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In this thesis I examine the Riksbank’s monetary policy for five periods from 1995-2023 to see if the Riksbank follows the Taylor rule. I do so by conducting a diagram of the actual policy rate and the suggested policy rate from the Taylor rule. I also conduct reaction functions using the inflation gap and the output gap and the dynamic Taylor rule’s reaction function. The results gives that the reaction function based on Taylors original rule gave positive and overall statistically significant outcomes for the first periods, while the last two periods had negative and statistically insignificant outcome. The dynamic Taylor rule gave no significant results and evidence for interest smoothing cannot really be concluded. The graphical interpretation shows a similar result as the reaction function. The conclusion is that the Riksbank can be said to have followed the Taylor rule for the first two periods (1995-2005 and 2005-2010), but not for the last three periods (2010-2015, 2015-2020 and 2020-2023).

This paper examines the Swedish experience of forward guidance 2007-2018. We focus on three interrelated issues: first, the effects of forward guidance on the discussion within the Board of Directors of the Riksbank, second, on the communication between the Riksbank and the public, and third, on the interest rate expectations held by various groups in Swedish society. We conclude that forward guidance has had negative effects on the dialogue within the Board as well on the communication between the Riksbank and the public. In addition, forward guidance has failed to affect expectations about interest rates in a systematic and significant way. We trace the roots of these consequences to the inability of the Riksbank to forecast its future policy rate three years ahead with any reasonable accuracy. The Riksbank has learned from this dismal performance and partially abandoned forward guidance, returning to a focus on the rate of inflation – as it did prior to the introduction of forward guidance.

In a historical perspective, the stabilization policy regime in Sweden is in a state of constant change, affected by economic crises, international impulses, domestic politics, and developments in macroeconomic theory. Economists have been deeply involved in this process. The current framework for monetary and fiscal policy, with an independent central bank focusing on inflation targeting, and a rule-based fiscal policy, is not the final stage of this process. Future crises will once again change the goals, the instruments, and the institutional framework. In a historical perspective, the rapid expansion of the financial system, with the accompanying accumulation of private debt and high rates of asset inflation, stands out as a likely cause behind the next crisis. The next crisis will be followed by yet another step in the perennial pursuit of a better stabilization policy.

Should an inflation-targeting central bank have an explicit tolerance band around its inflation target? This paper provides an answer derived from the Swedish experience. The Riksbank is exceptional in the sense that it first adopted and later abolished an explicit band and is currently considering bringing it back. We conclude that the band should be explicit for several reasons. Most important, an inflation-targeting central bank should be open and transparent to the public regarding its actual ability to control inflation. We discuss how a numerical measure of the proper width of the band can be constructed to foster communication and credibility.