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In this paper, we investigate if an increasing competition in an oligopolistic market will enhance the real incomes and consumer surplus in the long run. For this purpose, we apply a two-sector overlapping generation model in which members of the young generation own the oligopolistic firms. We show that increasing competition in the oligopolistic market leads to ambiguous outcomes regarding the real income and consumer surplus in the long run. However, we show that the distribution of income will become fairer if the competition increases, but it is possible that the price for a fairer distribution is a lower income for all members of the economy.

Este escrito busca extender la teoría del monopolio en un contexto dinámico y vincular los hallazgos con el bienestar de los consumidores, eficiencia económica y poder de mercado. Para ello se presenta una medida de bienestar de los consumidores en términos intertemporales, así como la forma en que se relaciona dicha medida con la eficiencia y el poder de mercado. Finalmente, se presentan las decisiones del monopolio y se evalúa su efecto en términos de bienestar y competencia. Abstract: This paper seeks to extend the theory of monopoly in a dynamic context and link the findings with the welfare of consumers, economic efficiency and market power. To this end, a measure of consumer welfare is presented in intertemporal terms, as well as the way in which this measure is related to efficiency and market power. Finally, the decisions of the monopoly and its effect is evaluated in terms of welfare and competition are presented. Maestría

This article presents a systematic analysis of the net economic benefits associated with the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. We offer a derivation of producer and consumer surplus to estimate economic benefits. Fundamental to the implementation of these models is a specific value of the elasticity of demand, but in its absence we estimate what its value would be when the benefit-to-cost ratio associated with public support of the SBIR program equals unity. We infer from these calculations, and from general knowledge about the ability of SBIR-funded firms to exploit their monopoly position, that the SBIR program likely generates positive net economic benefits to society. Copyright The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Expanding access to preschool education is a particularly important policy issue in developing countries, where enrollment rates are generally much lower, and where private institutions constitute a much larger share of the formal preschool sector, than in developed countries. This paper examines if an expansion in the supply of public preschool crowds-out private enrollment using rich data for municipalities in Brazil from 2000 to 2006, where federal transfers to local governments change discontinuously with given population thresholds. Results from a regression-discontinuity design reveal that larger federal transfers lead to a significant expansion of local public preschool services, but show no evidence of crowding-out of private enrollment, nor of negative impacts on the quality of private providers. This finding is consistent with a theory in which households differ in willingness-to-pay for preschool services, and private suppliers optimally adjust prices in response to an expansion of lower-quality, free-of-charge public supply. In the context of the model, the absence of crowding-out effects of more public preschool providers can be rationalized by the existence of relatively large differences in willingness-to-pay for preschool services across different demand segments. Our theoretical and empirical findings therefore suggest that in developing country settings characterized by relatively high income inequality, an expansion in public preschool supply will likely significantly increase enrollment among the poorest segments of society, and need not have adverse effects on the quantity or quality of local private supply., We thank three anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. Odd Rune Straume acknowledges the financial support provided by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Operational Program Factors of Competitiveness (COMPETE); and by national funds received through the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) under the research grant PEst-C/EGE/UI3182/2013. Research for this paper has been supported in part by the World Bank's Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development and through the Strategic Research Program on Economic Development. The views expressed herein are those of the authors only, and not those of the World Bank Group. Final revision accepted: October 2, 2015.

This paper contributes to the limited literature on the welfare impacts of market concentration by developing a simple model that shows how exogenous variations in market power affect poverty. Increased market power leads to economy-wide welfare losses, because it raises the prices of goods and services for all agents in an economy and thus reduces the relative incomes of households, particularly among the poor. Declines in poverty in this context are only possible in the case wherein the poor have access to a share of oligopolistic rents. Although this scenario seems highly unlikely, this result has important implications for public policy, particularly for economies with less-than-perfect markets and social objectives of poverty eradication. This result suggest the possibility of taxing extranormal rents extracted by firms with market power and redistributing them through targeted lump-sum social transfers, thereby contributing to poverty reduction by mitigating welfare losses from the negative price effect.

A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.

Botswana has been one of the most successful countries in the developing world over the last 40 years by many measures. Incomes have grown at a sustained pace, poverty has fallen, and the citizenry has become more educated. To be sure, poverty and income inequalities remain a problem, but rising standards of living have meant a better life for this generation of Batswana than any before it. The question facing the country leadership is whether this commendable performance can be sustained into the next generation. There are clouds on the horizon that cannot be ignored. Diamond earnings, the life blood of decades of prosperity, have flattened out. In per capita terms they are falling. Moreover, because revenues from diamonds going to the public sector have been falling for more than a decade, a growth model predicated upon an ever expanding state presence is not viable. Diamond earnings accruing to the state for subsequent redistribution have peaked. Employment and wages in the public sector have reached their natural limits as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); recycling revenues from mining into the private sector, either directly or through the financial sector, has been inefficient with low social returns; and redistributive mechanisms to support social safety nets are also likely be approaching their limits. The country confronts the challenge of looking for new sources of growth outside of government.

This paper outlines the methodological issues associated with the task of measuring that actual delivered direct protection or taxation to individual agricultural industries, as well as the direct protection or anti-protection to non-agricultural sectors. It begins with a guide to what elements in principle could be measured. There are two key purposes of the distortion estimates being generated by this project are: 1) to provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly and indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and high-income countries, and hence for the world as a whole; and 2) to attribute the price distortion estimates for each farm product to specific border or domestic policy measures, so they can serve as inputs into various types of partial and general equilibrium economic models for estimating the effects of those various policies on such things as national and international agricultural markets, farm value added, income inequality, poverty, and national, regional and global welfare.

If we take into account the spatial dimension of markets, prices of incumbent firms may be higher, and consumer surplus may be lower with competition. This result obtains unambiguously, even in the highly competitive case of Bertrand competition. In Mikro- und Industrieökonomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dass Wettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen führt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, während die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so ist. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizität am größten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht berücksichtigt werden.

Thesis (M.Com. (Tourism))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006. The primary goal of this study was to determine the impact of price discrimination on tourism demand. Four objectives were defined with reference to the primary research goal. The first objective was to analyse the concept of price discrimination and relevant theories by means of a literature study. In this regard it was found that price discrimination between markets is fairly common and that it occurs if the same goods were sold to different customers at different prices. Price discrimination is also possible as soon as some monopoly power exists and it is feasible when it is impossible or at least impractical for the buyers to trade among themselves. Three different kinds of price discrimination can be applied, namely first-degree, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. The data also indicated that price discrimination is advantageous (it mainly increases profit) and that it has several other effects too. The second objective was to analyse examples of price discrimination by means of international case studies. In these different case studies it was found that demand and supply, therefore consumer and product, formed the basis of price discrimination. If demand did not exist, it would be impossible to apply price discrimination. The findings also indicated that, for an organisation to be able to practice price discrimination, the markets must be separated effectively and it will only be successful if there is a significant difference in demand elasticity between the different consumers. Furthermore, the ability to charge these different prices will depend on the consumer's ability and willingness to pay. If an organisation should decide to price discriminate, it would lead to a higher profit, a more optimal pricing policy and also to an increase in sales. The third objective was to analyse national case studies. This was done through comparing the data of a tourism organisation price discriminating (Mosetlha Bush Camp, situated in the North West) to two organisations that did not implement price discrimination (Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in the Northern Cape and Golden Leopard Resort, also situated in the North West). It was found that a customer with low price elasticity is less deterred by a higher price than a customer with a high price elasticity of demand. As long as the customer's price elasticity is less than one, it will be very advantageous to increase the price: the seller will in this case get more money for less goods. With the increase in price the price elasticity tends to rise above one. The fourth objective was to draw conclusions and make recommendations. It was concluded that price discrimination could be applied successfully in virtually any organisation or industry. Furthermore, price discrimination does not always have a negative effect; but can have a positive ass well. It can have a positive effect on tourism demand. The findings emphasised that the main reason for implementing price discrimination is to increase profit at the cost of reducing consumer surplus. From the results it was recommended that more research on this topic should be conducted. Masters

Should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors? Or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders? A theoretical model is used to answer these normative questions. The analysis focuses on the tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatization of noncompetitive sectors. Privatization transfers control rights to private interests and eliminates public subsidies, yielding benefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers. In developing countries, where budget constraints are tight, privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries but suboptimal for more profitable industries. And once a market has room for more than one firm, governments may prefer to regulate the industry. Without a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership. Copyright The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / the world bank . All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.