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The proposed version of macroeconomic theory of capital reproduction is related to thethesis that the dynamics of the economy are caused by the change in generations of capital and there is a problem of coordination between these generations. This paper discusses the so-called “switchover mode of reproduction”. As shown by the mathematical model, a coordinated growth is possible when the social and economic interests are agreed between the labor and the capital, as well as under a monetary policy that stimulates such growth. An uncoordinated growth poses a threat of economic crisis. This paper was prepared with the financial support from the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 14-18-02948).

This paper revisits the ability of central banks to manage private sector's expectations depending on its credibility and how this affects the use of interest rate rules and pegs to achieve monetary policy objectives. When private agents can only provide limited incentives for the central bank to follow a policy, we show that resulting limited credibility allows a central bank to prevents the inflation from diverging by defaulting on past promises if necessary. As a result, the Taylor rule, when expected, anchors inflation expectations on a unique equilibrium path as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied. Finally, we also show that limited credibility restricts the impact of long-term interest rate pegs, so as to make current conditions less dependent on future policy changes.