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Responsibility for immunisation in Nigeria is decentralised to sub-national governments. So far, they have failed to achieve optimal coverage for their populations. We evaluated a pilot intervention implemented between 2013 and 2014 to redesign a vaccine supply chain management system in Kano, Nigeria. The intervention included financing immunisation services from a designated pool of government and donor funds, a visibility tool to track vaccine stock, and a private vendor engaged to deliver vaccines directly to health facilities. The number of local government areas within the state with adequate vaccine stock increased from 21% to 98% after 10 months. To understand how the intervention achieved this outcome, we analysed immunisation coverage for the period and interviewed 18 respondents across different levels of government. We found that the intervention worked by improving ownership and accountability for immunisation by sub-national governments and their capacity for generating resources and management (of data and the supply chain). While the intervention focused on improving immunisation coverage, we identified gaps in the demand for services. Efforts to improve immunisation coverage and vaccine supply systems should streamline decentralised structures, empower sub-national governments with financial and technical capacity, and promote strategies to improve the demand and use of services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Policy making, translation and implementation in politically and administratively decentralized systems can be challenging. Beyond the mere sub-national acceptance of national initiatives, adherence to policy implementation processes is often poor, particularly in low and middle-income countries. In this study, we explore the implementation fidelity of integrated PHC governance policy in Nigeria's decentralized governance system and its implications on closing implementation gaps with respect to other top-down health policies and initiatives.Methods: Having engaged policy makers, we identified 9 core components of the policy (Governance, Legislation, Minimum Service Package, Repositioning, Systems Development, Operational Guidelines, Human Resources, Funding Structure, and Office Establishment). We evaluated the level and pattern of implementation at state level as compared to the national guidelines using a scorecard approach.Results: Contrary to national government's assessment of level of compliance, we found that sub-national governments exercised significant discretion with respect to the implementation of core components of the policy. Whereas 35 and 32% of states fully met national criteria for the structural domains of "Office Establishment" and Legislation" respectively, no state was fully compliant to "Human Resource Management" and "Funding" requirements, which are more indicative of functionality. The pattern of implementation suggests that, rather than implementing to improve outcomes, state governments may be more interested in executing low hanging fruits in order to access national incentives.Conclusions: Our study highlights the importance of evaluating implementation fidelity in providing evidence of implementation gaps towards improving policy execution, particularly in decentralized health systems. This approach will help national policy makers identify more effective ways of supporting lower tiers of governance towards improvement of health systems and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-1980s, the national health policy in Nigeria has sought to inspire community engagement in primary health care by bringing communities into partnership with service providers through community health committees. Using a realist approach to understand how and under what circumstances the committees function, we explored 581 meeting minutes from 129 committees across four states in Nigeria (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna). We found that community health committees provide opportunities for improving the demand and supply of health care in their community. Committees demonstrate five modes of functioning: through meetings (as 'village square'), reaching out within their community (as 'community connectors'), lobbying governments for support (as 'government botherers'), inducing and augmenting government support (as 'back-up government') and taking control of health care in their community (as 'general overseers'). In performing these functions, community health committees operate within and through the existing social, cultural and religious structures of their community, thereby providing an opportunity for the health facility with which they are linked to be responsive to the needs and values of the community. But due to power asymmetries, committees have limited capacity to influence health facilities for improved performance, and governments for improved health service provision. This is perhaps because national guidelines are not clear on their accountability functions; they are not aware of the minimum standards of services to expect; and they have a limited sense of legitimacy in their relations with sub-national governments because they are established as the consequence of a national policy. Committees therefore tend to promote collective action for self-support more than collective action for demanding accountability. To function optimally, community health committees require national government or non-government organization mentoring and support; they need to be enshrined in law to bolster their sense of legitimacy; and they also require financial support to subsidise their operation costs especially in geographically large communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health care costs incurred prior to the appropriate patient–provider transaction (i.e., transaction costs of access to health care) are potential barriers to accessing health care in low- and middle-income countries. This paper explores these transaction costs and their implications for health system governance through a cross-sectional survey of adult patients who received their first diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) at the three designated secondary health centres for TB care in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. The patients provided information on their care-seeking pathways and the associated costs prior to reaching the appropriate provider. Of the 452 patients, 84% first consulted an inappropriate provider. Only 33% of inappropriate consultations were with qualified providers (QP); the rest were with informal providers such as pharmacy providers (PPs; 57%) and traditional providers (TP; 10%). Notably, 62% of total transaction costs were incurred during the first visit to an inappropriate provider and the mean transaction costs incurred was highest with QPs (US$30.20) compared with PPs (US$14.40) and TPs (US$15.70). These suggest that interventions for reducing transaction costs should include effective decentralisation to integrate TB care with services at the primary health care level, community engagement to address information asymmetry, enforcing regulations to keep informal providers within legal limits and facilitating referral linkages among formal and informal providers to increase early contact with appropriate providers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The benefits of an interconnected world for health care remain untapped. As a result of the politics of inequality between rich and poor countries, one or a few health systems are set up as models. Every country, irrespective of political or economic status, should be open to learning from others to build relevant and cost-effective systems. To combat the current global challenge of chronic noncommunicable diseases, poor countries have the advantage of flexible health systems that are veritable laboratories of health systems research. Not only can research conducted in these health systems help harness the potential of mobile communication technologies and informal health providers, it can also help rich country health systems adapt to meet the chronic disease challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Among older adults in Nigeria, women, the very old and those unable to work consult more often. • People living in the South South and in the South East report illness more often but consult less when feeling ill. • For Nigerian older adults, poverty and lack of education impede healthcare-seeking behaviour. • Improving access to healthcare for older adults in Nigeria will very likely require lifting the financial and additional social barriers. Abstract This study aimed to examine the factors associated with healthcare-seeking behaviour of Nigeria's older adult population. Data were retrieved from the Nigeria General Household Survey (GHS - year 2013) database, representative at the national level. Bivariate analysis and Poisson regression were performed. Among 3587 adults aged 50 years and over, 850 reported having been sick in the previous four weeks, and 53% of those had consulted a health practitioner in that period. Those consulting were more likely to be women (PR = 1.30, 95% CI [1.1–1.15]), older than 65 (PR = 1.25, 95% CI [1.1–1.5]), and unemployed (PR = 1.24, 95% CI [1.0–1.4]), whereas lack of education (PR = 0.73, 95% CI [0.6 0–0.8]), low household income (PR = 0.72, 95% CI [0.5–0.9]) and living in the South East (PR = 0.59 95% CI [0.4–0.7]) and in the South South zones (PR = 0.60 95% CI [0.4–0.7]) were associated with lower consultation rates. Our results suggest that improving older adults' healthcare-seeking behaviour in Nigeria will require the lifting of financial barriers and improvements to education. More studies are needed to better understand geographic differences and the low consultation rate by men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Nigeria, the shortage of health workers is worst at the primary health care (PHC) level, especially in rural communities. And the responsibility for PHC – usually the only form of formal health service available in rural communities – is shared among the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local governments). In addition, the responsibility for community engagement in PHC is delegated to community health committees. This study examines how the decentralisation of health system governance influences retention of health workers in rural communities in Nigeria from the perspective of health managers, health workers, and people living in rural communities. The study adopted a qualitative approach, and data were collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The multi-stakeholder data were analysed for themes related to health system decentralisation. The results showed that decentralisation influences the retention of rural health workers in two ways: 1) The salary of PHC workers is often delayed and irregular as a result of delays in transfer of funds from the national to sub-national governments and because one tier of government can blame failure on another tier of government. Further, the primary responsibility for PHC is often left to the weakest tier of government (local governments). And the result is that rural PHC workers are attracted to working at levels of care where salaries are higher and more regular – in secondary care (run by state governments) and tertiary care (run by the federal government), which are also usually in urban areas. 2) Through community health committees, rural communities influence the retention of health workers by working to increase the uptake of PHC services. Community efforts to retain health workers also include providing social, financial, and accommodation support to health workers. To encourage health workers to stay, communities also take the initiative to co-finance and co-manage PHC services in order to ensure that PHC facilities are functional. In Nigeria and other low- and middle-income countries with decentralised health systems, intervention to increase the retention of health workers in rural communities should seek to reform and strengthen governance mechanisms, using both top-down and bottom-up strategies to improve the remuneration and support for health workers in rural communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is evidence that non-government health system actors can individually or collectively develop practical strategies to address primary health care (PHC) challenges in the community, existing frameworks for analysing health system governance largely focus on the role of governments, and do not sufficiently account for the broad range of contribution to PHC governance. This is important because of the tendency for weak governments in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). We present a multi-level governance framework for use as a thinking guide in analysing PHC governance in LMICs. This framework has previously been used to analyse the governance of common-pool resources such as community fisheries and irrigation systems. We apply the framework to PHC because, like common-pool resources, PHC facilities in LMICs tend to be commonly owned by the community such that individual and collective action is often required to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons'-destruction and degradation of the resource resulting from lack of concern for its continuous supply. In the multi-level framework, PHC governance is conceptualized at three levels, depending on who influences the supply and demand of PHC services in a community and how: operational governance (individuals and providers within the local health market), collective governance (community coalitions) and constitutional governance (governments at different levels and other distant but influential actors). Using the example of PHC governance in Nigeria, we illustrate how the multi-level governance framework offers a people-centred lens on the governance of PHC in LMICs, with a focus on relations among health system actors within and between levels of governance. We demonstrate the potential impact of health system actors functioning at different levels of governance on PHC delivery, and how governance failure at one level can be assuaged by governance at another level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]