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This article studies the violent politics of stigmatisation and erasure of nationalist urban infrastructure. In general, urban infrastructure is a mechanism of state power. But, through the case of the imposing presence of Turkish nationalist infrastructure in the Kurdish city Diyarbakir, it demonstrates that when tied to an antagonistic nationalist political project, this infrastructure is often purposefully built to violently cleanse urban spaces of the national "other". Be it a statue, a mural or a picture of a nationalist leader – this infrastructure is incapable of inflicting physical pain. Nonetheless, its violence is symbolic and meant to have a real effect on Diyarbakir's Kurds' ability and willingness to identify as Kurds. That said, violence does not entirely inform the spatial experience of those targeted by this nationalist infrastructure. The article demonstrates that Kurdish residents also found ways of remaining unaffected, even treating the infrastructure laden with Turkish nationalist iconography as a reminder of their own Kurdish identity. This article thus expands our understanding of what nationalist infrastructure does. It may be designed to be violent. However, it also reveals itself to be a site of contestation – equally inspiring the persistence of the counter-narrative of the national "other". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines state building in Dersim with reference to local demands and the state capacity. It first analyzes how the Turkish nationalists aimed to transform the Dersim region. The focus then shifts to the local responses towards the state policies following the military operations of 1937 and 1938. I posit that the Kurds' relation with the state relied on pragmatism and negotiation rather than outright hostility. Moreover, I demonstrate that the locals' expectations from the state overlapped with the Turkish state's pre-operation agenda for the most part. Despite the local endorsement, the limited state capacity constituted a major obstacle in implementing land redistribution policy and expanding road networks with limited progress. The opening of schools, however, produced somewhat mixed results in the sense that the enrollment rates did not correspond to the increase in the number of schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To consolidate a predominant party system, an incumbent party will attempt to anchor voting behavior to social cleavages, a strategy called cleavage enclosure. However, does this strategy actually work? In Turkey, the incumbent AKP government has focused its campaigning on conservatives and nationalists. The analysis of the 2018 post-election survey reveals that the cleavage enclosure worked for conservatives but not for nationalists. Of the incumbent supporters in the previous election, conservatives replicated their support, whereas nationalists were less likely to support the incumbent than other identity holders. Nationalists tend to punish but not reward the incumbent party for its economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the 'nationalist movement' of Ahıska, a forcibly displaced people who have been arriving in Turkey from various parts of the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. I focus on how members of this community attempt to define the Turkish nation, how they invoke migration to Turkey as a patriotic and nationalist act, how they criticize the state's responses to this migration as insufficiently nationalist, and how they respond to the movement of non‐Turkish others into the territorial and documentary space that they seek to inhabit. This nationalist movement, albeit small in number, demands our attention because it is born of a phenomenon that is intimately familiar to displaced people and not commonly associated with nationalism – the longing for rest. This longing animates Ahıska efforts to organize themselves and engage with the Turkish state. What possibilities and limitations does this genre of nationalist movement hold for displaced people across the world? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of Europeanisation initiated in Turkey following the 1999 Helsinki summit witnessed a loosening of state control over the Patriarchate of Constantinople under the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In parallel with the AKP's reforms geared towards EU membership, the Patriarchate's activities became more transnational in their character, especially with regards to its organisation and influence over religious affairs within the Christian world. This contribution traces change and continuity in Turkish policy towards the Patriarchate under the AKP government. Key differences between the AKP government's stance on the Patriarchate and those of its predecessors are noted, with specific reference to prospects of EU membership and the strategy that has been devised by the AKP to that end. Specifically, the contribution shows that Turkey's bid to join the EU initially presented important leverage over Turkey, allowing the Patriarchate to reassert its transnational character. However, diminished prospects of EU membership together with a gradual return of nationalist sentiment now present an important challenge for the Patriarchate in its efforts to maintain transnational character and influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish nationalism has long presented a study in contrasts. The nationalist movement that created the Republic of Turkey sought to define the nation in explicitly civic and inclusive terms, promoting a variety of integrationist reforms. Those same nationalist politicians, however, endorsed other policies that were far more exclusionary, expelling many religious and ethnic minorities from the new nation and imposing harsh restrictions on those who remained. The seemingly contradictory nature of Turkish nationalist policies has been mirrored by much of the scholarship on Turkish nationalism, which has often viewed Turkish nationality through the lens of the “civic/ethnic divide,” with various scholars arguing that the Turkish nation is exclusively civic or ethnic. This article seeks to transcend this dichotomous way of looking at Turkish nationalism. I argue that the policies previously seen as being exclusively civic or ethnic are in fact both examples of boundary-making processes, designed to forge a cohesive nationalist community. Seen through a boundary-making perspective, the seemingly contradictory nature of Turkish nationalist policies in its early years is not paradoxical at all, but represents a multidimensional effort to construct a cohesive national community that could replace the defunct Ottoman state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Borne by people, intangible heritage is not tied to a territory, nor it is necessarily found within the borders of a single country. The 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage recognises this transnational character of intangible heritage and encourages States Parties to submit joint, multinational, nominations to its lists when a cultural element is commonly found in their territory. Despite such encouragement, there have been very few multinational inscriptions on the Convention’s lists so far. This article examines nationalistic approaches to intangible heritage as a major obstacle in this situation. While the Convention calls for international cooperation to safeguard the world’s intangible heritage, it inadvertently fosters nationalist claims on cultural traditions on the ground. States Parties may treat the Convention as a ‘patent approval system’ and use its lists to register shared traditions as their own national heritage. Their listing on behalf of a single State Party generates conflicts among countries over their origin and ownership. This article examinesKaragözshadow theatre as a case in point. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to theories of nonviolent resistance, violence is counterproductive and undermines the ability of a movement to achieve mass support. At the same time, studies of ethnic insurgencies suggest that violence is the only available method of mobilization in political systems characterized by entrenched ethnic hierarchies. Engaging with these arguments, this article addresses a historical puzzle: What factors explain the timing and ability of the PKK's (Partiye Karkerên Kurdistan) rise as the hegemonic Kurdish nationalist organization in Turkey between the late 1970s and 1990? The article argues that studies that identify Kurdish nationalism as a reaction to repressive policies of the Turkish state without paying attention to prevailing social conditions and oppositional strategies fail to provide a satisfactory response. It argues that the rise of the PKK was primarily a function of its ability to gain support among the peasantry in deeply unequal rural areas through its strategic employment of violence. It also identifies four causal mechanisms of PKK recruitment based on rich archival and field research: credibility, revenge, social mobility, and gender emancipation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period between the publication of "Usul-i Mimari-i Osmani" (1873) which is the first architectural history of the Ottoman era and the formulation of the Turkish History Thesis in 1930's which indicates a radical break in historiography, constitute the early phase of the architectural history in Turkey. Considering the lack of an established tradition of architectural theory or art history, the pioneering role, in this early phase, was accomplished not by architects or art historians, but by a general cultural elite motivated mainly by the nationalist concerns. During this period, Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism appear to be the three main nationalist/protonationalist ideologies. Among these, Islamism hardly had any interest in architecture, nor architectural history. During the Tanzimat era in which Ottomanism appeared and had a considerable effect among the intellectuals, architectural history and Ottomanism came together only in the agendas of those who were already interested in the arts, archeology or conservation matters. However Turkism who introduced a new concept of identity had to construct its cultural basement. Therefore architectural history took an important position in their agenda and became a practical tool to illustrate the nation's glorious past. This study aims to discuss the impact of Turkism oriented nationalism on the architectural history through the examination of the activities of some nationalist, antiquarian and scientific societies and the works of some authors of the era. Conferences, free courses, excursions constitute the main activity areas of the nationalist societies. Preparation of the photography and drawing collections of the main buildings of the past were also part of their program. Important figures of the architectural historiography of the era such as Celal Esad, Kemaleddin, Mehmed Ziya, Halil Edhem or Hamdulah Subhi were among the members of these societies and took part in their activities by giving lectures, preparing reports, or publishing in their journals. Even though they were not nationalist in their explicit aims Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni and Bilgi Derneği were also among the societies whose interest area covers architectural history. However their activities were restricted with the publication of journals and the organization of some discussions forums on the subject. Antiquarian societies, -among them Istanbul Muhibleri Cemiyeti is the earliest and the most known one-, were also organizing conferences, but were mainly concerned with the conservation problems. However, Istanbul Muhibleri Cemiyeti's publications on the Bereketzade Fountain and the Yali of Köprülü were important works of the era whose texts and drawings were prepared by architects and western art historians. The texts produced in this era are mainly articles published in the journals or periodicals of popular character. Books usually written in foreign languages and pamphlets are also among the publication genres even though they are not abundant in number. Inventories and texts which treat architecture as a rhetorical tool, constitute the two main group of works of the era. Among the authors, Celal Esad can be defined as the most illustrious and the most "professional" one. A part from his numerous publications, he also taught architectural history at the Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi. Ahmed Refik was a historian with a colorful style in which he uses architecture as the décor of the past events. Hamdullah Subhi was an amateur of art/architectural history and the "national orator" who worked as an activist for raising awareness on the subject. He also taught art history at Darülfünun. Mübarek Galib was the director of cultural affairs in the early republic and his publications are examples of inventorial works. The nature of nationalism is characterized by a dual action: Deconstructing every kind of attachment produced in the pre-modern societies and the building up of new loyalty mechanism. This dual attitude can also be observed in the texts dealing with architectural history of the era. Consequently while a tendency aims to homogenize and standardize the subject of study, the other appears to underline the differences in order to formulate new forms of belonging. In this paper Celal Esad, Mübarek Galib, Ahmed Refik and Hamdullah Subhi are studied as examples of these two attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The religious arid nationalist nature of the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925 has been debated by the scholars for decades, For the Kurdish nationalists the rebellion symbolized the Kurdish struggle for an independent state. For the Turkish state, it was another deception by Great Britain to stir up the region for its colonialist interests. Newly available sources in the US diplomatic archives raise the question of the Turkish government's fomentation and/or manipulation of the Sheikh Said Rebellion. In addition, some of the Turkish oppositional leaders (such as Kazim Karabekir) of the time suggested that this rebellion was allowed to happen to suppress the political opposition in Turkey. This study examines the validity of these claims and how this rebellion was manipulated to silence political opposition in Turkey. More specifically, this study will seek answers to the following questions: Was the Sheikh Said Rebellion fomented by the Turkish government to eliminate the political opposition? How was this rebellion manipulated to accomplish this aim? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy offers a particularly important vantage point for understanding the force of philhellenism in nineteenth-century Europe. Tracing the contribution of Italians to the struggles for Greek independence from the war of 1820-21 to the war between Greece and Turkey in 1897, this article shows how Italian support for the philhellenist cause illustrates the internationalist context of Risorgimento nationalism. After Unification the philhellenist cause offered the opportunity to continue the tradition of volunteers enlisting to fight against tyranny and oppression abroad. This culminated in the volunteer expedition to fight with the Greeks against the Turks in 1897 led by Ricciotti Garibaldi - son of the hero of Italian Unification. But that expedition also marked the end of the nineteenth-century international volunteer movement. In Italy many socialists and nationalists were opposed to it, in part because it was seen as a diversion from political struggles that needed to be fought at home and in part because the project of the nation in arms was less and less realistic in the context of late nineteenth-century geopolitics. But at its height, the international volunteer movement - to which Italy made a major contribution - was an act of political idealism that drew on appeals to the unity of Greco-Latin civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]