demands - namely, regional security considerations in the global system and the adoption of the principle of mutual obligations and responsibilities - have shaped these states' behaviour vis-à-vis the NPT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study estimates the economic effects of nuclear weapons development efforts in Pakistan using synthetic control group methods. Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program in 1972 and conducted its first test in 1998. This paper focuses on the growth impacts during the 1973 to 1997 period, before Pakistan established itself as a nuclear power. I create a synthetic control group for Pakistan using Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the 1950 to 1972. The impact of the nuclear weapons development program is measured as a treatment dummy for the years 1973–1997 in a Difference-in-Difference model. I find that Pakistan's per capita GDP would have been an average of about $718 per year higher had the country not undertaken the effort to produce a nuclear weapon. This equates to per capita GDP being 27.8% lower on average over the 25-year weapons-development period. Results are robust to several alternative specifications, including country exclusion, sparse synthetic controls, non-outcome characteristics as predictors of GDP, and in-space placebo experiments of differing specifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates how Global South countries tried to manage global pressures and preserved nuclear scientific ambitions via post-colonial understandings. By resorting to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), this work states this treaty operated as a response to arguably colonial-minded nonproliferation structures and, in this sense, refined existing instruments through a Latin American initiative. The lessons from this example are still crucial because it represented the first well-accomplished Global South initiative to establish a fully-fledged Nuclear-Free-Zone area. In so being, Latin American countries acquiesced to global nuclear rules by requiring some concessions from great powers. For instance, the Treaty of Tlatelolco's Additional Protocols I and II require that foreign countries with overseas territories in Latin America and nuclear-armed countries assumed not to perform tests or stock atomic weapons in the region. Employing a post-colonial theoretical approach, this article qualitative analyzes primary sources to unveil some peculiar regional tendencies from Latin America that encouraged countries to provide a response for international mechanisms erstwhile under formulation to curb nuclear proliferation according to great powers' understandings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been much discussion of small modular reactors. Companies developing such designs have received large amounts of government funding. Lower power outputs of these reactors will likely result in higher costs in comparison to large nuclear reactors, and even if they achieve parity, will fail economically, since large reactors are themselves struggling to compete with renewable sources of electricity. Mass manufacture is unlikely to reduce costs adequately and might itself become a source of problems, including the possibility of recalls. The history of problems with non-traditional nuclear reactor designs indicates that they will likely take longer to commercialize than light-water small modular reactor designs. The problems related to radioactive waste and nuclear weapon proliferation will persist, though in different technical configurations depending on reactor design. Small modular reactors fail the tests of time and cost, which are of the essence in meeting the challenge of climate change. Even the official schedules indicate that their contributions will be negligible by 2030 and remain small by 2035, when the grid needs to be nearly completely decarbonized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an important diplomatic, political, and legal landmark in the longstanding effort to abolish nuclear weapons. It has already been joined by 54 countries, but has been rejected by all the states that currently possess nuclear weapons. Accurate and even-handed analysis of the treaty's potential contributions, its relationship to other legally-binding instruments, and its likely future have been obscured by the perpetuation of a series of legal and political myths, which this article seeks to expose and clarify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diplomatic efforts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have stalled since fall 2022. Iran expressed willingness to cooperate, contrasting with uncertainty from the West. Recent talks on a "trigger or snap back mechanism" risk prompting Iran to suspend Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) safeguards, potentially sparking regional conflict. Two key factors contribute to the uncertainty: conflicting White House statements on diplomacy and the absence of direct talks due to the US special envoy's leave. Iran's advancing nuclear capabilities intensify the need for diplomatic solutions. This article advocates for a temporary JCPOA revival agreement, acknowledging challenges. Drawing from historical lessons of failed "piecemeal deals," it underscores the necessity of a grand bargain. This comprehensive approach requires resuming direct US-Iran negotiations, addressing Persian Gulf regional issues, involving Iran, the EU, and Ukraine to ensure noninterference in Ukraine, and international mediation for Iran-Israel tensions. These elements provide a holistic path to regional stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International legal cooperation in the field of control over the export, transfer, transit of dual-use goods and technologies is based on a number of mechanisms of general competence (for example, the UN, WTO) and specific regimes, the core of which constitute international treaties on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention) and related multilateral export control groups (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group). While the mentioned international treaties define the goals and basic principles of cooperation of their parties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the critical task of intergovernmental export groups, capable of responding more promptly to security challenges in the light of technological progress and market dynamics, is to ensure the development and regular updating of lists of controlled goods, dissemination and exchange of best practices in this area, articulation of instructions for participating states regarding the strengthening of national export control systems. Such a structure, promoting transparency and responsible behaviour of states, objectively increases the level of international security, ensures more profound and comprehensive cooperation and interaction of participating states, regular exchange of information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, which leads to a consensus on the specifics of the implementation of export control systems and harmonisation of national policies and regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, taking into account the "softness" of obligations arising from the activities of specialised export groups, the effectiveness of the control mechanism depends on the goodwill of the participating states and their commitment to the values and goals of these regimes and is also complicated by the limited participation of individual actors (for instance, India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the latest statistical evidence for the nuclear emboldenment thesis—nuclear-armed states are more likely to initiate military aggression than non-nuclear states—from (Bell and Miller 2015). If correct, their findings have important theoretical and policy implications regarding the effect of nuclear proliferation on international conflict. This paper shows, however, that Bell and Miller's findings heavily rely on two important components of their statistical analysis: (1) using all state dyad observations, and (2) employing pooled regression models to analyze time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data. I argue that those components are based on questionable assumptions on heterogeneity in their dataset. Based on alternative strategies dealing with heterogeneity in dyadic data, my reanalysis shows that the emboldening effect of nuclear weapons is not as robust as originally claimed. Instead, I find the robust deterrent effect of nuclear weapons: nuclear-armed states are less likely to be targeted in military disputes. These findings highlight the need for careful application of quantitative methods to produce a more robust understanding of nuclear issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the foreign policy gap between elites and the general public on nuclear proliferation? We investigate specific contexts in which experts' nonproliferation information changes public attitudes toward nuclear weapons development using a novel attitude change experiment. By randomly assigning seven categories of nonproliferation information to pro-armament survey participants, we examine how different types of nonproliferation information affect pro-armament respondents' opinions and behavioral choices. The results of our experiment demonstrate the enlightening effect of economic sanctions information. After learning about the economic costs and consequences of nuclear weapons development, pro-armament respondents substantially changed their opinion as well as behaviors toward nuclear proliferation. In comparison to economic sanctions information, other types of nonproliferation information (e.g. conditional military punishment, normative sanctions, nuclear technology sanctions, elite or public opposition to proliferation) have limited effects on pro-armament subjects' attitude changes. These findings are the first to identify the relative explanatory powers of previous explanations for nuclear nonproliferation at the individual level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The NPT placed two non-proliferation requirements on the NNWS. Article II expects the NNWS not to indulge in any activity related to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III(1) requires the NNWS to accept nuclear safeguards to be implemented by IAEA. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA. It is argued in the article how this concept will enable the IAEA to take apposite decisions to judge the State's credentials towards nuclear non-proliferation under Article II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]