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Many intentional torts involve conduct that is impulsive or unthinking, or defendant who lack sufficient assets to pay a tort judgment or whose insurance policies do not cover intentional torts. Tort theory, intentional torts, negligence, justification, restatements, torts, consent, dignity, intent, battery 46 The authors do note the possibility of a second-best solution: in lieu of replacing all of the "dignitary" torts with a single tort, the law might "retain[] separately named torts that describe specific ways a defendant may invade another person's dignity ... We simply do not see why these categories should have different rules." Keywords: torts; tort theory; intentional torts; negligence; justification; restatements; intent; battery; consent; dignity EN torts tort theory intentional torts negligence justification restatements intent battery consent dignity 551 573 23 04/12/22 20211001 NES 211001 1 Introduction This brief essay explores the issue of generality and tort law from two directions. [Extracted from the article]

Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts. Increasingly, when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal's vicarious liability for its agent's acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to supervise or control its agent. From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities. Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability does). This raises questions. Why doesn't direct employer negligence liability suffice, in terms of deterring employees' intentional torts? Or conversely, so long as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at all? In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer's preventative measures. Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration. The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability. The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers when their employees commit intentional torts. Specifically, I argue that the under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages imposed in vicarious liability cases. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. And seen through this lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal--typically defended as a "complicity rule" limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds--is justified on economic deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a bold proposal: eliminate the intentional tort of battery and merge cases of both the negligent and intentional imposition of physical harm into a single new tort. The advantages of a single tort of wrongfully causing physical harm to persons are many. It would (a) do away with complex and unneeded doctrinal details now contained within battery law, (b) pave the way to a sensible regime of comparative fault for all such physical injuries, (c) properly shift the legal focus away from the plaintiff's conduct and onto the defendant's, (d) eliminate the Restatement's need to supplement battery law with yet a separate intentional physical harm tort when an injury is intentionally caused but without the contact or other requirements of battery, and (e) force courts to decide various collateral issues (like whether punitive damages are available or whether liability insurance coverage is applicable) on their own terms and not by linking them to whether this case involves a battery (and then making exceptions, since it turns out that battery is not a reliable basis for deciding those collateral matters). More broadly, the new tort is intellectually more insightful as it anchors acts that now count as batteries more in their wrongfulness than in their intentionality as battery law does today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The five thoughtful, incisive articles by Professors Bernstein, Chamallas, Geistfeld, Moore, and Sugarman offer a breathtaking range of perspectives on the Restatement, Third of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons ("ITR"). Some view tort law from the widest vantage point, inquiring whether this forest deserves its own appellation or should instead be assimilated to the rest of tort's greenery. Some focus more on the trees-on the distinct doctrines that characterize the torts and defenses that ITR is restating. In this response, we engage with the participants at both levels. Our response also addresses two fundamental questions-the role of a Restatement and the significance of the "intentional tort" category. First, ITR is a Restatement of tort law. It is not a model code of tort law, nor is it an academic article committed to a particular vision of the proper purposes and principles of tort law. We see our task, not as creating a grand theory from which all of intentional tort doctrine can be deduced, but as a bottom-up endeavor, accurately characterizing developments in the case law and then providing the most sensible and persuasive justifications for extant doctrine. At the same time, however, we strive to provide intellectual coherence to this body of law. Thus, we examine not only the holdings in narrow doctrinal categories, but also the consistency of those holdings with more general tort law principles. Second, what is distinctive about the intentional torts to persons? How do they differ from torts of negligence or from other intentional torts? These questions have no simple answer, because most of the intentional torts to persons have very long historical roots, and because the common law process of reformulating doctrine has played a vital role in defining the scope of these torts in current American law. It is thus not at all surprising to find tensions and apparent inconsistencies between some current doctrines. Nevertheless, we believe that the contemporary formulations of these torts are indeed justifiable in principle. First, these intentional torts sometimes reflect a hierarchy of fault or culpability. Purposely injuring someone is more culpable, ceteris paribus, than negligently causing the same injury. Second, these torts sometimes protect distinct interests, such as the interest in avoiding emotional harm or in freedom of movement, that for various policy reasons are not protected by liability rules if they are only negligently invaded. Third, the intentional torts do not simply identify species of conduct that reflect greater fault or culpability than negligence. Comparing intentional torts is sometimes akin to comparing apples and oranges, because these torts protect a varied set of interests or protect them in varying ways. Fourth, the intentional torts express a pluralistic set of values and principles. No single principle (such as welfare, autonomy, or freedom) fully explains all of these torts. And fifth, although these intentional torts contain some reasonableness criteria, for the most part they reject the reasonableness paradigm of negligence, and thus reject the more flexible, less structured criteria of liability that that paradigm engenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to introduce the romanistic formed jurist in a short peregrination through a different legal system--different as an intellectual source and legal structure such as the Anglo-Saxon legal system, in order to bring an affable concern for the perspectives that can offer, therefore exploring a cultural dimension subjected to low interest of a nowadays continental jurist. Our concern will focus on that branch of private law known in a common law system known as tort law, trying to facilitate and understand the reason of this matter by drawing certain guidelines that will lead to a much tangible shape and crystallization of the institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article discusses how the Walden Court may have mischaracterized the effects test of Calder, and it explores how Calder's effects test should be applied. This Article argues that personal jurisdiction should be based primarily on forum regulatory interest, and it uses this link to apply effects test analysis in defamation situations, then in other contexts unexplored by the Walden opinion. Dram-shop liability and products-liability cases are explored as situations where personal jurisdiction should be upheld, similarly to Calder, on the basis of a plaintiff's good-faith allegation that a defendant intentionally acted to create foreseeable forum effects. To the extent courts are uncomfortable applying such effects analysis, and instead insist on additional defendant forum conduct, this Article suggests such action may be in response to the reality that a plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations almost always involve factually contested matters that, unlike a defendant's presence, cannot be determined apart from the merits of the case. This Article urges courts, however, to resist importing defendant presence-based considerations into modern personal jurisdiction analysis. Instead, courts should allow a plaintiff's goodfaith allegations of defendant-initiated effects to support jurisdiction. Such an approach is the best way to fully implement the minimum contacts approach required by International Shoe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various legal aspects of intentional torts against the person in Australia, focusing on the concept of negligence in Australia, as well as information about the elements of torts and analyses of several legal cases. The writ of trespass is addressed, along with damages under Australian law. According to the article, battery, assault, and false imprisonment are three separate intentional torts against the person. Intent, voluntariness, and recklessness are examined.

The article offers information on history, developments and significance of nthe Tort Immunity Act in 1965 of Illinois, which provides qualified immunity for local governmental and governmental employees from the liability against negligence and injuries. It analyzes the impact of the Tort Immunity Act upon the intentional torts of police officers in Illinois. It discusses the General Assembly's role in justifying the immunity to ordinary negligence of police officers.

This Article takes as its starting point Tony Weir's comparative essays on the law of torts. In particular it examines the circumstances in which requirement to establish malice subsists in the intentional torts and tracks "the staggering march of negligence" first charted by Weir fifteen years ago. As the conclusion argues, this process is certain to continue unless greater precision can be achieved identifying the element of intention entailed in different wrongs and the interests thereby protected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need for school educators and employees to be aware of legal rights and responsibilities related to their practice. It says that the awareness of teachers about these issues can help them avoid litigation, perform consistent actions, and implement school policy appropriately. Meanwhile, it explores the definition and scope of negligent liability and its application in educational practice. It also notes the difference of intentional and negligent torts and offers common examples including false imprisonment, defamation of character, and assault.