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Zayd Mutee Dammaj, is a Yemeni short story and novel writer known for his novel “er-Rehîne / The Hostage”, which has gained wide fame beyond Yemen. The author, who lived between 1943 and 2000, gained fame with his first and only novel, “erRehîne / The Hostage”, in addition to his several collections of short stories. The novel reveals the realities of the Yemeni Imamate that lasted in Yemen between 1904 and 1962 and the management policy of the Imams. It also deals with national consciousness and the struggle for independence. The novel was selected by the Arab Writers Union as one of the top 100 Arabic novels of the 20th century and has been translated into French, English, German, Russian, Japanese, Spanish, Hindi and Serbian. The novel attracted the attention of many critics and writers; it has been the subject of many studies, literary articles and academic theses not onlyin Yemen but also in many countries of the world. Apart from digital editions, one hundred thousand editions of the novel have been published until today. It is stated that this figure is a record number compared to Yemeni and Arabic novels. In this study, technical and thematic issues such as the plot of the novel, language and stylistic features, character analysis were analyzed and also touches on how the Imamate regime that marked the period affected people emotionally and spiritually, and how this regime took away their rights to life, freedom and dreams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Political Science Studies / Studia Politologiczne is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Both the Cyrillic and Latin scripts are routinely used for writing in Serbian. In existing ideological discourses, using Cyrillic is associated by some with Serbian ethnic authenticity and loyalty to nationhood, but by others with conservatism, Russian-leaning politics and dangerous ethnonationalism. For some, using Latin is associated with cosmopolitanism and a western-leaning internationalisation, but for others with an assault on Serbian heritage, values and tradition. In this context, with which script do Serbians today most closely affiliate and does established ideological discourse actually inform script choices? By seeing this affiliation as linguistic citizenship, the paper analyses survey data and metalinguistic explanations about which script Serbians choose to represent their own names as the most personal of identities. The data show that while some simply write their name in either script depending on habit, younger Serbians, and Serbians outside metropolitan areas, seemingly bias Cyrillic for ethnonationalist reasons as discourse predicts. However, especially revealing is that linguistic citizenship among older Serbians is sooner mediated by lingering notions of Yugoslavia and Serbo-Croatian as country and language that no longer exist but once indexed ideals of equality and harmony in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the establishment of Yugoslavia as a state that consisted of several nations such as Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians and Serbs, there will constantly be attempts to dominate other nations. For Serbia, the Yugoslav state will only be a tool for Serbian domination, which, in turn, stimulated Croatian national opposition. Nationalism will come to the fore mostly from the years 1844 with the infamous "Nacertania" program until the end of the Second World War. Serbian nationalism will also be emphasized during Tito's leadership, with the program of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 and its implementation by Slobodan Milosevic. The Serbs never stopped these forms of war even with the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and the Albanians who lived in other territories in the former Yugoslavia, but they managed to adapt them, depending on the political currents in the world, and continued the ethnocide that can be taken as an example flagrant application of silent fascism that acted in the institutional framework, without any serious reaction from the outside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944-1991" by Nick Miller is a comprehensive exploration of Serbian nationalism and its connection to the Serbian intellectual elite during a sensitive period of time. The book delves into the four-decade journey of these intellectuals towards nationalism, highlighting the role of unfulfilled promises by the Communist Party in pushing them towards this path. The author analyzes the works of prominent Serbian intellectuals such as Dobrica ¿osi¿, Borislav Mihajlovi¿ Mihiz, and Mi¿a Popovi¿, shedding light on their transformation from humanists to committed nationalists. The book provides valuable insights into Serbian thought and politics, offering a deeper understanding of the revival of nationalism in Serbia. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Community Connections: Studies on Education, Culture / Közösségi Kapcsolódások: Tanulmányok Kultúráról és Oktatásról is the property of Szeged University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, the policies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the national question between 1918-1941 will be examined. After the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia since 1929), which united the Southern Slavs under a single state in 1918, the most important political conflict in the country was between the pro-centralist Serbs and the pro-federal Croats. When the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was founded in Belgrade in April 1919, it accepted the idea that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed a single Yugoslav nation, and also set a goal of overthrowing the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After 1934, the communist party accepted the existence of Slovene, Croat and Serbian nations separately and adopted a political program for the establishment of a federal Yugoslav state on the basis of equality of nations. The decisions of the Comintern played a major role in changing the party's view on the national question. In this study, the transition process from the view of the existence of a single Yugoslav nation, which was adopted by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia when it was first established, to the view of federalist Yugoslavia, which recognizes the existence of different nations, will be explained. It will be argued also that the transformation of this ideological-political attitude was decisive to the establishment of Second Yugoslavia (1945-1991) as a federal state by the communists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Colloquia Humanistica is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Slavic Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the Yugoslav Sokol movement during the interwar period in Dalmatia, highlighting its attempt to promote integral Yugoslavism, the challenges it faced in being perceived as a Serbian organization, and its struggle to unify Croats under the Yugoslav consensus. Topics include the rise and fall of the Sokol movement's influence as a promoter of Yugoslav nationalism, its attempts to create a national Yugoslav consensus, and the challenges it encountered in being viewed as a Serbian organization, leading to disillusionment among Croats.

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Significantly penetrating the years between the two world wars, this situation testifies to the long process of uneven development of Serbian music. Despite the founding of the Belgrade Opera (1920), the gradual growth of performing qualities, the expansion of the repertoire, the premiere of the first Serbian musical and dramatic achievements of modern expression, the influence of popular music remains an almost exclusive privilege of traditional national forms of music. In order to establish internal continuity, they modernized and expanded the existing tradition with new genres, appreciating that sudden new leaps in language can be accepted primarily in those genres that have already gained some continuity in national music. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1980s in Yugoslavia, memories of the Second World War were instrumentalised to feed reciprocal fears and hatreds. It is also well known that, at the same period, Serb nationalists used the term "genocide" to refer not only to the massacres committed by the Croat Ustashas between 1941 and 1945, but also to the situation of the Serb population in Kosovo. This political instrumentalisation of the term "genocide" cannot be understood without going back to its definition and uses in the previous decades. Therefore, this paper first analyses the definition of the term "genocide" by the Yugoslav authorities in the first decades after the war, then its use by Vladimir Dedijer and his Committee to gather material on the genocide against the Serb people and other peoples in Yugoslav territory, as well as by representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church. Lastly, this paper looks at the widespread use of the term "genocide" in Serb, Croat and Bosnian Muslim nationalist circles in the late 1980s. Adopting such a perspective, it not only reveals the origin of certain semantic drifts, but also shows how legal and historiographical logics were related, as well as developments specific to the Yugoslav space and others common to the wider European continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociologija/Sociology: Journal of Sociology, Social Psychology & Social Anthropology is the property of MOD International and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Istraživanja: Journal of Historical Researches is the property of Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contributions / Prilozi is the property of Institute for History, University of Sarajevo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Łódzkie Studia Etnograficzne is the property of Polish Ethnological Society / Polskie Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article deals with the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements and how they influence the identity building process in the particular case of Kosovo Serbs. Based on original data collected during a nine-month fieldwork conducted by the author in Kosovo Serbs villages, this paper aims to present local dynamics of everyday resistance to power-sharing arrangements and their implications. I argue that ordinary people’s everyday resistance to power-sharing provisions engenders a marginalization process, which contributes to the emergence of multiple Serbian identities within the Kosovo entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of the Croatian Political Science Association / Anali Hrvatskog Politoloskog Drustva is the property of Croatian Political Science Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Radovi Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zaru is the property of Zavod za Povijesne Znanosti HAZU and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Drawing from the constructivist approach to heritage that defines it as a reflection of contemporary social circumstances, we attempt to outline the key agencies and processes shaping the reception of the Roman heritage in contemporary Serbia. Our case study points to the process of creation of the main narrative of Roman heritage in the country asSerbia – homeland of the Roman Emperors and to its role in the construction and promotion of social ideologies and identities. Analysis of the increasing popularisation of the legacy of the Roman past in public discourse presents considerable opportunities for questioning the social reality reflected by the reception of Roman heritage in Serbian context. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article deals with how the 1990s civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented in the media that currently remain influential among Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs. Critical discourse analysis is used both as a theoretical approach to discourse and as a methodological tool for its study. In the analysis, the civil war discourse in Bosniak and Bosnian Serb media is represented by two daily newspapers on each side. The analysis reveals mutually incompatible representations of the causes and nature of the war, the prevailing absence of dialogue, and the unwillingness of each side to consider the other side's war victims. Looking at more specific topics, a number of discourses are identified on both sides, among which some present the potential for dialogue with alternative representations. The discourses are interpreted through Bosniak and Bosnian Serb nationalist ideologies. The findings might support further research on the relation between the media and nationalism and on the ongoing Bosnian political dispute concerning the desired nature of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this research is to examine the prominence and certain correlates of the sense of national attachment among high school students of Serbian nationality in the north of Kosovo and Metohija and in the south of Serbia. The sample consists of 455 respondents, 179 high school students in Kosovska Mitrovica and 276 high school students in Niš. The research focuses on the correlation of collective and personal self-esteem, acceptance of certain value orientations, and socio-demographic variables (gender, monthly income, parental level of education, school success) with attachment to one's own nation. The results showed that a higher sense of national attachment among high school students entails their giving higher value to isolation from the rest of the world, religiosity, authoritarianism, and general activism is, as well as more prominent collective and personal self-esteem across the total sample. As regards the respondents from the north of Kosovo, none of the socio-demographic variables correlate with the degree of national attachment, whereas in the subsample from Serbia there is a tendency for the male students with lower monthly income and lower level of education of the mother to have a stronger sense of national attachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper is devoted to the issues of the human losses of the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia in World War One and the interpretation of the consequences of these losses. It is claimed that the exceptionally high losses were a decisive factor which propelled the decision of the Serbian Government in favour of the formation of Yugoslavia. This fact was concealed during the life of the state of Yugoslavia. The paper draws on Russian and Serbian archival material which has not been processed to date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Radovi Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zaru is the property of Zavod za Povijesne Znanosti HAZU and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Drina is a long winding river in the western Balkans, with many prosperous old towns on its banks. It had a central place in the mythologies of both Croatian and Serbian nationalists in the twentieth century. The idea that the river and its environs were unambiguously part of one national territory has led to the violent exclusion of other nationalities. This article looks at the Drina valley with a particular focus on the 1940s and 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clerical and secular representatives of Serbian people in the multinational conservative and legitimist Habsburg Monarchy had been striving continuously for centuries to preserve legal and political presumptions needed for preservation of national identity and civic equality, which were based primarily on the privileges that Serbs received for their war merits from Hungarian kings and Austrian emperors since the end of the 17th century. Faced with open hostility of the ruling Hungarian classes toward their legal and political status and grasping the irreconcilable differences between their privileged status and Hungarian national law, Serbs tended to instigate sanctioning of ethnic and civic equality through implementation of their privileges into the Hungarian legislation, all this with the support of the Viennese court and their Church-National Assembly. The climax of these efforts was in the year when the Diet adopted laws which in great deal accepted their requests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the dynamics of nationhood and intercommunal relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The author analyzes the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity among Muslims and Serbs in the country and explores how polarized group identities contributed to political violence during these decades. He discusses the ideology of the state-enforced "Brotherhood and Unity," examines the role of the League of Communists in community relations, and investigates the differences between ethnic conflict and national conflict.

In the late eighteenth century, the poly-ethnic Orthodox community of the Habsburg Empire has been characterized by an increase in the shift of loyalties. Both Serbs and Romanians still considered the Metropolis of Sremski Karlovci and their common, artificially created and confessionality-based "Illyric Nation", the main recipient of their common loyalty. In order to define its legal position in Hungary and thus in the Habsburg empire, an assembly was held in Temesvar in August 1790. Some of the postulations then showed that emerging national identities began to spread among the Orthodox (officially not ethnically defined as "Illyrians") leading to an emerging loyalty shift towards new national concepts based on ethnicity. Furthermore, these were also promulgated by social strata outside clerical structures, such as the still emerging bourgeoisie or the nobility whose representatives were also aiming towards a broader participation within the Hungarian legal system. An imperial decree marked the official end of the Orthodox discrimination in comparison to the Roman-catholic and Greek-catholic church that was complained about before on the Temesvar assembly. Trying to integrate the "Illyrians" in the legal system, the Hungarian diet granted them civil rights and a broader political participation. Its further promise of religious freedom indicates that the Orthodox community was still officially perceived beyond ethnic characteristics, in order to prevent ethnicity-motivated disintegration within Hungary, despite of its emerging inner rifts grounded in ethnic criteria. Thus the 1790 assembly and the following years represent a transition period in terms of national identity, its mutual perception and its promulgating groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of a separate Montenegrin language has been extensively debated in the last decades. Its roots, however, lie deeper, with the first demands for it appearing in the late 1960s. By analysing the contemporary sources, this paper seeks to establish how and by whom these demands were voiced, the argumentation of both sides of the debate and how were they received by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The debate was started by a group of Montenegrin intellectuals in a climate favourable to the “political periphery” of socialist Yugoslavia and the smaller nationalisms. The group, supported by some of the high executives of the Communist Party, claimed that the rights of the Montenegrin nation were being negated by the government's refusal to allow the local language to be codified to a literary standard. The discussion sheds light on the process of nation-building in socialist-era Montenegro, revealing its actors and dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Etnolog is the property of Slovene Ethnographic Museum and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper focuses on different interpretations of Montenegrin history after 2000. It is primarily dedicated to the new surveys of this country's history published in the first decade of the 21st century, mostly in close connection to the post-Yugoslav process of nation-building which culminated in 2006 by the declaration of independence. Critical comparative analysis of works by Thomas Fleming, Živko Andrijaševič, Šerbo Rastoder, Elizabeth Roberts and Kenneth Morrison is conducted in a wider context of recent historiographical production on different periods of the history of Montenegro, Yugoslavia and the Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the limits and possibilities for postethnic mobilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It employs and critically assesses Tarrow's classic concept of political opportunity structure for the explaining the variations in the occurrence of postethnic mobilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a deeply divided society. While the main cleavages in the country run along ethnic lines, a number of groups and NGOs attempt to mobilize alternative identities across ethnic boundaries. These groups are mostly based in the Federation entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not in the Republika Srpska. My analysis shows that the concept of political opportunity structure only partly explains this difference. I thus suggest an alternative perspective, which takes into account the cultural environment in which the mobilization happens. The first part of the paper expands on the definition of postethnic activism, explaining what it is and how I proceeded in researching postethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second part uses the framework of political opportunity structure for assessing the influence of environmental factors on the emergence and development of postethnic activism. The third part of the paper evaluates the relevance of the political opportunity structure framework, considers the merits of an approach which takes into account the cultural context, and suggests some further avenues for research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses and challenges some popular myths and perceptions about interwar Yugoslavia in post-socialist (and post-Yugoslav) Serbia. These include discourses that blame ‘others’ – ‘treacherous’ Croats and other non-Serbs, the ‘perfidious’ west, especially Britain – and that are also self-critical, of Serbs’ ‘naivety’ as exemplified in their choosing to create Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War, and of, later, embracing communism. The article also offers a reassessment of the interwar period, often neglected by scholars of former Yugoslavia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Miletić's politics at the Annunciation Council proved to be traditional, liberal and democratic. The main concept of Serbian political majority was based on the demand for the authorization with which the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy could restore political and territorial autonomy on the territory of Hungary. The concept was not in disagreement with the key political and ideological principles set by the leading Serbian liberals in diaspora. Leaning toward the majority's opinion, presented by the patriarch Josif Rajačić, Miletić made efforts to fulfill the requirements for achieving a lasting, historical, Serbian-Hungarian agreement and in this way make the political and legal status of Serbian people more secure while preserving its national identity. Although he stayed within minority, he defined politics that would become an integral part of the programme and ideology of the Srpska narodna slobodoumna stranka (Serbian national free-thinking party) in a few years time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recursive secessions are attempts at secession from a seceding state (or a state emerging from a secession). This article compares attempts at recursive secession of the Serb Krajina from Croatia and of Abkhazia from Georgia and the use of force and violence in these two attempts at recursive secession. While remarkable similarities are found in the political strategies of the secessionist leaders in these two cases, there are significant differences in the use of military force both by the secessionists and their host-state authorities. The difference may be explicable by the greater dependence of the Serb Krajina secessionist leadership on the military and logistic assistance of its protector state, Serbia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Issues in Ethnology Anthropology is the property of Issues in Ethnology Anthropology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Being attentive to initial reconstruction of identities in post-conflict environments is critical because robust group images are absent and there remains time and space for shifts in policy. Applying theories of social psychology, overlooked in literature on ethnic violence, peace-building, and reconciliation, this article examines characteristics and consequences of the emerging socio-psychological trend of 'defensive nationalism' in post-conflict Serb narratives. The article argues that the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have contributed to an identity crisis among the Serbs, and identifies the issues of 'individual versus collective' guilt and 'legal versus political' trials as major factors. The destabilization of the Serb self-image on the global scene has instigated new, and furthered old, forms of defensiveness, leading to the dismissal of the tribunal's proceedings in favor of contradictory and conspiracy accounts. The point of conducting fair and effective prosecutions is undermined if reconciliation opportunities are simultaneously diminished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the evaluation of local culture, regional demographics, and local-level institutions in Croatia. It explores the anti-Serbian campaigns that were concentrated in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina. It examines the city's social, political, cultural, and religious institutions reacted and participated on the Ustasha regime's attack on Serbs. It mentions that Ustasha regime has positioned a genocidal campaign against Sarajevo's Serbs, but not all were targeted. It notes that in Sarajevo's case there was a reciprocal relationship that existed between local and national prerogatives wherein local identities affected the state genocidal agenda. It suggests that victims should still remain as part of the local and national community.

What will be discussed in this article is the pattern of ethnic relations in the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina, with a special focus on the relations between ethnic Hungarians and the Serbian majority. Particular attention will be paid to the political engineering of ethnicity, at the elite level, and ethnic relations from a grass-roots perspective. What will be demonstrated is that instead of focusing on internally homogeneous and externally demarcated ethnic groups, the function of ethnicity in Vojvodina can be understood in terms of a continuous process orchestrated by interest groups. The ultimate aim of these interest groups, or organizations, is to forge an overriding sense of group cohesion among the Serbian majority as well as the ethnic Hungarian community. The impact of this process on ethnic relations is always subject to the persistence of a trans-ethnic substratum that manifests itself in the form of Vojvodinian regional identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how local sympathy is aroused toward a government under attack from a foreign military. Additionally, the article explores the strength of the national mythology of the attacked nation. The bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 is used as a case study. It is noted that a surge in national mythology can influence groups divided by race, religion, and social status to come together and find common identity on the national level. In Yugoslavia, Serbian groups previously discontent with their government supported Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević following the NATO bombing. As the nation's economy declined, though, so too did support for Milošević.

Copyright of Migration & Ethnic Themes: MET / Migracijske i Etničke Teme is the property of Institut za istrazivanje migracija / Institute for Migration Research (IMIN) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Participation in mass crime is often approached from a top-down perspective that centralizes the actions of the masses under the order of elites and leaders. While there is some evidence to support this approach, a more complete assessment of participation in mass crime must also consider the grassroots contingencies that unite the collective motivation and capacity that induce such actions. Such a bottoms-up approach is developed in this article with a particular focus on the personal experiences of former Serbian militiamen who took part in scenes of mass violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interviews with former militiamen illustrate how political opportunities, diverging nationalistic attitudes, proximity to growing violence in increasingly localized killing fields, incentives to participate in parallel criminal activities, and an influence within community networks that were submerged in mass crimes united to legitimize and facilitate their personal commitment to the events that took place in this region during the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Since the outbreak of the War of Yugoslav Succession in 1991 and the subsequent atrocities, a significant portion of Serbian society, including the upper echelons of the government, has displayed symptoms of the denial syndrome, in which guilt is transposed onto the Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovar Albanians. This syndrome is also associated with a veneration for the victimized hero, with sinister attribution error, and with tendencies toward dysphoric rumination. In the Serbian case, it has also been associated with efforts to whitewash the role played by Serbs such as Milan Nedić and Draža Mihailović during World War Two and has reinforced feelings of self-righteousness in Belgrade''s insisting on its sovereignty over the disputed province of Kosovo. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the status minorities might have in the successor states to socialist Yugoslavia. Socialist Yugoslavia dealt with minority issues in an original way, though it was never completely successful in fulfilling the promise of removing nationalism from politics, which had been an important part of the partisan movement's appeal during World War II. Communists in Yugoslavia did not accepted the notion that majorities and minorities could be determining factors in political decision-making. Consequently, the Yugoslav communist regime did not recognize the concept of ethnic or religious minorities. Rather, it considered the country to have six recognized Yugoslav nations Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and since 1968 Muslims.

Slobodan Miloševic was the central actor in the recent Yugoslav drama that began with the rise of nationalism and ended with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. How did he emerge as a charismatic leader, and why did the Serbian people follow him to national disaster. It is argued that Miloševic owed his charismatic authority to the sense of widespread social discontent he helped be forged by strategically manipulating key cultural symbols of the Serbian nation. The claim that charismatic leadership, far from being an effect of existing real crises, may also become a major cause of prospective ones suggests new ways of theorizing about political charisma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]