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The academic debate on whether there is a “resource curse” has lasted for nearly three decades. This paper aims to verify the existence of a “resource curse” with the proposed new model, named the generalised weighted least squares support vector panel regression (GWLS-SVPR) model, from the perspective of spatial heterogeneity, in response to the debate of scholars. Our case study focuses on the data of 31 regions in China from 2009 to 2018. The results show that the impact of natural resources on economic growth has spatial correlation and heterogeneity, and different proxy variables have different conclusions. Overall, it is easier to conclude that there is a “resource curse” by using resource dependence as a substitute variable for natural resources than by using resource abundance. Using per capita GDP as the proxy variable of economic growth is easier to get the conclusion that there is no “resource curse” than per capita GDP growth rate. After considering both spatial heterogeneity and proxy variable differences, we conclude that a “resource curse” does exist in some regions of China, but there are obvious spatial differences.

Natural resources may become a blessing that can contribute to societies’ welfare increases. Yet natural resource abundance could also become a curse for countries’ economic development. Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between natural resources and economic performance. However, the results remain ambiguous and have no consensus in the literature. In specific, most literature focused only on testing the curse’s existence, while studies that involve the role of financial development in mediating the nexus remain scarce. To the best of our knowledge, this is a pioneer study in a developing country endowed by natural resources. Using panel data of 33 provinces from 2012 to 2018, this study implements the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique to examine the existence of the natural resource curse and scrutinize the role of financial development in mitigating the curse. Results show that Indonesia potentially experiences a natural resource curse. Nonetheless, the negative effect of natural resources on economic growth could be mitigated by enhancing the role of financial development to reach a certain threshold over economic output. This study recommends policymakers to not only increase financial development across the provinces but also pay more serious attention to other factors causing the natural resource curse in Indonesia.

PurposeA reflection on some supposed oil exporting states constantly reminds of the (in) validity of the resource curse hypothesis and environmental consequences of oil exploration. In Africa, especially the case of Nigeria, the argument has remained whether the country's voluminous deposit of crude oil has positively affected the livelihood of the people. The study aims to examine the impact of oil production on the income level in Nigeria.Design/methodology/approachIn this context, the study first examined validity of Dutch disease in Nigeria, thus providing a foundation to further establish the resource curse hypothesis. As such, the impact of crude oil production (CRUDE), square of crude oil production (CRUDESQ), crude oil reserves (RESERVES) and population (POP) on economic growth over the period of 1980–2018 is examined through the combination of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL), fully-modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) and canonical cointegration regression (CCR) methods.FindingsWhile the study revealed the existence of Dutch disease in Nigeria, the resource curse hypothesis is also valid. However, the study found that the resource curse hypothesis in Nigeria can be over-turned when the CRUDE attains a certain maximum threshold, i.e. when crude oil output is doubled over time. In addition, either of crude RESERVES or oil rent (RENT) is seen as a limiting factor to economic growth while POP poses a positive and desirable impact on the country's economic development.Originality/valueThus, the implication of a U-shaped relationship between oil production and income level is that Nigeria's natural resources exploration could be employed to over-turn the potential of resource curse hypothesis by increasing exploration while the sources of leakages and misappropriation of the oil revenues are deliberately mitigated. Other useful socio-economic policies were proposed for the Government.

Non-renewable energy resources are considered to be an important input for industries that support local industrial production and employment. However, many researchers believe that such resources have a damaging effect on the institutional quality, because this quality has an effect on a country’s decision-making mechanisms, and on the human capital, which is usually described as the accumulation of education in a specified population. This collective damage thus impedes economic growth and development. The present study analyses the impact of resource rents from non-renewable energy resources and the human capital on the institutional quality in Kuwait, using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach based on data for the period between 1984 to 2018. The results indicate that an increase in rents from non-renewable energy resources has decreased institutional quality, whereas human capital enhances the institutional quality both in the short and long-term. This study concludes that an investment in the human capital could help insulate Kuwait from the damaging effects of over-reliance on the non-renewable energy resource rents.Keywords: Non-renewable Energy Resources; Resource Rents; Institutional Quality; Human Capital; Kuwait; Resource CurseJEL Classifications: F62; O11; O38; O40DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.11370

The literature on the natural resource curse is well known – countries with abundant natural resources fail to transform that advantage into favourable development outcomes (see Badeeb, Lean, and C...

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the role of economic integration and natural resources and foreign direct investment (FDI) complementarity in explaining economic growth in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).Design/methodology/approachThe study employed the ordinary least square-random effects and the generalized two-stage least square instrumental variables (IV) regression to examine the relationship between the variables.FindingsThe authors find that regional economic integration and natural resource abundance are essential for promoting economic growth. The results further show a potential resource curse phenomenon, offset by the complementary effect of FDI in resource-rich countries. The findings are robust after conditioning for different measures of institutional quality.Practical implicationsThe findings suggest the need for deeper regional trade integration and international cooperation, prudent natural resource management and concerted effort toward economic diversification.Originality/valueMany studies have examined the determinants of economic growth in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, these studies did not incorporate or assess the potential of economic integration in the region. Moreover, studies that examined the growth effects of FDI did not assess the complementary role of the region's natural resource endowment which potentially drives FDI inflows. This study fills these gaps and provides a robust analysis of economic growth drivers in the region.

The resource curse literature shows that natural resources, particularly oil, help regime or leadership survival, but it also suggests that resource-rich countries are prone to civil wars or political instability. This article argues that the ownership structure of the oil sector matters and influences leadership survival. Specifically, foreign ownership of the oil sector raises leaders’ survival prospect and leads to more military interventions aimed to help the leader. Using data on oil ownership and leaders from 1962 to 2006 across 120 developing countries, this article finds that foreign involvement in the oil sector has a negative effect on leadership turnover. Countries with deeper foreign involvement in the oil sector are also more likely to experience military interventions on the side of the leaders. In other words, leaders of oil-producing countries do receive political support when they cooperate with and serve as ‘petro-friends’ to foreign powers.

The novel coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) is a deadly disease that increases global healthcare sufferings. Further, it affects the financial and natural resource market simultaneously, as both are considered complementary goods. The volatility in the oil prices deteriorates the global financial market to substantiate the "financial resource (oil) curse" hypothesis primarily filled with earlier studies. In contrast, this study moved forward and extended the given relationship during the COVID-19 pandemic in a panel of 81 different countries. The study's main objective is to examine the volatility in the domestic credit provided to the private sector due to oil shocks and the COVID-19 pandemic across countries. The study is essential to assess the healthcare vulnerability in the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to the damage of financial stability, causing deterioration in the oil rents to affect the global sustainability agenda. The study employed statistical techniques to get sound inferences of the parameter estimates, including robust least squares regression, seemingly unrelated regression, and innovation accounting matrix to get a variable estimate at the level and inter-temporal framework. The results confirmed the U-shaped relationship between oil rents and financial development during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, it verifies the "financial resource (oil) curse" hypothesis at the initial stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Later down, it supports the capital market when economies are resuming their economic activities and maintaining the SOPs to restrain coronavirus at a global scale. The qualitative assessment confirmed the negative effect of financial development and oil shocks on environmental quality during the pandemic crisis. The innovation accounting matrix shows that the COVID-19 pandemic will primarily be the main factor that intervenes in the relationship between oil rents and financial development, which proceed towards the "resource curse" hypothesis during the following years' time period. Therefore, the need for long-term economic policies is highly desirable to support the financial and resource market under the suggested guidelines of restraining coronavirus worldwide.

The ‘resource curse’ associated with natural resource abundance has long been a subject of study across multiple disciplines. Though much research has focused on possible effects of resource wealth on the formal economy, little is known about how such wealth affects the informal sector, a substantial portion of global economic activity. We posit that resource windfalls directly contribute to growth in the informal economy, as investment and spending patterns associated with such revenues limit opportunities within the formal sector and thus channel more labor and businesses into the informal sector. We test these claims across a panel of over 120 countries for the period 1985 to 2012. Across multiple model specifications, we find that resource wealth growth is associated with increased informal economic activity.

Purpose This study aims to explore the institutional complexities associated with the design and implementation of a natural resource fund for innovation. Design/methodology/approach This study examines the case of Chile's Innovation Fund for Competitiveness by means of a historical approach building on interviews with key informants. Findings The proper functioning of a natural resource fund for innovation requires efficient institutional and operational structures, as well as strong coordination with innovation system actors. In particular, the case of Chile highlights the challenges inherent in adopting a regional approach when implementing this type of strategy, due to the institutional voids that hamper the role of regional governments in emerging countries. Originality/value Natural resource funds for innovation constitute a strategic mechanism for developing the innovative capabilities necessary to enhance the competitiveness of resource-rich emerging countries. This is one of the first studies addressing the institutional challenges involved in setting up this kind of fund in practice, focusing on one of the most relevant and longstanding examples from Latin America.

Studies have shown that the paradox of “the more resource-rich the poorer” otherwise known as “resource curse” has been prevalent in many countries endowed with natural resources. To mitigate this trend, a revenue management strategy called Natural Resource Funds (NRFs) - a government owned special-purpose vehicle to ensure effective management of the country’s natural wealth was embraced in some nations. This paper critically reviewed the roles of NRFs in breaking the resource curse. The Systematic Quantitative Assessment Technique (SQAT) was adopted in identifying and reviewing sixty-seven (67) peer reviewed journal articles that had researched on NRFs in the last decade. The findings were that NRFs have played an effective role in some advanced countries (Chile and China), while they have failed, especially in Africa, Middle East and Latin America due to poor institutional framework and governance. A globally set code of resource governance was recommended to strengthen the role of NRFs and enhance their effectiveness. Resource revenue maximization other than revenue utilization would be a good area for future research.

This study analyses the impact of natural resource rent on financial development to test the resource curse hypothesis in Saudi Arabia on quarterly data span from 1985Q1 to 2017Q4. We employ two novel methodologies at same time such as nonlinear autoregressive model (NARDL) and Wavelet-based quantile-on-quantile estimation to check the asymmetric behaviour of natural resource rent on financial development. The findings of NARDL confirm the nonlinear behaviour of natural resource rent with financial development. The results also show real GDP, gross capital formation and institutional quality affect financial development positively. The empirical results of Wavelet-based quantile-on-quantile estimation method also reveal the heterogeneous response of natural resource rent effect when decomposes into different quantiles that become positive to negative. The results further explain that the natural resource rent has a positive effect in short-run, but it exerts an adverse effect on financial development after attaining stability.

Based on the ‘resource curse’ theory, this study uses panel data for 256 prefecture‐level cities in China from 2003 to 2016 to test the relationship and mechanism between natural resource dependence and economic development. The panel model and instrumental variable regression results show that natural resources generally promote economic development, but for 109 resource‐based cities, the influence of natural resources on economic development seems quite different. The panel threshold model shows that in the resource‐based cities, (i) resources have a ‘blessing effect’ on economic development during economic prosperity (GDP growth rate is greater than 12.1 per cent); (ii) the relationship is not statistically significant when the GDP growth rate is between 5 per cent and 12.1 per cent; and (iii) when the GDP growth rate is lower than 5 per cent, natural resources have a ‘curse effect’ on economic development. Furthermore, the results of the mediation effect model show that the mediation effect of industrial diversification on the relationship between resource dependence and economic development suppresses the promotion of natural resource on economy. An excessive concentration of resource industries has a crowding‐out effect on non‐resource industries in resource‐based cities, which reduces the level of industrial diversification and is not conducive to economic development.

In this paper we examine the impact of natural resource wealth by focusing on historical coal-mining across European regions. As an exogenous source of variation in coal extraction activities, we rely on the presence of coal-deposits located on the earth’s surface, which historically facilitated the discovery and extraction of coal. Our results show that former coal-mining regions are substantially poorer, with (at least) 10% smaller per-capita GDP than comparable regions in the same country that did not mine coal. We provide evidence that much of this lag is explained by lower levels of human capital accumulation and that this human-capital effect is concentrated in men. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the persistently lower levels of human capital in coal mining regions that we document result from the crystallization of negative attitudes towards education and lower future orientations in these regions.

Corruption is considered an important driver of the resource curse in developing countries. Based on a large-scale field experiment in Tanzania, this paper studies how the salience of future natural resource revenues shapes beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. We find some evidence that information about the discovery of natural gas causes people to expect more corruption in the future, but no evidence of the information making people at present more willing to engage in corruption and dishonest behavior or less trusting. The findings do not support the idea of self-fulfilling expectations about future corruption. The paper provides a rich set of results on the determinants of corruption and trust in a development context, which may contribute to a better understanding of the micro-foundations of the resource curse.

Government behavior can be affected by natural resource benefits. Benevolent government and political leaders may use them to improve the welfare of the people, whereas others may use them for their own interests. To examine the effects of oil bonanza on government behavior comprehensively, this study investigates how giant oilfield discoveries affect the size and composition of government expenditure using data from 168 countries between 1972 and 2008. We find weak evidence that giant oilfield discoveries increase total government expenditure significantly in the medium and long term, whereas their effects are more evident in the short term, especially when controlling for other factors affecting total government expenditure. We also obtain evidence that democracy plays a mediating role in these effects; if the democracy level in a country is consolidated, the size of total government spending does not increase even when discovering giant oilfields. Considering each category of government expenditure, giant oilfield discoveries increase expenditure on health and social protection significantly, whereas they decrease educational expenditure. Furthermore, giant oilfield discoveries decrease expenditure on economic affairs and defense and increase general public services and public order and safety. Finally, giant oilfield discoveries increase the net implicit gasoline subsidy in the long term. These findings enhance our understanding of the effects of oil bonanza on government behavior.

In efforts to explain the resource curse, researchers have examined the connection between the resource curse and national corruption. Because being relatively rich in natural resources may encoura...

The article provides a comparative analysis of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to find out how the country's wealth in natural resources affects the features of its innovative development. The study confirmed the inverse relationship between the level of a country's resource endowment and the rate of its innovative development: the richer a country is in natural resources, the lower the level of innovation development in it. This trend, which is called the "resource curse", has manifested itself to the greatest extent in Kazakhstan through a significant dependence on oil exports, as well as in Ukraine due to dependence on the export of grain crops. The main factors affecting the characteristics of the country's economic development in such conditions are the level of human capital, which manifests itself through formal education, formed skills, as well as the perfection of the institutional environment, which should create incentives for the development of high-tech manufacturing industries. Overcoming the negative effects of the “resource curse” requires the will and systemic organizational efforts of the state to redirect resource rent to the development of modern industries, as well as assistance in their entry into foreign markets. But the problem here is the lack of interest of the state in improving the institutional environment in the presence of high natural resource rent, that is, there is a relationship between the availability of resource rent and imperfect institutions. The development of the ICT sector can be considered a positive trend in Ukraine, which could potentially prevent a sharp decline in the level of human capital development.

Russian Federation and Canada are the largest arctic powers that have similar features in evolving their Arctic zones. In the mid-1920s both countries formalized their rights to the northern territories. Russian and Canadian arctic regions are located in harsh climatic zones,geographically distant from national political and business centers, poorly populated, and rich in natural resources. At the same time, there are obvious differences in political institutions,“core-periphery” relationships, business organization, and social activities of aboriginal people and newcomers. The purpose of this study is a comparative evaluation how the rich resource base and industrial production impact on the socio-economic development of the Arctic regions of Russia and Canada. To reach the goal authors use the official statistical sources of the Russian Federation and Canada. Case study method, comparative analysis, and econometric calculations are applied. As a result similar and distinctive features of the industrial development of the Arctic regions of these countries were identified. It can be explained, first of all, by the institutional characteristics of Russia and Canada. Comparing an evidence of the leading extractive companies completed the empirical analysis. Authors concluded that the regions under consideration are characterized by a high or medium share of the extractive industry in the regional economy. Specialization in natural resources extraction and primary processing does not have a negative impact on the economic development of the territories. However, outer companies are engaged in this business that increases the dependence of the regional economy on the conjuncture of world markets. The article investigates in empirical studying common features of the extractive industry in the peripheral Russian and Canadian Arctic territories and its impact on the socio-economic development of these regions.

Research suggests dependence on natural resource development leads to decreases in per capita income, increases in inequality, and elevated poverty. Natural resource development generally takes two forms—extractive (e.g., oil and gas, mining, timber) and nonextractive (e.g., tourism, recreation, real estate). However, research has rarely examined both in tandem. Drawing on the concept of dependence (i.e., overspecialization), the author tests the hypothesis that increasing levels of both forms of development were associated with diminishing returns to economic prosperity—operationalized as per capita income, inequality, and poverty—in rural America over the period of 2000 to 2015. Extractive development exhibited the expected relationship in remote rural counties for all outcomes, while nonextractive development had a generally negative relationship with per capita income, a positive relationship with poverty, and no relationship with inequality. Support for the overall hypothesis was limited due to the returns of nonextractive development being more negative than expected.

Scholars develop two different thoughts of natural resource wealth and its relations to political stability, namely - the resource curse and the rentier state. In the rentier state discourse, the revenue from resource extraction is used to buy off peace through several methods, such as patronage, repression, external support and large-scale distributive policy. The rentier economy concept becomes an important subject to explain oil economies in oil-rich countries across the world, especially in the Middle East region. This paper explores the rentier practice outside the Middle East by focusing on Southeast Asia. It uses a single case study - Indonesia under Suharto during the oil boom period. Two main questions are addressed by this paper - what kind of rentier state practice can be found from the authoritarian government especially during the oil boom period, and how the local/regional newspapers report on and react to the government rentier state practices? The paper relies on nine local, and three national newspapers as its primary data, supported by secondary sources to answer those questions. The finding shows that the national and local newspapers wrote different reports on rentier practices and all newspapers adopted three different positions on rentier practices - pro-government, critical to government, and neutral position.

While most of the literature on natural resources highlights their effect on the growth rate and level of income, this paper shifts the focus toward the distribution of income. Using newly developed dynamic panel co-integration techniques to account for the cross-country heterogeneity, cross-section dependence, and feedback effects in the oil-volatility-inequality nexus, it finds that oil abundance increases human capital investment, improves institutional quality, and hence mitigates income inequality. However, oil volatility has the opposite effects. It accords with the recent trend in the resource curse literature that it is the volatility, rather than the level, of oil that causes the paradox of plenty. The results also shed light on the factors that shape a country's response to its oil richness and volatility and offer policy implications for mitigating detriments associated with oil volatility.

The relationship between foreign direct investments (FDI) and natural resource endowment of a country is contentious. This study attempts to study this relationship for Saudi Arabia that is primarily an oil-producing country. In the process, it would also assess the role of institutions, trade openness, and domestic investments in attracting FDI. Using the methodology of cointegration over the data for the period 1984-2016, the study ascertains the presence of ‘resource curse’ in terms of attracting FDI. The study discovers new findings as to the resource curse in attracting FDI are not because of institutional quality which has a positive relationship with FDI. The results also indicate the absence of crowding out of domestic investments. Finally, the study recommends channeling FDI to Greenfield projects with the maximum transfer of management and technology.Keywords: Natural Resource, Institutions, Trade openness, Crowding-out, CointegrationJEL Classifications: E02; F21; O43; P33DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.10359

Using a panel dataset of 95 countries from 1980 to 2014, we find that natural resource rents have a causal negative effect on labour shares. This effect is robust to estimation methods and control ...

Many countries badly mismanage their natural resource endowments. We argue that a fundamental change in paradigm is needed. Specifically, we advocate treating non-renewable natural resources as a finite shared inheritance asset, and extraction as the sale of the inherited wealth. We identify several proposals that logically derive from treating mineral sale proceeds as intergenerational wealth rather than as revenues that can be spent. Wealth portfolio management suggests that mineral owners must strive for zero-loss when selling minerals, establish a passively invested future generations fund from the proceeds and distribute dividends from that fund to citizens as the rightful owners of the shared inheritance. The current dominant metaphor of proceeds from the exploitation of non-renewable mineral resources as being “windfall revenues” is underpinned by government accounting standards. The “windfall revenue” metaphor is not only inaccurate but also produces several pernicious effects that help explain the poor management of natural resource endowments in so many countries. We do not anticipate that our ideas will quickly overturn centuries of established practice. We do, however, believe that the case needs to be made.

The socio-economic impacts of past mining were studied at Singkep Island, Indonesia. Tin mining was the only major industry on the island from 1812 to 1992. It contributed around 65% -90% of the local economy, provided 2452 out of 8716 direct jobs, operated 2 out of 39 primary schools, built infrastructure and controlled the hospital, airport, power plant and piped water. After closure, substantial mining benefits turned very quickly into long-term losses. Job opportunities became unemployment, economic contributions became economic collapse, and infrastructure assets became liabilities. Environmental degradation was a negative impact during and after mining. Education was relatively unaffected because most children attended state schools. Poor resource governance during active mining led the island to heavy economic dependence, little economic diversification, and failed to transform the finite natural resources to human capital. These findings challenge the claim that Indonesia has successfully released itself from the resource curse that prevailed in the 1970s-1990s. Most previous research on Indonesia carried out analyses at national scale, while the case of Singkep emphasises the importance of regional studies.

Is it possible to reverse the resource curse through institutional reform? Evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between abundance of natural resources and economic growth, political stability, democracy, and peace. However, evidence illustrating how institutional reform can reverse this situation is scarce. In this paper, we exploit a component of an institutional reform that modified the allocation rule of oil royalties in Colombia and evaluate a set of effects of this reform on the living standards of Colombian households. Using international variations in the price of oil for identification, we find that the reform had important effects on several household welfare indicators. We find positive impacts on important dimensions, such as reductions in multidimensional poverty and improvements on income, employment, housing conditions, health, and education, among others. Results are mixed or null in other outcomes, such as formality or employment in the service sector. Importantly, we find no effects on monetary poverty but larger income effects for rich and urban households. We test for the different channels boosting these effects and provide tentative evidence that supports the role of fiscal and administrative capacity mechanisms.

This paper discusses the role of private sector development in overcoming the challenges of the resource curse. It identifies the developmental factors in the private sector in natural resource dep...

This study examines the natural resource curse hypothesize on a panel of 111 countries over the period 1996–2015. Using a range of heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques, it tests the resourc...

Azerbaijan is a case study of the issue of nations with non-renewable natural resource-based economies, usually fossil fuels, facing depletion of what was deemed to be their principal resource. Azerbaijan’s petroleum wealth has been a defining feature of its national economy, social development, and national character for 150 years. It has also manifested what is commonly known as the “resource curse” for its entropic effect on all of the other sectors of the economy. This main driver of its economy is projected to be exhausted roughly within the next 30 years. The focus of this piece is on assessing the prospects of developing a national economy that can create a more equitable and sustainable economic public benefit over the next generation. Each of the pathways summarized herein are from capstone project research reports of graduate students on this issue. It is ultimately intended to be a demonstration of conducting applied future-oriented anticipatory action learning.

This paper tests the political economy theory of the resource curse of the Iranian economy over the period 1984–2017. We find that natural resources dependence is harmful to economic development on...

The discovery of a lot of natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, and minerals has become the source of poverty, deprivation, and inequality in some countries. The failure to properly use those resources has been associated with the “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty” concept. This happens when the resource-rich countries fail to benefit fully from their natural resources’ wealth, something that leads to the failure of the governments of the relevant countries to respond effectively and efficiently to public welfare requirements. In recent years, Tanzania has discovered a lot of oil and gas resources which are expected to contribute more to the sustainable development of the country. However, the question here is whether Tanzania will not face the challenge of resource curse as it has been observed in other developing countries that are rich in natural resources. Thus, this paper is intended to analyze the relationship between the resource curse, natural resources, and economy. It examines the resource curse in some contracting countries such as Zambia, Nigeria, and Gabon. It furthermore pinpoints on how Tanzania can avoid the resource curse.

Recently, work on the natural resource curse thesis has extended to testing the effects of natural resources on public health. Focusing on the case of malaria, this paper examines the effects of the interaction between resource dependence and political institutions on malaria management. To be more specific, this work argues that in a resource-abundant state, democracy plays an active role in providing health goods to the general public and allocating government funds to public health. Democracies also combat corruption behaviors and diversify economies in a more effective way than their autocratic counterparts. By testing a series of interaction effects between natural resources and democracy, this paper finds a positive and robust effect of democracy on the reduction of malaria death rates in resource-rich states, based on data on malaria deaths during the period of 1990–2016. Resource-rich dictatorships demonstrated the worst performance in malaria control compared with resource-rich democracies and resource-poor democracies and dictatorships. This empirical evidence has policy implications for resource management, public health, and infectious disease control and prevention.

Ghana’s 2007 oil discovery prompted widespread concern about the “political resource curse.” Ghanaian policymakers, in partnership with the international community, mobilized resource curse discourse to propel innovative reforms aimed at building institutional capacity, enhancing transparency, and promoting accountability. Ghana’s urgent and decisive response to the problem of oil, however, highlighted its relative lack of resolve to address enduring mineral conflict. In this article, we employ fieldwork, event ethnography, and a content analysis of 1,003 articles published in Ghana’s Daily Graphic (2006-2012) to trace the discursive and material effects of oil on Ghana’s extractive governance landscape. We argue that global discourse around oil grounded in resource curse centered Ghana’s political attention on oil relative to conventional minerals like gold and reinforced modes of extractive governance that overlook longstanding violence around gold extraction. Our research demonstrates the continued power of resource curse discourse to construct a model of natural resource governance and conflict that remains disconnected from lived experience. We question the utility of resource curse as a lens through which to view resource-conflict linkages by demonstrating how it fails to capture important aspects of the relationship between resource extraction, governance, and violent conflict.

Access to and distribution of natural resources have been since immemorable time at the root of violent conflict. Over the last few decades, international institutions, legal scholars and civil society started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison between resource commodities and wars. Current debates emphasize how, through sanctions, global regulatory initiatives, and legal accountability, the governance of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict countries has improved, although international law should play a greater role to support the transition to a durable peace. The aim of this article is to illuminate the biases and limitations of dominant accounts by exploring the influence of the resource curse thesis, and its hidden propositions, upon legal developments. Using the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions as a case study, it shows how legal practices and discourses have contributed to a narrow understanding of resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or caused by weak/authoritarian/corrupt governments. What is obscured by the current focus on greed and ineffective resource governance? What responsibilities and forms of violence are displaced? Engaging with these questions allows us to see the dynamics through which structural injustices and distributive concerns are marginalized in existing responses to these conflicts, how the status quo is perpetuated, and the more subtle ways in which external interventions in the political economy of the Global South take place.

According to the resource curse theory, persistent violence in developing areas results from rebels’ ability to finance warfare with natural resource revenues. Surprisingly, this overlooks the complexities of raising revenue from a mobile mining population that values security as well as income. The literature thus neglects a fundamental question: what are the incentives of rebel groups to prevent or perpetuate conflict in mining areas? This paper delineates a rational to both increase and decrease violence. Protecting a mine should allow rebels to extract taxes in return. Simultaneously, to maintain this demand for security, rebels may need to destabilize the wider area. The hypotheses are tested with novel data on rebel taxation at over 3’000 artisanal mines in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Supporting the hypotheses, the results show that rebel-taxed mines appear exempt from violence nearby but imperiled at the perimeter.

The strategic management of resources have recently garnered widespread analytic attention with the prevailing consensus being the “resource curse,” and its negative effect on social, economic and political development worldwide. The curse is significantly worse for traditional and indigenous communities where tribal land rests atop valuable subterranean resources without much leverage to negotiate for their use or ownership. Some of the poorest indigenous people live in the most resource-rich regions of the world, a condition that is true in both the developed and developing worlds alike. The Royal Bafokeng Nation of South Africa, however, provides a strong counterpoint. Deemed Africa's richest ethnic group, the nation was able to leverage its political clout to establish a community investment company which administers a lucrative financial portfolio that consists of assets in a diverse range of economic sectors all stemming from platinum resources on Bafokeng tribal land. The case of the Royal Bafokeng Nation provides a stark anomaly to the literature on indigenous access to subterranean resources and begs the question “how do communities navigate leverage with their respective state governments in order to benefit from their subterranean natural resources on their indigenous land?” To examine this question, this paper borrows insights from examples in former Anglophone colonies of settlement for structural context and argues that the Bafokeng's political culture evidenced by its political mobilization, inclinations to litigate and its shrewd politicking provided levers of success in negotiating for communal access to platinum resources.

A common puzzle in economics is whether natural resources are a ‘curse’ or a ‘blessing’ for economic development. Previous studies have suggested that resource booms can promote growth, but private...

This study reviews the theoretical literature concerning the resource curse as it pertains to the impact of natural resources upon economic growth and corruption in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and how the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) membership can be of help. The EITI is an international standard promoting open and transparent resource governance through disclosure mechanisms in the resource value chain. Corruption has been associated with less-than-average economic growth in resource-rich countries. This research concludes that the theoretical review found that through the dissemination of disclosures in the natural resource sector, the EITI can potentially reduce the prevalence of corruption in implementing countries in SSA and it can address negative economic growth outcomes associated with resource abundance. However, there is not much evidence empirically needed to suggest this.

Overall, the empirical literature related to "Natural Resource Curse" can be divided into three main strands; first, which examines the impact of natural resources and economic growth. Literrature studies explain economic outcomes in countries rich in natural resources in part operate from a neoclassical / public choice or behaviorist perspective. The second literacy study; examine the impact of natural resources on democracy or democratic institutions. In one of his previous contributions, Ross (2001) not only discussed the mechanism and channel but also examined it empirically. Ross points out that natural resources in the form of oil and mineral wealth are negatively related to the size of democracy. He also found tentative support for three causal mechanisms connecting oil and authoritarian rule. Third empirical literature review; examines the impact of natural resources on institutional governance measures, such as corruption. Ades and Di Telia (1999), empirically and theoretically look for the determinants of corruption, the results include the impact of natural resources. Using the share of fuel and mineral exports in total exports, they invaded whether an increase in this section led to an increase in corruption in the 1980s and 1990s.