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Servant leadership is an effective leadership style that focuses on ethics and morality. Emotional intelligence (EI) is also associated with effective leadership and ethical behavior; thus, there has been a surge in studies that assessed the link between EI and servant leadership. Nevertheless, the empirical landscape of this relationship is mixed and fragmented. We undertook a meta-analysis to clarify this literature and found that (1) emotional intelligence (EI) has a significant positive relationship with servant leadership (ρ̅̂ = .57); (2) the relationship between EI and servant leadership is stronger in studies having a lower percentage of well-educated subjects, in low power distance cultures, and in high institutional collectivism cultures; and (3) We were unable to find sufficient evidence to support moderating effects of the relationship between EI and servant leadership for gender (male-dominated and female-dominated studies), age (between young and old subjects), for self-report versus follower-report of servant leadership, and across different scales of servant leadership.

Este texto es una reacción a la argumentación propuesta por Francisco Saffie por la cual el “reconocimiento recíproco” da lugar al com- portamiento solidario y ético de los hombres en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones tributarias. Lo anterior por cuanto, para el autor, existe una fuerte relación entre la tributación y el derecho a la propiedad privada, lo que llevaría a construir el derecho tributario sobre principios. El comentario al texto diserta, en primer lugar, sobre los conceptos de “ética” y “moralidad” e intenta comprender cómo el “reconocimiento recíproco” incentiva en los hombres estas cualidades. También ahonda en la dificultad de entender qué son los “principios jurídicos” para analizar la construcción del derecho tributario sobre los mismos.

Consumers often judge short trading that profit when asset prices fall to be less moral than long trading that profit when asset prices rise. In this research, we show that the relatively lower moral judgments of short trades/traders make consumers favor long instruments over short instruments as their investment vehicle of choice. However, we can make short instruments appear as attractive as long instruments by incorporating an economic argument and a moral argument for short trades, i.e., short trades make markets efficient by revealing the true worth of an asset and thereby protect consumers from higher prices. We find that neither the economic nor the moral argument, by themselves, can make short trades morally equivalent to long trades. The results imply that financial organizations need a core moral justification to validate the efficiency/rationality of their practices if they wish to respond to public pressures demanding ethical behavior.

This article aims to conceptualize, for the first time, an implicit form of moral disengagement and investigate its role in relation to cheating behavior. In line with the implicit social-cognition models, we argue that the implicit moral disengagement would represent an unintentional, automatic, and less accessible form of the mechanisms bypassing the moral self-regulatory system. We anticipate that in situations implying on-the-spot decisions and where individuals might suffer no consequences for the misconduct, the implicit moral disengagement would predict the actual behavior while the explicit moral disengagement would predict self-reported conduct. The results of three empirical studies provide support for the theorization of an implicit moral disengagement and its assessment through a newly developed implicit measurement procedure using the relational responding task. Results of the structural equation models, including both implicit and explicit moral disengagement, demonstrated that only the implicit one was associated with the actual misconduct.

To what extent does the market exhibit moral and ethical behavior? Morality complements the positive effects of the market. The results of the market correspond only partially to our righteous ideas. In case of market failure, morality ensures that third parties are not harmed. Against this background, the social market economy is entering the market and changing the distribution results. Social morality is an important corrective factor in the market economy. If a market economy is to be an advantage for society, society must sanction immoral, damaging behavior through legal penalties or social exclusion. In addition, it must promote voluntary ethical behavior through the provision of values.

Moral identity, how individuals define themselves relative to various moral attributes, is an important factor in the regulation of moral thought and behavior in organizations. We advance both the conceptualization and operationalization of moral identity through considering the complexity of its content and structure. We do so through integrating self-complexity theory to establish a deeper understanding of how individuals both define themselves as moral beings and structure moral attributes within their self-concepts across various roles (e.g., co-worker, son/daughter, etc.). To date, moral identity has been conceptualized as a global unitary construct. Across five samples, we find that it is dimensional (having dimensions of Benevolence, Justice, Obligation, and Integrity) and that individuals construe themselves relative to each dimension differently across sub-identities/roles. We then assess the effects of this expanded construct across two samples and find that using the complex structure of moral identity, we can predict situated ethical intentions and deviance within and across roles. Further, a within-participants experiment using an additional sample demonstrates that when priming a focal role, the unique moral identity content constituting that role provides predominant influence on corresponding ethical choices.

We introduce a new model of bounded ethicality which helps explain three persistent puzzles of ethical behavior: when moral awareness is or is not present, when ethical behavior is more or less consistent with past behavior, and when blind spots obscure our ethical failures. The original conception of bounded ethicality ( Chugh, Banaji, & Bazerman, 2005 ) described the systematic psychological constraints on ethical behavior and has contributed to our field's understanding of the phenomena of everyday, “ordinary” unethical behavior. In this more detailed model, we delineate these systematic processes and mechanisms and show how concepts of automaticity, self-view, and self-threat play critical roles in our ethical decision-making. The model describes distinct, asymmetric patterns of (un)ethical behavior and pinpoints the contingency which determines which pattern is more likely to unfold, including when we will trend to more or less automaticity and more or less ethical behavior. Our model integrates and synthesizes many of the key models and findings in recent behavioral ethics research into a single, overarching model of ethical decision-making, offering an anchor for new questions and a new realm of study.

This review synthesizes research on power and morality. Although power is typically viewed as undermining the roots of moral behavior, this paper proposes power can either morally corrupt or morally elevate individuals depending on two crucial factors. First, power can trigger behavioral disinhibition. As a consequence, power fosters corruption by disinhibiting people's immoral desires, but can also encourage ethical behavior by amplifying moral impulses. Second, power leads people to focus more on their self, relative to others. Thus, those with power are more likely to engage in self-beneficial behavior, but those who lack power are more prone to engage in other-beneficial unethical behavior. Overall, we offer predictions as to when and why power will yield more or less moral behavior.

The movie “Arbitrage” showcases how, driven by greed, corporate America shuns family, relationships, morality and ethical behavior. In the pursuit for power and money, the corporate becomes the person. An alternative, in such a situation, for an ethical leader, would have been to declare the $400 million debt and uphold the sanctity and truthfulness of his relationship with his daughter.

In this article we explore how assumptions about human nature may influence the ways one might try to promote ethical behavior in organizations. We summarize two common views of human nature in organizational research—Homo economicus and Homo heuristicus. We then extend these views by putting forward a third view of human nature initially proposed by Emile Durkheim—Homo duplex—which describes human beings as moving back and forth between a lower (individual) and higher (collective) level. We suggest that the Homo duplex view is uniquely equipped to account for variables of interest to organizational scholars because of its attention to a fundamental tension: People in organizations can be both selfish and groupish, and the balance between those tendencies influences the ethical profile of the organization in complex ways. We end with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the Homo duplex view for behavioral ethics researchers.

This article applies the concept of prudence to develop the characteristics of responsible risk-modeling practices in the insurance industry. A critical evaluation of the risk-modeling process suggests that ethical judgments are emergent rather than static, vague rather than clear, particular rather than universal, and still defensible according to the discipline’s established theory, which will support a range of judgments. Thus, positive moral guides for responsible behavior are of limited practical value. Instead, by being prudent, modelers can improve their ability to deal with the ethical and technical complexity of the risk-modeling process. While the application of prudence to resolve ethical challenges in risk modeling, an issue of practical importance to managers, is a first in the literature, the practice of applying an ethical lens to issues of pragmatic importance for managers is well established in Maak and Pless (J Bus Ethics 66:99–115, 2006a; Responsible leadership, 2006b) among others.

This investigation uses a simulated business-to-business sales context to examine five individual moral philosophies (true altruists, true egoists, realistic altruists, tit-for-tats, and realistic egoists). The simulation is based on the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma and its associated payoffs, employing computer-generated sales agents that represent different companies and industries. The agents were selected randomly across 1,000 rounds, and interacted with exchange partners according to the moral philosophies noted. In some cases, various corporate cultures were added to determine their impact on the evolution and final mix of philosophical orientations of agents within firms. Simulation results indicate the importance of ethical behavior on the long-term financial success of companies as well as the larger industries in which they participate.

Differences in ethical behavior between members of the upper and lower classes have been at the center of civic debates in recent years. In this article, we present a framework for understanding how class affects ethical standards and behaviors. We apply the framework using data from a large Dutch population sample. The data include objective measures of class, survey responses relating to ethical behavior, and results from an experiment designed to probe ethical choices. Ethical behavior proves to be affected by (a) moral values, (b) social orientation, and (c) the costs and benefits of taking various actions. Strong class differences emerge in each of these areas, leading to differences in behavior. Moreover, strong differences among different conceptions of class (wealth, education, etc.) produce additional variation. We argue that the relationship between class and ethical behavior is far from a simple pattern; it is a complex mosaic.

Dear Sir, A man's ethical behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death.[1] Albert Einstein Morality and ethics are exceedingly important aspects of neurosurgery and are the subject of a recent editorial in Surgical Neurology International.[2] Patients and doctors should work together to ensure an ethical approach to the clinical neurosciences in general and to neurosurgery in particular. The editorial in question repeatedly suggests that morals are derived from religious principles. This is a common misconception. Indeed, amoral and unethical behavior is often supported by religion; historical and contemporary examples are support for slavery and oppression of women and homosexuals. Moreover, numerous secular, nonreligious individuals and organizations (such as Doctors Without Borders) display highly moral and ethical behavior without belief in a god/gods or religion. Personal religious bias has no role in scientific discourse, including the neurosurgical literature.

The purpose of this symposium is to examine how issues related to individual values, morality, and ethics influence the way in which people build relationships with leaders and co-workers, and ulti...

Recent research has shown that ethical behavior can be influenced by features of the immediate environment such as the presence of a cheater or the characteristics of a room. We suggest ethical beh...

Ethical behavior — the conscious attempt to act in accordance with an individually-owned morality — is the product of an advanced stage of the maturing process. Three models of ethical growth derived from research in human development are applied to issues of business ethics.

ETHICS has, of late, become almost a buzzword, bandied around by key-note speakers, media pundits and practical politicians. We have been inundated with a born-again awareness of morality and ethical behavior in every walk of life, as an aftermath of adverse impact of numerous GATEs and SCAMs involving cover-ups and crimes committed by persons held at high pedestal of trust and responsibility in business, government and other spheres of activity.

If individuals exhibit less ethical behavior in the workplace than in their personal decisions, this may constitute evidence of role morality behavior. Role morality can be defined as “claim(ing) a moral permission to harm others in ways that, if not for the role, would be wrong” (Applbaum, 1999. Ethics for adversaries: The morality of roles in public and professional life (p. 3). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.) To investigate this issue, 55 practicing accountants completed and returned the experimental survey. Results show that in many situations, business decisions were less ethical than personal decisions, consistent with the theory of role morality. The implications and limitations of this study as they relate to practicing accountants are discussed.

Even though an underlying commitment to morality is clearly stated in most professional real estate organization codes of ethics and most standards of practice provide detailed guidelines and rationale for proper professional conduct, these provisions are often ignored, and the common perception of unethical behavior in real estate persists. This essay examines ethics and ethical conduct in the real estate profession, going beyond rule ethics and end-point ethics into the uncharted waters of habitual behavior and integrity. The goal is to stimulate dialogue among real estate professionals about the value of striving for creation of professional real estate organizations that are self-selected by discriminating members. These sort of organizations are seen as a means to establish a common perception of ethical behavior in real estate.

How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a payoff that they would otherwise not receive (Studies 1-3) or they could overbill for their work (Study 4). We manipulated the number of cheating opportunities they expected but held the actual number of opportunities constant. The data showed that the likelihood of cheating and the extent of dishonesty were both greater when people believed that they were facing a last choice. Mediation analyses suggested that anticipatory regret about passing up a chance to enrich oneself drove this cheat-at-the-end effect. We found no support for alternative explanations based on the possibility that multiple cheating opportunities depleted people's self-control, eroded their moral standards, or made them feel that they had earned the right to cheat. The data also suggested that the cheat-at-the-end effect may be limited to relatively short series of cheating opportunities (i.e., n < 20). Our discussion addresses the psychological and behavioral dynamics of repeated ethical choices.

One hundred ninety-four females participated in a study of the ability of Mosher's (1968) Morality-Conscience (MC) Guilt Scale to predict ethical behavior in a situation that provided some opportunity for cheating. The results provide initial evidence for the existence of two subscales of the MC guilt scale: a Self-Punishment scale and a Moralistic scale. The two proposed subscales correlate differentially with the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) and differentially predict cheating under conditions of low risk of detection.

First , I'd like to outline some ideas about some criteria for making ethical judgments and when those ethical judgments might be made. In particular, I'm going to focus on two areas: setting up the evaluation question or negotiating the evaluation contract, and instrumentation. The first thing I did when I started thinking about this topic was to look up ethics in the dictionary. I came up with two definitions which I think will help illustrate my point. One definition of ethical behavior is conforming to the standards of conduct for a given profession. I think for most of us that's what we think about when we think about ethical behavior as evaluators-conforming to the standards of our profession. The other definition is conforming to moral standards; having to do with ethics or morality. This presentation deals with more than just conforming to the standards of our profession. I would like to emphasize that to be an ethical evaluator, it's first very important that you conform to the standards of our profession. If you don't do that, clearly you aren't being ethical. But beyond that, evaluation is a peopletype business. We deal with people on a regular basis, and as people dealing with people, there are additional ethical issues that we need to consider.' Obviously we follow the Joint Committee Standards. We look at the ERS Standards. We look at the ethical standards for conduct of research with human participants, the APA standards. We look at standards for conducting anthropological studies put out by the American Anthropological Association. Federally mandated institutional review boards that look at the rights of human subjects are in place for all of us. Those are the kinds of standards we must follow, but is there something else? Are there other considerations that we need to look at?