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The present conflict in Ukraine is considered one of the most significant crises in Europe since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is taking place in a very specific area with special interests of external actors. The conflict, which has escalated into a war, has been regulated and, in fact, frozen, due to the participation of international organisations. This study focuses on the role of three European security organisations-- the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)--in the de-escalation and resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The qualitative case study examines the ability of the selected organisations to take a position and enter the conflict. The study proves that the ability of an organisation to enter the conflict is, to a certain extent, determined by its position towards the conflict (resulting particularly from its membership) and by the tools available to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines four of Europe's more marginal military institutions that receive less attention: the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF); the French led European Intervention Initiative (EI2); the British led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); and the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian joint brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). These are described here as "interstitial" because they exist in the niches between both the main multilateral security forums (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE) and the national level. They are intermediaries, working like bridges to cover political obstacles, while often borrowing resources from established actors (notably NATO). It is argued here that such institutions are a form of national hedging against institutional blockages within NATO/EU while providing a platform for national defence policy entrepreneurship. In the context of Cold War 2.0 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, such institutional practices should not be dismissed as marginal. They offer a means to deploy European military forces outside formal NATO or EU decision-making structures, a feature which confers a useful flexibility. (161) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following years of grievances, Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 and sparked the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Conversations between Soviet and Western leaders in the final days of the Cold War are at the center of the Kremlin's justification for these actions. Russia claims the West exploited a weakened Russian state by rapidly expanding NATO in former Soviet and Warsaw Bloc nations, despite a promise not to expand. This research seeks to answer how Russia's NATO-expansion justification for invading Ukraine is inconsistent with the historical record. Findings reveal that the West never provided assurances on NATO expansion and Russia accepted and advocated sovereignty, international borders, states determining their security arrangements, and not using coercion to settle international disputes. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia also increased cooperation with an already expanding NATO, which only further exposes the hypocrisy of their disinformation campaign and ultimately invalidates their war justification. This analysis is critical to understand how Russia changes the historical record to justify military action and threatens the geopolitical balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This book examines the main stages and authoritarian obstacles of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, which gradually transformed into a hybrid conflict. In the various chapters of this book, the authors compare the main advantages and disadvantages of NATO enlargement in terms of the results of defending democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors analyze the relationship between NATO enlargement and U.S. foreign policy on democracy and security in Central and Eastern Europe, which are indicators of NATO's resilience as a political and military intergovernmental organization. The book analyzes the challenges of democratizing political regimes from the perspective of political security, including the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses how Western mainstream news media framed causal factors of Russia's 2022 invasion of the Ukraine. The article is based on a synthesis and integration of scholarly studies as well as a primary data analysis of Western mainstream newspaper reporting. The research firstly conducts an integrative literature review investigating how Western mainstream news media have reported on Russia and the new Cold War more broadly. Using this as a backdrop, a quantitative and qualitative content study investigates how causes of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine were framed in the US, the UK and the German press. To contextualize news media framing, the second section critically assesses the Western diplomatic and historical record of NATO expansion. The article identifies two competing explanatory frameworks: the dominant Western news media narrative assumes that Russia/Putin's imperial ambitions and nefarious traits have caused the war, and a second narrative, advanced by several scholars, former diplomats and selected journalists, asserts that NATO's eastward expansion created the context for Russia's invasion. The article concludes that the second narrative has been de-emphasized in the news. Such framing is contrary to the historical and documentary record, and links to a marginalization of non-military solutions to solve the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article examines the growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine and their impact on regional and global geopolitical dynamics, focusing on the importance of military organizational management in this complex situation. The confrontation between the two countries, fuelled by Moscow's geopolitical aspirations to consolidate its control over Ukraine, has escalated into a military conflict with far-reaching repercussions. Ukraine's rapprochement with the European Union and NATO has exacerbated tensions, generating indirect arms deliveries and threatening regional stability. In this context, military organisational management becomes crucial to manage and mitigate the escalation of the conflict. The capacity for strategic planning and coordination of military actions is essential to maintain stability and prevent wider conflict. Also, the ability to manage human and material resources effectively and strategically can influence the outcome and duration of conflict. In addition, it is important to stress that tensions between Russia and Ukraine not only have bilateral consequences, but also affect relations between Russia and NATO. Military management must therefore be adaptable and address the complex and interlinked challenges of this rapidly changing geopolitical context. The paper further argues that an appropriate approach to military organisational management can be essential for managing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as for maintaining regional and global stability in the face of the complex challenges of current geopolitical tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NATO's security turn following Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine opened new prospects for adopting the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda from external operations to all tasks of the alliance. Drawing on feminist institutionalism and feminist pragmatist approach to security, this article interrogates NATO's WPS localization in deterrence and territorial defence. I demonstrate that NATO has in the past decade been unable to operationalize WPS in deterrence and defence. I identify following obstacles to NATO's post-2014 WPS considerations: first, implementing WPS pragmatically as an external, depoliticized and low-priority military agenda pushed primarily by femocrats; second, taking WPS to the strategic level while omitting practical localization in deterrence and defence; and third, approaching WPS partnership with Ukraine as a unidirectional transfer of NATO's WPS knowledge to Ukraine rather than a mutual learning. I argue that these institutional factors made NATO's WPS implementation only reactive and ultimately ill-prepared for such gendered security crisis as the one caused by Russia's full-out war against Ukraine in 2022. The article makes the case for rethinking feminist conceptualization of deterrence through the convergence of WPS and resilience agendas. This concerns going beyond military deterrence and centring social and political practices which are linked to societal resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role did conventional arms control (CAC) agreements failures play in Russia's decision to invade Ukraine? Using a process tracing and counterfactual mixed methodology analyzing Russia's invasion motivations, this article attempts to answer the question by assessing Russian strategic policies, proposals, and arms control agreements. These demonstrate that Russia, seeing its sense of "indivisible security" being violated, sought to adjust or establish new CAC agreements to address a growing conventional military imbalance between NATO and Russia. Having failed to establish a fixed and stable conventional military balance through CAC, and as Ukraine edged closer to NATO membership, Russia resorted to the use of force shortly after their December 2021 proposals were not accepted. The article concludes by suggesting that this case supports arms racing and arms-control related causes of war theories, and that dissonant perceptions of the actual or ideal military balance can lead to conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an interview with Ambassador Vesko Garcevic, discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its geopolitical dynamics in Europe. The interview explores historical context, nuclear escalation concerns, and potential diplomatic solutions. Ambassador Garcevic's personal experience with the dissolution of Yugoslavia highlights the impact of international relations on individuals and nations. The article also discusses Montenegro's relationship with Russia and its shift towards Euro-Atlantic foreign policy goals. It compares Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership and emphasizes the role of diplomacy in resolving conflicts. The article presents potential outcomes for Europe after the war and highlights the importance of diplomacy and the challenges of negotiating with Russia. [Extracted from the article]

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We have chosen to study international responsibility for carrying out disinformation campaigns, aiming to assess the importance and progress that the use of disinformation campaigns has obtained in contemporary international society as a geopolitical weapon, much like other well-established means such as the use of force. We focus on the situation with Russia because it has become apparent not only to specialized researchers but also to all citizens through the mainstream media that Russia has used disinformation campaigns to cloak its invasion of Ukraine in a smoke cloud of lies and half-truths. Thus, we found that, in the case of the Russian disinformation campaigns, the full circle of the accountability relationship has been completed. The Russian state has been accused of or blamed for carrying out these disinformation campaigns. The violation of certain international obligations has been reported, and it has been held accountable or even sanctioned for this. In light of these findings, it can be concluded that disinformation campaigns are becoming increasingly important as a tool of geopolitics or international relations, either on their own or in conjunction with other, more classic weapons in international society, such as the age-old use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) is the property of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer's claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian 'imperialism' toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer's arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What sort of military assistance has Ukraine received to date from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members since 2014? What has driven NATO allies' decisions to provide military assistance to Ukraine? This essay addresses both questions. It offers a preliminary examination of how strategic, economic, and risk considerations might have shaped NATO members' decisions regarding arms transfers to Ukraine, a country that remains outside of the Alliance but nevertheless is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Using both a qualitative analysis of post-2014 assistance and a purpose-built dataset combining military aid to Ukraine since late January 2022, we find that prior strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is strongly associated with military aid to Ukraine. Economic considerations and prominent risk factors such as fossil fuel dependency thus far have not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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With the implementation of the UN's System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008), an unusual impact of wars on economic growth emerged. The SNA 2008 enables nations to include the depreciation of military hardware in their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculations. Economic growth can be furthered not only by making extensive military investments in force modernization but donations of weapons and ammunition can also be factored into a nation's national accounts. This research note presents how the SNA has affected the Czech Republic, a member of both the EU and NATO, which is a small-sized country that since 2022 has donated an extraordinary volume of second-hand hardware to Ukraine, which has contributed to the economic growth of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Over the past decade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undertaken a strategic transformation to address various threats against the Alliance. Amongst those threats, Russia poses the most inimical and immediate challenge in terms of time, geography, and intent. Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, what could a strategic policy toward Russia for the next decades look like? What is needed to deter aggression against allies across all domains, to deter below the threshold of armed conflict and to de-escalate and terminate conflict above the threshold? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Russia-Ukraine crisis has posed a formidable challenge to the European security architecture dominated by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a long time. Russia is on a revisionist path to reclaim its lost ground from NATO. The principle of 'equal and indivisible security' is fundamental to European security architecture. The belligerents of the crisis have different interpretations of this principle, resulting in confrontation. Ukraine's inclination to join NATO and the European Union (EU) might have been the foremost reason for Russia's invasion. But it also appears that Russia's larger geopolitical objective remains to redefine and redraw the lines of cohabitation with NATO. In this context, this paper tries to understand the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and how it affects the European security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article explores the practice perspectives of European and Euro-Atlantic integration for the West's Eastern neighbours with a focus on Ukraine in the main directions of cooperation: political, economic, security, and communication. It has been established that Eastern Partners show a dissimilar political interest in rapprochement with the EU and NATO due to the existence of different foreign policy goals. The EU's Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are primarily aimed at defending the European integration, so the states are interested in developing close trade relations, and in achieving open and sustainable economic growth. The results have shown that Ukraine's deepening Euro-Atlantic ties are a continuation of the European course of the state's development, since the interaction with the EU and NATO aims to expand transatlantic relations and create updated security formats. The article also analyses the mechanisms of improving the efficiency of the communication between the EU, NATO and Ukraine by informing the public about the progress of Ukraine's integration into relevant structures, the reforms of the economic and security sectors of Ukraine, and its participation in the Alliance's non-military initiatives. The findings suggest that the improvement of public communication tools increases the involvement of governments in implementing integration policy goals and identifying issues that need a further response. Additionally, the Ukrainian government should strategically focus on ensuring and implementing practical measures aimed at shaping the image of Ukraine as an intent partner that adheres to its political commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors have investigated the features of legal support for cybersecurity in some of the leading countries of the world, have established the organizational basis for its support, as well as the main aspects of NATO and the EU's activities and standards in this area. In particular, the essence of the concept of cybersecurity is determined by referring to the views of both foreign scientists and Ukrainian scientists, and fixing this definition in normative documents of international importance (international standard ISO/IEC 27032:2012). Actual strategic goals in the direction of ensuring cybersecurity in countries such as France, the UK, the United States, as well as the settlement of these issues at the legislative level in Ukraine are highlighted. It has been established which state bodies operate in the indicated countries, whose powers include ensuring cybersecurity. Attention is paid to the settlement of cybersecurity and cyber protection issues at the international level, in particular at the EU and NATO levels. Particular attention is paid to NATO standards - TEMPEST. The content of the norms of the current legislation of Ukraine in the field of ensuring cybersecurity and the nature of the priority tasks of the National Cyber Security Coordination Center under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine are disclosed, which are normatively enshrined in the relevant Regulation. The features of the regulatory and organizational support of cybersecurity in some leading countries of the world and in Ukraine are structured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low security level in Ukraine forms the latest and still permanent conflictual situation which results the country's territorial disputes in the international level. NATO intended to exclude Russia from the main world leader countries" range so the EU's, and in the same time the NATO's, intention to get closer to Ukraine, seemed a threat for the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation, in order to obtain their position between the major world leader counties, still exercises pressure on the Black Sea area, which activities constitute the abuse of energy and military power as well as the support of the Post-Soviet, Black-Sea region countries separatists. In conclusion the NATO as well as the Russian Federation needs to make steps towards each other, because it is true that Russia can exercise a leader role in the Black Sea region which affects the whole world's market economy and also the EU. The article contains a comprehensive description of the events of annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, and the local, regional and global geopolitical changes caused by this movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses an interdisciplinary approach-based study of the current gender equality issues in the Ukrainian security and defense sector. The range of tasks – the completion of which determines successful implementation of gender policy in the national security and defense sector– is outlined. Particular attention is paid to identifying prospects for the formation of equal rights and opportunities for women and men, which should be implemented at both institutional and personal levels. The research was conducted with the unity of interdisciplinary, concrete historical and systematic approaches, methods of philosophical reflection, systematic and comparative analyses, studies of documents and surveys. An analysis of legal documents and standards within the framework of international and national legislations that outline the boundaries of gender policy implementation in the security and defense sector revealed zonal inconsistency of gender equality practices in terms of NATO standards and national gender strategies. For the efforts in overcoming gender gap and stereotypes, the current study has traced the dynamics of change in the practices applied within the Ukrainian security and defense sector since the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security became imperative. Despite significant positive changes in ensuring gender equality in the Ukrainian security and defense sector at the institutional level, there are problematic aspects at the personal level that significantly slow down the process of reforming the sector and can undo all gender initiatives. The range of tasks to solve the identified problems is formed in line with building personal gender awareness and gender competence among the personnel, including superiors and executives at all levels. Educational practices, first and foremost, in higher education institutions of the security and defense sector should play a leading role in completing these tasks. The analysis carried out resulted in the need for reconciling formally legitimate institutionalized programs, projects, tasks and the internal consent – the recognition of necessity to fairly realize equal rights and opportunities for women and men by the representatives of the security and defense sector structures themselves. It is becoming of fundamental importance to implement changes in personal practices of everyday life, which are conjugated with the deep transformations of personal value attitudes and orientations towards building gender tolerance and gender culture, rejecting sexism and gender-based violence as well as forming individual responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hereby article aims at reviewing the following elements: actions of the Russian Federation which have shaped the current security context in Europe, since 2014 up to present day – the WHAT; the main reason for its actions on NATO’s Eastern Flank – the WHY; and how the North-Atlantic Alliance chose to respond to Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine, in 2014 – the HOW, asking the legitimate question if the deterrence and defence measures taken so far are enough to provide collective security for all Allies on the Eastern Flank. With Russia’s switch from a NATO partner to a state with an aggressive position on the Allied Eastern Flank, with the aim of regaining the power it once held, as well as its actions against Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, this paper will conclude on the necessity for NATO to have a clear strategy on Russia’s assertive actions on the Eastern Flank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine exacts a heavy death toll throughout Ukraine. Morbidity and mortality of warfighters and vulnerable civilian communities are inversely proportional to quality access to a viable medical evacuation chain. The military inspector is one option to fill the gap in prehospital medicine to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing damage control resuscitation/surgery (DCR/DCS). Method: Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are applied. Qualitatively describing the medical evacuation of Shane, providing death estimates of the point of injury to receipt of DCR/DCS. Provide interoperable care across the military-civilian and humanitarian sectors. Describe the standardized and consistent evacuation chains across the entire battlefront from the point of injury to the Role 1/Role 2 echelons of care. Results: The medical evacuation chain for this current iteration of Russian violence is currently inadequate, not standardized, not well integrated at the military-civilian interface. Preventable morbidity and mortality from conventional Russian weapon systems have increased. Conclusion: Armed Forces of Ukraine to engage with NATO and EU colleagues to acquire the methodology and practical applications to reduce preventable morbidity and mortality. Standardized approaches to the concept of damage control resuscitation and damage control surgery to the paradigm of tactical combat casualty care can help reduce morbidity and mortality. The Ukraine crisis and Russian war is killing people in Ukraine, prehospital medicine must address and focus on reducing preventable causes of morbidity and mortality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses Ukraine's geopolitical position and argues that Ukraine is slowly gravitating towards West. The paper gives a small hint of approximation process of Ukraine within EU and NATO, and argues how this approximation process is opposed by Russia, who wants Ukraine back to its influence. Occupation off Crimea by Russia violated international order, opening way to unstructured international ties out traditional UN bodies. The Ukraine's destiny is unclear, Dnieper River may divide country in two, and the West faces biggest security and political threat after WWII. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After regaining independence in 1990, Lithuania chose a strategic path to integrate into Western organizations, with clear priorities for the European Union and NATO, the biggest military alliance in the world. In Russia, such direction was regarded as a threat to its influence in the post-Soviet area. Hence the article seeks to provide an overview of Lithuania's security policy, with specific emphasis on the role of Russia, in the recent quarter century. The aim is to distinguish key priorities for Lithuania and assess their practical implementation. Furthermore, the paper seeks to analyse the impact of the war in Ukraine, both on Lithuanian and regional security as well as the development of key security priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet-made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far-reaching implications for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major-power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Russian-Ukrainian dispute over Crimea attracted wide international attention. The purpose of this paper is to explain its historic, demographic, legal, political and military strategic background, its similarities with and differences from other "frozen" conflicts on the periphery of the former Soviet Union, the roles of three main parties directly involved in the Crimean conflict, its linkage with secessionist attempts in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, wider international ramifications of the conflict and the ensuing deterioration of the West's relations with the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea marks a new low in Russia–NATO relations. When we examine the relationship between NATO and Russia through the post-Cold War era, we can ask: was the deterioration in relations determined by geopolitical, historical, cultural and identity factors, or could sustainable partnership might have been possible had alternative decisions been taken? We argue that different reasons account for each of the four instances of deterioration in the relationship. Throughout the period some constants can be identified: cooperative rhetoric rarely mirrored reality; a mismatch in expectations, commitments and perceptions torpedoed the prospect of a more stable cooperative partnership; and, a surprising persistence in low-key but significant cooperation can be noted. The article concludes with the observation that dissonance at the heart of NATO–Russia relations is best understood as the consequence of Russia's attempt to navigate its way through a strategic trilemma and divorce signals Russia's failure to square the circle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events in Ukraine are in the thick of actuality, at the crossroads of East and West. From a buffer zone it has become an acute space of exhibition of Russia's interests, on one side, and of the European Union's, on the other side. As the EU does not have a unique army or a strong political leadership, the presence - as major actors - of NATO and the United States of America is necessary. Huge geostrategic, military, economic, politic, cultural, social and even religious interests are involved. As a neighbour state, member of the EU and NATO, Romania is directly concerned by the present deployments. We wonder if its foreign politics is an appropriate one. Moreover, great stakes aim at the statehood and independence of the Republic of Moldova, but also at the status of the Romanians living in the Cernowits region. Thus, we try to analyse what will happen in Ukraine and with the actors involved, in general. There are several possible scenarios, among which: the success of the elections and the stabilization of Ukraine in integrum; the federation, with the preservation of the frontiers or with the amputation of these ones; Russia's conquest of the country, taking into account EU's demonstrated incapacities; a war that can dangerously escalate; the maintenance of a grey situation, whre the two camps explore each other, sanction each other, but not too drastically, elections and referendums are organized, weapons are pacing around, threats are teething, but nothing important is decided, not even a new cold war. The title hints to everyon's weaknesses (is Ukraine a selfsustainable state?), but especially to EU's, the geopolitical objectives of which are in complete disagreement with its means. That is why, in a short term, Russia can win. But in a medium and long term... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ukrainian crisis has focused attention on the European Union and NATO. Brussels and Moscow have become powerful symbols of two different ways of politics and life. But the European defense structures built so laboriously over the past two decades have proved irrelevant. Meeting the new threat from the East requires a joint effort by Europeans and Americans—in large measure through NATO. Yet, Ukraine is not a full member of the Alliance, hence is not covered by the Article 5 security assurance. President Putin is intent on increasing Russian power in the world—by creating a Eurasian economic association that will rival the EU, by forming with the EU a pan-European security system to replace NATO, and ultimately by challenging and transforming the U.S.-centered international order. Europe, NATO, and geopolitics are back. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]